Information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa. by Yahaya, Lateef Folarin
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Lateef Folarin Yahaya
Department of Information Systems 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Doctor of 
Philosophy to the University of London
2000
UMI Number: U615193
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615193
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
" T |- |£ £ £  £
F
7 796
POLITICAL
1
Acknowledgements
To misquote Thomas Hobbes, the PhD process can be ‘nasty, brutish and long’. So it is 
beholden unto me to thank those who eased the burden and helped me manage the 
troughs of academic solitude. First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt 
thanks and appreciation to my supervisor Jonathan Liebenau. Without his constant 
guidance, availability and friendship this research would have taken twice as long and 
been twice as painful. In the same vein, I wish to extend my thanks to my fellow 
doctoral students at the London School of Economics, for their advice and 
companionship.
At the same time this research would not have been possible without the help of many 
outside the world of academia. In particular, I wish to thank Richard Kerby and Vijay 
Parmar at the United Nations Development Programme for allowing me to participate 
in the Internet Initiative for Africa project, and giving me unprecedented access to the 
information I required. I also wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to Ernest Wilson El at 
the University of Maryland, Nyaki Adera at the United Nations University in 
Maastricht and Nancy Hafkin at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
for their encouragement and advice.
On a personal note, I wish to thank my friends and family, who through their moral and 
spiritual support always encouraged me to see the bigger picture and fulfil my 
intellectual curiosity.
Abstract
Since the post-war period researchers have been pointing to a shift towards a new 
techno-economic paradigm. Whilst the macroeconomic impact of this powerful wave of 
technology has yet to be determined, it is sensed intuitively as being more important 
than generally suspected and to have major multiplier effects on national development. 
The convergence of information technology and modem communications has raised 
renewed hopes for enhancing national development in developing countries. At the 
same time, there are legitimate fears of increased marginalisation for those countries 
that fail to keep pace in the technological race.
Grappling with the complexity involved in constructing an infrastructure that can 
improve their ability to achieve development objectives, and may lay the foundations 
for their future competitive advantage, few Sub-Saharan African countries have 
constructed a coordinated policy response to the complexities involved in creating an 
effective information infrastructure. Economically and politically fragile, and with only 
the promise of technological potentialities, the vast majority of African policy-makers 
are adopting a cautious approach. In the face of such a policy vacuum external actors 
such as multilateral development agencies, have taken it upon themselves to design, 
implement and fund initiatives with the idea of information infrastructure at their core. 
Such initiatives, whilst bringing much needed infrastructure to the region, are often 
short-termist in outlook and do not necessarily dovetail with local development 
objectives. If less developed countries and regions are to implement telecommunication 
networks and information services that will serve their interests, they must prioritise 
objectives that rest firmly in their particular economic, political, cultural and social 
context.
Within a broad, multi-dimensional research schema, the research examines the main 
actors in the field of information infrastructure development in Africa. These are 
identified as development agencies, indigenous government and the foreign private 
sector. By articulating the respective roles of these actors and their spheres of influence, 
the research provides a coherent understanding of information infrastructure
development activities within Sub-Saharan Africa. The research outlines a policy 
framework, which at both the conceptual and practical levels, argues that government 
plays the critical role in articulating national strategies for the coordination of disparate 
actors and scarce resources. The main contribution of the research is a practical policy 
framework that pinpoints priority areas for information infrastructure development 
within the Sub-Saharan Africa region.
.The African must realise that he must fight unceasingly fo r  his own emancipation; for  
without this he is doomed to remain the prey o f rival imperialisms,
Jomo Kenyatta, 1967
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction
The increasingly ubiquitous nature of information and communications technologies 
has two concurrent and complementary impacts on developing countries. First, they 
open up opportunities to accelerate social and economic development. Second, they 
create a pressing policy and investment agenda both to capitalise on the new 
opportunities and to avoid the deterioration of international competitiveness. The 
pressing reform and investment agenda dictated by the rise in the importance of 
information and communication technologies, aims to move countries into a different 
kind of economy where information is a key factor of production, and firms compete 
globally on the basis of knowledge, networking and adaptability. This research asserts 
that the creation of an information infrastructure represents a key investment for Sub- 
Saharan African countries. At the same time, it acknowledges the complexity involved 
in creating this novel infrastructural construct. This chapter begins with a delineation of 
the key terms of the research, provides an introduction to the literature on information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) and their impact on society, and a more 
specific critique of the literature on ICTs and developing countries. Finally, the 
research methodology and contributions of the research are presented.
1.2 Research objectives
Specifically, the research seeks to fulfil the following objectives:
• To evaluate the state of national information infrastructures in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Wilson (1996b) et al. have set out to dispel the myth that the developing world is 
hopelessly behind in terms of information and communication services. Meaningful -  
albeit still unevenly distributed -  information infrastructure development is under way 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. But whilst development agencies, the foreign private sector and 
African entrepreneurs are energetically pursuing opportunities in the continent's 
emerging information infrastructure markets, they are impeded by what Wilson labels a
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"Berlin Wall" of regulation and monopoly (Wilson, 1996b, p. 4). This dissertation will 
investigate the state of information infrastructure in the region by looking at two of the 
most important elements: telecommunications and information technology
development.
• To evaluate the construction of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in terms of the respective roles of multilateral development agencies 
and the foreign private sector
The research concentrates on two of the most significant external actors in the 
construction of information infrastructure in the Sub-Saharan Africa region: 
multilateral development agencies and the foreign private sector. The research asserts 
that what ultimately is determinant is not communication or other technologies per se, 
but rather the social and economic forces in command of the conceptualisation, design, 
development and application of those technologies.
• To construct a framework for designing information infrastructure policies
Given the lack of homogeneity in the developing world there is no single "one size fits 
all" solution. Each government has its own immediate focus and priorities in 
developing appropriate information infrastructure policies. While acknowledging that 
individual nations are at differing stages in this process, the research contends that there 
are general principles and guidelines that should be followed by policy-makers in order 
to achieve the best policy mix. The research presents the case for an integrated public 
policy approach to the implications arising from the wider use of information and 
communication technologies. The overarching theme and guiding concept of 
information infrastructure is provided, alongside an analysis of these technologies in 
supporting development.
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1.3 Justification of the research
Given its multidisciplinary nature it is only recently that anything resembling a body of 
work on the subject of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has begun 
to form. Attempts to create a cogent body of work have been hampered by two main 
factors. Firstly, the sheer rate of growth of technology has militated against a 
consolidation of accumulated data. Secondly, the issues surrounding ICTs straddle the 
whole social science spectrum. Despite these obstacles researchers are attempting to 
find appropriate responses to the myriad questions posed. The literature that is available 
has tended to emanate from the United States and Europe and hence neglects issues that 
may be more relevant to developing countries.
These works represent the first efforts to analyse these initiatives with the distance that 
time brings, and are a welcome addition to the debate. Yet, few authors have attempted 
to judge the merits of one approach over another and there has been very little 
substantive work on developing countries, let alone Sub-Saharan Africa. Odedra 
(1990a) concludes that there is little in the way of established theoretical or empirical 
material to provide guidelines for research on information infrastructure and developing 
countries. The academic research that has been conducted has focused on issues of 
technology transfer and diffusion, information systems capabilities and information 
technology policy (Bhatnagar and Anderson, 1990; Odedra, 1990a; Kluzer, 1993; 
Grant, 1996 and Harindranath, 1997). At the same time, as of 1998, there had yet to be 
a single, clearly defined explicit policy statement on national information infrastructure 
by any Sub-Saharan African country, except South Africa. Given the growing 
importance of information infrastructure, this research attempts to provide much 
needed research in this field.
It is essential to begin with a definition of the units of analysis in order to delineate the 
field of enquiry. The research is primarily concerned with information infrastructure in 
Sub-Saharan African countries. The research uses the term information infrastructure 
both to indicate a new range of goods and services and a foundational technology 
which is having, and will have, an increasingly profound effect on the processes of 
production and delivery of all other industries and services. The scope for such an 
infrastructure itself is new, emerging only within the last two decades as a result of the
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convergence of a number of inter-related advances in the areas of micro-electronics, 
fibre optics, software engineering, communications, laser and information technology 
(Freeman, 1995).
The term "infrastructure", though normally seen in the physical sense as a public good 
with considerable economies of scale, is equally amenable to the concept of strategic 
information and communication technologies. Talero (1996) points out that certain 
information systems in an economy, such as an air transport control system, should be 
properly viewed as part of an infrastructure: fostering economic activity, enjoying 
economies of scale and benefiting non-users. But whereas physical infrastructure is 
easily identifiable, the constituent parts of an information infrastructure are more 
difficult to pinpoint. Intuitively these strategic information systems are those that are 
seen to facilitate a raft of concerns, ranging from supporting and generating private 
profits, to public service delivery (Drake, 1995).
In the light of these two aspects, any viable definition must take into account both the 
national and infrastructural considerations. Thus, information infrastructure is, for the 
purposes of this research, defined as the telecommunication networks and strategic 
information systems that can be utilised for national development. As Talero (1996) 
points out, this definition accommodates the developmental concerns of developing 
countries and denotes something both existent and novel that underpins current and 
emerging forms of economic activity.
As befits the growing importance of information infrastructure, myriad definitions 
abound as to what this generic term can encompass. Hamelink (1997), for example, 
sees information infrastructure from a technological standpoint as composed of 
information and communication technologies that can be classified according to five 
functions:
• Capture: such as remote-sensing satellites, radar systems, video storage systems 
and optical character recognition devices.
•  Transport: such as coaxial cable, fibre optic cable, microwave links, 
communication satellites, cellular mobile radio, facsimile machines, telex and 
modems.
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• Storage: such as memory chips, magnetic film, tape, laser emulsion and microfilm.
• Process: such as integrated circuits, computer software and peripheral equipment.
• Retrieval: such as on-line databases, television, radio.
Heeks defines information and communication technologies as the ’electronic means of 
capturing, processing, storing, and communicating information’(Heeks, 1999, p. 3). He 
goes further to argue that there are other technologies within an information system, 
including:
• Intermediate technologies, such as radio, television and traditional 
telecommunications;
• Literate technologies, represented by written formats such as books and 
newspapers; and
• Organic technologies, based solely on the human body such as the brain and sound 
waves.
This research takes a different approach and argues for a definition that assesses its 
potentiality for society rather than technological specifications. With this in mind 
information infrastructure and the technologies that comprise it are seen as having an 
impact in four main ways. Firstly, as an end product in itself, information and 
communication technologies such as computer hardware and software represent a 
source of income for those who produce, maintain and sell them; a potentially 
important contributor to gross national product. Secondly, information and 
communication technologies can be seen as a production technology. As a means of 
production they have revolutionised the manufacture of products such as cars, and are 
now widely diffused throughout almost every sector in industrialised countries; 
allowing more efficient and productive use of resources. Thirdly, as a conduit for 
information, technologies such as the telephone and electronic mail represent a vital 
element in the transfer of information. Finally, information technology can provide a 
means of processing information. The utilisation of software such as decision support 
systems and computer-aided design can facilitate the transformation of information into 
knowledge.
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The context in which the research is located is Sub-Saharan Africa. We use the term 
Sub-Saharan Africa to denote a region that has a population of approximately 600 
million and spans three main linguistic zones -  Anglophone, Francophone and 
Lusophone.1 It is comprised of forty-eight independent states that, on the whole, 
emerged from a long period of colonial administration only in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
Of the world's thirty-four least developed countries, twenty-six are to be found in this 
region. This region is thus unique in its high concentration of poor countries, with 
disparities in culture and language but with similarly parlous states of capabilities in 
information and communication technologies, and macroeconomic weakness. 
Throughout the dissertation the term Africa is employed. This is not to denote all the 
countries on the African continent but rather refers to those countries within the Sub- 
Saharan Africa region.
1.4 Review of the literature
The rapid expansion of the Internet and the profound transformations of the media and 
telecommunications markets have raised the visibility of information and 
communication technologies to such an extent that they and their impact on society 
remain one of the key polemic issues at the end of the 1990s. The literature surrounding 
these issues has developed organically over time with distinct stages of development. 
Borrowing a term from economics there would appear to be a definite conceptual 
product life cycle. The first phase in this cycle has been the identification of a 
phenomenon that is both technical and speculative in orientation. Actors whose brief it 
is to explain the features and implications of a new trend or shift dominate this phase. 
The area of concern is defined in broad brush strokes, given the uncertainty over the 
longevity of the phenomenon. A typical example of the work at this stage of 
development is Arthur C. Clarke's paper, ''Extra-Terrestrial Relays; Can Rocket 
Stations Give Worldwide Coverage?" (Clarke, 1945).
1 However the level of ethnic diversity in the region is staggering. In Nigeria alone, for example, there are over 
250 identified ethnicities (Garba, 1995).
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Clarke postulates the possibility of space stations giving worldwide communication 
coverage by the end of the century. Allied with these early speculative essays were 
arguments that we are witnessing a shift towards a post-industrial techno-economic 
paradigm began to gather force in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. 
Vannevar Bush (1945) was perhaps the first in a stream of authors heralding the advent 
of what Marshall McLuhan (1964) was to call the "global village". These exploratory 
articles were followed in quick succession by, amongst others, Hayek’s (1945), "The 
Use of Knowledge in Society" and Tadeo Umesao’s (1984) concept of johoka shakai or 
informationalised society. These were amongst the first to point to revolutionary 
changes in the uses of information and its potential socio-economic impact.
In the wake of these earlier speculative essays, there has been a rush, in both the 
popular and academic media, to place these rapid changes in a societal context2; the 
goal being to relate the increasing sophistication of technology and planning to the 
emergence of a new society. Daniel Bell’s (1973) concept of the post-industrial society 
for example, suggests that, unlike Rostow’s (1953) stages of growth thesis in which 
economic growth is the axial principle, in a post-industrial society the key principle is 
the acquisition and codification of theoretical knowledge. Thus, power resides in the 
possession and with the possessors of that knowledge (Bell, 1973, pp. 18 -  20). Despite 
the differing labels, there is a consensus that, of all the changes taking place in our 
time, none have more profound ramifications than the new ways in which we 
communicate with one another. There are no historical precedents to guide us through 
this momentous change and it is difficult to predict what it may bring about.
Whether or not one is inclined to wholeheartedly commit oneself to such proselytising, 
the past two decades have seen a profound shift towards a era in which information 
technology and telecommunications are assuming greater and greater importance. 
Whilst critics of this view have suggested that such changes are illusory, research by 
Machlup (1962) and Porat (1977) is often cited as empirical corroboration of the 
phenomenon. By disaggregating US employment data, Porat's research argued that 
agriculture and manufacturing were on the decline and that the "information economy"
2 For example DahrendorFs (1975) "post-capitalist" theory and Amitai Etzioni’s (1973) "post-modern" theory, 
are examples of the attempts by writers to capture the Zeitgeist (Dizard, 1982).
20
had arrived. Focusing on the activities that workers performed rather than on their 
explicit job titles, he was able to argue that, by 1980, ’more people in the United States 
were engaged in information work than any other kind of work. Indeed about 48 per 
cent of the US population was engaged in one form or another of information work’ 
(Porat, 1977, p. 57). Though both Machlup and Porat’s studies have been described as 
crude and prone to unsupported generalisation (Dizard, 1982), the literature points to a 
permanent shift in the structure of the global economy, and it is one whose 
ramifications are difficult to predict. Given this seemingly irrevocable trend the locus 
of debate has shifted to more fundamental and less technical concerns.
The focus of these concerns is more on the implications of these profound changes as 
their effects become more evident and earlier predictions seem to be more than 
ephemeral. Seeing the problem from a different angle, theorists and the media have 
seized on the idea of technology as a potential panacea for, and the cause of a raft of 
present and future societal problems. They have in their sights an altogether larger beast 
and their writings are characterised by the utopian, hyperbolic and apocalyptic, as more 
attention is given to institutional, political and distributional issues. Analysts recognise 
that technological change, as Ellul (1964) has pointed out, is far from neutral, creating 
winners and losers. The spectre that haunts this utopian vision is the fear that these 
changes will support existing power structures, weakening further the technologically 
dispossessed (Castells, 1997b).
There are two perspectives underlying much of the recent debate in this phase. On one 
axis we have an impact perspective, concerned with the speed and the extent of change 
and its impact on society. At one extreme the negative position suggests that 
"continuism" is likely with a "more of the same" view which argues for the limited role 
of ICT-related change. Schiller (1984) argues, for example, that the primary beneficiary 
of these changes will be corporate capitalism, with no change in the underlying 
superstructures of society. Commentators predict increased polarisation with negative 
connotations and the term "info haves and have-nots" is placed on the international 
agenda. Concerns grow that if citizens are not able to have access to the new telematics 
infrastructures and services, existing patterns of inequality will simply be reinforced; 
leading to an information aristocracy rather than a digital democracy (Burstein and 
Kline, 1995). In this perspective there is a more reasoned realisation that any benefits
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are unlikely to accrue equitably. Theorists such as Manuel Castells (1997b) point to the 
negative consequences that lie in wait for countries that fail to upgrade their 
information infrastructures.
At the other extreme, optimists such as Toffler (1970) and Gilder (1997) point to the 
benefits that these radical changes will bring. In this perspective the emerging global 
information society is characterised by positive features: there will be more effective 
health care, better education, more information and diversity of culture. New digital 
technologies are seen to create more choice for people in education, shopping, 
entertainment, news media and travel. This positive and transformist perspective 
stresses that the information society is fundamentally new and that it has an all- 
pervasive revolutionary quality. Gilder (1997), for example, asserts that new 
information technologies will undermine the monopolies, hierarchies, pyramids, and 
power grids of established information society. In a similar vein Carter (1995) looks at 
the strategic importance of exploiting the opportunities offered by ICTs to support 
economic regeneration. Within this perspective ICTs are envisioned as being the 
conduit for a variety of services that will empower citizens.
On the other axis we have an agency perspective which reflects debates between the 
extremes of technological and social determinists. Technological determinists see the 
information society as being driven by technological advances3, asserting that 
technological change drives economic growth, leads to profound structural adjustments, 
and institutional changes. Allied to this is a belief in the transformative capacity of 
technology. Writers such as Freeman (1995), among others, assert that it is 
technological breakthroughs that drive a cyclical process of creative destruction, with 
new technologies inducing novel, more productive investments, but at the same time 
destroying the economic feasibility of earlier ones. This leads to a fundamental change 
from the prevailing economic model of an industrial paradigm to a new techno- 
economic paradigm (TEP) based on a cluster of innovations in information and 
communication technologies (Perez, 1983; Soete, 1985; Freeman, 1994a).
3 See, among others, Hiltz and Turoff (1978); Toffler (1980); Beniger (1986) and Zuboff (1988).
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The gravest problem with the technological determinist perspective is that it ignores the 
role of human agency. Determinists believe that technological choices and the changes 
arising as a result of them, originate in a socio-economic vacuum. However, they fail to 
see the specific interests that generate them. Guided by this perspective, policy-makers 
find it very difficult to accept that technological innovations do not, in and of 
themselves, create the institutional arrangements within which they function^ They fail 
to see that whether the potential of technologies will be realised in positive rather than 
negative ways, depends much more on their institutional organisation than on the 
features of their technical performance (Callon, 1987).
If the technological environment is accepted as given, then options for decision-makers 
are limited to reactive policies and programmes, ’designed to cope with, or adapt to, the 
consequences of technical change, rather than anticipating (and so influencing) these 
consequences’ (Edge, 1995, p.26). Unless they understand what problems the major 
stakeholders want to see resolved, and what technical systems they select, policy­
makers cannot anticipate the consequences of these systems and thus make a concerted 
attempt to influence their use in socially beneficial ways. At the other extreme of the 
agency dimension are those who argue for the critical importance of social 
determinism. According to this perspective every stage in the design and 
implementation of a technology involves conscious choices which are determined by 
human agency. These choices shape the direction or usage of technological outcomes 
with differing implications for a society as a whole and particular groups within it 
(Williams, 1982).
Figure 1 overleaf, shows the breadth of the debate between technological and social 
determinists. In this impact-causality matrix, each continuum has a midpoint of, 
respectively, neutrality about impacts and contingency about the causes of those 
impacts. Characteristic of speculative debate, differences between positions are not 
likely to be easily resolved as they remain captives of their value system (Miles, 1989). 
Yet, there appears to be a consensual point of access to all the different perspectives: 
that these technologies are not neutral and will have an impact, be it positive or 
negative. This conceptual schema is useful in that it provides a framework for some of 
the more common perspectives. Such a framework necessarily simplifies a complex 
reality, but it can be used to understand differing positions on technology and
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development. Moreover, the broad brushstrokes of the conceptual schema show how 
little substantive work has been conducted on the implications of information and 
communication technologies for industrialised countries, not to mention developing 
countries.
Figure l:The Impact-Causality matrix
Causality
Technological determinism
Positive/_____________________  Neutral/ __________________ Negative/
transformative Contingent Continuism
Social determinism
In order to provide an insightful analysis we must place these fundamental changes 
firmly in the context of developing countries and more specifically Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This analysis begins with the historical treatment of communications in development 
theory, the disillusionment that arose from this treatment, the current revival in support 
of technology and economic development and the criticisms it attracts. It then identifies 
four aspects of the current debate: the technological, the economical, the critical and the 
public policy perspective.
1.5 Information and communication technologies and development theory
In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the debate on the impact of information and 
communication technologies has been less vociferous and detailed, and emerged at a 
later stage than the debate in industrialised countries. It can be traced back to the post­
Impact
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war development theory literature that emerged as the majority of newly-independent 
developing countries embarked on ambitious plans for national development. Rostow’s 
(1953) "stages theory of economic growth", for example, encapsulated the economic 
thinking at the time. Growth and development were considered synonymous, and a 
simple "iron law" of economic growth held that, so long as the amount of savings and 
investment results in a rate of growth of output that is greater than the increase in rate 
of population growth, cumulative economic growth would take place (Heilbroner, 
1963, p. 86). Rostow even went so far as to prescribe a precise formula that would take 
countries through a set of stages to, ultimately, that of high consumption. Needless to 
say few, if any countries were able to meet these demands. Rostow’s stages model was 
the ultimate attempt on the part of post-war economic planners to devise something like 
a development-vending machine: ’you put in the money, press the button, and get 
growth’ (Brookfield, 1975, p. 39).
Analysts of all ideological persuasions are increasingly agreed that the basic construct 
sought by theorists from as early as the 1940s, the typical underdeveloped country’, 
simply does not exist (Todaro, 1997). Belatedly, theorists and practitioners are 
emphasising that individual circumstances -  economic, social and political -  vary, and 
that the appropriate path of economic and political development cannot be determined a 
priori, but only in the context of these specific conditions. At best, one can seek to 
theorise in terms of groups of countries with similar conditions and key characteristics. 
In the wake of the failure of earlier development models there has been a growing 
realisation that development is more multidimensional than economics could 
comprehend, and more cumulative than simplified models can capture (Streeten, 1980). 
Subsequently there has been an increase in the readiness to acknowledge the 
contribution made by different analytical perspectives.
One such perspective was that of development communications. The role that the 
availability of information and the operations of the mass media in particular should 
play in economic development has been the subject of considerable debate. Lemer's 
(1958) "The Passing of Traditional Society" epitomises the strongly prescriptive 
approach. Asserting that the communication of information about the thinking, 
practices and achievements of the developed world to a receptive minority of potential 
opinion-formers in the developing nations, would set in train a self-perpetuating
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virtuous cycle of literacy, technical innovation, economic growth, urbanisation and 
industrialisation. In the mid-1960s, it was argued that mass media -  the press, radio and 
later television -  could act as an agent of development. Development communications, 
the intersection of the communications and the economic and social sciences, 
represented an important component of the stages of growth model prevalent at the 
time. The central ideas behind the model were that:
• development is essentially the maximising of goods and services available to a 
given society and is quantifiable;
• the developing world is distinguished from the developed world by the lack of 
these goods and services;
• one of the main constraints to the developing world increasing its stock of 
goods and services is the consciousness of its people. Trapped within their own 
experiences they have a lack of knowledge of what is available to them. By 
increasing awareness of the gains made in other countries, perceptions would be 
altered. As a result, there would be a shift from a subsistence-based society to a 
capitalist economy; and
• the most effective method of achieving this change in beliefs was the 
application of technology-based communications, principally radio and, in time, 
television. Literacy is not necessary; images are created that promote "psychic 
mobility", and messages concerning health, education, farming methods, and 
more, are delivered (Dordick, 1993, p. 22).
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, this development model held considerable sway 
in the early 1960s, as the majority of developing countries invested heavily in 
constructing broadcast media infrastructures. The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), for example, recommended that 
developing countries achieve a minimum of media availability: 10 newspapers per 100 
people, five radio receivers per 100 persons, two cinema seats per 100 persons, two 
television sets per 100 people (UNESCO, 1964). Yet these well-intentioned 
interventions were deeply flawed. By and large, policy-makers in the developing 
countries were concerned with the availability of technological products, rather than 
with the more complex problems associated with their political, economic and cultural 
integration. Thus little or no attention was given to meeting the infrastructural
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requirements for a productive assimilation of imported science and technology in the 
recipient countries. The process of technology choice also tended to be undemocratic. 
Very seldom was there a comprehensive analysis of needs and alternative choices to 
meet those needs, nor was there usually any public consultation on alternatives 
(Connors, 1993). Most policy-making was characterised by an emphasis more on 
operational choices (procurement and deployment) than on the strategic:
Rarely did the countries at each stage of the decision-making process raise basic 
questions such as: Does the country have the technology? Can it develop the 
technology? Can it adapt imported technology? How long will it take? What 
resources will be needed? What are the trade-offs between importing 
technology now and waiting to develop it at home? Why not import now, but 
plan in such a fashion that there will be no more repetitive imports in the future? 
(UNCTAD, 1985, p. 162).
When, in the course of the 1960s, the volume of transferred technology increased 
considerably, many recipient countries became aware of a number of issues: the 
transfer usually consisted of end-products rather than of technology per se, much of the 
transfer took place as intra-firm movements, and the conditions under which the 
transfer took place were often disadvantageous for them. Moreover, much of the 
technology was inappropriate, obsolete, over-priced, or all of these combined (Odedra, 
1990b). The development communications model which had seemingly justified 
expenditure on communications appeared to have failed to achieve any of its 
objectives. Much of what was on offer, even in the more specifically educational and 
advisory programmes, did not target those most in need. The potential opinion-formers, 
on whom the 1950s model depended, tended to be unrepresentative of the majority of 
the population. Those who were most likely to seek out and learn what was available 
were invariably relatively well-educated, urban residents with little contact with the 
illiterate, uneducated subsistence farmers who were the real target. As Connors argues 
It was little wonder, then, that the one transistor radio in the Third World village, 
which could act as a conduit for valuable practical advice, has often been permanently 
tuned to a popular music channel’ (Connors, 1993, p. 20).
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Lemer had suggested that the dissemination of images or accounts of the prosperous 
West would give rise to ’a revolution of rising expectations’ (Lemer, 1958, p. 24). In 
reality the reverse was the case as fmstrations rose and nations could not satisfy 
consumer wants (Woods, 1993). Due to the lack of indigenous expertise in 
broadcasting, the cost of original programming was high, and programmes were 
imported from the United States and Europe. These messages were being transmitted 
by people who had little or no understanding of the conditions that prevailed in the 
recipient states, presenting messages that were alien to indigenous cultures and often 
promoted the desire for inappropriate consumer goods. By serving to increase the 
unequal distribution of power and wealth by raising both the aspirations and the 
productivity of the more privileged information-consuming segments of society it has 
accentuated the competitive disadvantage of the have-nots (Bourgault, 1995; Cruise 
O’Brien, 1983; Woods, 1993).
During the 1970s, the increasing introduction of more sophisticated information and 
communication technologies often had unforeseen negative secondary effects, such as 
serious balance of payments problems arising from their capital intensity (Clippinger, 
1976). The primary beneficiaries of such new technologies as satellite communications 
were, more often than not, the companies that were responsible for the provision of the 
equipment, the banks who were providing the funding, and the local administrative elite 
who used the new technology (Hamelink, 1997). It was felt that developing countries 
were unfairly prejudiced, specifically by the bias of western-centric news agencies, and 
more generally by the lopsided flow of transborder data (Williams, 1982).
In response to what was seen as the increasing bias of information flows emanating 
from industrialised nations a raft of information initiatives were launched by 
development agencies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the 1980 UNESCO General 
Conference, the International Programme for the Development of Communication was 
initiated with the unanimous support of all member states. Shortly thereafter, the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Plenipotentiary Conference of 1982 
established an independent commission to study the problems of worldwide 
telecommunications development. The UNESCO MacBride Commission report of 
1980 reflected more accurately the fears of developing nations. The report called for a 
"new world information and communications order" which would reflect more
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accurately the particular problems of the developing nations, guarantee the rights of 
citizens to communicate, and take action to right the acknowledged imbalances in the 
ways in which international communication was run. In 1985, the ITU’s Maitland 
Commission produced a report entitled "The Missing Link", recommending more 
investment in telecommunications in developing countries and more resources for 
training and transfer of technology. Among its principal conclusions were the 
following:
...it was urgent to grant higher priority to investment in telecommunications; 
the effectiveness of existing systems had to be improved; the scarcity of foreign 
exchange in developing countries required new methods of financing; and the 
ITU itself should play a more effective role in ICT development. The Maitland 
Commission concluded not only that ICTs are critical to economic 
development, but also that they unleash forces transforming education, 
enriching national cultures and reinforcing social cohesion (Report of the 
Maitland Commission, 1985, p. 13).
In the 1980s, Third World leaders came to share the expectation within industrial 
nations that innovations in telecommunications and computer technologies could 
markedly improve industrial performance and increase economic productivity. 
Furthermore, there was a common belief that ICTs could, in fact, enable developing 
economies to leapfrog over industrialisation into a post-industrial society. In the spirit 
of what Sussman (1991) has labelled "re-modemisation -  the empire strikes back", 
information and communication technologies have replaced radio and television, and 
have been hailed as embodying revolutionary potentiality in the struggle for economic 
development. With this hope, developing countries began to launch policies and 
programmes to acquire a share in international satellite communications and 
transborder data flow networks. Behind this flurry of activity has been a strong fear of 
being left behind and cut off from the emerging global digital highway. The general 
belief seems to be that, without adequate access to the global information infrastructure, 
developing countries cannot hope to be economically competitive (Cogbum and Adeya, 
1999).
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Whether these new technologies, and the access to information they bring, can act as a 
catalyst for development is a moot point. With sporadic and ineffective 
communications infrastructures, endemic poverty, poor health and illiteracy, the 
widespread utilisation of these "revolutionary" technologies remains a pipe dream for 
all but a tiny elite. Policy-makers in developing countries are thus confronted by a 
difficult conundrum. They are being advised to nurture the development of highly 
sophisticated, world-class channels capable of carrying the digitised content that will 
increasingly become the norm for trade and commerce. At the same time, they must 
address the needs of the vast majority of their populations who have low per capita 
incomes and are rurally based.
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the topic at hand, there is no unified body of 
literature on information and communication technologies and developing countries. 
The four dimensions outlined below represent important compass points in the debate 
on the impact of ICTs in developing countries. They should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive, rather they complement and add to the efficacy of a critical analysis of the 
current debate.
1.6 The dimensions of information infrastructure
(a) The technological dimension
In the technological dimension the emphasis is placed on discussing the relative merits 
of competing technologies in technical terms. The Internet and the applications needed 
to access it and the telecommunications systems linking them up, have all been widely 
reported upon (Wilson, 1996a; UNDP, 1998b; Solomon, 1995; Jensen, 1996). Here the 
focus is on the design, distribution and the uses of the hardware and the software 
systems. In this area little substantive work has been carried out though Kahin and 
Wilson (1997), within the Harvard Infrastructure Project and at MIT, undertook a major 
study analysing information and telecommunications technical systems in 1997. The 
Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), have produced some of the more
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comprehensive and up-to-date work in the field of technological developments in Sub- 
Saharan Africa.4
The brief of writers with this technical bent appears to be to explain the most advanced 
cutting-edge features of new technologies to other like-minded experts. Much is made 
of competing methods of content delivery such as fibre optic technology, low earth- 
orbiting satellites and radio technologies. The Internet here looms large as the most 
tangible aspect of the information revolution and indeed it is taken as a proxy of the 
level of sophistication of a nation’s information infrastructure. As a result much is made 
of the lack of network capacity in developing countries. Maps showing the geographic 
representation of Internet coverage are provided as damning evidence of the developing 
world falling further and further behind (Goodman, 1994). The technological solution 
is cast as a "broadband network". The purest vision being an integrated, all-fibre, all 
digital, two-way, high-speed network over one "super-pipe". Which would allow for 
the transmission of an entire spectrum of communication applications from "plain old 
telephone services" (POTS) to video-on-demand interactive services. Proponents within 
this dimension are technologically determinist, viewing technology as a neutral prime 
mover.
(b) The economic dimension
The economic dimension concentrates on the dynamics of technological change. 
Technology is seen as central to economic development and as the most obvious cause 
of the cumulative wealth of industrialised nations (Freeman, 1994a; Chesnais, 1986). 
Proponents argue that information and communication technologies enable a multitude 
of activities to be done in different, cheaper and more efficient ways and thus represent 
a new factor of production (Perry, 1995). This factor of production is seen as a chronic 
disturber of the comparative advantage that lies at the centre of the emergence of a new 
techno-economic paradigm (Chesnais, 1986). Citing the influential economists, 
Schumpeter and Kondratieff, the assertion is that technology has provided the principle 
source of change for firms, regions and nations alike. A further assertion is that
4 See in particular Menou (1993) and Jensen (1996).
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technological change drives economic growth through a process of creative destruction, 
with new technologies inducing novel, more productive investments, but at the same 
time destroying the economic feasibility of earlier ones. However, these changes do not 
lend themselves easily to economic analysis (Ayers, 1990; Foray and Freeman, 1993; 
Rosenberg, Landau and Mowery, 1992).
The diffuse benefits and the sheer unpredictability of technological change make it 
difficult to ascertain the economic benefits to be gained from ICTs. Nor can we seek 
solace in economic history. The telecommunications industry is one of the few major 
global industries that has undergone an almost complete transformation, from one 
based on electromechanical technology, to one based on microelectronics (Akwule, 
1992; Cowhey, 1995). In other rapidly growing areas such as information technology 
we have few previous industrial counterparts sufficiently similar to make a comparison. 
Despite this high level of unpredictability economic theorists have attempted to locate 
these phenomena within a theoretical framework. One such attempt concerns technical 
progress and how countries develop technologically over time.
Though not formally accepted as an alternative to neo-classical theory, the neo- 
Schumperterian or neo-technology approach attempts to offer a benchmark for studying 
a wide range of issues concerning technological progress. In the spirit of Kuhn, Dosi 
(1984) introduces the notion of technological paradigms to describe the prevailing body 
of technological knowledge. Within this school of thought the market acts to reward 
firms and countries who keep abreast of technological innovation whilst penalising 
those that fall behind. At the commercial level the market thereby acts as an economic 
environment, selecting certain innovations and rejecting others. Diffusion theory 
represents an extension of this microeconomic analysis to the country level. It 
represents an attempt to explain the determinants, pace and trajectory of the adoption of 
technological innovations, and how transitions to major technological paradigms has 
led to historical changes in the economic rankings of countries.
Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) extend diffusion analysis to show how technology may 
give rise to historical shifts in the relative economic positions of nations. Like firms, 
leading nations will attempt to maintain economic advantage through the exploitation 
of technological opportunity. Thus, the very existence of gaps will act as a technology 
pump from leading to lagging countries. Some elements of technological and scientific
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knowledge will be transferred free, via conduits such as multinational organisations 
(Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990).
The second strand in the economic approach sees information and communications 
technologies as a valorisation of public communication. It promotes the development of 
new technology in the hopes of creating a demand in the marketplace that will yield 
economic and social benefits. The keys to this approach are positive externalities, as 
demand acts as a multiplier feeding on itself and stimulating even greater production. 
The major hypothesis is that information and communication technologies are seen as 
underpinning a host of economic activities. This is supported not just by unbridled 
optimism, but by a host of studies in the field of economics. Economic studies and 
lessons of the last 15 years are seen to provide substantial evidence at the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic levels that telecommunications investment yields 
direct and measurable economic benefits contention (Cronin, et al., 1991, Hyun and 
Lent, 1999, Runge, 1985). Bell (1973) has asserted that one of the prerequisites of 
participating in the information economy is that there must be an extensive 
communications infrastructure. It follows from this that the basic building block of the 
information infrastructure is the telephone service and the high-speed 
telecommunications backbone linking it internationally. Hudson’s (1984) study, "When 
Telephones Reach the Village", shows strong evidence of a positive correlation 
between the telephone and economic development in developing countries. Despite the 
contestability of the flow of causality, the consensus is that an efficient 
telecommunications infrastructure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
economic development (Hardy, 1980; Saunders et a l , 1984).
Whilst the studies cited above appear to point to an economic justification for putting in 
place advanced information infrastructures, there are a few important caveats. Hardy 
(1980), for example, fails to specify in precisely what ways telecommunications 
supports economic growth; rather it appears to be tacit assumption, an intuitive given in 
his research. This problem bestrides the concept of information infrastructure: how to 
effectively measure the potential impact of this recent convergence of technologies. At 
the micro level, there is still a distinct lack of understanding as to where and when -  
much less why -  information technology can be applied to foster economic growth. The 
measurement of productivity linked to technology growth continues to be problematic
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(Solow, 1988; Castells, 1997a) two of the major econometric studies in this field have 
arrived at differing conclusions (Cronin et al, 1991; Capello, 1994).
Despite these caveats, these technologically determinist theories have been embraced 
wholeheartedly by some development practitioners in development agencies. They 
point to the success of the newly industrialising countries as evidence that this 
phenomenon has the potential for widespread application in the developing world. 
Consequently, despite the lack of any substantive work on their appropriateness to 
particular developing regions, new technology is seen as a panacea. The leitmotif of the 
literature is of developing countries "leapfrogging" stages of technological 
development. For example, Knight and Boostrom (1995) assert that, ’countries which 
are able to seize the opportunities these technologies present will be able to leapfrog 
into the future even though they lack a developed communications infrastructure today’. 
They even go so far as to suggest a lack of infrastructure may be a benefit in disguise: 
In fact countries with little existing communications infrastructure, with less need to 
deal with vested interests in old technologies, can proceed directly to the use of 
wireless technologies and fibre' (Knight and Boostrom, 1995, pp. 34 -  36).
Yet such sweeping assertions are not embedded within the social context of access to 
these technologies. Although data on usage is at present limited in the context of Sub- 
Saharan Africa, even on a worldwide scale they do not indicate that anything more than 
a small percentage of the world's population is on-line, and that the majority of these 
come from affluent countries and have professional backgrounds (ITU, 1997a). One 
can draw parallels with the spectacular failure of the application of development theory 
to practical problems over the last three decades. The lessons from this failure have 
evidently not been learnt, and the developing world is hardly well served by policies 
based on rarefied economic theories, which often show such a blatant disregard for the 
resource-scarce realities of developing countries.
(c) The critical dimension
A critical perspective on information and communication technologies takes a political 
economy approach. Historically, the principal incentives for the development of ICTs 
after the Second World War have come from military interests, and therefore many of
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the innovations in electronic data processing and telecommunication technology 
described above have been, to a large extent, stimulated by the needs of military 
operations (Hamelink, 1997). At the same time, large corporations also found important 
uses for electronic networking. Commercial transmissions through electronic networks 
commenced during the 1960s and 1970s, facilitating airline reservations, international 
banking and credit control. The upgrading of telecommunication technologies and their 
integration with electronic data processing was thus largely promoted by an 
international military/industrial complex that needed fast, reliable and inexpensive 
technologies for their information handling and were willing to make exceedingly large 
investments (Hamelink, 1997).
The high development costs of the majority of information technologies has meant that 
its economic viability is geared towards high-volume production and the exploitation of 
a mass market (Hamelink, 1997). In the component industry the industrial structure is 
highly concentrated and transnational. This phenomenon is increasing as large 
multinational firms attempt to reap the advantages of economies of scale by the 
utilisation of vertical integration. As result of the increasing concentration and 
importance of ICTs to global terms of trade, concern has been voiced about the 
implications for developing countries. Critics such as Rada (1980) contend that the 
readjustment policies of industrialised countries, together with their development and 
control of information technology, is simply reinforcing the present division of labour 
through substantial increases in productivity and concentration of information-intensive 
sectors in them. Furthermore, he argues that the developed economies control an 
increasingly all-pervasive technology that has changed both their industrial and service 
sectors, and in turn reinforced their major advantage in science and technology. As a 
result the theory of comparative advantage, the assumption that developing countries 
would industrialise on the basis of labour-intensive industries, has been effectively 
undermined by the convergence of information and communication technologies. If 
there is no longer any need for labour, asks Kaplinsky and Cooper, (1989) where does 
the comparative advantage for developing countries lie?
The effort to increase automation has led to greater integration between manufacturers 
and electronic/information technology firms (Rada, 1980, p. 50) This phenomenon has 
been matched by a similar concentration in information storage and retrieval. As
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Woods points out, this concentration is associated with the development of fluid 
international networks that are not constricted by national boundaries. (Woods, 1993, p. 
131). The economic, political and cultural ramifications of these data flows are of 
immediate and growing concern to those countries which are seen as being dependent 
vis-a-vis the industrialised world.
Proponents of the critical dimension also argue that the creation of an information 
infrastructure requires a massive mobilisation of funds and a sustained commitment to 
investment. As the production of the necessary technology is restricted to a small 
number of developed countries the development of information infrastructure will be 
inevitably funded via recourse to foreign currency. Yet given the worsening 
macroeconomic climate prevalent in the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, 
exacerbated by worsening terms of trade in primary commodities, and continued 
indebtedness, access to foreign exchange is limited. Greater public expenditure in 
advanced communications systems has usually first increased indebtedness, especially 
foreign indebtedness. Secondly, it has helped to produce a redistribution of spending 
away from crucial areas such as education, health and other utilities. Thirdly it has 
benefited relatively small sections of the population (Sussman, 1997).
Those within the critical dimension assert that developments in information and 
communications technologies, as well as the growth of transborder data flows, impact 
negatively on the development efforts of developing countries. One of the dominant 
metaphors of regional development is the core-periphery dichotomy (Friedman, 1966; 
Santos, 1979; Strassoldo, 1981). According to this perspective the world is now divided 
into three broad types of regional economy: those with a highly technological 
environment; those with a significant proportion of skilled personnel but lacking a 
diversified and modem industrial structure; and those with reserves of unskilled labour 
which are either surplus to farming and mral occupations or redundant to declining 
industries (Hamilton and Linge, 1983, p. 24). These tally directly with the core, semi­
core and periphery structure. The world systems perspective sees the core-periphery 
stmcture as dynamic rather than static. The world systems view also maintains that core 
and periphery are not areas, regions or states, but spaces where core or peripheral 
processes dominate. In simple terms, core processes consist of relations that incorporate 
relatively high wages, advanced technology and a diversified production mix, whereas
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periphery processes involve low wages, more rudimentary technology and a simple 
production mix (Taylor, 1989, p. 17).
Economically, the core is a set of regions where complexity, technology and control are 
the norm, and where linkages to other nodes and the global system are common. The 
situation in developing countries is considerably more complex than the model is able 
to capture (Lo, Salih and Douglass, 1981). Nonetheless the concept of dualism captures 
effectively the interrelationships -  and lack of relationship -  between different groups 
in the economy. Dependency theorists, such as Escobar (1995) and Hamelink (1983) 
argue that, as users of the end products of the technology, developing countries are not 
in a position either to establish technological control or to engage in competitive 
research and development.
In the cultural dependency model, ideological-cultural relations of domination and 
dependence are expressed in the control of the production and distribution of culture 
and ideology by the metropolitan capitalist countries, and more specifically their 
transnational corporations. Metropolitan centres such as the United States, Britain, 
France, Germany and increasingly Japan, have "world" languages, and largely control 
the flow of news and information to dependent societies. They exercise a largely 
unchannelled dominance in scientific and technological research and development, and 
produce the basic technical means of media and cultural production throughout most of 
the dependent world. This extremely asymmetrical flow of information between the 
advanced capitalist countries and those in the developing world is seen as not simply a 
commercial exchange, but rather a process whereby the latter are dominated by the 
communications ideologies of the major capitalist countries (Boyd-Barrett, 1977).
In addition the reliance on highly concentrated databanks and information technology 
hardware means that decisions in crucial areas of economic development and public 
policy will be made in accordance with criteria established in the major corporations of 
the capitalist world. Metropolitan cultural-ideological domination both reinforces and is 
part of capitalist economic domination. It helps ensure that subordinate classes remain 
locked into a capitalist hegemony, which they cannot challenge fundamentally since 
their consciousness is profoundly conditioned by metropolitan-derived ideologies and 
values. The domination is such that dependent ruling classes stay within and help
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maintain this hegemony, reproducing the old colonial patterns of dependency and 
domination (Rada, 1980; Kaplinsky and Cooper, 1989; Hamelink, 1983; Mattelart, 
1980).
The principle problem with these arguments is that they assume that an ideological 
superstructure can be created and reproduced elsewhere. Further that this superstructure 
can somehow be imposed without being a part of the internal dialectic of change and 
social and cultural reproduction. There can be little argument that there is a substantial 
inequality in terms of mass media and cultural production between developed and less 
developed countries. There is also a substantial inequality between countries in their 
ability to utilise information and communication technologies. Nor can issue be taken 
with the contention that information flows are often unidirectional. However, the 
existence of such inequalities provides us with little insight into the way in which 
international capitalist ideologies affect the process of development. In spite of these 
flaws the cultural dependency approach is useful in that it demonstrates that domination 
does not simply depend on repressive methods but can also contains a sophisticated 
ideological component (Sarti, 1981). While dependency perspectives still provide the 
framework for much of the theorising and analysis of international flows of information 
in the third world, they have been increasingly challenged and modified. The focus is 
now on questions of internal social structure, on what happens to these information and 
communication technologies in the specific context of different national societies.
More recent criticism has stemmed from the utility value of the technologies 
themselves. The sceptics are on the whole dismissive of the transformative power of 
information and communication technologies. For them the hyperbole surrounding 
these technologies is akin to that which surrounded information technology in the 
1970s. Information technology then was trumpeted as a valuable tool for development 
practitioners and as an opportunity to foster economic development. However, despite 
heavy investments the returns were far from dramatic (Solow, 1988). In the light of the 
convergence of information and communication technologies critics see history 
repeating itself. For them, advocates of the "revolutionary potential" school of thought 
are akin to ardent salesman, peddling "silicon snake oil" (Stoll, 1995; Noll, 1996). 
Connors (1993) argues, for example, that much has been made of the potential for these 
technologies in education, with little basis on reality. The education system in Sub-
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Saharan Africa is already in a state of acute disarray and neglect, and computers will 
add to that, being expensive, prone to obsolescence, and needing salaried personnel to 
look after them.
Those in this critical dimension sense intuitively that information and communication 
technologies, unless effectively planned, will only serve to further widen the gap 
between elites and the poor. For example, it has been pointed out that free trade has 
historically been advocated most ardently by the countries that stand to gain the most 
from market liberalisation (Estabrooks, 1988); this thesis can be extended to the 
development of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such ideas err on 
such critical issues as the sources of comparative advantage in a dynamic world, the 
benefits of integration and the nature of international competition. These issues, of 
crucial importance, have been almost universally ignored in the mainstream literature. 
The critical dimension counterbalances this and highlights the importance of asking 
critical questions in the final analysis.
Given the continued failure of the application of orthodox development theory, concern 
shifted in the 1980s away from the grand reconstruction of society to meeting the basic 
needs of people (Todaro, 1998). The feeling has been that development theory has 
forgotten its fundamental goal: to improve the economic and social lot of the masses. 
The emphasis should, thus, be placed on the elimination of absolute poverty as well as 
economic growth. Thus the recommended path was based not on a heavy concentration 
on modem sector development, but on a more evenly diffused, broad-based 
development to which the ’traditional’ sector would make a substantial contribution and 
appropriate technology would be utilised. Allied to this was the importance of self-help 
and isolation from the industrialised economy. Furthermore, foreign aid and assistance 
were seen as detrimental drugs that countries must be weaned from (Garba, 1995). This 
view was essentially anti-technology and a nostalgic harkening back to simpler times in 
the past, proposing a disengagement from the world economy (Schumacher, 1993). 
Evidently this was impractical. Senghas’ (1983) criticism of this approach sums it up 
best:
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What choices do the Third World countries have? Hardly any, for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, the dominant elites of most Third World countries whether 
elected or not, civilian or military, are the principle local beneficiaries of this 
relationship [with the highly industrialised countries]. They are vulnerable to all 
manner of blandishments that accompany high-power sales drives. Secondly it 
will be foolhardy and impracticable to opt out of the worldwide network of 
satellites, computers and digitalised telephones. No country can stay away from 
these networks and yet remain within the mainstream of world commerce. The 
alternative is to be forced out of office or to increase repression. Proposals for 
de-linking and self-reliance are mostly conceptual fantasies that have little 
relevance to the realities on the ground (Senghas, 1983, p. 22).
(d) The public policy dimension
The fourth dimension to the debate on information and communication technologies 
concerns public policy. Underpinning much of the literature surrounding these 
technologies is an indication that technological accumulation is by no means a passive, 
mechanistic process, but a painstaking, costly and deliberate effort on the part of 
successful firms, governments and nations. It follows from this that the future 
development of an effective information infrastructure is determined by the complex 
interaction of the oft-competing forces of technological progress, economics and public 
policy. With no clear choice of technology government policy plays a major role in the 
both the speed of technology uptake and the choice of technology. Public policy may 
significantly alter the private and public costs and benefits associated with any given 
technological alternative; therefore it becomes a critical factor in the equation.
In light of this much of the recent debate regarding information and communication 
technologies clusters around issues of public policy. Dutton (1997) identifies four 
contending viewpoints within the sphere of information and communication 
technologies and public policy: public interest guardians, information society sceptics, 
information industry deregulators, and information society enthusiasts. For the 
enthusiasts the "visible hand" is much in evidence with public policy playing a pivotal 
role in the promotion of information and communication technologies (see for example 
Bangemann Group, 1994; Mackintosh, 1992). Guardians also recognise the importance
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of a guiding hand but are more concerned with how information and communication 
technologies pose a threat to the public interest. A particular concern is the distribution 
of these opportunities (Blunder et al., 1992; Mansell, 1993). The sceptics are on the 
whole dismissive of what they see as the "fool’s gold" of information and 
communication technologies. For them the hyperbole which abounds is driven by those 
most likely to benefit from greater diffusion of these technologies; the result of supply- 
push rather than demand-pull (Stoll, 1995; Noll 1996). Deregulators are also 
enthusiasts, but see the emerging information infrastructure as being market driven and 
being hindered by red tape. They are ardent supporters of the free market and advocate 
the total deregulation of all industries concerned (Noam, 1994).
Most of the responses to the policy conundrums created by information and 
communication technologies have been ad hoc and incoherent in nature. The first 
comprehensive attempt to analyse the impact of the convergence of technologies was 
the Nora-Minc (1980) study, commissioned by the French government in 1980. The 
report identified the challenges arising from information technology for France. These 
new challenges were seen as being the onset of the "rmformatization de la societe", or 
the computerisation of society, which could result in ’changes for the better or for the 
worse’, depending upon the actions of French national planners (Nora-Minc, 1980, p. 
112). "Telematique", the convergence of information and communication technologies 
was seen by the authors as increasing productivity, but causing short-term 
unemployment. Fostering the decentralisation of administrative structures and 
promoting the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby 
moderating power relations (Nora and Mine, 1980).
They predicted that with knowledge as an engine of growth, there would be significant 
social and economic changes, comparable to those that took place when agriculture was 
replaced by manufacturing. The report then noted that in contrast to these likely 
outcomes, French traditions favour centralisation and administrative proliferation, 
hierarchy rigidity in big business’ (Nora and Mine, 1980, p. 6). However, where Nora 
and Mine differed radically from previous commentators was their emphasis on a 
proactive government response in the light of these challenges. They concluded that if 
France ’does not respond effectively to the serious new challenges she faces, her 
internal tensions will deprive her of the ability to control her fate’ (Nora and Mine,
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1980, p. 254). The report calls for the creation of deliberate policy vis-a-vis telematics, 
arguing that the technology can only 'facilitate the coming of a new society, but it 
cannot construct it on its initiative' (Nora and Mine, 1980, p. 6).
Baran (1957) and Farber (1964) were amongst the earliest of writers to focus on the 
technical and political dilemmas confronting the policy-makers who must struggle to 
create effective responses to the technological changes they face. They argue 
convincingly that the impact of information and communication technologies has been 
underestimated and that the interim period will be a period of inevitable discomfort to 
those nations that are least prepared. Seen from this standpoint, academics and 
practitioners are trying to clarify the relationship between information and 
communication technologies and development. Their ultimate goal is to provide novel 
frameworks through which to understand how this convergence in technologies can 
make a sustainable contribution to economic development. One such framework is the 
concept of a national and infrastructural approach to information and communication 
technologies. An emergent and relatively novel policy construct, it represents an 
attempt by researchers to create order out of policy chaos.
1.7 National information infrastructure policy
At this early stage of its evolution it is unsurprising to find that national information 
infrastructure (NH) is an oft-cited but rarely described concept. However, there is 
general consensus amongst writers that it is underpinned by two fundamental 
constructs. Firstly, that it is pitched at the national level and secondly that it is 
infrastructural in outlook. Critics of this view contend that the effects of globalisation 
confine the national level solely to the margins of economic policy (Drucker, 1970). 
Yet, however transnational the phenomena may appear, national policy-makers and 
leaders must first calculate the consequences at the local level. For example, most 
telecommunications companies, no matter how international, will serve national 
markets. Moreover regulatory structures will be put in place to control the indigenous 
market rather than the global market. It would thus seem that the most relevant 
questions being asked by economic actors are still being pitched at the national level. 
This is not to diminish the importance of taking into account the impact of
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globalisation, but rather to insist that the starting point must be the national political 
economy (Lamberton, 1994).
It would appear that there is a rich seam of work in the field of public policy design 
from which policy-makers can draw inspiration. Mintzberg (1983), for example, 
describes the internal structure and the immediate organisational environment for large 
policy organisations. Hahm and Plein (1995), in their analysis of the role of the 
Presidency in technological development in Korea, show the importance of a high level 
champion of the cause. Odedra (1990a) emphasises the importance for developing 
countries of an explicit information technology (IT) policy rather than the reliance upon 
an allocatively inefficient trial and error approach. Corey (1995) compares information 
technology policies in South-East Asian countries and finds that success is a function of 
vision by highest-level national leadership, modem IT infrastructure and education, 
trained personnel and human resources development strategies. Lindberg (1977) in his 
comparative work on national energy policies, concludes from comparing several cases 
by discussing, \h& great difficulty that governments have experienced in coordinating 
the contradictory roles thrust upon them in the course of the evolution of the energy 
problem’. National policy-making is characterised by ’fragmented and incoherent 
policy-making’ within the government, and contention with competing groups and a 
powerful Industrial technocracy’beyond it (Lindberg, 1977, p. 335).
Adopting the concept of information infrastructure, researchers, frequently under the 
aegis of development agencies, have attempted to articulate policy frameworks. 
Institutions such as InfoDev, created by the World Bank in 1996, have become a 
prodigious source of analysis on information infrastructure issues. Under its aegis for 
example, Talero and Gaudette (1996) have both produced papers on possible scenarios 
for the constmction of national information infrastructures in developing countries. 
Independent scholars have also carried out solid comparative work as can be seen from 
Telecommunications Policy and other specialist journals. Yet at the academic level 
Drake et al. (1995) have pointed out the significance of the paucity of international 
telecommunications and information studies in the leading political science and policy 
journals. With the exception of Cowey and Krasner, few leading scholars have done 
substantive work in this field. The majority of output still emanates from professional 
journals and the development agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations.
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Moreover the literature that is available on information infrastructures has tended to 
emanate from the United States and Europe and hence neglects issues that are more 
relevant to developing countries. Much of this research takes it as a given that countries 
have an embedded IT and communications facility. With these assumptions firmly in 
place the key issues are generally seen to be the impact on employment, common 
regulatory standards, market development and new applications, and the role of the 
private sector (Bangemann Group, 1994, Cowhey, 1995). The latter, the relative roles 
of the public/private sector and how this affects the construction of an information 
infrastructure has attracted significant comment. Researchers such as Cowey (1995) 
have attempted to explain the different approaches taken to information infrastructure 
by comparing different industrial structures. The assertion is that the protectionist, top- 
down approach evident in Europe is a result of the domination of large, often state- 
owned companies, whereas the information infrastructure in the U.S. is seen as being 
more dynamic; a reflection of the large number of small start-up firms and a wider 
variety of firm size (Talero, 1996).
In terms of the relative roles of the sectors vis-a-vis the development of the information 
infrastructure, the consensus appears that the private sector is an engine of growth 
whilst the public sector is seen as the regulator and arbiter of free trade. The most 
comprehensive report to date on the European Union's (EU) approach to building 
information infrastructure echoes these views. Produced by the EU's Bangemann 
commission, it asserts that the main task of government is to 'safeguard competitive 
forces...so that demand-pull can finance growth' (Bangemann Group, 1994, p. 221). Yet 
such an argument whilst viable for the industrialised nations fails to address the 
practical concerns of developing countries. In reality these regions without a developed 
pre-existent infrastructure require significant guiding by the "visible hand". Singapore's 
"intelligent island" proposals show that even in an island state with a relatively 
developed communications infrastructure, in-depth planning is necessary to bring an 
information infrastructure to effective fruition (Blanning et al., 1997).
Few countries, developed or developing, have produced a strategy that transcends the 
telecommunications sector to address computer hardware/software systems, publishing, 
the Internet, and other segments of the ICT spectrum. This is hardly surprising given
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the complexity and the variety of issues clustered around the concept of an information 
infrastructure. Furthermore, given the lack of heterogeneity of the developing world 
there is no single "one size fits all" solution. As Han and Walsham state, ’to imitate 
existing national strategies can only lead to major weaknesses in any systems’ (Han and 
Walsham, 1993, p. 24). Thus, each government has its own immediate focus and 
priorities in developing appropriate policies. While acknowledging that individual 
nations are at differing stages in this process, the public policy dimension contends that 
there are general principles and guidelines that should be followed by policy-makers in 
order to achieve the best policy mix.
With different rationales and different strategies, countries have made efforts to address 
the challenges thrown up by the convergence of information and communication 
technologies in a concerted manner. The earliest examples of which were Singapore’s 
vision of an "intelligent island" in 1992 and the Clinton/Gore vision of a U.S. "National 
Information Infrastructure". These efforts appeared to reach critical mass in 1994, 
inspiring the concept of a Global Information Infrastructure and subsequent G-7 
conferences on what became known as the Global Information Society. In an attempt to 
investigate this phenomenon researchers, have attempted to investigate the raft of 
recent initiatives in the pursuit of a national information infrastructure.
Kahin and Wilson (1997) investigate efforts to define a broad but coherent set of 
national policies to advance the development of information infrastructures. The 
motivation for most initiatives are found to be innovation, economic growth, and 
competitive advantage. Information infrastructure is seen as having positive 
externalities which it is hoped will cascade rather than ripple through the national 
economy. Wilson (1996a) points out that national initiatives typically involve a three- 
prong approach. Firstly, a grand vision is formulated; this is designed to conceptualise 
the plan and to give the nation an easily digestible concept to grasp. The epithet "2000" 
is normally added to the title of the vision, to convey the feeling of the dawning of a 
new era. Singapore’s Vision 2000 is a recent example of this. The next stage involves 
marshalling appropriate policies or policy frameworks. Wilson (1996a) points out that 
this may mean recasting existing policies to account for changes in technology. Finally, 
strategies for implementation are outlined which invariably cover specific policies. 
These may encompass new regulatory frameworks, tax incentives, deregulation and
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promotional rhetoric. He points out that these policies often require continued 
monitoring given the volatile nature of technological shifts.
A report by the OECD (1996) takes a similar approach to Wilson and details the 
approaches taken by member states. These recent approaches can be characterised by 
two factors. Firstly, an extremely broad vision that appears to encompass not only 
telecommunications, but also information technology, content and a myriad of 
applications. Secondly, the emphasis is placed on the private sector, which is expected 
to be the catalyst that spurs the organic growth of the information infrastructure. While 
a useful compendium in itself, methodological concerns are non-existent, with little 
effort to aid in the process of constructing national baselines for comparison. While 
useful as a summary of shared concerns and evolving developed country position, the 
report does not provide much guidance for researchers, prioritise which aspects should 
be singled out, or suggest causal relations amongst the factors.
Both these works represent a first effort to analyse these initiatives with the distance 
that time brings, and are welcome additions to the debate. Unfortunately they represent 
a collection of descriptive accounts of public policies in this area. No attempt is made 
to judge the merit of one approach over another and the case studies are almost entirely 
confined to the industrialised countries and South-East Asia. In fairness to Kahin and 
Wilson (1997) and their contributors there has been very little substantive work on 
national information infrastructure in developing countries let alone Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Indeed, as of 1998, there had yet to be clearly defined explicit policy statement 
on information infrastructure plans by any Sub-Saharan African country, excluding 
South Africa. Yet frequent reports rank this region at the bottom of information 
infrastructure indices (UNESCO, 1997; Connors, 1993; Dordick, 1993).
However, these indices continue to be empirically problematic. The rigorous 
measurement of an environment in terms of the access to information that it affords its 
inhabitants is a formidable task. Data on the wide range of variables which determine 
the intensity and quality of indigenous information infrastructure are difficult to collate 
on a genuinely comparable basis (Dordick, 1993). The nature of the phenomenon being 
measured ironically contributes to the difficulty, in so far as in information-intensive 
environments the breadth and sheer volume of data is too great to be conducive to
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consistent measurement. Conversely in information-poor environments, there is simply 
a dearth of reliable empirical evidence. Despite this, there are some relevant measures 
available on a global scale, which permit comparative analysis. According to statistics 
from the ITU et al. the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa is in marked contrast to many 
Asian and Latin American countries, who are already making haste and actively 
competing for information investment dollars and trade. These developing regions are 
becoming increasingly aware of the clear relationship between local communications 
infrastructure and encouraging foreign direct investment.
Singapore was the first country to articulate a national information infrastructure, 
publishing plans for the creation of an "intelligent island", where a fibre optic 
communications network would support a large variety of advanced information 
services. Korea likewise plans the completion of its own infrastructure for 2015, whilst 
construction of Malaysia’s high-speed super corridor continues apace (Kim, 1999). 
Thailand’s IT 2000 Policy represents similar efforts to create regional hubs in South- 
East Asia for financial services, manufacturing, commerce, transport, tourism and 
human resources training. The Chinese government was laying new 
telecommunications lines in 1997 at the rate of 14.5 million a year, and other countries 
are seeking alliances and partnerships with western companies to help meet the cost of 
boosting capacity (ITU, 1998b).
There are signs of change, though, in Sub-Saharan Africa with many governments 
embarking on telecommunications reform in order to improve local capabilities. 
However, the main focus of efforts to reduce the digital disparity have emanated from 
international development agency organised initiatives. As a result the majority of 
initiatives in pursuit of information infrastructure are being designed, implemented and 
funded by the international development agencies. For example, the African 
Information Society Initiative, founded at the African Regional Symposium on 
Telematics for Development organised in Addis Ababa in April 1995 by UNECA, is an 
attempt to overcome these traditional problems and ensure Africa can participate in the 
"Global Information Society". Its partners include the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), UNESCO, and IDRC. By 2010 this initiative 
foresees an information society for Africa in which:
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Every man and woman, schoolchild, village, government office, and business 
can access information through computers and telecommunications; information 
systems are used to support decision-making in all the major sectors of each 
nation’s economy; access is available throughout the region to international, 
regional and national "information highways"; a vibrant private sector exhibits 
strong leadership in growing information-based economies; African information 
resources are accessible globally, reflecting content on tourism, trade, 
education, culture, energy, health, transport and natural-resource management; 
and information and knowledge empower all sectors of society (Cogbum, 1996, 
p. 32).
Yet new technologies have the potential to further widen existing gaps between the 
elite and the poor within African countries (Castells, 1997b). While some sectors are 
adopting information and communication technologies, for the most part they are 
overwhelmingly used by the wealthier and predominantly urban elites (Wilson, 1996b). 
Moreover, in the face of technological uncertainty few Sub-Saharan African countries 
have constructed policy strategies to ensure that the benefits of these technologies 
accrue equitably. Economically and politically fragile, and with the merits of 
information and communication technologies still unproved and only the promise of 
potentialities, most are adopting a wait-and-see attitude.
The majority of developing countries are increasingly trying to attract foreign direct 
investment. At the same time, as information and communication technologies become 
increasingly central to the competitiveness of corporations, the quality of the local 
information infrastructure is looming larger and larger in the locational decision of 
firms (Keen and Kanbur, 1991). A 1997 survey of European business decision-makers 
found that 43 per cent of companies regarded the quality of telecommunications to be 
’an absolutely essential’ factor in considering where to locate their businesses abroad 
(ITU, 1997b). Most studies have suggested a reciprocal relationship over a period of 
time between telecommunications and economic development (Hardy, 1980). Yet the 
precise nature of the relationship between infrastructure quality and economic 
development is extremely complex and fraught with difficulties for policy-makers. 
What is evident is that efficient infrastructures are not sufficient in themselves to 
guarantee economic development. Human capital is critical throughout the process of
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technological change. In all settings, the skills of the people -  for accepting and 
interpreting information, for improving and enhancing technology, and for generating 
new technology -  ultimately determine what organisations and nations can accomplish 
(Cassiolato, 1997; Madon, 1994; Odedra-Straub et al., 1995; Grant, 1996). An 
educated, skilled population has far more opportunities for change, innovation and new 
endeavours than one where lives are trapped in a routine of poverty.
Much of the literature takes a utopian vision of the transformative power of information 
and communication technologies, and thus calls for public intervention to ensure the 
effective adoption of these technological tools. Winner (1993), for example, calls for 
the establishment of political ergonomics, a discipline that would develop ideas to 
facilitate the specification of a suitable fit between a society and its instruments. In 
reality infrastructures are by their very nature evolutionary and emergent. They are the 
combined outcome of many major and myriad minor decisions all concurring to shape 
their appearance and functionality. Even if this were not the case, the sheer complexity 
of many large technological systems is such that rational design would still result in 
sub-optimal performance. One must also acknowledge that the technology per se is not 
a panacea. Yet in a limited way, the explosion of information and communication 
technologies may offer us a new path of thought and action. This has opened up a 
whole range of activities and new solutions from which conventional thinking, old 
traditions and the limits of previous technology and thinking have excluded us until 
now. To paraphrase Albert Einstein, the thinking that has brought us to our present 
stage cannot carry us beyond it. Taking this on board we would do well to heed the 
words of Hayek in his classic essay, "The Use of Knowledge in Society" (1945), 'that 
knowledge does not exist in concentrated or integrated form, but as dispersed bits of 
incomplete and contradictory information from which knowledge has to be gleaned' 
(Hayek, 1945, p. 526).
1.8 Summary
This chapter has presented a critical review of the literature surrounding the 
convergence of information and communications technologies and its impact on 
society. It has presented an impact/causality model that highlights the breath of opinion 
on this topic and the speculative nature of the debate. Placing this analysis in the
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context of developing countries it has argued that there are four dimensions that must 
be taken into account to gain an understanding of the current issues. Contending that 
the shift towards a knowledge-based economy has important implications for all 
countries -  especially those in developing regions -  an argument has been made for the 
importance of an integrated approach to information infrastructure development and 
public policy in this area. Additionally the chapter has sought to analyse the more 
recent literature on the information infrastructure concept, and how national policy­
makers are resolving the problems practically.
The arrival of information and communication technologies has brought with it 
extraordinary changes which are not well understood. This is a time of uncertainty, but 
the major danger is that problems are seen as merely technical with consequential 
neglect of the human, social, and economic aspects. In response to this uncertainty, 
much of the literature is frankly unhelpful. The utopian envisages a better world, but 
says little or nothing about how to get there, often supplying nothing but literary hot air, 
which serves to keep technology-based hopes alive. The dystopian, on the other hand, 
sees only the reinforcement of existing power relations. Evidently the likely outcome 
lies somewhere between both extremes. The main purpose of the research is to provide 
policy-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa with analytical perspectives that create a better 
match between technological potential and the achievement of development objectives.
1.9 Research methodology
Within the discipline of information systems there has been an increasing use of 
interpretive research methods, ranging from phenomenology to methods of language 
interpretation (Lee, 1991, p. 342). Klein and Myers (1996) argue that this shift arises 
from a number of reasons. It reflects a desire to move away from strictly technological 
approaches that neglect managerial and organisational issues. Researchers are seeking 
to investigate the grey areas of human interaction with information systems that strictly 
positivist approaches fail to tackle (Mumford et al. 1985; Orlikowski, et al., 1991; Lee 
et al., 1995). Klein and Myers assert that, through interpretive research the 'researcher 
can study problems in the richness of their real-life setting as contrasted with the 
artificial context of research laboratory studies' (Klein and Myers, 1996, p. 2).
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Interpretive approaches give the researcher greater scope to address issues of influence 
and impact and to ask questions such as why and how particular technological 
trajectories are created.
Moreover, many have pointed to the amenability of interpretive research to 
investigating new and emergent phenomena. Kodoma, for example, argues that:
Although established frameworks are the most appropriate for analysing past 
technologies, when a new paradigm of technology is emerging, there might be a 
serious discrepancy between the subject of study and the methodology used for 
the study. We have to create a new conceptual framework for a new paradigm 
(Kodoma, 1995, p. 15)
Klein and Myers (1996) go further by asserting that an interpretive research 
methodology is ’often the only way to glean knowledge in a scholarly way in an area 
which is new or not accessible to quantitative research at all’ (Klein and Myers, 1996, 
p. 2). It is this last assertion, the lack of accurate and relevant quantitative measures, in 
tandem with the desire to study the complexities of information infrastructure 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa that underpins the methodological approach of this 
thesis. The concept of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa is as an 
emergent phenomenon that suffers from a distinct lack of accepted common 
frameworks, approaches and methodologies to guide the practical employment of 
public policy. Straddling a number of diverse disciplines ranging from political 
economy to information systems, few researchers have attempted to take a holistic 
approach to the issues at hand. The research seeks to describe and understand the 
context in which information infrastructure is developed in the Sub-Saharan African 
region.
This thesis takes a primarily qualitative approach to investigating the issue of 
information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was felt that the 
variety of actors and the lack of accurate quantitative data in this area precluded a 
strictly quantitative approach. Nor would a quantitative approach provide the necessary 
descriptive detail for interpretative research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In order to 
capture and interpret the key issues the thesis employs multiple research techniques to
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arrive at the critical elements that interact to constitute efforts to create national 
information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. The primary methodological tools 
employed are an analysis of quantitative data and the descriptive case study method. 
According to Yin (1994) the case study method is appropriate in situations where there 
are a large number of variables. Case study research excels at bringing to us an 
understanding of a complex issue or object* and can extend experience or add strength 
to what is already known through previous research. Yin defines the case study 
research method as ’an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’ (Yin, 1994, p. 
23).
The often volatile nature of technological change coupled with the richness of the Sub- 
Saharan Africa region necessitates a research approach that is broad enough to 
highlight the key actors and stakeholders within their context and narrow enough to 
achieve the research objectives. Towards this aim there are three principles that 
underpin this research. Firstly, that it is problem-oriented, focusing on specific large- 
scale systems namely information infrastructure and its development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Secondly, the research emphasises the development of general principles as 
well as analytical approaches that can be used in the design of large-scale systems. 
Finally the research is policy-oriented, concentrating on the development of improved 
procedures for governmental decision-making. It tries to point out failings in current 
policies due to flawed normative models or conflicts with cultural values, and then to 
identify and propose alternative policies.
Yin (1994) identified six primary sources of evidence for case study research. Not all 
sources are essential in every case study, but the importance of multiple sources of data 
to the reliability of the study is well established (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). The six 
sources identified by Yin (1994) are:
• documentation;
• archival records;
• interviews;
• direct observation;
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• participant observation; and
• physical artefacts.
No single source has a complete advantage over the others; rather, they may be 
complementary and can be used in tandem. Thus a case study should use as many 
sources as are relevant to the study. With its use of multiple data collection methods 
and analytical techniques, it can provide researchers with opportunities to triangulate 
data in order to strengthen the research findings and conclusions. Triangulation 
increases the reliability of the data and the process of gathering it (Jick, 1979). In the 
context of data collection, triangulation serves to corroborate the data gathered from 
other sources. The research aims to explore these issues at the following levels:
• An analysis of the present levels of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
The initial period of research concentrates on a regional analysis of the existing and 
projected level of the sophistication of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Given the inherent definitional issues with delineating elements of an information 
infrastructure the thesis isolates two key segments -  the telecommunications and 
information technology sectors -  as proxy variables. The methodology chosen for this 
element of the research is an analysis of secondary, and, where available, primary data. 
Sources of data include United Nations agencies, national statistics and market research 
reports. The purpose of this element of the research is to get an overall picture of the 
development of information infrastructure in terms of these two proxy variables. This 
survey reveals the extent of current developments and the actors undertaking them.
Critics of this approach have questioned the validity of "counting telephones" in 
developing regions; however, it is the contention of this thesis that such methodological 
devices can establish benchmarks that facilitate regional and international comparisons 
(Mansell and Wehn, 1998). This positivist approach represents a sense-making exercise 
in order to quantify the extent of information infrastructure development in the region. 
There is an explicit acknowledgement as to the shortcomings of existing data, and 
given the time frame of the research and the impracticalities of region-wide data
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collection, it was adjudged that secondary data sources were sufficient to provide a 
suitably accurate overview. Quantitative data collection and analysis are also critical to 
the formulation of public policy. Without an indication of information infrastructure 
densities and the like, policy-makers are hampered in their efforts to prioritise the use 
of scarce resources.
• An examination of the respective roles of development agencies and the foreign 
private sector in information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
The development of information infrastructure in Africa continues apace despite 
government inaction. International development organisations are increasingly placing 
more emphasis on plugging the so-called communications gap, whilst multinational 
initiatives are multiplying as corporations see healthy profits in protected markets. In 
terms of the role of the development agencies, an evaluation research approach is 
undertaken. Suchman (1967) defines this approach as the determination of the results 
attained by some activity designed to accomplish some valued goal or objective’ 
(Suchman, 1967, p. 85) This approach is appropriate because it evaluates broadly 
aimed projects through the use of aggregated secondary data. It also has advantages 
with regard to flexibility on measurement issues, data sources, data collection 
procedures (aggregate, observational, and interviewing data are of relevance in this 
instance), cost and expertise (Hoole, 1976).
To assess the role of development agencies a two-pronged approach is taken. In order 
to get an overall picture of the extent of development agency activity in this area 
content analysis is conducted on 273 development agency initiative abstracts, taken 
from the Partnership for ICTs in Africa (PICTA) donor’s database. This database is 
publicly available on the World Wide Web, and allows authorised agencies to update 
their information and communication technology-related activities via the Internet. The 
hosts of the database estimate that the database covers 90 per cent of development 
agency activities in the field of information infrastructure construction in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This was considered to be an appropriate sample from which to draw 
conclusions. Abstracts from all these projects based in and around Sub-Saharan Africa
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were then analysed using the NUD*IST content analysis software, which allows the 
identification of common themes in texts.5 These themes were then assessed 
quantitatively and interpreted accordingly.
Content analysis is just one of several research techniques which may be used to 
conduct textual analyses (Babbie, 1995; Silverman, 1993). The other techniques tend to 
involve an in-depth analysis of particular texts by examining their underlying meanings 
through a detailed scrutiny of their construction and structure and the relationships 
between different words within each text (semiotics). Another common approach is 
examining the behaviour of people interacting with texts and reacting to them 
(ethnography and linguistic ethnomethodology) (Unerman, 1999). Krippendorff (1980) 
characterises content analysis as a research technique for use in analysing a wide 
variety of communications and structures it in such a way as to enable further 
investigation. It therefore seems a particularly appropriate research method for 
undertaking a quantitative analysis of the project abstracts of ICT-related projects. The 
research method behind content analysis typically:
...involves establishing categories and then counting the number of instances 
when those categories are used in a particular item of text. . .  [It] pays particular 
attention to the issue of reliability of its measures -  ensuring that different 
researchers use them in the same way -  and to the validity of its findings -  
through precise counts of word use (Silverman, 1993, p. 59, emphasis in 
original).
A key assumption is that either the number of times an item is disclosed, or the amount 
of space devoted to a particular disclosure, signifies the importance of the item being 
disclosed (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Krippendorff, 1980). The technique enables 
further analysis on unstructured documents by providing well-defined and consistent 
measurement categories which can be used to compare the content of each document 
analysed. The approach of this thesis was to employ a strictly quantitative approach to 
content analysis rather than more in-depth investigations which would have explored
5 NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data by Indexing, Searching and Theorizing) is a software package 
for the management and qualitative analysis of non-numerical unstructured data. It provides facilities for 
managing, exploring and searching the text of documents.
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the social context and construction of the communication within the text (Unerman, 
1999). The objective being to quantify and categorise the number of ICT-related 
projects being funded by development agencies.
The first stage involved in designing a content analysis project is to decide upon the 
units of analysis to use for both observation and recording of data. Krippendorff (1980) 
identifies four types of units of analysis used in every content analysis study as being: 
sampling, recording, context and enumeration units. Sampling units represent definable 
instances of communication which are independent from each other. In the case of this 
research, the most clearly definable sampling units were the project abstracts of 
development agency ICT-related projects. These were chosen because they represented 
a succinct introduction to the project (on average less than 300 words) and allowed 
clear categorisation.
This quantitative analysis of the sample of development project abstracts provides 
important information on the direction of development assistance flows, and how one 
of the key groups of actors is influencing information infrastructure development in the 
region. This quantitative exercise was consolidated in Chapter Six by a descriptive case 
study of one particular project. Given the wide range of project areas and different 
institutional agenda, there was an acknowledgement that one case study would be 
unlikely to exemplify the role of development assistance in information infrastructure 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus the goal of case study selection was not to 
investigate a "typical" development agency ICT-related project. Rather, the case study 
was designed to illustrate the problems that were deemed typical to development 
projects in this area. The selection of the case study was based on a number of criteria.
Firstly, it was imperative that the project was information infrastructure-related. A 
significant proportion of sample projects within the PICTA database were focussed on 
awareness raising activities such as workshops and conferences, and it was felt that 
these, concentrating mainly on sensitisation, were too narrowly focused. Moreover the 
case study was designed to encompass technological as well as design and 
conceptualisation issues. The second set of important criteria was that the project under 
investigation had to be based in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and had clearly stated 
predefined objectives to be achieved within a fixed duration. The third criterion was
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that, given the disproportionate influence of the major development agencies such as 
the United Nations and the World Bank, the selected project had to have been designed 
and funded by a major development agency. A final important selection criterion was 
the level of access to project-specific documentation afforded to the researcher. Given 
that the important decisions regarding the design of development projects take place 
prior to project implementation (Taylor, 2000), it was critical that the researcher had 
access to project documents and internal data.
Evaluations of development projects are often carried out either by project designers or 
by external researchers. Both of these traditional approaches to project evaluation have 
evident flaws. Unfortunately, the scope for ’moral hazard’ within evaluations conducted 
by project coordinators is wide (Dow, 1989). They may not provide accurate and 
honest appraisals of project outcomes as their objectivity may be fatally compromised. 
At the same time external evaluators suffer from two main deficiencies: their distance 
from the project itself and their reliance on project coordinators who are unlikely to 
want to provide unflattering data. It was thus hoped that by participating in the project, 
the researcher could get a unique insight that normally eluded external researchers.
After consultations with various agencies, the researcher took advantage of previous 
work experience with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to select a 
case study of a project that satisfied all the above criteria. The project selected was 
designed, conceptualised and funded by the UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Africa 
(RBA), based in New York. In response to the UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Initiative for Africa, RBA had decided to implement a programme to increase Internet 
connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa. To that end they had designed an "Internet 
Initiative for Africa". Having previously worked in the regional bureau for Africa as an 
economic consultant, both the project coordinator and leader assented to my 
participation on the project, specifically on a mission to assess a proposal the bureau 
had received from the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) to improve 
their fledgling Internet provision service.
Within this unit of analysis two elements of investigation are conducted. Firstly, the 
overall design of the Internet Initiative for Africa is examined. Secondly an evaluation 
of the Ethiopian Internet Initiative for Africa project is conducted. The research was
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conducted over two extended periods of time. Over a three week period in New York 
and then during a three week period in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The case study was 
based on interviews with project leaders in New York and Addis Ababa. The first 
period, based in New York, involved an analysis of the secondary literature of the 
project and meetings with the project leader and policy advisor. Within-case analysis 
was employed to familiarise the author with the conceptual basis underpinning the 
project and also the rationale. The researcher studied the project’s written 
documentation in order to get a sound understanding of the project itself.
The second phase of the case study represented an assessment of the initiative, based on 
the author’s experience as a participant in an evaluation mission to Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. Analysis at this level allowed the gathering of multiple sources of data, 
namely: in-depth semi-structured interviews, observational data collection firstly as an 
observer and secondly as a participant, and secondary data collection. It was decided to 
use semi-structured interviews, as recommended by Yin (1994), to expand the depth of 
data gathering, and to increase the number of sources of information. The interview 
protocol was free form and followed the recommendations of Yin (1994).
Firstly, informal meetings were conducted with the local staff of the UNDP country 
office of Ethiopia to ascertain the key sectors of Internet users in Ethiopia. These were 
identified as:
• non-governmental organisations;
• academia;
• private sector; and
• international organisations.
A minimum of two organisations were then selected from each category as being a 
representative sample of that sector. Interviewees were then selected based on their 
knowledge of Internet issues and also their usage of electronic networking. Where 
possible, interviewees were responsible for information systems and communications 
decision-making in their respective organisations. In order to sensitise interviewers to 
the project under investigation, a copy of the Initiative project document was delivered 
prior to the commencement of the interviews. Over a period of three weeks, 21 semi­
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structured interviews were conducted with the following groups in order to ascertain 
their opinions on the Internet Initiative in Ethiopia:
• private sector information technology vendors;
• senior staff at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa;
• senior staff at the National Computer and Information Centre;
• head of the Ethio-Intemet Centre (ETC’s Internet Centre);
• members of the Chamber of Commerce;
• officials of the local UNDP office;
• Addis Ababa University officials and senior staff; and
• several NGOs.
There were a number of qualifying criteria for selection. Firstly, that interviewees had 
used or attempted to use the Internet. Secondly that interviewees were involved in the 
procurement of information and communication technology equipment for their 
organisations. These conditions were designed to ensure that interviewees could 
provide real insight into both the problems of using and procuring ICT products, and 
would be capable of providing informed opinion on external efforts to improve both 
these aspects. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the data collection technique 
of choice because of the need to get feedback on specific topic areas, whilst at the same 
time giving interviewees room to be informative. The semi-structured interview themes 
are listed in Appendix D, along with a list of all those interviewed and their 
organisations. The case study was not designed to test an hypothesis, but rather was 
designed to illustrate issues arising from ICT-related development projects in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (Bouma and Atkinson, 1995). The primary unit of analysis is the United 
Nations Development Programme / Regional Bureau for Africa Internet Initiative. The 
case study itself was not designed to test the achievement of project objectives, but to 
question certain assumptions of the project designers and to illustrate some of the 
traditional issues concerning ICT-related donor-assisted initiatives raised in the 
literature.
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To further assess actors involved in information infrastructure development in the Sub- 
Saharan Africa region Chapter Five explores the role of the foreign private sector. 
Again, this group of actors is playing a varied role in the region, ranging from the 
provision of telecommunications services to the production of information technology 
products. To focus the research it was decided to investigate the role of emerging forms 
of telecommunications provision in and around the continent. To this end satellite and 
submarine cable projects were used as proxy variables for the role of the foreign private 
sector in the infrastructure development efforts of African countries. Primary and 
secondary sources were used to arrive at a comprehensive list of all the major satellite 
and cable projects being conducted that affect the Sub-Saharan Africa region. These 
initiatives were then assessed in terms of their contribution to the indigenous 
infrastructure and their value-added. Criteria include such variables as geographic 
coverage, cost of service, and intended market. To illustrate the potential impact of 
these innovations in telecommunications and data transport, two countries, Nigeria and 
Ethiopia, were selected to illustrate the demographic and economic issues that will 
dictate the appropriateness of new connectivity options for African policy-makers.
• An assessment of the role of indigenous efforts to construct information 
infrastructure
Two national case studies, Nigeria and Ethiopia, are presented to assess indigenous 
information infrastructure creation. Based on primary and secondary data, the role of 
national policy-making is analysed in terms of relevant public policies and public 
pronouncements concerned with information and communication technologies. 
Variables such as telecommunications reform, fiscal policy and education policy are 
evaluated, as well as the role of domestic industries. Each case study employs 
quantitative data to analyse the two proxy variables of the telecommunications and 
information technology sectors.
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1.9.1 Assumptions and limitations
Throughout the research proxy variables, namely the telecommunications and 
information technology and Internet sectors, are used to demonstrate key developments 
in information infrastructure creation. However, given the paucity of data and 
inaccuracy of metric methodologies these variables remain difficult to isolate 
empirically. The research relies heavily on secondary data sources; however, the rapid 
pace of technological change often meant that aspects of the information infrastructure 
within a particular country, such as Internet connectivity changed significantly over a 
six month period. However, given that overall the level of information infrastructure 
components within Sub-Saharan Africa remains relatively and absolutely 
underdeveloped, the secondary data sources were capable of conveying a suitably 
accurate overview of the sector.
With regards to the choice of case study methodology, critics assert that the study of a 
small number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of 
findings. Others feel that the intense exposure to study of the case biases the findings. 
Some dismiss case study research as useful only as an exploratory tool (Lee, 1989). 
Despite these valid criticisms, researchers continue to use the case study research 
method with success in carefully planned and crafted studies of real-life situations, 
issues, and problems (Grant, 1996; Odedra, 1990a; Kluzer, 1993; Kamel, 1994). For the 
purposes of this research the case study method was deemed appropriate and consistent 
with the exploratory nature of the area of enquiry. The national case studies of Ethiopia 
and Nigeria were designed to be descriptive case studies at the macro level. This macro 
level approach, based on analyses of secondary data, precluded a much more detailed 
investigation of both countries. Nonetheless, the case studies achieved the objectives of 
identifying the main local and external actors, the constraints to infrastructure 
development and the role of public policy. Such a description deeply enriches the 
understanding of causality and how information infrastructure development in the 
region is being affected by the context in which it is constructed.
The case study of the Internet Initiative for Africa project in Ethiopia raised a different 
set of methodological issues, namely the potential bias of the researcher as an active 
participant. Though the evaluation of a project is traditionally conducted with ex post
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investigations the compartmentalised nature of the Internet Initiative for Africa project 
in Ethiopia permits an assessment of that particular part of the initiative (Rebian, 1996). 
Moreover, interviews were carried out once the project objectives had been agreed 
upon. It was thus unlikely that there would be any fundamental change to the project 
design.
1.9.2 Contributions of the research
Whilst this research does not seek to provide explicit policy solutions, it does provide a
conceptual framework that will guide African policy-makers and point to areas of
consideration. Specifically the dissertation provides:
• A critical analysis of the literature on ICTs and its impact on Sub-Saharan Africa.
• A conceptual framework which justifies the importance of information 
infrastructure for Sub-Saharan African countries.
• An analysis of the current sophistication of information infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa. This will allow an assessment of the key areas of strength and
weakness that national polities should focus on.
• A critical examination of the respective roles played in the construction of 
infrastructure by development agencies, the foreign private sector, and national 
governments.
•  Finally, the research suggests a framework for the development of national
information infrastructure policy. This framework aids both in assessing current
infrastructure, and designing public policy that is appropriate to the indigenous 
environment.
1.10 Structure and outline of the research
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Following this chapter’s introduction to the 
literature, Chapter Two presents theoretical justifications for the utility value of 
information and communication technologies in meeting the developmental challenges
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facing Sub-Saharan Africa. It also points to the importance of human agency in shaping 
technological trajectories, utilising constructive technology assessment theory to 
underpin a belief in the role of public policy.
Chapter Three articulates a conceptual framework which provides policy-planners with 
an empowering analytical perspective from which to view information infrastructure 
development. This national information infrastructure framework is a multidimensional 
conceptual construct that recognises the existence of a multiplicity of actors with 
varying and often divergent interests, and justifies the role of the state as coordinator, 
constructor and regulator.
Chapter Four presents a survey of the state of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in terms of two key elements: telecommunications and Internet development. 
The empirical evidence, whilst incomplete, does reveal statistical homogeneity in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region in terms of the paucity of information infrastructure. An 
analysis is made of the state of both these sectors. The chapter then seeks to identify the 
various actors partaking in the development of information infrastructure in the region, 
assessing their roles and motives.
Chapter Five examines new telecommunications connectivity options emerging on the 
continent and asks how they can contribute not only to improved telecommunications, 
but also to the broader development of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It presents a framework to analyse the relative merits and disadvantages of these 
technological systems in relation to national criteria.
Chapter Six looks at the critical role that development agencies have played in the 
development of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is argues that 
whilst their efforts have brought much needed expertise and physical infrastructure, 
there are legitimate concerns as to the effectiveness of externally designed initiatives. 
Firstly, an introduction is provided to the history of development assistance to African 
countries in the field of information and communication technologies. Secondly, a 
sample survey of projects is conducted to determine the main areas in which 
development assistance is being applied in ICT-related activities, and the rationale
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behind these activities. Finally a case study of the United Nations Development 
Programme’s Internet Initiative for Africa is carried out.
Both Chapters Seven and Eight represent analyses of the information infrastructure in, 
respectively, Nigeria and Ethiopia in terms of the conceptual framework outlined in 
Chapter Three. Following this framework, the twin pillars of information infrastructure 
-  the telecommunications network and the information technology industry -  are 
examined in-depth. Specifically it sets out to review existing capabilities, identify the 
actors engaged and/or determining information infrastructure development. Providing 
assessments of short-term needs, and pointing to the creation of strategies to achieve 
longer-term objectives.
Chapters Nine provides policy recommendations on how to solve problems common to 
the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and specific to Ethiopia and Nigeria. Chapter Ten 
represents a summary and discussion of the research findings and the implications for 
public policy. It draws conclusions from the research undertaken and presents a case for 
the utility value of the national information infrastructure framework. Finally, 
suggestions for future research are provided.
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CHAPTER 2 
The Justification for Information Infrastructure
2.1 Introduction
The review of the literature in Chapter One revealed widespread speculation and little
in the way of substantive research into the issue of information infrastructure in
industrialised and developing countries. The theoretical analysis presented in this 
chapter seeks to avoid the conceptual flaws inherent in causal and technologically 
determinist models, by arguing the case for a more limited, utilitarian role for 
information and communication technologies. The research does not seek to reify 
information and communication technologies as deus ex machina. Nor at any stage 
does the research attempt to argue that the construction of an information infrastructure 
can lead to economic development. Rather, it seeks to justify expenditure on 
information infrastructure for the facilitation of the achievement of national objectives. 
These new technologies are seen as facilitating and enabling national capabilities and a 
raft of concerns ranging from supporting and generating economic activity to public 
service delivery, providing, for example:
• information for policy formulation and implementation;
• better data for financial control of the public sector;
• improved decision support systems;
• access to information for the rural population;
• links for researchers and professionals to research findings;
• information for more effective natural resource management; and
• improved access to timely and relevant information on international markets.
A utilitarian approach argues that there is clear justification for the use of information 
and communication technologies in developing countries. The emphasis is placed 
firmly on practical as opposed to theoretical propositions, as answers are sought to such 
concerns as the relationship between investing in technology and the benefits which 
might arise. The justification for the positive role that these technologies can play in 
facilitating national development emanates from a number of important strands in
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social science research. Firstly, the emergent literature on the "economics of 
information", which argues that decision-makers in developing countries are poorly 
served by inadequate information infrastructures that undermine their short and long­
term competitiveness (Abidi, 1991). Secondly, studies attesting to the economic 
importance of infrastructure, in particular telecommunications. Thirdly the economic 
importance of new technologies for long-term economic growth, as exemplified by the 
neo-Schumpeterian school of thought. Finally, the research introduces constructive 
technology assessment theory as a justification for public policy in information 
infrastructure construction.
2.2 The economics of information
Stigler famously remarked that, ’[information] occupies a slum dwelling in the town of 
economics’ (Stigler, 1968, p. 71). Since then there has been increasing interest in the 
"economics of information". Theoretical treatises proliferate on the previously 
neglected implications of informational asymmetries for the functioning of markets, 
competitive or otherwise. This recent work has been in addition to that associated with 
the extant literature on game theory, bargaining, and negotiation, in which information 
and misinformation play crucial roles.
The main information "problems" seen to affect developing countries can be grouped as 
follows:
• uncertainty about the future (incomplete information);
• inherent uncertainties and deficiencies or asymmetries in information about the 
present; and
• informational deficiencies or asymmetries about the present which are 
"unnecessary" in the sense that it is possible, at a price, to remove or reduce them 
by "searching" and/or "advertising".
While everyone suffers from uncertainty about the future, it is not the case that 
everyone suffers equally, since people have differing access to information sources and 
varying capacities to process them. Policy-makers in developing countries, however,
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may not have access to even to such rudimentary guides as information on current 
prices, let alone other market conditions or opinions. In volatile commodity, financial 
and foreign exchange markets, for example, the effects of even slight delays in the 
receipt of information may have serious consequences.
The new economics of information focuses on cases of imperfect information in which 
prices serve not only to clear markets but also to convey signals as to quality. Hillier 
(1997) points out that uncertainty over the quality of goods and services may be 
"inherent" in that further search efforts may give little insight into the characteristics of 
the good or service. This informational problem may directly impede developing 
countries’ entry into international trade. The quality of their products may be regarded 
as uncertain and, surprisingly, the lower their prices the greater buyer resistance may 
be. Imperfect information is also said to generate lender resistance to developing 
countries financial instruments in global credit markets. Boafo (1990) highlights that 
the herd mentality’ of private banks’ lending to particular developing countries suggests 
highly imperfect information and reliance on the behaviour of other participants in the 
market.
Of even greater significance for developing countries is the dearth of information 
surrounding purchasing decisions. Governments and the private sector in developing 
countries face major informational problems as buyers. For them, the informational 
situation is often analogous to Akerlof’s6 (1984) seminal analysis of the market for 
"lemons". His analysis showed that those who sell high-quality products are reluctant to 
sell in the open world market at some kind of average price, which includes that for 
low-quality products. However, the poorest and least informed tend to seek out 
bargains on the "used car market" of the world; and they, like used car buyers are 
frequently exploited. The low-quality goods drive out the high-quality ones on the open 
markets. Not only then are there direct costs to the cheated purchasers from quality 
misrepresentation by sellers but, more importantly, there are social costs derived from 
the driving out of some legitimate businesses from the market. As Spence (1974) points
6 The seller of superior goods knows that his good are superior and will not be adequately compensated in an 
open market in which "lemons" are also to be found, and which the inevitably ill-informed are unable to tell 
the difference. The cautious (or informed) buyer is willing to pay a higher price for better quality goods. 
There are some signs -  firms' reputations, branding -  to guide the ill informed; but these typically involve 
oligopolistic rent which wise poorer buyers can ill afford (Akerlof, 1984).
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out that, ’clearly the traditional presumption of caveat emptor has no basis within 
welfare economics, when information is costly’ (Spence, 1974, p. 35).
Examples of the dangers arising from the provision of misleading or incomplete 
information, in environments within which there are a few checks or balances, abound 
in developing countries. A dramatic example is the introduction of widespread access 
to television in Samoa in the mid-1970s. Frequent advertisements for the medicinal 
product Pepto-Bismol led to enormous quantities being consumed In a society where 
no incidence of intestinal or digestive ailments had previously been visible’ (James and 
Lister, 1980, pp. 83 -  4). Examples such as these point to the intuitive conclusion that 
consumers in developing countries are more likely to form their predilections on the 
basis of misinformation.
Moreover information plays a critical role in the development process. The ability to 
identify, implement, and evaluate development strategies is inextricably connected to 
the effective collection, utilisation and dissemination of information (Kelly, 1998). 
These informational deficiencies are endemic in Sub-Saharan Africa; most countries 
have trouble acquiring, retrieving, processing and disseminating information of various 
types. This "information poverty" exists at every level of society and impairs public and 
private decision-making. In the South, where raw information is lacking, as well as the 
means to convert it into knowledge, information poverty takes many forms and can 
have serious consequences (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1996). For example, local business 
opportunities are curtailed by serious lack of knowledge about local and international 
markets, concerning changed patterns of demand, or new products, technologies and 
methods of production. Researchers, scientists, and skilled workers are isolated from 
current developments in their professions. Lack of timely information means, in turn, 
low productivity and poor-quality research, and valuable time wasted hunting for 
information and repeating research already done. Moreover, developing countries face 
obstacles that seriously handicap policy-makers: inadequate knowledge of natural 
resources, and unreliable socio-economic data, as well as poor information on national 
accounts, debt, balance of payments, market prices, extent of poverty, and impact of 
poverty alleviation, health and education programs (Abul Naga, 1994).
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This leads to fundamental weaknesses in public policy planning. Lack of information 
also reduces bargaining power in bilateral and multilateral negotiations (Levine and 
Lippman, 1995). For example, major companies armed with remote-sensing satellite 
information about commodities such as oil, minerals or crops may know more about a 
developing country’s resources than the country itself. Jequier and Dedijer (1987) 
discuss this issue with reference to the example of Guyana which in 1976 extended the 
limits of its territorial waters to the now customary 200 miles; thus extending the area 
under its sovereignty by 50 per cent. However, though it was likely that this additional 
territory contained oil, the country had not a single oil industry engineer. Thus, without 
foreign intelligence the country would have been unable to exploit its natural reserves. 
Similar weaknesses may be felt in borrowing on international capital markets, dealing 
with multinationals, or influencing decisions by multilateral organisations like the 
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.
Another illustration is the need for intelligence on multinational corporations. These 
corporations often comprise a disproportionately high level of economic activity in 
developing countries (UNCTAD, 1995). However, despite their prevalence and their 
importance to a country’s balance of payments, policy-makers often know very little 
about their activities (Jequier and Dedijer, 1987; Klein, 1988). Thus developing 
countries often find that they are negotiating from a position of considerable 
informational weakness. These multinationals, which often have turnovers larger than 
the GDP of many developing countries, have access to and often produce the latest 
market intelligence (Cruise O’Brien, 1983). The surprise withdrawal of IBM from India 
in the wake of new indigenisation decrees in the late 1970s, for example, has been 
widely attributed to India’s lack of information with regards to the two companies. 
Failure to develop information infrastructures in developing countries may not only 
mean the perpetuation of the inefficiencies and inequities of present international 
exchange but also their worsening, as a result of internationally unbalanced 
technological change in the foreseeable future.
There is evidently a clear need for the development of better systems of market 
information for use by developing countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which are characterised by the poverty of their information infrastructure. To acquire 
information through arm’s-length purchase is to face the difficulties of quality
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assessment, rapid obsolescence, inappropriate packaging, other’s market power and 
probable high cost (Abul Naga, 1994). The long-term solution to the issues raised 
above points firmly to the development of indigenous information systems (Madon, 
1992; Kamel, 1994). Scale economies in the collection, processing, storage and 
transmission of information have always been at the centre of discussions about 
informational capacity on the part of economic and political actors (Spence, 1974). As 
Klein points out, ’whether information is to be made or bought, the difficulties of 
appropriating the product, the gains to be realised through its diffusion, and the 
potential for scale economies and positive externalities, all suggest the potential 
productivity of governmental rather than decentralised private activity in this sector’ 
(Klein, 1980: 278). This would seem to point to the economic value of the public 
information infrastructure provision.
There is also a desperate need for more informed decision-making in developing 
countries. For example, rural communities would benefit greatly from mechanisms that 
furnish them with the information they need to manage their environment and resources 
more efficiently. As Brodnig and Mayer-Schonberger (1999) argue 'accurate and 
reliable information is a key ingredient, if not precondition for sustainable 
development' (Brodnig and Mayer-Schonberger, 1999, p. 1). For example, the ability of 
policy-makers to manage their natural resources can be vastly improved by deploying 
technological innovations such as geographical information systems (GIS).7 These 
allow the collection of accurate and comprehensive spatial data in such information­
intensive areas as disaster prevention and resource management. Brodnig and Mayer- 
Schonberger (1999) highlight the fact that in many developing countries maps and 
other geographical products from the colonial era are still in use as informational 
benchmarks.
From a governmental point of view, information infrastructure is increasingly being 
seen as critical to effective public administration. Bhatnagar (1999) and others have 
pointed out that technological innovations in information systems such as electronic 
document management, and inter- and intranets can lead to innovative administrative
7 A Geographical Information System (GIS) can be defined as a computer-based system used to capture, store, 
edit, analyse and display geographically referenced data (Poole, 1995).
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information systems which can enhance policy formulation, improve the quality of 
public service delivery and make planning more effective. Moreover decision support 
systems can aid policy-makers in the effective deployment of public policy.8
2.3 The economic value of public infrastructure
There have been numerous economic studies on the general role of public infrastructure 
in economic growth. Much of the literature seeks to capture infrastructure’s direct and 
indirect externality effects by observing the relationship between public capital 
expenditure (as a proxy for increases in the stock of infrastructure), and some growth in 
aggregate output or productivity. For example, a survey of 179 manufacturing 
establishments in Nigeria documented the costs of unreliable infrastructure and the 
costs of consequential investment in alternative sources. The study found that due to the 
unreliability of electricity supply, 92 per cent of firms owned electricity generators. In 
fact private infrastructure provision constituted 15 per cent of total machinery and 
equipment costs (Lee, 1996). Moreover, the survey found the burden fell 
disproportionately on small firms. If small firms are unable to realise the benefits of 
efficient generation of infrastructure services, either because the services are non­
existent or provided so unreliably, they will be forced to seek higher cost alternatives 
which may have unfavourable impacts on profits and levels of productivity. In their 
totality these costs result in an under-utilisation of existing productive capacity and 
production inefficiency. These estimates, however, fail to reflect a more important 
feature of infrastructural deficiency; namely dynamic long-term costs.
Aschauer (1989) and Canning (1999) has conducted studies on U.S. infrastructure, and 
Reitveld (1989) has surveyed studies of infrastructural impact in Europe. The 
consensus emerging from these studies is a positive correlation, but for numerous 
reasons, their conclusions are far from robust. For example, even when efforts are made 
to identify the direction of causality, the results are often inconclusive because of other 
econometric factors (Lee, 1996). In addition the variables chosen are often too
8 See Kamel (1994) who investigates the role of Egypt’s Information and Decision Support Centres (IDSC) in 
supporting the policy-making capabilities of local governors.
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aggregated to allow meaningful policy recommendations, and little attention is paid to 
the efficient utilisation of the infrastructure under examination. An infrastructure’s 
linkages to an economy are multiple and complex, because it affects production and 
consumption directly, creates many positive and negative externalities, and involves 
large flows of expenditure. Nowhere is this truer than in the telecommunications sector.
In light of the increasing integration of the global economy and the simultaneous 
economic opening up of many developing countries, telecommunications is now 
recognised as a fundamental requisite of any national or large-scale growth project in 
the developing world. As one of the few industries that cuts across and integrates social 
and economic activities, telecommunications holds a strategic position in the building 
of a dynamic and flexible national economy. The sector is central to the national and 
international flows of capital and commerce (Kiplagat and Werner, 1994; Labelle, 
1995; Saunders et al., 1994). This is especially true in light of the merger of 
communications technologies and information technology that has radically 
transformed the role of communications technologies in the productive system.
It follows from this that the basic building block of the information infrastructure is the 
telephone service and the high-speed telecommunications backbone linking it 
internationally. A more persuasive justification for a prioritisation of information 
infrastructure expenditure looks at the relationship between telecommunications 
infrastructure and economic activity in various sectors. In this context 
telecommunications are widely considered to be a strategic investment that is the key to 
maintaining and developing competitive advantage at the level of the nation, region, 
and the firm. Countries and firms that lack access to modem systems of 
telecommunications cannot effectively participate in the global economy (Wellenius 
and Stem, 1994).
Acknowledging that the diffuse benefits and the sheer unpredictability of technological 
change make it difficult to ascertain the economic benefits to be gained from 
information and communication technologies, there has been substantial increase in 
research on the influence of information and communications on economic growth. 
One major hypothesis is that information and communication technologies are seen as 
underpinning a host of economic activities. This is supported not just by unbridled
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optimism, but also by a host of studies in the field of economics that seem to justify this 
contention (Edirisuriya, 1995; Runge, 1985; Macdonald and Madden, 1998). These 
economic studies and lessons of the last 15 years are seen to provide substantial 
evidence at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels that information 
infrastructure, and specifically telecommunications, investment yields direct and 
measurable economic benefits.
Mostly designed to support the planning and design process in developing countries, 
the underlying objective of these studies has been to justify quantitatively the economic 
value of telecommunications investment (Saunders et al., 1994). The economic 
rationale underlying these studies is that telecommunications infrastructure may be 
viewed as an input to a productive process, a ’factor of production’ like petroleum or 
electricity (Saunders et al., 1994, p. 73). In their review of the literature Saunders et al. 
(1994) point out that one can group the economic benefits to be derived from 
telecommunications under four categories: market information for buying and selling, 
transport efficiency, regional development and coordination of international activity. 
They also assert that telecommunications can amongst other things:
• substitute cost-effectively for mail usage and personal travel;
• potentially increase productivity through better management in both the private and 
public sectors;
• remove some of the physical constraints on organisational communication in 
various sectors of the economy; and
• improve the efficiency of markets, allowing economic agents greater scope in 
responding to changes in information.
They conclude that telecommunications still appears to command a lower order of 
priority in many developing countries than is justified in economic terms. 
Communication and mass media researchers have also echoed these sentiments. Pool 
(1977), for example, has asserted that It would seem clear that international 
telecommunications is of great importance to the developing world. It can bring 
deficient information facilities at a leap up to the best, or its lack can lead to slipping 
further and further behind’ (Pool, 1977, p. 56).
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These claims are corroborated by empirical studies on the relation between economic 
growth and the diffusion of information and communication technologies in which the 
supply and demand of telecommunications has been linked to the level of economic 
development of a country (Jipp, 1962; Hardy, 1980; Sauders et al., 1994). Hudson 
(1984) asserts that there strong evidence of a positive correlation between the telephone 
and economic development. Hardy (1984) investigates the telephone’s role as a 
contributory agent in economic development. Concluding that there is a positive 
correlation, in that telecommunications plays a crucially supportive role in economic 
activity. Similarly, the diffusion of information technology has been related to the 
development of the non-agricultural sector of the economy (Stoneman, 1976; Ayers, 
1990; Bhagavan, 1997; Freeman, 1995).
Consequently, information and communication technologies are seen as representing a 
set of generic technologies with the potential for stimulating substantial economic 
growth and productivity because they are all-pervasive in their implications for 
industrial and economic development. As result, some researchers have made a strong 
case for the value of investment in these technologies as an enabler of economic 
development; based on ideas of information technology enhancing worker productivity 
and increasing the returns on other capital goods. Looking specifically at the value of 
information technology investments, a number of researchers argue that information 
technology-led development may result in or anticipate economic growth. Kraemer and 
Dedrick (1996), for example, in a study of information technology investment in 12 
Asia-Pacific countries, found a strong correlation between information technology 
investment and productivity in national economies. However, they themselves admit 
that it does not provide ’conclusive evidence of a causal relationship’9 (Kraemer and 
Dedrick, 1996, p. 330).
Whilst the studies cited above appear to point to a clear economic justification for 
putting advanced information and communications infrastructures in place, there are a 
few important caveats. Hardy (1980), for example, fails to specify in precisely what 
ways telecommunications supports economic growth; rather it appears to be a tacit 
assumption, an intuitive given in his research. This problem bestrides the concept of
9 See Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993).
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information infrastructure: how to effectively measure the potential impact of this 
recent convergence of technologies. Yet at the micro level, there is still a distinct lack 
of understanding as to where and when -  much less why -  information technology can 
be applied to foster economic and employment growth. The measurement of 
productivity linked to technology growth continues to be problematic and researchers 
have yet to come up with a conclusive answer to the so-called 'Solow Paradox' — 
computers everywhere, but little in the way of productivity gains.10 This research does 
not seek an answer to this question, nor are any suggested, but it does echo the 
conclusions of Kenney (1995) who argues that, '...electronic switching and advanced 
telecommunications are the core of the emerging information technology. A country's 
ability to benefit from new information systems, through domestic and international 
computer networks, data communications, fax and media, for example, depend heavily 
on the modernity of its telecommunications network' (Kenney, 1995, p.38).
2.4 Neo-Schumpeterian theory
The multiplier and network characteristics of information and communication 
technologies have led many to ascribe special qualities to them. Hamelink (1986) 
argues convincingly that they do not just represent another technology, but rather the 
command and control system for all other technologies. Consequently, the control of 
this technology is a vital component in the distribution and execution of social power. 
Differential access to information and communication technologies determines the 
capacity to collect, process and use information: a conclusive factor in decision-making 
(Kamel, 1994). Moreover information and communication technologies are 
increasingly becoming a foundational technology: more and more they represent the 
indispensable infrastructure for a whole range of industrial production processes.
Proponents of this opinion argue that information and communication technologies 
enable a multitude of activities to be done in different, cheaper and more efficient ways
10 Daniel Sichel (1998) provides an excellent analysis of the key issues. In brief, he argues that recent 
developments in information technology are a continuation of past trends and that caution is necessary 
before a nation can hope to count on a large boost to productivity growth.
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and, thus, represent a new factor of production (Perez, 1983). This factor of production 
is seen as a chronic disturber of comparative advantage that lies at the centre of the 
emergence of a new techno-economic paradigm (Dosi, 1984). The impact of 
information and communication technology arises from three of its characteristics. 
Firstly, it is an enabling technology: it can be applied in a wide range of different 
circumstances and can itself contribute to further technological change. Secondly, the 
capacity of the technology has been increasing at an exponential rate for over two 
decades and shows no signs of abating. Finally, and most importantly, the cost of 
technology has fallen rapidly over the same period of time, and again seems likely to 
continue to do so.
Citing the influential works of Schumpeter (1939) and Kondratieff11, the assertion is 
that technology has provided the principle source of change for firms, regions and 
nations alike. Technological change is seen as driving economic growth through a 
cyclical process of "creative destruction", with new technologies inducing novel, more 
productive investments, but at the same time destroying the economic feasibility of 
earlier ones. Freeman argues that the global economy is now at the critical, and painful, 
juncture between the fourth and fifth cycles. Further, that the change from an industrial 
model, based on a specific techno-economic paradigm (TEP) to another invariably 
implies profound structural adjustments, and institutional changes:
Changes of TEP are based on combinations of radical product, process and 
organisational innovations. They occur relatively seldom (perhaps twice a 
century) but when they do occur they necessitate changes in the institutional and 
social framework if their potential is to be fully exploited.
(Freeman, 1987, p. 67)
According to TEP theory the current paradigm is easily identifiable and gives rise to 
Kondratieff-type cycles. Freeman and Perez describe the former TEP in the following 
manner:
11 The theory of long waves, though often credited to Kondratiev, actually has a rich lineage, with economists 
such as Pareto, Parvus and van Geldem all having commented extensively on the secular movements of long 
time series of price data, identifying such long waves (Brundenius, 1995; Mager, 1987). The renewed 
interest in long cycles in economic development is primarily associated with Schumpeter and the neo- 
Schumpeterians such as Freeman, Soete, Perez and van Duijn).
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The technological paradigm which predominated in the post-war boom was one 
based on low-cost oil and energy-intensive materials (especially petrochemicals 
and synthetics), and was led by giant oil, chemical, automobile, and other mass 
durable goods producers. Its ideal type of productive organisation at the plant 
level was the continuous flow of assembly line, turning out massive quantities 
of identical units. The ideal type of firm was the corporation with a separate and 
complex hierarchical managerial and administrative structure, including in- 
house research and development and operating in oligopolistic markets in which 
advertising and marketing activities played a major role. It required large 
numbers of middle-range skills in both the blue and white-collar areas, leading 
to a characteristic pattern of occupations and income distribution...This 
paradigm required a vast infrastructural network of motorways, service stations, 
airports, oil and petrol distribution systems, which was promoted by public 
investment on a large scale already in the 1930s, but more massively in the 
post-war period (Freeman and Perez, 1988, p. 60).
Freeman argues that information and communication technologies have the capability 
'to act as the basis of a technological revolution in countries aiming to catch up the 
world's industrial leaders' (Freeman, 1996, p. 218). But there is an explicit 
acknowledgement that realistically 'catch-up' applies only to a small band of developing 
countries that are increasingly leaving the rest behind. Fagerberg (1994) argues that 
while "catch-up" growth is possible, it can only be realised by countries that have a 
sufficiently strong social capability in investment, education and research and 
development. Perez (1983) and Soete (1985) point out that there is no way in which an 
indigenous enterprise can overcome the huge disadvantage in comparative unit costs if 
basic infrastructure and skilled human capital are absent, as is the case in most 
developing countries. More importantly the existence of a local science and technology 
infrastructure, and research and development efforts by local firms, are prerequisites for 
the efficient use of these new technologies (Antonelli, 1986; Appleton and Teal, 1999; 
Bezanson, 1997). The fact that the technology innovation and diffusion processes are 
dynamically intertwined has important implications for technological mastery in 
developing countries. Public policy must, therefore, be aimed at creating a climate that 
is conducive to national innovation.
77
For the purposes of the conceptual framework, the work of the neo-Schumpeterians 
provides an insightful explanatory framework in which to view the fundamental 
changes that the global economy is undergoing. It places these radical changes in a 
historical framework and makes a persuasive argument for the value of information 
infrastructure. Neo-Schumperterian theory makes it clear that technology is no 
exogenous "manna from heaven" (Dosi et al., 1988), rather, that technological change 
is an inherently endogenous process: technologies are conceived, developed and 
diffused by way of a long and costly process that is mediated by economic and social 
considerations.
This section has made a case for the importance of information infrastructure for 
developing countries. By citing economic theory and studies, it has argued that 
countries are disadvantaged by uncertainty arising from an informational deficiency 
that can be alleviated by the use of information and communication technologies. 
Secondly, with reference to research on the value of public infrastructure in general, 
and telecommunications in particular, it has shown a clear-cut justification for 
constructing or upgrading information infrastructure. Finally, the conceptual framework 
has utilised neo-Schumpeterian theory to place the current fundamental technological 
changes in an historical context, and show the far-reaching implications for public 
policy. However, like the proverbial curate’s egg, the theory of long waves and new 
technoeconomic paradigms is good in parts and bad in others.12 Neo-Schumpeterian 
theory offers theoretical titillation to developing countries seeking more substantial 
insights, based on praxis, on how to harness the potentiality of information and 
communication technologies. Whilst the above section has provided a theoretical 
justification for the importance of a well-developed information infrastructure, there are 
evidently some compelling challenges that Sub-Saharan Africa faces in an era 
characterised by the ubiquity of information and communication technologies.
12 Firstly, these changes do not lend themselves easily to economic analysis (Ayers 1990; Foray and Freeman 
1993; Rosenberg, Landau and Mowery 1992). Rosenberg and Frischtak, (1984) along with others have 
questioned the very existence of long-wave cycles.
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2.5 Challenges to development in Sub-Saharan Africa
(a) Increased competition and commodity substitution
Traditional domestic markets are becoming more exposed to competition enabled by 
new technological capabilities. With many Sub-Saharan African countries dependent 
on donor assistance and foreign direct investment, the increase in the number of 
competing countries which may be more attractive locations due to better information 
infrastructures, poses a serious threat to wealth creation.13 Advances in biotechnology 
and material science are leading to synthetic substitutes for the primary products on 
which the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries are dependent (Coates and 
Mahaffie, 1997). Prices for products such as vanilla, sugar, cocoa and palm oil have 
declined steadily over the last decade as Western firms have undertaken genetic 
research to develop outright synthetic substitutes or varieties that can be produced in 
their laboratories or in non-traditional environments (Wright and McManus, 1991). The 
concern, therefore, should be how African farmers and firms can take advantage of 
global opportunities and develop the necessary skills to compete. Similarly, optical 
fibre could virtually eliminate copper from trunk systems in the future 
telecommunications market. As the region that produces the majority of the world’s 
copper, African countries will find a shrinking demand for their product. This reduction 
in the economic viability of traditional commodity markets may also have an impact on 
rural-urban migration. The rise in the application of new technologies, new production 
systems, and the organisation of international trade reduces the need for traditional 
agricultural farming. As a result there is a growing exodus from rural to urban areas. 
Rural people are destined to be painfully absorbed into the informal economy of 
already overcrowded urban centres (ADB, 1998; Castells, 1997b).
Technological innovation is also leading to efficiency improvements in the use of raw 
materials. The result is a long-term trend of dematerialisation in industrial production
13 A survey of 55 US corporations with investments in Africa found that the telecommunications infrastructure 
was ranked as the fifth most important factor in considering undertaking direct investment in Africa. 
Yahaya, L. (1996) Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria, M.Sc. Dissertation, University of Manchester.
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(Quah, 1999). This declining material intensity in production represents a new barrier 
to Africa’s full participation in the world economy, as most African countries are 
exporters of primary commodities and raw materials. Complicating the situation are the 
challenges of globalisation and the ever-changing context of development. In the 
current era of globalisation and international trade agreements, African policy-makers 
are finding it harder to utilise public policy to protect fragile sectors and nurture infant 
industries. Public policy space has been severely limited, as African countries must 
comply with new rules. Unlike the tiger economies of East Asia in the 1970s and 
1980s, African countries cannot implement strategic trade policy, which promotes 
export while protecting domestic firms from intense foreign competition in the local 
market. Africa must today comply with trade regimes which it did not participate in 
designing and does not have the capacity to comply with.
(b) The international intellectual property rights regime
Allied to this is the race to lay claim to knowledge, particularly in biotechnology, which 
has been accelerated by the privatisation of research and development, market 
liberalisation and the tightening of intellectual property rights legislation. The 1999 
UNDP human development report asserts that: In defining research agenda, money 
talks louder than need -  cosmetic drugs and slow-ripening tomatoes come higher on the 
list than a vaccine against malaria or drought-resistant crops for marginal lands', argues 
the report (UNDP, 1999, p. 6). It goes on further to assert that:
tighter control of innovation in the hands of multinational corporations ignores 
the needs of millions. From new drugs to better seeds for food crops, the best of 
new technologies are designed and priced for those who can pay. For poor 
people, technological progress remains far out of reach (UNDP, 1999, p. 6).
There are thus legitimate calls for a review of the intellectual property rights agreement 
under the World Trade Organisation. Despite the increasing importance of intellectual 
property rights, current international agreements on intellectual property were 
negotiated before most governments and people understood the social and economic 
implications of patents (Brush, 1996). As a result the intellectual property rights regime 
has developed with little input from many of the developing countries, which are now
80
feeling its impact. According to the UNDP report current patent laws pay little attention 
to the knowledge of indigenous people, and on what can be owned: The result: a silent 
theft of centuries of knowledge from developing to developed countries’ (UNDP, 1999, 
P- 6).
International intellectual property legislation and control over the networks through 
which information flows are becoming the key sources of power in the information 
economy; neither of which African countries control. Multinational corporations are 
increasingly exploiting Africa for its untapped knowledge and reselling it back to the 
continent (Brush, 1996) A recent case saw US grain corporations attempting to 
establish "Basmati" rice as their own trademark (Kundnani, 1998). One of Africa’s 
continuing problems is that it does not know what it does not know. Ignorance over the 
continent’s natural resource endowments combined with the increasing sophistication of 
such technologies as remote sensing mean that better-informed players are patenting 
Africa’s resources and profiting from Africa’s ignorance. The global intellectual 
property rights regime is at the behest of such corporations and only serves to 
undermine the efforts of developing countries to safeguard their heritage.
(c) Unemployment
The impact of the information economy on employment is still unclear. Some 
economists, such as Schumpeter and Kondratieff14, argue that any impact on 
employment is dependent on the nature of the jobs created, and the extent to which jobs 
are replaced. Information and communication technologies and electronic commerce 
can create new employment opportunities in a number of areas in developing countries. 
Service industries, such as airlines and insurance, that involve labour-intensive tasks 
are taking advantage of the fact that modem telecommunications networks allow them 
to locate these activities in lower wage regions. However, employment generation is 
predicated on Africa’s need to create a comparative advantage in cheap skilled labour.
14 Soete, L. and ter Weel, B (1999) Schumpeter and the knowledge-based economy: on technology and 
competition policy, Maastricht: MERIT.
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Another related issue of importance is the effect of these technologies on labour and 
capital productivity. As the labour displacement caused by such technologies is in fact a 
de-skilling at the level of the labour process, labour shortage acquires an entirely 
different dimension in developing countries (Cassiolato, 1997). This de-skilling arises 
in tandem with an increasingly desperate need for highly-skilled personnel. Thus, in 
order to maximise value added from these technologies, a fundamental reappraisal of 
capabilities is required. This calls for an increase in expenditure on human resources; 
precisely the opposite of what is happening in the majority of developing countries 
(ADB, 1998). The basic characteristics of these technologies, as outlined above, all 
point to an indelible fact. To use them effectively requires skills and capabilities that far 
exceed those received from the simple importation of sophisticated technology 
(Odedra, 1990a, Grant, 1996). Gaining access may be a first step, but it only leads to 
static efficiencies; but what is necessary are dynamic gains. These will only arise 
through a long interactive process of leaming-by-doing, where the user-producer 
relation plays a crucial role.
Even if this is achieved, regions and firms are increasingly attracting talent from around 
the world, while leaving aside a significant fraction of their own population whose 
educational level and cultural/technical skills do not fit the requirements of the new 
production system. Silicon Valley in San Francisco, the most advanced information 
technology producing region in the world, is a case in point. It is widely acknowledged 
that this concentration of cutting-edge firms has only been able to maintain the pace of 
innovation by the annual recruitment of thousands of engineers and scientists from 
India, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Israel, Russia and Western Europe (Saxenian, 
1994).
Africa is likely to suffer from a severe brain drain that stems from inadequate national 
universities (Appleton and Teal, 1998). India, for example, whose Institutes of 
Technology (IIT) are regarded as a developing world success story, continues to see 
one in five information technology graduates leave the country to pursue further study 
in the United States or England with few returning (Appleton and Teal, 1998). Such is 
the global demand for skilled labour that, at a 1999 training session in Holland,
82
Microsoft representatives reportedly hired bodyguards to fend off other recruiters.15 
Increasingly the poorest parts of the world may find that they are less and less relevant 
to the functioning of a global information economy, if their only asset is the cheapness 
of their labour in an era in which there is a demand for cheap and skilled labour 
(Castells, 1997b). To leverage Africa’s comparative advantage in labour there is an 
urgent need to upgrade the skill sets of its workers. At the same time, in order to benefit 
from such lucrative industries as outsourcing, the existence of world class information 
infrastructures is critical (Heeks, 1999a).
(d) Social disruption and a loss of government control
The Industrial Revolution brought great economic and social benefit, but it also brought 
about massive dislocations of people, increased industrial pollution, unhealthy child 
labour and unsafe work environments (Crafts, 1979). Societies were often slow in 
responding to these negative side effects. Similarly, the increasing use of information 
and communication technologies may bring potential invasions of privacy, easier 
access by children to pornographic and violent and hate materials, more sophisticated 
and far-reaching criminal activity and a host of other as-yet-unknown problems. In 
addition, as global integration increases, governments are seeing a reduction in the 
scope of their powers. Governments who hope to raise financial capital on the 
international markets or from institutions know that there is a heavy price to pay. They 
must conform to a narrow set of criteria that are adjudged to increase the likelihood of 
healthy returns for international investors. Thus countries are discouraged from 
investing in social programmes as these are seen as being inflationary (Harris, 1998). 
Privatisation of state assets is often a prerequisite and a tight monetary and fiscal stance 
is seen as essential.
Unfortunately these neoliberal economic principles are often discordant with the 
achievement of national development objectives and the straightjacket of international 
finance criteria reduces the economic manoeuvrability of the developmental state. For 
those developing countries that stray from the mantra of neoliberalism the punishment 
can be swift and devastating. The 1998 East Asian financial crisis was the direct result
15 "Global demand for IT professionals reaches crisis point", Predicasts, 15 January 1999.
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of a collapse of confidence by overseas investors in the underlying fundamentals of the 
region’s component economies. In Thailand, for example, US$ 8 billion was withdrawn 
from the financial markets in just five hours, as investors responded to perceived 
structural weaknesses in the Thai economy (Harris, 1998).
Moreover, commentators on the information economy have failed to ask who is best 
placed to reap the trumpeted benefits. Whilst African countries struggle to upgrade 
their communications infrastructures, the best placed are invariably those multinational 
corporations who can invest in high-cost research and who have access to global 
distribution channels (Kundnani, 1998). The structure of the information economy 
enhances the position of those at the cutting edge of the application of ICTs. Thus, 
those who stand to gain the most from the integration of global markets are economic 
agents, such as multinational corporations, who are finding it is easier to coordinate 
their cross-border activities (Sussman, 1997). This has serious implications for 
government control over their economic behaviour. African governments may find it 
increasingly difficult to monitor the financial affairs of cross-border economic agents 
and their impact on domestic economies. In addition government fiscal controls are 
becoming increasingly challenged by the development of electronic commerce and new 
service industries (Braim, 1998).
(e) Exponential Loss
According to the traditional model of international trade, comparative advantages 
between countries arise from differences in resources rather than differences in 
production functions. Yet within the information economy technological differences are 
a major engine of trade (Krugman, 1995). Moreover any such technological advantages 
will tend to cumulate rather than lessen over time, as comparative advantages in 
technology become self-reinforcing. Those who do not participate will suffer punitive 
costs. For example, people with Internet access now enjoy better consumer product- 
pricing opportunities than those without access. They also enjoy greater access to 
information. Moreover, those without access to the Internet are finding themselves 
penalised. Nations whose economic players don’t have access to computer networks 
and the Internet will suffer as well. The value of not participating will be calculated at 
an exponential loss.
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This concept of exponential loss is based on Metcalfe’s law16, which is a consideration
of the utility value of networks. The law states that the usefulness, or utility, of a
network equals the square of the number of users. Until a critical mass of users is
reached, a change in technology only affects the technology. If we take the telephone as
an illustration, Metcalfe argues that one phone has no utility value* a few phones have
limited value, but when telecommunications diffusion is ubiquitous a telephone
becomes almost a necessity. The essence of Metcalfe’s Law is that new technologies
are valuable only if many people use them. A more recent example is the Internet,
which exhibits Metcalfian "exponentiality" because the technology has bypassed
critical mass. The concept of exponential loss represents the obverse of Metcalfe’s law,
and attempts to explain how countries are affected negatively by not being connected to
global networks. The obverse abstract relationship can be constructed by saying the
degree of exponential loss is equal to the benefits of being connected plus the dynamic
costs of not being connected, divided by a time period and given an exponential value.
*
Thus, the value of the network can be expressed as n . The dynamic cost of not being 
connected can be expressed as the cost (c). This relationship takes place over time (t). 
Therefore given these variables the relationship can be expressed as:
Where n2 is the value derived from being connected and c is the cost of not being 
connected in terms of worsening terms of trade, for example, and 3 1 is equal to the time 
period. Also where the benefits of being connected to the network or n is a function of 
the number of users n„ multiplied by the marginal utility value added of each additional 
user. So that:
As with every abstract theory ceteris paribus, or "all other things being equal", applies: 
namely that the benefits for developing country and industrialised country users are 
obviously different. The benefits for a developing country from being online are at the
16 Robert Metcalfe founded 3Com Corporation and designed the Ethernet protocol for computer networks.
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same time greater and lesser than that of an industrialised country. For example, 
electronic mail may be more useful to an African than a European because of the 
unreliability of substitute communication mechanisms (assuming of course a reliable, 
fast and cheap connection). At the same time, the number of people that someone in 
Sub-Saharan Africa can e-mail are far fewer, and the available local content much less, 
hence the benefits of the network may be less pronounced. Also the exponential 
opportunity cost of exclusion may well be greater in technologically advanced 
countries where Internet access/skill are becoming prerequisites in certain areas.
The potential benefits of the Internet to Sub-Saharan African countries, for example, 
will be dependent entirely on the efficacy of the telecommunications network: how 
many telephones there are, how easily they can be interconnected and their reliability. 
How quickly a new application reaches critical mass is determined by how much it 
costs new users to get access to the network, since buyers will weigh this cost against 
the utility value of the technology at the time of purchase. The lower the initial price, 
the more quickly critical mass is reached. The exponential nature of information 
infrastructure growth has clear policy implications for Africa. Without concerted efforts 
to widen access to these technologies and to create an environment conducive to their 
growth the technological gap seems set to widen further.
(f) The changing public policy environment
Ndulu (1997) points out the changing global environment has irrevocably altered the 
model for policy-making in Africa. For example, he points to the slow but ineluctable 
transition from a dirigiste style of macroeconomic management to a more laissez-faire 
approach. This calls for more information on the behaviour of various market entities 
and a sounder knowledge of the efficacy of the variety of policy instruments in 
inducing the desired response from a wide range of actors. Consequently, over the last 
decade the demands for more informed and precise policy-making have increased 
significantly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whether these challenges to national development 
in Africa come to the fore is contingent upon the ability of African policy-makers to 
critically examine the state of Africa’s information infrastructure and economy and 
construct an effective policy response. Despite the weakness of the state in the majority
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of African countries in the area of ICTs it must not be lulled into unrealistic 
expectations of the benefits that can accrue from the information economy.
2.6 The role of public policy
The common strand underpinning all the above justifications for information 
infrastructure is that the effective utilisation of information and communication 
technologies throughout the economic system is not just a matter of making 
incremental improvements, or of extending existing capacity in a few new industries. 
Explicitly, it involves a major upheaval in all sectors of the economy and changes in the 
skill profile and capital stock (Freeman, 1996, p. 134). Freeman’s work and the theories 
of technological change and economic growth all point to the same conclusion. The 
process of technological accumulation is by no means a passive, mechanistic process, 
but a painstaking, costly and deliberate effort on the part of successful firms, 
governments and nations. The main problem in such periods of paradigm change is the 
adaptation of the economy to change. It is here that the type of structural and 
institutional inertia identified by Perez (1983) is acute, and that new national policies 
and new regulatory regimes play a central role in overcoming it (Freeman, 1995). The 
ability of government and actors to constructively shape and assess technology is at the 
heart of a conceptual framework which makes a compelling case for the role of public 
policy planning in the area of information infrastructure development.
Economic history is littered with prescriptions and exhortation as to the merits of 
economic liberalism: the intersection of market forces, unfettered exchange rates and 
integration into the global economy. The underlying assumption, that the market does 
indeed know best, can be traced to Ricardian economics. However, as Penrose (1990) 
asserts, it ’neither appeals to history nor experience demonstrate its truth in a dynamic 
world. Where did government not play, in collaboration with local businesses and other 
elites, a very powerful role?’ (Penrose, 1990, pp. 238 -  230) In reality few countries 
achieved economic success by rigidly applying Adam Smith’s tenets of economic 
liberalism: relying on the "invisible hand", abandoning subsidies and being freely open 
to imports and foreign investment. The role of integration as an aspect of economic 
liberalism also requires careful examination. The reality is that imports and technology
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may flow in with investment without achieving lasting, effective technology transfer. 
The juxtaposition between the ideal and the reality arises from a long chain of 
assumptions from which the case for economic liberalism precariously hangs.
Even in an era of downsized governments and hollow states, some functions remain 
important for governments to perform. The general case for government intervention in 
technology-related issues may be divided into three broad arguments:
1. The first set of arguments is founded on the assertion that an unfettered market 
mechanism is unlikely to result in the optimal resource allocation of technological 
activities (Cooper, 1980). In developing countries the following issues must be 
addressed:
• That monopolies or oligopolies exist within certain parts of the communication 
industry. The strong oligopoly in the production of information technology has 
serious implications for developing countries. It generally means that importers of 
embodied technologies are in an asymmetric position vis-a-vis developed nations.
• Inappropriate choice of technology may be made due to a lack of information 
regarding alternatives, and weak negotiating structures with suppliers of 
technology, which may result in unduly expensive technology transfer.
• Pressures of comparative advantage in trade may reinforce the reliance on labour- 
intensive production of a narrow of basic products. Rather, considerable advantage 
may accrue from looking to the production of innovative products and diversifying 
the industrial base. As this is unlikely to happen spontaneously, the need for careful 
and planned manipulation of resources is clearly necessary.
• There are public good aspects to information infrastructure that will not be 
undertaken by the market. The market does not cater for public goods, and social 
welfare is increased when government intervenes to fund non-commercial 
expenditure such as education and resource management.
• The planning horizon of individual firms is often shorter than is socially desirable. 
As a result short-term planning could prevent society as a whole from planning for 
long-term structural shifts in the nature and input requirements of technologies 
currently at the development or introductory stages.
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2. A second argument rests on the political economy of developing countries, the need 
for technology appropriate to the locale as opposed to western-oriented modes of 
production.
3. The third argument relates to the fear that benign neglect in a world increasingly 
dependent on technology, and the access to information which it brings, has serious 
long-term consequences for terms of trade.
Echoing these justifications for the role of public policy in the sphere of information 
and communication technologies are the difficulties inherent in technology transfer. 
One has to bear in mind the intrinsic limits of technology transfer. Despite the simple 
neo-classical view of technologies as simple commodities, recent research continues to 
suggest otherwise. Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) assert that firm specific technologies 
are much less mobile and leaky than Information’ and equipment embodied techniques 
of production, thus technology innovations tend to be firm specific. They conclude that 
in order to fully maximise the utility value of new technologies, developing countries 
need to develop the capacity to produce and use them locally.17
Further empirical evidence points to the fact that the rate of technology diffusion across 
countries is influenced by the systemic, strong cumulative effects of "interrelatedness". 
The argument is that late-adopting countries, with smaller amounts of the innovative 
capital goods that embody the new technologies, have lower rates of diffusion 
(Antonelli, 1986). The reasons offered include the paucity of relevant and timely 
information and skills for information-based technologies, and a lack of a critical level 
of interrelatedness with other complementary technologies. As Kaplinsky and Cooper 
highlight, ’unless all, or most of the "electronic jigsaw" is in place, the systemic 
advantages of information and communication technologies are difficult to capture’ 
(Kaplinsky and Cooper, 1989, pp. 7 -  8). This obviously poses obstacles for longer-run 
systemic competitiveness.
17 Research by McKendrick (1988), amongst others, shows how the inefficient introduction of automation in 
the Indonesian banking system was caused by an excessive reliance on foreign vendors of hardware who 
supplied neither maintenance nor the software needed for the system to function properly. This contrasted 
with the successful introduction automation in Brazilian banks, which jointly developed their automation 
systems with local suppliers who were also owned by the main banks.
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Odedra (1990b) argues that very little information technology transfer is actually taking 
place in Sub-Saharan Africa. The five major channels of transfer: acquisition of 
equipment, technical assistance, education and training, direct foreign investment and 
licensing are not effective. She lists a number of key factors, which greatly facilitate the 
technology transfer process. Firstly, a widespread awareness of the value of 
information for development. Secondly, a level of indigenous organisational capacity 
for supporting the transfer process should be in place. Thirdly, a range of infrastructure 
improvements necessary to support the system and the services based upon them should 
be in place; an explicit justification for the role of public policy. Countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa lack the financial resources, industrial infrastructural base, research and 
development capacity and requisite national institutions for formulating and 
implementing technology policies, all of which are the prerequisites for effective 
technology transfer. Nor has the region generated indigenous institutional capacity to 
assess whether incoming technologies are appropriate.
If the putative goal of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is to attempt industrial "catch­
up" and ape the success of their faster-growing developing counterparts, the 
implications are clear. Developing countries can no longer rely on low-cost labour; 
greater emphasis will have to be given to technological acquisition and improved 
quality. Highly skilled personnel are required to absorb, adopt and apply the imported 
technologies and industrial organisations. In addition, a well-trained workforce is 
required to assimilate and diffuse the new technologies and work systems.
Harindranath (1997), in his PhD thesis on India’s information technology industry and 
public policy, points out the key role that government has played in liberalising key 
sectors. However, he asserts that India’s policy in this area has had both positive and 
negative impacts on the local information technology industry. He argues that the early 
success of the Indian IT industry owes a great deal to the relative absence of 
government controls. But that government continues to restrict the growth of the sector 
through financial and administrative controls and bottlenecks in these sectors. For 
example, in a newspaper article surveying India’s IT industry, Dewang Mehta, the 
president of the National Association of Software and Service Companies (Nasscom) 
points out that his organisation appealed to the Indian government for the provision of
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high-speed data telecommunications links in 1991. However, such calls for assistance 
were ignored as ’[the government] reckoned [Nasscom] were smaller on the economic 
scale than plastic-bucket manufacturers’.18 With hindsight such neglect has not stopped 
the Indian IT industry growing to a valuation of $5.7 billion in 2000, with annual IT 
revenues forecast to reach $87 billion by 2008, contributing 35 per cent of India’s total 
exports and providing employment for 2.2 million people.19 However, earlier 
government provision of suitable infrastructure may have allowed the industry to grow 
even faster.
It is clear that in such regions government should act as a facilitator by creating the 
necessary infrastructural support for the growth of knowledge-based industries. The 
Indian government now has ambitious plans to diffuse information infrastructure 
throughout the country, including plans to provide 86, 000 villages with video and 
Internet facilities linked to educational centres. In a survey of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Harindranath (1997) goes on to assert that it is not just that African countries lack 
effective national strategies for information infrastructure development, but that most 
countries continue to take a decidedly negative stance towards this sector. Allied to 
these issues are legitimate concerns over the role of development agencies in 
encouraging the use of ICTs that have tended to benefit affluent urban residential users 
over their rural counterparts. Sussman (1991) argues that this has led to the neglect of 
other telecommunications services that are primarily used by the rural and urban 
labouring classes. What is needed is an understanding of the ramifications of 
fundamental technical change that doesn’t take the technological imperative for granted.
2.7 A theoretical justification for the role of public policy
The idea of a technologically determined information revolution, with serious social 
implications, has been a consistently recursive topic both in the academic and popular 
press. Many authors have pointed to similar junctures in history when new technologies 
have been imbued with revolutionary potential (Flichy, 1995). Yet the successive
18 Knipe, M. (2000) "Lonely cabbies spearhead the IT revolution", The Times, 9 March 2000, p. 19.
19 Ibid.
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failure of these technologies in no way appears to have diminished the appetite for 
technological determinism. This popular thesis argues that technology follows an inner 
logic and proceeds down an unstoppable path, and that society is at the behest of a 
technological imperative (Edge, 1995). In this universe, technology is king and all that 
is necessary is to assess its impact.
However, as Williams (1982) and Edge (1995) point out, the false assumption is that 
these technologies are effective and reliable vehicles for achieving organisational 
change. This overlooks the often protracted difficulties in their implementation and 
frequent failures to deliver predicted and desired outcomes. As Mackay (1995) points 
out, what is striking about the notion of technological determinism is neither its 
theoretical validity nor its explanatory utility, but rather that it is ’the single most 
influential theory of the relationship between technology and society’ (Mackay, 1995, 
p. 4).
Despite the popularity of technological determinism, it leaves unanswered the 
fundamental question \vhat is shaping the technological changes that are having these 
"effects"?’ (Mackay, 1995). In response, a body of work straddling disciplines as 
diverse as economics, sociology and politics has begun to emerge that challenges the 
prevailing technological determinist orthodoxy and attempts to answer this question. 
These studies are underpinned by a shared desire to open the "black box" of 
technology, and explain why technologies develop and diffuse as they do. Specifically 
the aim is to debunk the two popular strands of technological determinism: namely that 
the nature of technologies and the direction of change are immutably unproblematic; 
and that technology has necessary and determinate "impacts" upon economic life and 
society as a whole.
In response to the prevailing technological determinist orthodoxy, some theorists have 
argued the need to widen the scope of enquiry to more than monitoring the social 
adjustments necessitated by new technologies. Though from varied academic 
disciplines the unifying theme is that technologies are not neutral, that they do not 
follow a predetermined, linear path. Williams (1982), for example, describes the 
development of communications technologies as contingent on structural and historical 
forces. He argues that actors deliberately choose to invest in a particular technology for
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their purposes. Further, that groups of actors that have power will choose to develop 
those technologies that enhance that power. He goes on to argue that every stage in the 
design and implementation of a technology involves conscious choices. The criteria on 
which these actual choices are made depend on social as well as the purely technical 
issues. These choices ’shape the content of artefacts and the direction (or ’trajectory) of 
innovation programmes, resulting in many potential technological outcomes with 
differing implications for a society as a whole and particular groups within it’ 
(Williams, 1982).
A review of the emergent literature on the shaping of technological change reveals a 
multitude of factors that influence the development and diffusion of technologies20, 
ranging from geographical and resource concerns to the role of cultural and political 
factors. However, studies have tended to focus on one or more of these rather than 
looking at the broad picture. A more thorough approach takes the starting point as the 
particular social context within which technical change takes place, rather than a 
particular technological field. The social processes, the actors involved and their 
respective interests and goals are identified, and attempts made to trace their influence 
on evolving technologies (Mackay, 1995). What is needed, therefore, is an examination 
of the dynamic interaction between social forces that affect technological development 
and technological innovations that affect social relations. More specifically, an 
acknowledgement that the manner in which society shapes technology is dependent on 
the objectives of actors involved in the development and diffusion of that technology 
(Daey Ouwens et al., 1987; Rip and Van den Belt, 1988; Bijker and Law, 1992).
Whilst researchers have attempted to look beyond narrow technological questions, 
public policy still remains firmly rooted in a technocentric world. As a result the 
emphasis of research and policy has traditionally focussed on attempts to understand 
and predict the likely consequences of evolving technologies; so that those that are 
considered socially undesirable can be avoided or ameliorated. This conception of the 
technological given has restricted the approach of public policy to technology, to two
20Mackay (1995) lists at least nine types of social influence on technological change: geographical, 
environmental and resource factors; scientific advance; pre-existing technology; market processes; industrial 
relations; organisational structures; state institutions and the international system of states; gender divisions; 
and cultural factors.
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dimensions: promotion and control (Johnston and Gummett, 1979; Coombs, Saviotti 
and Walsh, 1992). Promotion activities concentrate on the mismatch between existing 
levels of technology in a country and its technological needs. The control arena looks at 
the externalities that arise, or could arise from technological implementation, which are 
deemed to be socially undesirable. The policy regimes that have evolved from these 
two basic approaches have generally been aimed at a fairly aggregate level. They have 
tended to focus on distributional issues, externalities and various perceived instances of 
market failure (Coombs et al., 1992).
In the control dimension policy emphasis has been placed on pragmatic responses to 
particular types of problem, arising from technologies, which are deemed to be socially 
undesirable. Prominent examples include environmental pollution, and product safety. 
In an attempt to reduce the negative externalities arising from these undesirable 
technologies, public policy has sought to penalise them, by resorting to fiscal as well as 
statutory measures. In the promotion dimension government intervention has sought to 
push favourable technologies via, amongst other measures, research and development 
funding and subsidisation. Both forms of technology forcing, promotion and control 
polices rely on perceptions of what is socially desirable or undesirable (Bijker and Law, 
1992).
However, such an approach to public policy is flawed in a number of respects. An 
assessment of technological merits gives no indication of the interests of those deciding 
what is socially desirable. Moreover, this policy approach is essentially reactive, and 
fails to ask questions about the design, development and diffusion of the technology 
itself. Collingridge (1980) argues that traditional assessment of technology faces two 
fundamental problems. Firstly, an information problem: impacts cannot easily be 
predicted until the technology is extensively developed and widely diffused. Secondly, 
a power issue: once a technology is entrenched change is difficult and subject to 
significant inertia, and that technological flexibility is a solution to the problem. This 
essentially reactive approach traditionally focused on post hoc economic evaluations of 
the benefits of technologies already designed and developed. In the 1970s technology 
assessment research in the U.S. and Europe focused on the direct and derived 
consequences of technology. The overarching goal was to establish a more informed 
basis for public policy decision-making on the introduction of new technologies. The
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decision-making processes related to technology \vere considered to be rational, 
sequential, and containing separate decisions; during the process, the results of 
technology assessment were often ascribed a decisive role’ (Smits and Leyten, 1988, p. 
18).
A more proactive, and therefore more effective, approach has emerged recently in the 
guise of constructive technology assessment. Constructive technology assessment 
(CTA) may be defined as a field of research which, in an anticipatory way, analyses 
technical innovations, calculates their consequences for the environment and for 
society, checks the expected results with regard to relevant values, and makes 
recommendations based on these studies to the responsible decision-makers. Emerging 
in the Netherlands in the early 1980s, it began as a broadening of traditional technology 
assessment to acknowledge the role of actors in the design and development of new 
technology (Rip et al., 1995). As constructive technology assessment it is designed not 
to prevent all innovations, but to select out of the abundance of feasible innovations, the 
actually desirable ones and to slow down technical development wherever it could 
become dangerous (Ropohl, 1983, p. 84). Technology assessment policies thus ’focus 
on problems of dealing with and adjusting to change. It involves in the first instance 
abandonment of the traditional normative goal of trying to define an optimum and the 
institutional structure that will achieve it, and an acceptance of the more modest 
objectives of identifying problems and possible improvements’ (Nelson and Winter, 
1982, p. 394).
The underlying assumption of CTA is that technological change stems from within the 
economic and social system and is not merely an adjustment to transformations brought 
about by causes outside that system (Bijker and Law, 1992). The goal is to develop 
technologies with desired positive impacts and with few (or at least manageable) 
negative impacts. An intentional strategy to do so would integrate the anticipation of 
technological impacts with the articulation and promotion of technology development 
itself. Thus, CTA emerges as an instrument of government policy aimed at improving 
the societal integration of technology and influencing the use and further development 
of technology. CTA intuitively bestrides two dimensions: the analytical and the 
normative. The analytical dimension, as outlined below, involves an assessment of the 
actors and interests intimately bound up in the design, development and diffusion of
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technology. A key task in this dimension is the identification of the positional identities 
of actors, how they intervene and their relative roles in the development of the 
technological system (Staudenmaier, 1985, pp. 198-99).
Callon (1987) proposes a number of hypotheses that emerge from this viewpoint:
• Technological development results from a large number of decisions made by 
numerous actors.
• Technological options can never be reduced to their strictly technical dimension.
Hence the design of technological options is a matter of political debate.
• Technological options bring about irreversible situations, resulting from the gradual
disappearance of the margins of choice: as time goes on, choices are inexorably
predetermined by decisions taken earlier. Unlike some decisions which always 
remain possible to revise, those that are materialised in technical commitments lead 
to durable imbalances and the consequent discarding of options which, with 
hindsight, might have been thought preferable to those actually taken.
Correspondingly these hypotheses raise a number of fundamental questions:
’(a) How do we identify the actors who take part in the process of design and adoption 
of technologies? In what ways do they intervene? (b) How do we explain the 
disappearance of alternative technological options (or of what is called technological 
variety)? (c) How can we account for the appearance of irreversible (or lock-in) 
situations?’(Callon, 1987, p. 308).
It is the answers to questions such as these that must be placed at the heart of 
information infrastructure planning. The policy planning process is comprised of a 
broad constituency of actors that form an intricate web of interaction between interest 
groups and organisations. These interactions underpin the shaping of new 
technological trajectories; what Russell and Williams have labelled ’the general 
characteristics of a society’s technological ensemble’ (Russell and Williams, 1988: 11). 
Dahl’s (1967) interest groups approach concurs and asserts that domestic policy 
formulation arises out of the interaction between key interest group coalitions. The 
predominance of this approach in the US is based on the fact that in American
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institutions, interest group coalitions -  and not the state -  are the central actors in policy 
formulation (Richardson, 1999). In developing countries, and especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the state is predominant, less attention has been paid to interest groups. 
Developing countries experience a continual reconfiguration and transformation of the 
political landscape, obfuscating the causal correlation between coalition preferences 
and policy outcomes. Yet although this makes actor identification problematic, the 
difficulty varies according to the scope of the subject under inquiry. With the relative 
absence of government and the clear roles of international organisations, non­
governmental organisations and the foreign private sector it is possible to identify the 
actors and coalitions within Sub-Saharan Africa.
The second dimension of CTA is normative in nature and is especially applicable to the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. This dimension seeks to ensure that new technologies 
dovetail with existing and future goals of social development. From this vantage point 
information and communication technologies should not be conceived as the starting- 
point for planning design, but rather as a means to an end, to achieving specific goals, 
in the most appropriate, culturally adapted and efficient way. In light of this dimension, 
information infrastructure planning adopts primarily a socio-economic view. 
Characteristically, it treats information infrastructure as a resource capable of being 
allocated, conserved and re-distributed like other elements of national infrastructure. 
Moreover, the concept of planning for information infrastructure is intimately bound up 
with the concept of development. However, the concept of development remains 
nebulous and hard to pin down. Rather than proposing a definition of development it is 
sufficient to say that a constructive technology assessment views information 
infrastructure planning in light of the social environment and according to national 
objectives. It is designed to see what specific prescriptions, amongst which technology 
is included, can best advance these social goals (Hancock, 1981).
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the normative perspective will invariably revolve around some 
pre-established objectives of "development policy", varying according to each country's 
needs and aspirations. There is, however, a consensus that certain developmental 
objectives are desirable (UNDP, 1998b):
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• reducing dependence on other countries and fostering self-reliance;
• equitable income distribution, which may include an emphasis on provision for 
"basic needs";
• increasing per capita income;
• diversifying the industrial base;
• environmental sustainability;
• increasing employment; and
• encouraging foreign investment.
Other important issues in the normative dimension may include:
• urban vs. rural considerations;
• labour vs. capital intensive approaches;
•  long range vs. short-termism;
• centrally planned vs. decentralised planning; and
• national vs. local projects.
One immediate problem with these policy aims is that they not all entirely compatible. 
For example, emphasising basic needs provision may retard income growth. 
Encouraging inward foreign investment seems likely to increase "dependence". 
Furthermore if we add the commonly cited aims of technology policy further 
contradictions appear:
• improving the efficiency of technology transfer;
• improving the efficiency of technology operation;
• broadening and strengthening the industrial base; and
• developing indigenous technology capability.
Bearing in mind the immediate contradictions in some aspects of these normative goals, 
it is to be expected that further application of policies designed to improve the 
utilisation of technologies may exacerbate these conflicts. Evidently constructive 
technology assessment of information and communication technologies will require 
management of these policy conflicts. Given the diversity of circumstances in which
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different Sub-Saharan countries pursue their normative objectives, and given that even 
within individual countries, different sectors may have different requirements and 
priorities, it is clear that no one approach can simultaneously satisfy all requirements, in 
all sectors, in all countries. Each country or region will want to utilise the new 
technological and service opportunities to meet its particular priorities and needs, these 
objectives represent an illustration of the normative perspective which underpins 
constructive technology assessment. This is qualified by the analytical perspective of 
constructive technology assessment which recognises that realisation of these 
normative goals is contingent upon the capacity of the recipient economy to understand 
fully the complex characteristics of the technologies that flow in (Bhagavan, 1997; 
Odedra-Straub et al., 1995). Taking a government perspective, Rip, Misa and Schot 
(1995) argue that CTA offers three strategies:
• to support the development of desirable technologies;
• to regulate or "punish" undesirable technologies; and
• to influence transformations of technology that occur anyway.
Ideally all governments, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, would pursue the last 
strategy. Indeed, much of the emphasis in constructive technology assessment theory is 
placed on steering the development of technology from the outset. However, given the 
asymmetries in information and research and development capabilities between 
developing countries and industrialised nations this proves, at least in the short-term, 
unrealistic. In Sub-Saharan Africa the public policy response, in both dimensions of the 
control and promotion of information and communication technologies, has been weak, 
and more often than not counterproductive. They lack the requisite skills and, more 
importantly, information to conduct a thorough assessment of information and 
communication technologies and how to plan for information infrastructure. Yet the 
future social impact of information and communication technologies is uncertain. Since 
there are no valid scientific instruments to predict future social impact, it is necessary to 
make social choices about the future under conditions of uncertainty.
These uncertainties do not justify a "do-nothing" policy. Each country has a clear 
priority: to create an information society and an information economy that reflects its 
culture and needs. Developing countries should enhance the national capacity to learn,
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identify areas where policy is appropriate, take appropriate action and take an active 
part in developing national information infrastructures. Quite simply there are options 
for developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They are in a position to steer the 
development of information and communication technologies to suit their needs. Long­
term goals should be to:
• direct the application of new technologies to promote local, regional, and national 
networks;
• create indigenous capacity in these new industries; and
• direct attention to cutting-edge technologies.
But before these can be achieved the interim priority must be to conduct a thorough 
analysis of existing levels of information infrastructure, pinpoint weaknesses and
develop expertise in technology assessment. Though CTA is still in its theoretical
adolescence it offers much in support of the role of public policy in shaping 
technological trajectories. As a school within the broader theory of social shaping, it 
furnishes decision-makers with analytical perspectives that can help to create a better 
match between technological potential and preferred sustainable futures. However, the 
paradigm of CTA is still under construction: analysis of cases, designing of 
experiments and policies, and development of specific tools have yet to be done. 
Within this research constructive technology assessment represents the final piece in a 
conceptual jigsaw that has justified the importance of information infrastructure and 
offered an empowering framework within which to view the role of public policy.
The arguments presented in the preceding sections suggest that a number of issues need 
to be addressed by policy-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa and the international 
community as a whole. As Freeman (1995) has highlighted, it is evident from the 
growing inequalities of the global economic system that countries cannot be left simply 
to fend for themselves. There must be an acknowledgement that countries do not begin 
in this prospective technological revolution from the same starting-line. The choice of 
technology is neither a reflection of technical necessities nor the culmination of an 
evolutionary struggle for competitive survival which unfolds independently of the 
influence of politics and society (Daey Ouwens et al., 1987). On the contrary, the 
diverse new forms of technology and organisations are shaped by strategic decisions
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about potential markets and the historically-contingent balance of political power 
within societies. At these critical junctures, when technologies and institutional 
structures are in a state of flux, a combination of structural economic forces and 
political concerns will determine the future direction and shape of technological 
progress for many decades. As Haq (1988) highlights, a technology:
...may appear extremely attractive and tempting as a symbol of modernity, but 
it calls for serious examination as to whether it is appropriate, easy to maintain, 
efficient, cost-effective, compatible with the general level of technology and, 
most important, whether it is likely to help achieve the fundamental socio­
economic goals of less developed countries (Haq, 1988, p. 147).
2.8 Summary
By recourse to theories of information economics and the role of infrastructure for 
national development this chapter has made the case for the importance of information 
infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has avoided the simplistic polarisation of 
information and communication technology effects as being either benign or 
deleterious, but argued that it is contingent on human agency. Information and 
communication technologies and the infrastructural conduit through which they flow 
are seen less as "revolutionary" artefacts, than effective mechanisms for improving and 
supporting the capacity of policy-makers and economic agents in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This utilitarian approach to information and communication technologies reminds us 
that these tools are only intermediary devices designed to facilitate the delivery or 
understanding of information. Finally, the chapter has presented arguments against 
technological determinism, which point to how actors shape technology and how 
governments can constructively assess and influence national technology trajectories.
In the absence of a thorough analysis of the impact of these technologies, and 
indigenous input into the implementation process, this state of affairs may continue 
with far-reaching ramifications. Long-term strategies must be formulated that make it 
more difficult to embark on what Mody et al. (1993) refers to as ad hoc purchases, ad 
hoc proposals, and the acceptance of Trojan horses as gifts. Having outlined the
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theoretical contribution of constructive technology assessment, and the broader school 
of social shaping theory, the question arises as to how developing countries can utilise 
these analytical perspectives to facilitate the achievement of social goals through the 
use of information and communication technologies. The first goal must be to 
recognise the inherent complexity involved in the information infrastructure planning 
process. The creation or upgrading of information infrastructure involves an in-depth 
understanding of the cultural, economic, technological and social dimensions particular 
to each locale. Therefore a contextual analysis is necessary to better understand the 
politics, practices, and impact of changes as they are experienced by various nations.
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CHAPTER 3
National Information Infrastructure: A Conceptual Framework
3.1 Introduction
This chapter constructs a conceptual framework, based on the arguments presented in 
Chapter Two, of the importance and utility value of information infrastructure for Sub- 
Saharan African countries. There is an explicit understanding that the development of 
an information infrastructure is a uniquely complex and dynamic task, involving the 
coordination of a portfolio of internally and externally-driven factors, actors and 
projects. This research argues the need for a systematic approach to the development of 
information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. It reviews the complex interactions 
between actors and the multi-faceted nature of constructing national scale information 
infrastructure policies in an increasingly globalised world.
The framework for information infrastructure proposed in this chapter is not designed 
to provide a detailed operational plan, but rather to provide an analytical perspective 
that facilitates effective policy-making. At the same time, it is argued that though 
information infrastructure policy will be dictated by country-specific issues, there are 
certain commonalities across Sub-Saharan Africa which allow the articulation of a 
generalised policy framework. The conceptual framework outlined below serves as an 
analytical device that facilitates an understanding of the interaction between a range of 
actors, issues, motivations and mechanisms. As with all new technology systems, an 
information infrastructure portends both significant potential benefits and serious 
potential problems. Some investments may result in positive economic and social 
returns, others may result in enormous waste. Within the conceptual framework of this 
research, the likely outcome is predicated on the efficacy of public policy.
This research defines information infrastructure policy as comprising the set of all 
public laws, regulations, and policies that affect the development and use of 
information and communication technologies and the creation, use, storage, and 
communication of information. This broad definition focuses on the institutional 
policies that determine the kind of information infrastructure that is created and how
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the information that flows through this infrastructure is disseminated. This definition is 
necessarily broad and inclusive. The conceptual framework does not seek to focus on 
the narrow and broad definitional debates surrounding the terms "information" and 
"policy". Rather, it uses the term information infrastructure policy in the more 
traditionally employed context of public policy. Arguing for the need for a multilevel 
and multidimensional framework within which the role of government and public 
policy is paramount.
3.2 Information policy theory
Ironically, at a time when the availability of timely and relevant information is 
increasingly becoming acknowledged as critical to national development (Madon, 
1994; Kamel, 1994) there is a conspicuous absence of academic investigation in this 
area. There is little in the way of research on information policy in Africa; the library 
and information systems field aside. There is a distinct lack of accepted common 
frameworks, approaches and methodologies to guide the practical deployment of 
information policy. The available literature continues to be exploratory rather than 
definitive, and serves to map out the territory (Rowlands, 1996). This mapping out is 
hampered by the theoretical pluralism of the field. Problems abound particularly in 
relation to definitional constructs and the need to appropriate the right models in order 
to aid in the sense-making process.
If one deconstructs the concept of information policy into its two key elements: 
information and policy, a review of the literature reflects the theoretical pluralism 
evident in the field (Machlup and Mansfield, 1983; Liebenau and Backhouse, 1990). 
Nor is the term "policy" easily dealt with, Hogwood and Gunn (1984), for example, 
differentiate 10 clear definitions of the term. As Rowlands argues ’there are at least as 
many definitions of the term "information policy" as there are writers on the subject’ 
(Rowlands, 1996, p. 27). Hemon and Relyea, point out that ’although the literature 
often refers to information policy in the singular, there is no all-encompassing policy -  
rather, information policies tend to address specific issues and, at times, to be 
fragmented, overlapping and contradictory' (Hemon and Relyea, 1989, p. 71). Within
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the conceptual framework of this thesis, policy is defined as purposeful action in the 
pursuit of predefined objectives.
The leitmotiv of information policy research appears to be complexity (Rowlands, 
1996; Malley, 1988; Wilson, 1996a). There is also an explicit acknowledgement, that 
given this complexity and the breadth of information infrastructure policy, there is no 
ideal catch-all policy (Han and Walsham, 1993; Talero, 1996, Mansell and Wehn, 
1998). Rather, information policy, and by extension information infrastructure policy, 
represents a compromise between competing interests; comprising an enduring conflict 
among or between objectives, customs, plans, activities and stakeholders. Though the 
lack of an academic treatment of information policy is bemoaned above, there do exist, 
in the social science literature, a number of models and frameworks for investigating 
public policy. Rowlands (1996) provides an incisive matrix based on the work of 
Trauth (1986) which locates the majority of contemporary research on information 
policy in one of four quadrants.
In Figure 2 overleaf, an information policy matrix is presented in which the vertical 
axis indicates the scope of the research whilst the horizontal axis indicates the intent of 
individual policy studies. According to Trauth (1986), research that falls into the 
"descriptive studies" region characteristically describe policies or highlight issues that 
require policy. Prescriptive policy studies, on the other hand, make a normative 
judgement as to what the content of policy should be. They ’explicitly set out to make 
recommendations and to have an influence on the formulation of policy’. (Rowlands, 
1996, p. 37).
In the matrix, the horizontal axis represents not only the breadth of the inquiry at hand 
but also the degree to which the research incorporates elements from different 
disciplines. Trauth (1986) argues that the scope of the literature on the policy 
formulation process veers between research that can be characterised either by being 
integrative or particular studies of the policy process. "Integrative" policy studies take a 
broader approach and are commonly multidisciplinary in outlook, while particular 
approaches tend to focus only on one area, public policy, and remain within a single 
academic discipline.
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Figure 2: Information Policy Matrix
PARTICULAR
INTEGRATIVE
PRESCRIPTIVEDESCRIPTIVE
Adapted from Trauth (1986)
Trauth (1986) came to the conclusion that what is urgently needed is more practical 
research into the policy formulation process. Research that is located in the upper right 
hand of the matrix, and that is both prescriptive and integrative and that focuses on the 
immediate needs of policy-makers. This is the approach of this research. It does not 
seek to create frameworks and methodologies for understanding information policy and 
how it comes to be; rather, the explicit intention of this research is normative: to create 
a framework that provides recommendations for what national information 
infrastructure policy should be in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this respect the research is 
inclined more towards the practical rather than the theoretical. It seeks to answer a
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specific set of questions, by creating a practical policy construct that pinpoints priority 
areas for information infrastructure construction in Sub-Saharan Africa.
By conceptualising policy as a process rather than an event or occurrence we can better 
understand and influence the process of policy creation. Lasswell (1977) asserts that the 
policy formulation process lies along a continuum, as show in Figure 3, that can be 
divided into three sequential phases:
• Design
• Implementation
• Evaluation
Figure 3: The Policy Formulation Continuum 
feedback Loqp
Design -----► Implementation Evaluation
As we move from left to right the issue gains recognition as an area for public action 
and an agenda is set. At this stage various actors conspire to shape the appearance of 
the problem and ultimately determine the agenda and policy approach. The final stage 
of the design stage is the creation of specific policies which actors assume will lead to a 
desired outcome. The policy formulation process then shifts to the implementation 
phase, with an assignment of roles and responsibilities and actual policy 
implementation. Next, the process moves into the evaluation phase, wherein the policy 
or group of policies are monitored during their duration and evaluated at their 
culmination. However, such a continuum applies to static ad hoc policy-making. What 
is lacking from the above conceptualisation of the policy process is the all-important 
feedback loop. This has traditionally been the problem with policy-making in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: the discontinuity of public policy.
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Since Lasswell’s (1977) "simplified stages" model of policy development there have 
been various theoretical reinterpretations of how policy is formulated. One such 
approach argues that policy development is based initially on the achievement of an 
ideal state. In this approach policy-making occurs in a vacuum, unaffected and 
unsullied by everyday realities, conducted by rational actors. Policy options are 
selected almost scientifically, based on cost-benefit analysis, and are arrived at by a 
rational decision based on the information at hand. Writers such as Trauth (1986) and 
Lindblom (1959) assert that firstly ideals are articulated, and then policies sought to 
rationally achieve them. This theoretical model is simplistic and reductionist in a 
number of ways. Firstly, actors rarely see their behaviour as irrational; thus rationality 
is often a subjective concept. Secondly, in reality the policy process is a far less 
"rational" and murkier process based far more on compromise and conflict resolution 
than the achievement of ideal states (Mintzberg, 1983). Nevertheless, the rational actor 
model offers much theoretically to analyses of policy-making by what it purposely 
neglects.
Another important approach is the bureaucratic imperative model. This approach 
argues that at the outset of policy formulation the rational actor approach is often in 
evidence. That is to say that policy-makers begin with the best intentions and highest 
ideals of how their policy will achieve a particular objective. However, these objectives 
must be channelled through the prism of bureaucratic structures, which inevitably 
distort the final policy product. Burger, for example, argues that:
Any policy that is to be implemented by a bureaucracy must be transformed in 
such a way that whatever the intent of the policy-makers about the 
implementation of the policy, the bureaucratic rules of the implementing 
organisation will be more powerful (Burger, 1993, p. 19).
Within this perspective policy-makers are more prone to short-term "fire-fighting" 
rather than the systematic achievement of long-term goals. Public policy tends to be 
reactive rather than pre-emptory; a response to the emergence of new technologies and 
that tends to be technology-driven.
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Given the inherent complexities of trying to macro-manage competing interests, policy­
makers often operate on a pragmatic basis and adopt a flexible and conservative stance. 
Rowlands (1996) sums up this approach as the ’art of the possible’; ends become 
subservient to the means available. As a result, the policy process is characterised by 
cautious incrementalism. It contrasts significantly with the rational actor approach in 
that ideals are subverted by the reality of the sub-optimality of public bureaucracies. 
Despite their contrasting perspectives both the rational actor and bureaucratic 
imperative models assume an underlying linearity in policy-making. In spite of the 
locus of power, the policy process is marked by its journey through a series of stages. A 
third interpretation challenges this assumption.
The "garbage can" model is adapted from an idea proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen 
(1972) and further developed by Kingdon (1984) who argues that policy-making i s , '... 
a primeval soup [in which] ideas float around, confront one another and combine. The 
soup changes in a process of natural selection, survival, demise and recombination' 
(Kingdon, 1984, p. 87). In the garbage can approach, policy-making is characterised 
first and foremost by chaos and dynamism. Unlike the rational actor approach, which 
tunes out the background noise, the environment in which policy is formulated is the 
key to understanding policy outcomes. A generalised view is that the environment is 
constructed on shifting sands, comprised of mobile and fluid strategic alliances 
amongst concerned parties and government. Each actor or group of actors pursues their 
own agenda and the policy output is representative of their respective spheres of 
influence and lobbying strength. Kingdon (1984) identifies three sets of characteristics 
that fuel the non-linearity in the policy-making process:
• problematic preferences in the early stages of the policy-making process make it 
difficult for the individual participants to grasp what their preferences are, these 
may have to be "discovered" as the process unfolds and as more information 
becomes available;
• unclear technological trajectories ensure that individual participants in the policy­
making process may not necessarily fully understand the needs and goals of the 
organisations they represent; and
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• fluid participation in the composition of the participants in any large scale decision­
making process may change over time. Dominant actors may lose their power and 
weaker players may move ahead.
Thus according to Kingdon et al. this model sees policy-making as an asymmetric 
process typified by bargaining amongst actors. This model is actor-centric rather than 
process-centric, with networks of actors emerging and acting strategically as "policy 
entrepreneurs", taking advantage of temporary windows of opportunity (Rowlands, 
1996)
3.3 Implications for information infrastructure planning in Sub-Saharan Africa
Having outlined the theoretical concepts surrounding information policy, the question 
arises as to the implications for national information infrastructure policy formulation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Information infrastructure planning remains very much an 
emergent phenomenon in both industrialised and developing countries. However, many 
of the principles underlying policy planning in this area have developed from 
communications planning. Mowlana (1990) defines communications planning as 
’systematic, institutionalised principles, norms, and behaviour that are designed through 
legal and regulatory procedures and/or perceived through historical understanding to 
guide formation, distribution, and control of the system in both its human and 
technological dimensions’ (Mowlana, 1990, p. 16). This definition complements 
constructive technology assessment theory because it points to an analytical framework 
that acknowledges the role of policy-planners in shaping the development and diffusion 
of technology (Bijker, et al., 1987).
Conceptually there are two distinct elements within an information infrastructure: 
information and the technological conduit through which it passes. According to Heeks 
(1999b) an information infrastructure is also composed of two further elements: 
processes of purposeful activity and people to undertake those processes. This research 
asserts that information infrastructure can only be understood and manipulated in the 
context in which it operates (Madon, 1993; Odedra, 1993). It exists within an 
environment of institutions (organisations, groups, markets) and of influencing factors
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(political, economic, socio-cultural, technical and legal). Grant (1996), for example, 
highlights the significance of ’macro-contextual and organisational factors on 
information systems capability building’ (Grant, 1996, p. 4). Heeks presents this milieu 
as in Figure 4.
Information
System
T echnology
Political
New ICTs Economic
Networks Socio­
culturalGroups People Information Processes
Paper
Hardware,Radio/TV
T echnic
Markets Legal
Figure 4: A Systemic View of Information Infrastructure
Source: adapted from Heeks, 1999b
From this diagram it can be seen that an information infrastructure sits within an 
environment or system comprised of institutions and influencing factors. This systemic 
approach seeks to take a holistic view of information infrastructure development 
(Kelly, 1998). Heeks omits to mention that national information infrastructure 
development is also influenced by international and regional factors. These cross­
cutting layers affect every aspect of information infrastructure planning and must be 
taken into consideration at all times. The information infrastructure itself is comprised 
of a number of layers beginning with human resources and processes. Next by the 
technologies, both traditional and modem, that act as conduits for the ultimate purpose 
of an information infrastructure: the information it provides.
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This multidimensional model shows the complexity inherent in coordinating the 
creation of an infrastructure that is contingent on so many different actors and 
processes. Given this complexity the best approach to clearly articulating a strategy for 
information infrastructure construction is take a sequential approach: beginning with 
the national planning process and culminating with international considerations. Whilst 
there is an explicit acknowledgement of the importance of the crosscutting nature of 
international and regional concerns. To preserve conceptual clarity the approach of this 
chapter is to take each level in turn.
3.4 Information infrastructure planning at the national level
The first stage in the information infrastructure planning process must be a conceptual 
understanding of the problems at hand. There is no such thing as a standard outline for 
an information infrastructure strategy, and given the number and diversity of the 
countries in Sub-Saharan, there is no single "one size fits all" solution. As Han and 
Walsham state, \o  imitate existing national strategies can only lead to major 
weaknesses in any systems’ (Han and Walsham, 1993, p. 34). Rather, the creation and 
direction of public policy is affected by cultural ideologies (Porat, 1977, Hofstede, 
1991; Fallows, 1996). The alignment of cultural norms and technology policy may play 
a significant role in shaping information infrastructure policy. This is especially true in 
Sub-Saharan Africa where cultural norms are deeply embedded.
Obijifor (1998) asserts that information and communication technologies in Africa can 
be categorised in terms of urban and rural forms. The urban kind of communication 
corresponds most closely with those found in industrialised countries, namely modem 
communication delivery mechanisms such the telephone and mass media. However, for 
the vast majority of Africans the traditional information and communication channels 
are the norm. Examples of mral communication tools include tribal drums and 
community leaders, the marketplace, religious establishments and drinking spots. 
Ugboajah (1985) asserts these traditional sources of, and delivery mechanisms for 
information in Sub-Saharan Africa are widely used because they are considered to be 
authentic and reliable and because they allow face-to face interaction and opportunities 
for immediate feedback.
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Taking this viewpoint on board writers have argued that the "African conception" of 
communication is different from mainstream western perceptions (Obijiofor, 1998, 
1998; Grant, 1996; Ugboajah, 1985). However, this is only true to an extent. What 
should be taken from discussions about the "African" conception of communication is 
not its special character, but rather that in the absence of a modem, pervasive and 
reliable communications systems, rural inhabitants will continue to rely on tried and 
tested methods of information gathering. The African conception of communication is 
no different from that of western societies in that Africans prefer to get their 
information from trusted sources or failing that "the horse’s mouth" (Ugboajah, 1985).
The traditional mechanisms for the communication of information in rural areas are 
limited in their effectiveness and should be supplanted by a gradual introduction of 
more modem information and communication technologies. However, traditional 
information and communication delivery mechanisms must be respected and if an 
information infrastructure is to be truly national, then they must be used as a means of 
informing the rural population of the need to "upgrade". Ugboajah (1985), in an 
analysis of mral communication in Nigeria, cogently substantiates this point by 
pointing out that traditional mral information communication mechanisms occupy an 
important position in the diffusion of messages within the belief systems of the mral 
audience. Further, that these traditional mechanisms are:
...respected and revered [and are] perceived as authoritative and credible...it is 
important that [their] role in the communication of mral change be recognised 
by those in charge of reaching the village audiences by more 'modem' means 
(Ugboajah, 1985, p. 16).
The implications of this are that national culture and demographics are critical factors 
in information infrastmcture development. In an incisive paper on the role of national 
culture in information infrastmcture planning, Garfield and Watson (1998), utilising a 
cultural classification model developed by Hofstede (1991), argue that Sub-Saharan 
African societies can be classified as hierarchical and high power distance societies. 
The Sub-Saharan African organisational framework is seen as "familial". In this 
organisational mode information infrastmcture development is the result of supply push 
rather than demand pull, with government sponsoring the development of a network or
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heavily regulating its competition and use. In such societies, where there is an unequal 
distribution of power resources, Garfield and Watson (1998) argue that policy-makers 
within this organisational model will design the information infrastructure playing field 
and applications that serve national objectives. Whilst there is an explicit 
acknowledgement that each country’s cultural and demographic composition will 
impact on the information infrastructure planning process, it is possible to identify 
some generalisable planning guidelines.
3.4.1 Planning principles
There are principles that should be common to all information infrastructure planning 
exercises. Hancock (1992) asserts that the key principles are that:
1. Planning should be contextualised: at whatever level it is pitched, it should attempt 
to treat a coherent spectrum of social, cultural, technical and economic concerns.
2. Information and communication technologies should not be perceived as the 
starting point, but rather as a means of achieving specific goals, in the most 
appropriate, culturally adapted and cost effective way available.
3. The information infrastructure planning process should be democratic and broadly 
representative.
4. The process should systematically include within its parameters the needs of users, 
and ensure their representation to the maximum extent possible within the planning 
environment.
5. Planning should have a sound conceptual base, drawing on external or traditional 
models only after analysing their appropriateness and relevance to the planning 
environment.
6. Planning can only be undertaken effectively if it places emphasis upon access to the 
best research and information base available in a given environment.
7. Information infrastructure planning should be organised as an evolutionary process, 
capable of learning from its own practice and application.
8. Evaluation and monitoring are integral to all stages of the planning and 
implementation process.
9. Information infrastructure planning should avoid prematurely closing off strategic 
options.
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There are also fundamental premises underlying the methodology for the formulation, 
implementation and operation of a national information policy. Such national policies 
are required to ensure:
•  the harmonious implementation and operation of information resources, services 
and systems (e.g. timely access to relevant information for varying needs of users) 
throughout the society;
•  coordination and compatibility of the overall national information system and better 
complementarity and compatibility between the various legislations concerning the 
provision of information; and
• more effective participation in regional and international information systems and 
services.
From a review of the literature (Talero, 1996; Wilson, 1996a; Ohojah, 1995; Odedra- 
Straub et al., 1995; Odedra, 1993) it is also possible to identify six components that are 
desirable for information infrastructure planning in Sub-Saharan Africa:
1. A portfolio of investment projects to develop and put in place the information 
infrastructure. Intuitively, this portfolio would consist of projects to expand the 
telecommunications network and projects to deploy the strategic information 
systems that the country needs for its developmental priorities.
2. A set of policy and legal reforms to create an environment conducive to information 
infrastructure growth. Examples include public information policies that protect 
investment, intellectual property, and individual privacy.
3. A strategy for development of human resource capabilities in information and 
communication technologies, through appropriate education and training policies 
and institutions.
4. An agreement on responsibilities for implementation, financing, regulation and 
participation.
5. The need for information infrastructure institution-building.
6. The importance of fostering a local ICT culture.
Having identified the premises and the key components underlying the information 
infrastructure planning process, the next task is to delineate the necessary stages in the
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planning process. These stages are by no means static but rather should serve as general 
steps through which policy-makers should pass in order to optimise their understanding 
of the issues at hand. The mercurial nature of technological change necessitates policy 
dynamism and the application of a certain degree of "fuzzy logic"21 to some policy 
aspects while maintaining some policy rigidity:
(a) A review of existing facilities and services in the information infrastructure.
(b) Identification and analysis of current actors and activities in the information 
infrastructure.
(c) Needs assessment: An analysis of present and future needs in the various sectors of 
information infrastructure.
(d) Strategy formulation.
(e) Assignment of roles and responsibilities.
(f) Evaluation, reappraisal and research.
There must also be an explicit recognition that information infrastructure planning does 
not take place within the national vacuum, but rather it takes place within and is 
affected by a regional and international context.
(a) Review of existing capabilities
Both the review of existing facilities and identification of actors and activities within 
the current information infrastructure are closely linked stages and collectively can be 
seen as part of the crucial sense-making process. The first stage necessitates, as it were, 
a stock-taking exercise of the current condition of the information infrastructure. 
Evidently the information infrastructure in developing countries places the emphasis on 
more traditional methods of information delivery and retrieval. However, as stated 
earlier, this research concentrates on information and communication technologies. 
Thus the elements of the information infrastructure that policy-planners should focus 
on are those listed below. From a review of the literature (Melody, 1996; Kahin and 
Wilson, 1997) it is possible to identify a consensus on the foundations of an 
information infrastructure based on information and communication technologies:
21 See Kosko, B. (1993) Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science o f Fuzzy Logic, New York: Hyperion.
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•  Telecommunications
• Information Technology
• Content
•  Applications
• Human resources
• Regulatory and legislative framework
This stock-taking exercise will involve: (a) a review of existing capabilities in all the 
above areas and (b) the activities of identified actors in the areas above. The importance 
of these preliminary exercises cannot be overstated. It is the foundation on which all 
other decisions will be built. Designed to create an information infrastructure profile, 
this exercise requires detailed information on each of the above categories. For the 
telecommunications network, for example, necessary information will include, inter 
alia, traditional measures of network capacity such as teledensity, as well as more 
dynamic measures which capture the growth of wireless communications. The 
assessment of public policy towards these components of information infrastructure is 
also of crucial importance.
(b) Examination of actors and activities
This is primarily envisaged as involving an examination of the actors identified and 
their current influence on the development and diffusion of information and 
communication technologies. This framework is first of all designed to indicate a 
universe of actors, and their spheres of influence. Following the analytical perspective 
of constructive technology assessment the identification of actors is crucial to the 
development of effective public planning. A preliminary list of the main actors in 
information and communication technologies development in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
listed below. This list is in no way exhaustive and should be taken only as indicative of 
the reality:
• National government
• Domestic and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
• International development agencies
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• The domestic private sector
• The foreign private sector
• Regional bodies
• Professional associations
• Technology institutions
Analysis would involve looking at, for example:
• National government: The current public policy regime in the fields of
information and communication technology: an assessment of its merits or flaws. 
Obvious examples would include policy pronouncements, the regulatory regime, 
education policies, and fiscal measures.
• International development agencies: Identification of development assistance for 
information infrastructure development, the various agencies involved, objectives 
of projects and levels of assistance, assessments of appropriateness and
sustainability.
• The domestic private sector: Level of indigenous capacity in the main areas of 
information infrastructure, and their utilisation of information and communication 
technologies.
• The foreign private sector: multinational firms and their penetration of the 
domestic market, supply arrangements, and influence on domestic consumption and 
production.
Again, the above list is only indicative of the type of analysis that should be conducted. 
Each country and region will doubtless have different actor configurations, and it goes 
without saying that any analysis must be firmly rooted in the local context. Table 1 
overleaf represents a generic framework that provides a summary checklist for the 
consideration of policy planners. The rows identify the major actors in each sector of 
the information infrastructure, the resources required, the regulatory and promotional 
areas on which public policy should focus, the primary product and services outputs, 
and finally the sectoral strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that public 
policy should address. The columns signify the key activities in information 
infrastructure. The supply of equipment, telecommunications network development, the
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applications and value-added services run over that network, and finally the users of the 
envisaged services.
Table 1: A systemic view for identifying information infrastructure development
priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Markets/
Activities
Equipment
Supply
Network
Development
Content/ 
Value Added 
Services
Demand for 
Applications
Actors
Telecoms / IT 
Media 
Electronics
Government / PTO 
Development agencies 
Foreign private sector
National
Regional
Global
Private Sector 
Government 
Households
Resources
Requirements
Technology
Capital
Skills
Capital
Skills
Management
Interoperability
Skills
Marketing
Management
Integration
Skills
Capital
Policy/ Regulation
Domestic
capacity/
import/export
Education
PTO reform/ 
Coordination of 
Foreign Aid
Access
IPR
Standards
Sectoral reform 
Skill change 
Transition 
policies
Products/
Services
Transmission/
Switching
Terminals
Software
Public Services 
Leased capacity 
Designer networks
Databases
Internet
Multimedia
Networks
Specialised
content
Network
management
Strengths/
Weaknesses/
Opportunities/
Threats
By product line 
By technology 
development 
By skill base
Network coverage 
Productivity
Local content 
Access 
Skills
Leading and 
lagging sectors 
Development 
goals
Source: Adapted from Melody, (1996)
This framework affords policy planners a holistic overview of the key components and 
requirements of information infrastructure development. Being actor-centred it is 
compatible with constructive technology assessment, and provides an effective 
framework within which to view a host of activities. Having identified the actors and 
their influencing roles, policy-planners in Sub-Saharan Africa, be they national polity’s
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or international coalitions, can begin the assessment and coordination of a portfolio of 
activities that were perhaps hitherto disconnected, contradictory or even superfluous.
(c) Needs assessment
Having analysed current indigenous information infrastructure capabilities the next step 
is to undertake an assessment of needs, to pinpoint areas of weakness and to formulate 
a long-term strategy for development of effective information infrastructure. Again, 
Table 1 provides a useful analytical framework for policy planners, assessing country 
requirements in terms of priorities. Information infrastructure planning should hinge on 
a "hierarchy of needs" approach that clearly prioritises the component elements of 
information infrastructure in terms of necessity. For example, extending basic 
telecommunications services to a greater percentage of the population is a fundamental 
need, as is increasing awareness of information technology. This stage echoes the 
normative dimension of constructive technology assessment, and will involve a clear 
articulation of societal goals that can be facilitated by information and communication 
technologies.
(d) Strategy formulation
Once a country has gone through an exhaustive examination of its existing facilities 
and has assessed its hierarchy of needs, the next stage policy-makers must engage in is 
strategy formulation. This process of strategy formulation also involves the articulation 
of a national information infrastructure vision. It is not sufficient for developing 
countries to jump on the "information revolution" bandwagon and announce ethereal 
plans. Rather, a vision is the fruit of a process of labour that strategically plans the most 
effective method of creating national information infrastructure to further 
developmental objectives. Many developing country policy-makers have fallen in to the 
trap of articulating where they would like to be in 20 years’ time, whilst forgetting the 
reality of where they are now. The articulation of an information infrastructure vision 
will inevitably involve the creation of strategic goals and target dates around which to 
rally the energies and resources of stakeholders.
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Specifically this would involve the identification of a portfolio of investment projects to 
develop and put in place the information infrastructure. Intuitively, this portfolio would 
consist of projects to improve the quality and extent of the physical infrastructure, and a 
set of policy and legal reforms to create an environment conducive to information 
infrastructure growth. The portfolio should also include a strategy for the development 
of human resource capabilities in ICTs, through appropriate education and training 
policies and institutions. There are a variety of approaches to strategy formulation that 
are being taken by countries. Table 2 presents two main strands in national information 
infrastructure formulation which have emerged: a conceptually useful dichotomy of a 
top-down and bottom-up approach to information infrastructure strategy formulation 
(Talero, 1996; UNECA, 1995; OECD, 1996).
Table 2: Approaches to Strategy Formulation
Top-down Approach Bottom-up Approach
Identification of the strategic 
opportunities and needs for information 
and communications in the economy.
Development of an inventory of the Nil-related 
projects currently being advanced throughout the 
economy.
Definition of the strategic investments 
needed in information infrastructure to 
facilitate the achievement of pre­
determined development priorities.
Examination of portfolio of projects to assess their 
rationale and development impact. Seek concrete 
development impact and timely completion.
Formulation of strategic goals and target 
dates for the NIL
Agreement on reforms needed to eliminate 
constraints to successful completion and 
sustainability of strategic projects above.
Agreement on reforms needed to 
eliminate constraints to development of 
information infrastructure and to ensure 
successful completion and sustainability 
of strategic investments.
Assessment of the knowledge and skill gaps that 
threaten successful implementation of the strategic 
project portfolio and formulation of remedial 
policies.
Determination of responsibilities for 
implementation and regulation
Determination of responsibilities for implementation 
and regulation.
Source: Adapted from Talero (1996)
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Both are, evidently, simplifications of myriad combinational possibilities, and are not 
mutually exclusive. The bottom-up approach is common in countries with already well- 
established information and communication technologies industries, and where the 
focus has been on private-public partnerships that divide roles between innovation and 
regulation respectively. The United States has typified the bottom-up approach; the 
private sector is seen as the engine of information and communication technology 
innovation and growth, whilst government is expected to play a more regulatory role 
(Kahin, and Nesson, 1997).
The top-down approach, on the other hand, may be more appropriate in countries 
without an embedded infrastructure and where the paternal state is still very much in 
evidence. It was the approach followed by Singapore, Korea, China and Mauritius and 
is also being followed by the majority of developing countries (Kahin, and Nesson, 
1997; Liebenau and Harindranath, 1998). Elements of the two approaches may of 
course be combined, and in fact it is rare that countries follow one exclusively. This 
research asserts that the most appropriate approach to information infrastructure 
planning in Sub-Saharan Africa is a participatory top-down approach. "Top-down" in 
that the state is seen as the prime mover and coordinator of activities, and 
"participatory" to ensure the key element of the bottom-up approach: the broad 
involvement of a host of affected parties.
Echoing the top-down/bottom-up dichotomy, Okut-Uma (1991) asserts that 
governments can pursue an implicit or explicit approach to policy formulation. An 
explicit approach sees government as an active driving force in information 
infrastructure policy that mirrors the top-down approach explained above. Countries 
such as Malaysia and Singapore have elected to follow such an approach. An 
alternative is the implicit approach in which government is also an active participant, 
but works under the aegis of combined informal coordination mechanisms. Examples 
of such implicit policies include import restrictions on IT products, government 
procurement agencies and computer committees (Odedra, 1993) which are all common 
within Sub-Saharan Africa. The conceptual framework of this research asserts the 
importance of policy-makers pursuing an explicit, top-down approach to information 
infrastructure development.
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(e) Assignment of roles and responsibilities
Countries have also differed widely in their determination of the roles and 
responsibilities for strategy implementation. For countries such as Singapore, the 
Scandinavian countries and Japan the strategy has been top-down, with government as 
the executing agency. Other countries, such as Canada and Australia have delegated the 
task to an advisory coalition of parties likely to be affected. Countries with advanced 
communication infrastructures and an independent private sector, such as the U.S., 
have tended to combine both approaches, drawing upon the experience of appointed 
advisory bodies such as the National Advisory Council, whilst retaining responsibility 
within a government task force.22 For the Sub-Saharan African region the dominance of 
the state indicates that, in the main, responsibility lies with government. Yet the 
complexity of the information infrastructure development and coordination process 
requires a broader coalition of responsible parties. Given the information intensity of 
the information infrastructure planning process and the general weakness of the 
developmental state in Sub-Saharan Africa, development of the national strategy is best 
done through a broad-based participatory process. The complexity and importance of 
the task at hand necessitate a broad coalition of interested actors all pulling in the same 
direction. The following groups need to be represented in formulating the strategy, for 
the reasons given:
• the government usually needs to mobilise other stakeholders to participate, organise 
and often lead the preparatory work, and of course play a central role in actual 
strategy formulation, as a policy-maker and regulator;
• the demand side of the Nil, including the productive and service sectors, as well as 
sectoral ministries of government;
• the private sector, both supply and demand sides, which will need to provide the 
bulk of the investment and of the technical expertise needed to deploy the national 
information infrastructure;
• non-governmental organisations who have increasingly important roles as providers 
of services in society, particularly to the poor;
22 The Bangemann Commission of the European Union (Bangemann Group, 1994).
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• researchers in science and technology for the provision of knowledge and expertise 
in their fields; and
• international experts from the private sector or from international development 
agencies, who will play a crucial role. With access to timely and relevant 
information plus expertise in the technological field, it is hoped that they can 
contribute a non-partisan perspective which has at its core the achievement of 
societal goals. Moreover, they can help to negotiate better terms and conditions for 
developing countries in the global information infrastructure.
(f) Evaluation, reappraisal and research
A final area of action-oriented policy planning involves a constant evaluation and 
reappraisal of the information infrastructure planning process. Given the pace of 
technological change and innovation in the area of information infrastructure, public 
policy must be flexible. Policy monitoring and continuous feedback and reappraisal 
will aid in this process. Policy-makers should have the authority to alter infrastructure 
plans in the short-term whilst maintaining overall policy consistency. Allied to this is 
the need for research in line with the principles of constructive technology assessment. 
That is studying the shaping of technological trajectories from their inception. By 
influencing the types and forms of technology that are developed Sub-Saharan African 
countries can attempt to ensure the development of "desirable" and appropriate 
technologies.
3.5 Information infrastructure planning at the international and regional level.
There is also the need to take into account the international dimension when planning 
for information infrastructure. In an era of increasing globalisation no country can 
continue to isolate itself. Quah (1996) talks about the economic implications of the 
ongoing dematerialisation in economic activity. Economic value is now embedded in 
bits and bytes as opposed to concrete, leading to the ’growing weightlessness of GNP. 
Dematerialised economic value cannot respect geographical, physical or national 
boundaries’ (Quah, 1996, p. 7). From the practical point of view, the massive 
investments required in communications systems, and the economies of scale in them,
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mean that few countries can have an efficient information infrastructure all to 
themselves. This raises important questions about whether African countries will be 
able to overcome the financial and technical obstacles that hamper their access to 
digital technologies. Since reducing the ICT gap requires a major financial effort, one 
central concern is whether the international community is ready to provide the massive 
investments needed for the renovation, upgrading and expansion of networks in 
developing countries.
It is essential for all societies to understand that planning for the adoption and 
deployment of information and communication technologies can no longer be a purely 
local affair. Global negotiations such as the recent Uruguay Round on multilateral 
trade, and international institutions like the World Trade Organisation, have enormous 
impact on national planning. Therefore, developing countries must participate more 
forcefully and effectively in these institutions, basing their actions on greater policy 
coordination. But \he G-7723 lacks a research facility or a permanent secretariat, and is 
unable to carry out long-term planning or strategizing for international meetings and 
negotiations’ (Khor, 1995, p. 18). Without policy coordination, ’many developing 
countries do not obtain a fair share of the benefits of globalisation, and some actually 
suffer net losses’ (Khor, 1995, p. 16). Information infrastructure development therefore 
requires a broad set of governance principles to be accepted in order for them to be able 
to operate in a stable environment. This is increasingly the case when control and use of 
information and communication technology applications, such as electronic commerce, 
take on an international dimension. National information infrastructure, to an extent, 
will be linked to the global information infrastructure and will run on protocols decided 
internationally.
There are a growing number of organisations operating at the international or regional 
levels whose role it is to set the "rules of the game". Some of these organisations, like 
the ITU, have been in existence for some time. Others are of a more recent vintage and 
reflect the growing private sector involvement in establishing the governance regime 
for information and communication technology applications such as the Internet. The 
key issues which have to be addressed include intellectual property rights, preservation
23 The term G-77 refers to those countries outside the Group of Seven (G7) economic grouping.
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of the right to privacy and the security of electronic transactions. It is critical that this 
international dimension is not neglected, that national policy-makers keep a firm eye on 
the ever-changing global technological horizon.
Table 3: The International Dimension in Information Infrastructure
Development
Actors Sphere of influence Level Mechanisms
International
institutions
Intellectual property 
rights regime, 
telecommunications 
policy, development 
assistance
International Technology transfer through 
aid and expertise, property 
rights law and patents and trade 
agreements
Regional
organisations
T elecommunications 
policy, sharing 
agreements
Regional Inter-cooperation agreements, 
collective bargaining
Foreign 
private sector
Telecommunications 
and information 
technology 
infrastructure.
Local Provision of information 
infrastructure goods and 
services
As Table 3 shows, the role of public policy at each level is vital. At the international 
level information infrastructure policy-makers must ensure: membership and active 
participation of standards committees, international intelligence, and lobbying of the 
international governance regime to further their interests. At the regional level: insuring 
cooperation between neighbouring countries, sharing of information infrastructure and 
cooperative agreements on centres of excellence, access to submarine cable systems, 
and/or satellite sharing.
3.6 Assumptions and limitations of the framework
One of the biggest assumptions in the framework outlined above is that of government 
competency. Dosi et al. have observed that ’economic theory always assumes economic
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competence’ (1992, p. 208). Government intervention is normally justified in cases of 
market of failure, but given the weakness of the state in terms of access to information, 
political partisanship and public sector management we must also consider the reality 
of government failure. Determining the rationale for policy is closely connected to what 
we can reasonably expect from government in terms of their ability to collect, process 
and act upon available information. Katz (1988), for example, argues that government 
intervention may in fact be detrimental to the development of an information 
infrastructure in developing countries. He highlights in particular the uninformed 
decision making that can result in negative fiscal regimes towards the IT sector. African 
policy-makers can be their own worst enemies, politically driven and uninformed. 
Moreover, the dynamic information infrastructure strategies that African states may 
articulate in policy are unlikely to be matched by the rapid administrative reforms 
needed to support the policy. According to Peterson (1994) public bureaucracies in 
Africa are weak organisations whose structures are fragmented and under 
bureaucratised and authority is personal not procedural. He asserts that ’while the image 
is one of centralisation, the reality is a set of competing fiefdoms run by fiat rather than 
procedure’ (Peterson, 1994, p. 4). Drawing on the work of Moris (1977) et al., Goran 
Hyden (1993) notes six attributes of African public bureaucracies:
1. Personnel relations: norms about hiring and firing are rarely enforced; 
recruitment occurs through personal influence and security of employment is 
considered a generally acceptable norm.
2. Materials management: resources tied for specific purposes are often diverted to 
meet urgent needs in other sectors.
3. Planning: there is a flexible attitude towards both planning and scheduling and 
it is generally assumed that nothing occurs quite as arranged.
4. Decision-making: organisations tend to lack capacity for organisational 
intelligence; ability to learn from past mistakes is limited. Decision-making 
techniques remain personal to the managers. The result is that organisations 
tend to fail in managing large-scale, complex activities that are beyond the 
capacities of their top executives.
5. Control: large-scale organisations tend to be divided into micro-organisations 
controlled by individual top managers.
6. Professionalism: managers show a marked ambivalence about technical
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matters, on the one hand fearing them to the extent of non-action and on the 
other observing them as dramatic constraints that prevent action.
Thus there would appear to be high opportunity costs associated with government 
involvement: their lack of knowledge and experience, bureaucratic inertia, and their 
captivity to vested interests. Whereas there appears to be a clear justification of the role 
of public planning in coordinating and/or constructing information infrastructure, there 
are legitimate concerns as to the capacity of the state in Sub-Saharan African countries 
to do so effectively. Firstly, the legitimacy of state intervention is increasingly being 
challenged by the incessant rise of the neoliberal orthodoxy that has at its heart the 
abandonment of traditional forms of government, and the illegitimisation of the concept 
of the developmental state. Critics of state intervention contend that this concept is no 
longer credible. They point to the fact that more than 30 years of government 
intervention in the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa have seen living standards 
continue to plummet accompanied by no visible signs of development (UNDP, 1999).
Despite the success of the East and South-East Asian newly industrialising countries 
(NICs), they argue that any state intervention will lead to a sub-optimal outcome. 
Economic liberalisation is deemed to be best realised under specific state-models that 
allow greater flexibility in the market mechanism. This flexibility, under its 
accompanying language of structural adjustment and efficiency gains, has effectively 
undone the coalitions that supported the predominant paradigm of developmental 
etatisme. Moreover, the current redefinition of the state reduces the developmental 
options previously utilised by modem industrialised nations. Import-substitution 
policies, trade barriers, the use of subsidies, and other neo-autarkic measures, are under 
increasing ideological attack. The ideological hegemony of neoliberalism has 
undermined the legitimacy of the developmental state at precisely the time it is most 
needed.
Secondly, the ability of government to develop effective policies depends on their 
capacity to interpret information relevant to the economic, social, cultural and political 
environment. A strong information infrastructure would allow access to information 
from all of these sectors, and would provide the basis for competent planning and 
decision-making. However, such infrastructures are vestigial in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Policy-makers are trapped in an informational "Catch-22", wherein relevant and timely 
information is necessary in order to promote sound information infrastructure, but 
without a more efficient information infrastructure governments are not able to gamer 
the requisite information for effective decision-making.
Thirdly, the state in the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries has witnessed an 
unprecedented reduction in its ability to act. The past two decades have witnessed the 
severely declining fortunes of many economies of Sub-Saharan Africa. In a sample of 
32 Sub-Saharan Africa countries, the average annual rate of growth in real per capita 
GDP declined from 1.19 per cent in the 1970s to about 0.99 per cent in the 1980s, with 
an average of 0.35 per cent for the two decades24. Most infrastructure expenditures in 
developing countries are publicly financed, with little in the form of private capital 
finance. The debt crisis and the debacle of structural adjustment have generated an 
erratic and generally declining investment profile in almost every Sub-Saharan Africa 
country.25 Undermined by the conditionality of structural adjustment programmes, 
exploited through debt peonage, and weakened by political conflict, the majority of 
governments are in crisis management mode, prioritising short-term economic and 
political survival over long-term dynamics.
Yet despite this economic and political fragility developing countries are being 
encouraged to nurture sophisticated information infrastructure’s that are increasingly 
becoming the sine qua non of international trade. At the same time, Sub-Saharan 
African countries find themselves in an unenviably defensive position. With more 
pressing concerns, and in the face of technological uncertainty, few have constructed 
policy strategies to ensure that the benefits of these technologies accrue equitably.
The weakness of the African state in general necessitates a broad coalition of actors to 
ensure some element of transparency in the planning process. It is unlikely that the state 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, left to its own devices, could successfully coordinate the
24 World Bank (1991) The Challenge o f Development: World Development Report 1991, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
25 The empirical evidence shows that cuts in capital budgets constituted a disproportionate share of the overall 
spending cuts that were part of the economic austerity and adjustment programs of the 1980s. As a result the 
neglect of crucial maintenance and upgrading has left the majority of infrastructure facilities in the region in 
a parlous state (ADB, 1998).
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divergent interests and actors undertaking infrastructure development. What is needed 
are concerted efforts on the part of development agencies and the international 
governance regime to ensure equitable global access to information infrastructure, and 
to aid developing countries in their endeavours. Successful adaptation to technological 
progress is contingent upon the ability of countries and their composite parts to invest, 
innovate and promptly respond to changing conditions. With a view to success that may 
only materialise in the long-term, an appropriate policy framework hinges on 
consistency and credibility.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has presented a conceptual introduction to the broad topics of information 
infrastructure and public policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. A conceptual framework has 
been articulated which, drawing on theories that argue that technological trajectories 
are not given but actor-driven, provides policy-planners with an empowering analytical 
perspective from which to view the construction of information infrastructure. Given 
the role of the state as the egregiously dominant actor in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
chapter has presented the steps necessary for an effective dirigiste approach to 
information infrastructure planning: beginning with the assessment of existing strengths 
and weaknesses and an articulation of a vision to the assignment of roles and 
responsibilities and the evaluation and monitoring of public policy.
The framework is seen as a hierarchical conceptual framework for integrated national 
information infrastructure planning. Unlike most frameworks it does not imply the 
rigidity of centralised planning. Rather, it seeks to simplify the information 
infrastructure planning process by giving a holistic overview of an extremely complex 
and heterogeneous environment. The final objectives being to give policy-makers the 
ability to prioritise according to their national hierarchy of needs, proactively dictate 
the development of the requisite capabilities, and reactively deal with socio-technical 
contingencies; be they at the national, regional or international level.
130
CHAPTER 4
A Survey of Information Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to survey the state of information infrastructure in Sub- 
Saharan Africa in terms of two key elements: telecommunications and Internet 
development. The empirical evidence, whilst incomplete, does reveal a degree of 
similarity in the Sub-Saharan Africa region in terms of the paucity of information 
infrastructure that is statistically significant. By any measurement this form of 
infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa is critically underdeveloped and represents the 
major constraint to leveraging the dynamic gains that can be wrought from these 
technologies. Firstly, an analysis is made of the state of both these sectors in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Secondly the chapter seeks to identify the various actors partaking in 
the development of information infrastructure in the region, assessing their roles and 
motives. At this critical time, when both countries and companies are restructuring to 
take advantage of new technologies and services, both government and industry need 
better tools to measure impact and efficacy. They must reach beyond traditional 
definitions of infrastructure and look at who is constructing information infrastructure 
and how and why. In the process, the policies and practices that enable as well as 
constrain need to be assessed and understood.
Any assessment of the role of information and communication technologies in Sub- 
Saharan Africa requires an analysis of the existing empirical evidence. However, the 
phenomenal rate at which these applications continue to grow has meant that the 
available data are inevitably out of step with the realities on the ground. The traditional 
lack and availability of accurate statistics on the Sub-Saharan Africa region continue to 
compound these problems. As Mansell and Wehn point out, ’for many of the least 
developed countries, useful indicators are virtually non-existent’ (Mansell and Wehn, 
1998, p. 21). Moreover, much of the debate on ICTs and social development 
erroneously describes Africa as a homogeneous continent, in which the problems -  and 
hence solutions -  are universal. Yet the challenges facing African countries are a
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combination of problems shared with other countries and those created by each 
country’s unique history.
The diversity of the African region as a whole is reflected in the very large variation in 
information and communication technology usage on the continent. In some countries 
such as Zaire, in 1999, information infrastructure activity can be described as minimal 
at best; however, in North and South Africa there is a significant proportion of the 
population taking advantage of relatively advanced networks that have been installed in 
metropolitan areas. For example, some of the continent’s most sophisticated national 
networks are in Botswana and Rwanda, where by 1999 over 90 per cent of their main 
telecommunications lines were digital, compared to just less than 50 per cent in the 
United States (Obiabaka, 1999). However, the vast majority of African countries 
continue to subsist with grossly inadequate telecommunications infrastructures.
4.2 The Telecommunications sector in Sub-Saharan Africa
The widening disparity between access to telecommunications in the developed and 
developing world has already been the focus of several important studies over the past 
decades, most notably the 1984 report entitled The Missing Link by the Independent 
Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications Development, chaired by Sir Donald 
Maitland (ITU, 1985). However, empirical evidence reveals that the commission’s goal 
-  that by the early part of the next century virtually the whole of mankind should be 
brought within easy reach of a telephone -  is still far from becoming reality. 
Telecommunications coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa is among the lowest in the world. 
Empirical data from the ITU reveals that in 1996, teledensity, the number of telephone 
lines per 100 inhabitants, varied from 0.09 in Chad, to 0.94 in Zambia. Sub-Saharan 
Africa, excluding South Africa, averaged a teledensity of 0.46; South Africa was 9.4 
and all North Africa, 4.22.26
Overall the rate of expansion of telephone lines has been increasing, though at a rate 
slower than that of other regions. From 1986 to 1990, the average growth in telephone
26 All figures in this section from African Telecommunication Indicators (ITU, 1998).
132
lines was 8 per cent for Africa, 6.6 percent for Latin America and 12.3 percent for Asia. 
In the following four year period (1991-1994), the growth in telephone lines in Africa 
stagnated at 8 per cent while those of Latin America and Asia accelerated to 10.4 per 
cent and 26.7 per cent respectively (ITU, 1998a). Africa, it seems, is already at the 
margins of communications development even relative to other developing regions. 
This lack of telecommunications infrastructure has had obvious knock-on effects in 
terms of overall information infrastructure. In 1997, for example, data terminals per
100,000 inhabitants were 0.6 in Sub-Saharan countries compared with six in emerging 
economies and 111 in industrialised countries. Internet hosts per 100,000 inhabitants 
were 0.1 in Sub-Saharan countries compared with five in emerging countries and 1014 
in industrialised countries (ITU, 1998a).
The empirical evidence provided by the ITU conveys mixed signals as to the 
development of the sector in the regions. For example, the 1998 World 
Telecommunications Development report shows whilst registered demand for 
telephone services continues to exceed supply, the number of people waiting for a 
telephone line is falling (ITU, 1998b). Such encouraging news is tempered by the 
statistical problems inherent in the use of certain data. The telephone waiting list, for 
example, which is commonly employed as a yardstick for telecommunications demand, 
is not generally considered an accurate reflection of the true level of unmet demand for 
telecommunications services (Mansell and Wehn, 1998). While it measures demand 
under the extant price structure, it fails to account for latent or unexpressed demand; 
that is those who want a telephone but have yet to register their request. With waiting 
lists as long as seven years in some countries, registering for a telephone line is often 
seen as a futile gesture. This is just one illustration of the methodological problems that 
are particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa where on average over 70 per cent of the 
population are rurally based.
Methodological problems aside, it is evident that the telecommunications sector in Sub- 
Saharan Africa is underdeveloped by any criteria. The vast majority of countries in the 
region must subsist with low levels of service provision, which are increasingly failing 
to meet burgeoning demand. There is little in the way of innovation, with a scarcity of 
reliable value added services. The continent is characterised by low telephone 
penetration, slow network growth, antiquated systems, sub-optimal reinvestment of
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profits, high pricing of private facilities, poorly-dimensioned inter-city telephone links 
and national network infrastructures characterised by chronic underfunding for 
equipment (ITU, 1997b). Lack of skilled labour and the absence of strategic planning 
and management continues to contribute to the underdeveloped status of the sector. The 
cause of the weaknesses in the telecommunications sector, whilst varied, are on the 
whole easily identifiable. They are far from complex and can be divided into 
operational and political economy considerations.
4.2.1 Operational constraints
Supply-side constraints continue to hinder the ability of carriers to meet the burgeoning 
demand for telecommunications services. These constraints include the state monopoly 
of telecommunications and the existence of regulations that prevent the private sector 
from participating in the sector. Another contributory factor is the lack of resources 
necessary to augment investment in the sector. This is often as a result of the high level 
of indebtedness of the local operator. Even where funds are available, limited project 
implementation capacity may constrain network development (Kiplagat and Werner, 
1994). The capacity of national operators to maintain and manage their monopolies 
must also be called into question. Despite an unchallenged domestic market and the 
huge revenues culled from over-inflated international call charges, the 
telecommunications industry in Sub-Saharan Africa is plagued by low levels of net 
profitability (ITU, 1998a)
This lack of realised profitability is the direct result of low rates of investment 
efficiency, lack of effective management and high installation costs. Installation costs 
per line in Africa are extremely high relative to the industry average, reflecting the state 
of investment inefficiency in the sector. It is estimated that the average cost per line in 
the region is over US$4,500, more than three times the global industry average of 
US$1,500 (ITU, 1997a). Thus, if the industrial average prevailed in the region, the 
investment made could have financed three times more lines with the same amount of 
funds (ITU, 1998b). The high installation costs are partly due to the large rural areas 
that have to be covered, but also the dependence of the region on technology imports. 
With the exception of South Africa, which has its own production of integrated circuits, 
the continent relies heavily on imports for its equipment needs. This situation ties
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procurement of materials to the trading policies of its suppliers’ host governments, often 
forcing African countries to buy equipment and make investments not suited to actual 
needs (Noam, 1999). Problems of maintenance and management of spare parts are also 
blamed on the multiplicity of incompatible and outdated equipment (Kiplagat and 
Wemer, 1994). All these factors result in high operating costs and high subscription 
charges. For instance, in Mozambique the 1998 domestic telecommunications 
subscription cost was 69.8 per cent of GDP per capita (ITU, 1998b). Coupled with this 
is a lack of income diversification and price discrimination. The region’s operators 
depend heavily on international communications traffic that tends to yield higher 
income. Consequently operators prefer to target wealthy elites, international hotels and 
export-oriented enterprises (Adetunji, 1999).
In contrast, the tariffs remain too high for the rest of the population as demonstrated by 
problems related to the non-payment of bills and the increasing number of 
disconnections. Price discrimination, which charges lower prices for households and 
relatively higher prices for business, has widened the market and helped to cross- 
subsidise rural telecommunications (Saunders et al., 1994). However, insufficient 
amounts of the profits from price discrimination are reinvested and operators, or more 
accurately the governments who control them, prefer to indulge in profit taking (Shetty, 
1998b). In addition, foreign exchange restrictions continue to have a negative impact on 
public operators. International telecommunications tariffs in developed countries have 
fallen, as a result of which payments for traffic from outside have increased in Africa. 
These payments are often made in hard currency, although the public 
telecommunications authorities have noted that funds so received are absorbed by other 
public agencies (Shetty, 1998a). However, owing to the high international tariffs 
charged by local public telecommunications networks, they are increasingly being 
pushed aside by "parallel" networks. This has reduced the import capacity of local 
public operators to renew and service equipment, resulting in quality deterioration and 
poor service.
Another constraint is the insecurity of infrastructure. In a region in which such a high 
proportion of the population is living below subsistence level it is unsurprising that 
theft of public property is rampant. The copper cable on which the public switched 
network relies has a significant second-hand value. As a result theft and vandalism is a
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common problem faced by all public telecommunications operators (ITU, 1999b). 
There have of late been more concerted responses from PTOs, such as Nigeria’s 
NITEL, which employs guards at troublespots. However, because copper also requires 
more maintenance and is also susceptible to lightning damage, many operators are 
looking to replace links at risk with fibre optic and wireless connections.
4.2.2 Political economic factors
Whilst these operational considerations go a long way to explaining the poor rate of 
growth of telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa, the volatile political economy of 
the region continues to be a factor in accounting for the lack of development in 
telecommunications infrastructure. Civil strife and endemic political instability are 
partly responsible for the low densities in such countries as Somalia, Angola, 
Mozambique, Liberia, Sudan and Rwanda, to mention a few. Whilst the attainment of 
political stability in these countries will contribute favourably to the improvement of 
their telecommunications infrastructure, an underlying lack of confidence in the long­
term stability of these countries lingers. This lack of confidence has led to minimal 
private sector participation; with the bulk of investments coming from self-financing 
and bilateral and multilateral sources (ITU, 1998b). Compared to other developing 
countries, the level of self-financing by local operators is high, indicative of the lack of 
capital from other sources. At the same time, lending from bilateral sources is 
declining.27
The almost endemic macroeconomic and political volatility in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region has led to a lack of political direction of the telecommunications sector. Though 
deregulation is drastically altering the industrial landscape, for many years the 
telecommunications sector has been seen as a cash cow to be milked when needed. The 
sector has never been seen as a commercial entity but rather as a public service, heavily 
subsidised and free of commercial considerations (Noam, 1999). Whilst the vast 
majority of countries began to jettison these ideals some time ago, it is only since 1997 
that developing countries as a whole, and Sub-Saharan Africa specifically, have begun 
the process of infrastructure reappraisal (Wilson, 1999). As a result the
27 Whereas bilateral lending for the sector was US$431 million in 1989, it was only US$97 million in 1994 
(ITU, 1998a).
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telecommunications sector, like other public utilities, continues to suffer from low 
revenue collection, widespread corruption and ineffective strategic planning.
First and foremost, massive investment is required -  in telecommunications alone, for 
example, investment totalling at least $50 billion would be required to achieve a 
minimum teledensity of 5 per cent or five lines per 100 inhabitants -  in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (ITU, 1998b). This by far exceeds public sector financing capacity, making 
large-scale private investment a necessity. Governments will find it increasingly 
difficult to continue to monopolise information and communication technologies. 
Rather, an appropriate information and communications technology development 
strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa will inevitably involve private sector investment. For 
change to occur, the private sector has to be encouraged to invest in the continent. Yet, 
of the $95bn raised worldwide for telecommunications privatisation in the period 1994- 
1998 only $1.7bn was directed at Africa -  and again, most of that was for South Africa 
(Olamiji, 1999). Evidently the presence of the private sector must be bolstered in order 
to mitigate the shortfalls of public investment. Without this access to capital, markets 
and technology and the exploitation of new opportunities and the benefits of 
competition, any attempt to reverse the stagnation of the information infrastructure in 
Sub-Saharan Africa will be handicapped (Jayakar, 1999).
Increased investment alone is clearly a necessary but not sufficient measure. Efforts 
must be made to tackle the operational and political constraints to information 
infrastructure development. In the light of global shifts towards telecommunications 
deregulation, and a belated recognition of the importance of information and 
communication technologies, African policy-makers are putting in place frameworks to 
deregulate and enhance competition in their telecommunications sector. There has also 
been sustained and increasing pressure from development agencies for public sector 
reform in developing countries. The World Bank, for example, is increasingly making 
parastatal reform a condition for many of its investments in developing countries 
(Mansell and Wehn, 1998). Based on the premise that increased private participation 
and/or competition leads to improved operability and service delivery policy-makers 
are being urged to reform their telecommunications sector. Typically, governments are 
being advised to firstly dissolve the historical partnership between the postal service 
and the telecommunications sector. Secondly, they are being advised to restructure the
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regulatory framework so that the sector is more conducive to competition. Thirdly, to 
subject the national operator to commercial considerations whilst ensuring adequate 
regulatory provisions (Shetty, 1998a).
4.2.3 Telecommunications reform in Sub-Saharan Africa
As Table 4 shows, a significant number of Sub-Saharan African countries are now 
instituting reforms that permit competition in basic fixed telephony, allow new value 
added services, introduce competition from the private sector, and establish a separate 
regulatory agency.
Table 4: Privatisation of state-owned African telecommunications companies,
1987-1997
Country Public Telecommunications 
Operator (PTO)
Year of 
privatisation
Distribution of 
ownership
Cape Verde Cabo Verde Telecom Sari 1995 Portugal Telecom 
40%
Public 44% 
Employees 5%
Central
African
Republic
Societe Centrafricain des 
Telecommunications (SOCATEL) 
(domestic)
1990 France Cable et 
Radio 40%
Ghana Ghana Telecom 1997 France Cable et 
Radio 51%
Guinea Societe des Telecommunications de 
Guinea (SOTELGUI)
1995 G-Communications 
led by Telkom 
Malaysia) 60%
Guinea-Bissau Companhia de Telecommunicacoes 
da Guniee-Bissau, sari (Guinea- 
Telecom)
1989 Portugal Telecom 
51%
Madagascar Telecom Malagasay (TELMA S.A.) 1995 France Cable et 
Radio 34%
Sao Tome & 
Principe
Companhia Santomenes de 
Telecommunicacoes, sari
1989 Portugal Telecom 
51%
Senegal Societe des Telecommunications 
due Senegal (SONATEL)
1997 France Cable et 
Radio 33.3 % 
Domestic investors 
17.66% 
Employees 10%
South Africa Telkom S.A. 1997 SBC
Communications
18%
Telkom Malaysia 
12%
Source: adapted from the World Telecommunications Development Report 1997 (ITU, 1997a) and
ITU/BDT Regulatory Database.
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According to the ITU, by 1998 62 per cent of African countries had separated postal 
services from telecommunications, and nearly 75 per cent had corporatised their 
telecommunications operators (ITU, 1998b). Between 1989 and 1997, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic (CAR), Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Republic of Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal and South Africa had partially 
privatised their public telecommunications operators. In addition Chad and Niger had 
private participation in their international operators (ITU, 1998a). During 1998, Eritrea, 
Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia all announced plans to sell an equity stake in their state- 
owned telecommunications operator. However, as of 1998, only Ghana and Uganda 
had established a duopoly for the provision of basic telephony (ITU, 1998a).
Whilst the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries have begun to reform their 
telecommunications sector, only in the value added services segment have most 
permitted some element of competition. Whilst the number of fixed line services in 
Africa has reached a standstill, the mobile sector has continued to develop from 1997 to 
1999. Cellular is one of the few market segments where private investment and 
competition has been allowed in the African telecommunications sector. The number of 
GSM (Global System for Mobile) subscribers in Africa represented 3 per cent of the 
world's GSM users in February 1999. A dramatic increase from a negligible figure only 
two years earlier according to research by the ITU (1998a). In June 1997, Sub-Saharan 
Africa had 1.35m subscribers, compared to 9.7m in Asia and 33.4m in Europe. As of 
the beginning of 1999, cellular telephone services were available in over 35 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, mostly in the capital cities but also in some secondary towns.28 
Most of the cellular networks can be used to access the Internet, but the high cost of 
calls makes this prohibitive except for important e-mail. Yet, the vast majority of Sub- 
Saharan African countries have fewer than 10,000 subscribers each, and in all countries 
where there are mobile networks, usage is restricted to urban areas, with virtually no 
coverage in rural areas. Although many African countries have just one mobile phone 
operator, governments are being encouraged to increase competition, as they can gamer 
much needed revenue from the fees accruing from granting operational licences. In 
addition there are problems with equipment supplies. Shetty (1998b) points out that in
28 Data sourced from Strategis Group available at http://www.strategisgroup.com/reports/pubs/moblsa98.pdf. 
Accessed June 1999.
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Cameroon, for example, there is a mobile phone network but memory cards, which are 
essential for use, are often not available. Other factors such as climate and geography 
are also deterring the development of mobile telephony.
It is estimated that by 2002 the number of mobile subscribers in Africa will have risen 
to 5.7 million (ITU, 1998a). Yet despite this rapidly growing sector "plain old 
telephone services" or POTS, remain, for most countries, firmly entrenched in the 
public sector. Whilst other developing countries have rapidly deregulated their sectors 
and are reaping the concomitant benefits, the rate of growth of telecommunications 
capacity in the region still remains disappointing. This low growth rate can be 
attributed to a number of factors ranging from the paternalistic and nationalist attitudes 
towards the telecommunications sector to investor perceptions.
The telecommunications sector is considered to be a strategic asset and, as such, 
governments are loath to allow the control of such an asset to go to an external source. 
There is also the claim that foreign investors are unlikely to pay much heed to social 
development objectives. Such sentiments are behind the decision of the South African 
government to defer privatisation of Telkom SA for a period of 5 years whilst attempts 
are made to redress the legacy of apartheid, and correct the imbalance in 
telecommunications resources within the population. The World Bank, amongst others, 
has cited more cynical reasons for the reluctance to privatise in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
namely the huge revenues accruing from national monopoly. In reality the cause of the 
slow rate of reform arises from other factors including those listed above. Firstly, there 
is generally a lack of consensus from interested parties as to the merits of privatisation. 
With the telecommunications sector in Sub-Saharan Africa characterised by chronic 
over-manning29, powerful trade unions in countries such as Nigeria are actively 
lobbying against deregulation. Also the management of national operators are naturally 
wary about where the balance of power would lie in a joint venture with a foreign 
multinational.30
29 In Madagascar, for example, there are 10 lines per employee in the public telecommunication operator, in 
Tanzania there are 18 lines per employee, while in Morocco there are 80 telephone lines per employee (ITU, 
1998b).
30 "Unions wary of proposed NITEL plan", Punch, 13 March 1998, Lagos, Nigeria.
140
Attempts at sectoral reform have been hampered by the traditional approach to 
telecommunications regulation. National operators have historically acted as both 
operator and regulator. To some extent this is where the problems have arisen, with 
national operators abusing their monopoly position and overcharging subscribers. In an 
effort to resolve this, some 60 per cent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to 
the ITU, have separated operational and regulatory functions and created stand alone 
regulatory agencies.31 Yet despite attempts to introduce greater regulation these 
agencies have remained, for the most part, ineffectual. With weak mandates from 
government and limited powers, they have had little impact on curbing the abuses of 
national monopolies.32 Rather than being autonomous bodies, the majority of countries 
have reserved the right to appoint specific regulators and to issue specific directives to 
them. Already, some of the new generation of telecommunications regulators have run 
into difficulties with the ministries that were supposed to have ceded regulation of the 
industry to them (Shetty, 1998b). Questions are being raised with regards to the 
viability of the emerging global regulatory framework set by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the European Union. In developing economies, it is 
questionable as to whether telecommunications liberalisation can be sustainable 
without broader social and political change.
The environment of the telecommunication sector is also undergoing significant 
changes. The combined forces of "demand-pull" and "supply-push" have made 
telecommunications one of the leading growth sectors of the world economy. The 
telecommunication sector has a high profit potential in every country of the world. 
However, experience suggests that in developing countries retained earnings in the 
sector are not sufficient to finance all new projects because networks are 
underdeveloped and do not generate sufficient cash flow (Kiplagat and Wemer, 1994). 
Sector reforms leading to greater private sector involvement and competition are new 
forces shaping the development of telecommunications. These new challenges of the 
information society and the new trade environment heightened by the agreements 
reached by WTO, place even greater pressure on policy-makers, regulators and 
operators to acquire the necessary skills to manage the new environment. In this
31 ITU (1998) General Trends in Telecommunications Restructuring, Geneva: ITU.
32 Ibid.
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respect, human resources development becomes a key success factor. In addition, 
governments play a key role in the development of telecommunications, and therefore 
need to establish appropriate policies and regulatory structures to promote reasonable 
and affordable access to basic telecommunication services for all.
The regulatory framework should also create a stable and transparent environment, 
promote fair competition while protecting network integrity and guarantee the rights of 
users, operators and investors. Policies and strategies for the development of 
telecommunications should reflect the trend towards multi-services utilising a common 
infrastructure platform. Yet perhaps the biggest obstacle to greater deregulation is a 
lack of investor confidence. The macroeconomic climate in Sub-Saharan Africa is far 
from ideal and there are still tangible signs of chronic political instability. From a 
commercial standpoint, many national telecommunications operators simply do not 
represent a viable opportunity given the level of risk. The majority of national 
telecommunications operators have suffered from decades of operational neglect and 
will require substantial investment from any incoming operator. Additionally, the high 
proportion of small countries with largely rurally based low-income populations do not 
represent large enough markets for foreign investors.
This thus calls into question the privatisation imperative. Privatisation of the state- 
owned telecommunications infrastructure is not universally feasible, nor does it 
necessarily improve performance (Saunders et al., 1994). It appears that there is no 
universal solution to telecommunications restructuring. Whilst one of the main 
proponents of telecommunications reform, the World Bank, argues that privatisation 
offers the best solution, there are successful examples of divergent strategies. Vietnam, 
for example, has achieved an impressive rate of sector growth without undertaking any 
significant restructuring of its telecommunications sector; the national operator still 
maintains a monopoly position33. This suggests that privatisation is not necessarily the 
sine qua non of successful infrastructure development. Rather, it points to the need for 
careful analysis of the sector at hand. Whilst the period from 1984 has seen an 
increasing deregulation of the international telecommunications sector, the reasons for
33 Legard, D. (1999) "Vietnam will not allow deregulation", IDG News Service/Singapore Bureau 
24 September 1999.
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this differ widely amongst developing countries. For Singapore, for example, 
deregulation arose out of a need to raise capital to fund ambitious infrastructure 
expansion. The 1997 privatisation of Telebras in Brazil arose out of the intention of the 
state to withdraw from the provision of services. In Sub-Saharan Africa the impetus to 
privatisation stems from more compelling reasons. Mainly the desire to have 
desperately needed technology transferred and the need for management expertise.
In summary the main stumbling blocks to improvements in telephone access remains 
the issues of financing and subsidy, and operational efficiency. For change to occur, the 
private sector has to be encouraged to invest in the continent. So far, local investors 
have been elusive. Revenues generated from the small base of existing domestic 
subscribers fail to allow public operators to invest enough to cater for the growing 
demand for telecommunications services. Moreover, with reform of the international 
system of accounting rates, public operators must resign themselves to a regime of 
reduced international settlement rates and the rebalancing of domestic rates that will 
inevitably follow. There is a need for a more commercial influence in 
telecommunications development, but only if the pace of reform is driven by national 
requirements and not by outside pressure. However, the acceptance of commercial 
imperatives by developing countries should not be confused with a necessity to 
progress at a pace dictated by the industrialised countries. Rather, Sub-Saharan African 
countries must take the time necessary to introduce sectoral and economic reforms.
4.2.4 Regional telecommunications development
Since independence, African nations have viewed intra-African telecommunications 
capacity as essential to their initiatives toward economic, social and political 
integration. Regional telecommunications networks have been seen as critical to 
establishing commercial and governmental cooperation between African nations. 
Regional networks were also seen as a method for redefining the communication 
structure that had been established during the colonial period. Out of the desire for 
closer regional cooperation arose the most ambitious African telecommunications 
project to date: the Pan-African Telecommunications Network (Panaftel). Panaftel was 
envisaged as a continental network that would alleviate the need to transmit intra- 
African communications through non-African transit centres. Despite its ambitious
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goals, Panaftel has not developed a sustainable, integrated continent-wide 
telecommunications network. Certain links are sustainable and certain regions, 
particularly southern Africa, have advanced further than others in establishing 
connectivity (Akwule, 1992).
The majority of countries in the region still maintain links to former colonial rulers. For 
example, Francophone countries are connected to France, and the English-speaking 
countries to the UK or the United States. So, neighbouring African countries, instead of 
taking advantage of West African microwave links, route their telecommunications 
traffic through distant third parties. For example, between Ghana and the UK or the US 
and between Togo and France, but not between Ghana and Togo. However, despite the 
failure of Panaftel, a regional approach to solving the paucity of telecommunications 
infrastructure remains attractive. In recognition of this, attempts were made in the late 
1970’s to investigate the feasibility of a regional satellite network.34 The 1976 
Conference of African Ministers of Transport, Communications and Planning identified 
the potential of satellite networks for Africa and resolved to undertake a major 
feasibility study on the issue. Executed by the ITU, the study, known as the Regional 
African Satellite Community or RASCOM, became the largest ever undertaken in 
Africa on telecommunications, involving over 600 experts and a survey of 120,000 
villages (Akwule, 1992). The study concluded that there was an urgent need for an 
African satellite programme, which was to became operational in 1993. The core 
objectives of RASCOM have been to rationalise existing satellite use in Africa, obtain 
better rates for its members through bulk discounts, and to gain operational expertise in 
the management of satellite resources before the launch of a dedicated satellite for the 
continent in 2001.
Despite the failure of former cooperative efforts, RASCOM has so far succeeded in its 
first two objectives. By 1997 all African PTOs were utilising the same INTELSAT 
satellite, with the result that all countries can now be reached through a single satellite 
uplink, thus increasing the economies of scale for broadcasting and data services. 
However, given the scope of the project and the economic disparities between the
34The regional satellite model has been utilised throughout the world for regional telecommunications network 
development The European Satellite (Eutelsat) was established in 1983; the Arab Satellite (Arabsat) was 
established in 1985; and the Asian Satellite (Asiasat) was established in 1990.
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countries behind RASCOM, the project has been stalled at times due to political 
infighting.35 Despite these stumbling blocks the concept of a regional approach to 
improving existing telecommunications infrastructure remains appealing, and perhaps 
necessary given the economies of scale that can be achieved by pooling resources on 
the continent into one indigenous satellite. The major benefit of the regional satellite 
model is the flexibility that a satellite system would provide. It would be a conduit for 
numerous types of telecommunications traffic; for example, RASCOM plans to offer 
television, video conferencing and data transmission services on a commercial basis. It 
could also offer mobile services, location identification service and remote-sensing 
applications. A regional satellite system also offers African countries new options for 
addressing the low level of telecommunications in rural areas through the use of 
technological innovations such as VS AT networks (Shetty, 1998c).
Efforts to coordinate telecommunications plans at the ministerial level have intensified 
in the wake of growing interest in the sector. At the ITU’s 1998 Telecommunications 
Development Symposium, African telecommunications ministers embarked on an 
ambitious plan to double the existing number of phone lines on the continent over the 
next 5 years to 50 million. "The African Connection", a document released at the 
opening of the symposium, proposes to implement a continental plan of action by June 
1 2000, mainly as a tool to make Africa attractive to investors. The agreement was 
finalised at the Africa Telecom 98 conference that was organised by the ITU and held 
in Johannesburg. A seven-point plan of priority projects was agreed on by ministers ’to 
catapult Africa into the 21st century’ (Shetty, 1998a). Among the proposals ministers 
have agreed to put before their parliaments is a "one-stop shop" for channelling 
investment to the region. There was also a recommendation that African centres of 
excellence be created to provide decision-makers with information, and a concerted 
effort to make terrestrial connectivity between African countries a reality.
A proposal was also put forward with a view to creating an African 
Telecommunications Development Fund, drawing in a number of institutions including 
the World Bank and other institutional investors (Shetty, 1998b). To support the
35 "Africa’s grand satellite plan still beset by politics", Communications Week International, No. 93, March 
1998.
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resource mobilisation effort, the ministers propose to create common pools and 
databases on relevant African expertise in the areas of regulation, law and policy. Also 
discussed is a mechanism for continental coordination of regulators on the continent 
and a coordinated spectrum planning and management. There is also the aim to form a 
regional telecommunications market for equipment and services and common 
procurement arrangements on the continent. Whilst all these efforts are commendable, 
there are significant obstacles to be overcome. Firstly, there appears to be a lack of 
measurable and quantifiable targets for telecommunications development in the region 
(Mansell and Wehn, 1998). Secondly a pan-African agenda is difficult to forge in an 
environment of growing privatisation. It is difficult to implement even regional 
developmental accords, let alone pan-African agreements, when the majority of 
countries are pursuing unilateral agreements with the foreign private sector.
In summary, despite the efforts to liberalise and improve telecommunication services, 
the service offered by the vast majority of African countries is still far from adequate. 
Major and urgent improvements would need to be made if the continent is to avoid 
increasing marginalisation. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa need to invest in 
telecommunications, as a priority sector, if they are to leverage the process 
improvement and information retrieval benefits that are increasingly being enjoyed by 
more advanced regions.
4.3 The Internet in Sub-Saharan Africa
Attempts to get a true reflection of Internet usage in Africa are hampered by the lack of 
reliable data. Concerns abound as to the definition of a ’user’ or ’subscriber’ which may 
vary as the number of accounts being shared in Africa may be much greater than in 
more developed regions. For example, a survey of Internet usage in Ethiopia presented 
in Chapter Seven, revealed that local Internet accounts supported an average of 10 
users. Despite these methodological hurdles, the level of Internet connectivity in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region continues to grow apace, to such an extent that only three 
countries remained without local access by the end of 1998 -  Eritrea, Libya and 
Somalia (ITU, 1998b). However, though immense progress has been made in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, Internet services are still largely confined to the capitals and major
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towns, thus bypassing up to 70 per cent of African populations who are rurally based. 
In relative terms the Internet remains still in its infancy in Africa, yet despite the high 
costs and poor quality phone lines, e-mail and discussion groups, in particular, have 
been quickly embraced as powerful tools for sharing information and ideas (UNDP, 
1998b).
Historically the development of networking capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
the result of the efforts of non-govemmental organisations (NGOs) to bring 
connectivity to the region. Until the beginning of 1996 the majority of African 
countries relied on NGO-constructed initiatives to connect to the Internet (Adam, 
1996). The earliest users and disseminators of Internet technology were academic and 
research organisations and organisations belonging to the Association of Progressive 
Communications (APC), such as GreenNet (London) and the Institute for Global 
Communications (San Francisco). These have actively supported or established 
networks in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and often provided countries with their 
first link to the Internet. These networks successfully targeted key actors in the 
development process -  international NGOs and local civil society groups (Pruett and 
Dean, 1999).
Following a pattern that was set by the industrialised nations, the growth in Internet 
connectivity in the Sub-Saharan region is now strongly driven by commercial forces, as 
Internet service provision begins to mature. The Internet sector is becoming more 
competitive, profitable and less dependent on the efforts of the donor community. The 
first providers of full Internet services have typically been the public 
telecommunications operators (PTOs). However, there is a clear trend of deregulation 
in the sector as a significant number of African countries have licensed private sector 
firms for Internet service provision. Yet, in a significant number of African countries 
the public operator maintains control of the international telecommunications gateway 
and leaves the resale of end-user Internet access to the private sector (ITU, 1997b). In a 
few countries, namely Cote d'Ivoire, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia, the PTO 
operates the gateway in competition with the private sector (Jensen, 1999). As of 
March 1999, the only countries where the public operator is not supplying Internet 
services are Liberia, Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Namibia 
(ITU, 1998a).
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Deregulation has resulted in most African capitals having more than one Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) and in late 1998 there were almost 400 ISPs across the region 
(300 excluding South Africa). Six countries had more than 10 ISPs but 14 countries 
still had only one (Jensen, 1999). The majority of these service providers are small 
businesses, often started by technicians, who learned the requisite skills through 
training whilst working at NGOs or at university, and have partnered with local 
entrepreneurs (ITU, 1998b). Some national ISPs are operated by universities, such as 
ZamNet in Zambia, and others have been established by larger companies; mostly those 
already associated with the information and communication technologies industry. By 
January 1999, the total number of computers connected to the Internet in the region, 
excluding South Africa, was estimated by Nua Surveys at nearing a million (see Table 
A3 in Appendix A). Africa’s share of Internet host sites worldwide was only 0.025 per 
cent in 1997, and fell to 0.022 per cent by the beginning of 1998.36 As of January 1999 
there were about 24 countries in the Sub-continent with over 1000 users but only 
countries with over 3000 (Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe).37
Most of the international connections in Africa are carried via satellite. The exceptions 
to this are the marine fibre optic link from South Africa to the cross-Atlantic hub in the 
Canaries, and Djibouti, which has access to the SEA-ME-WEA cable. Also, the 
countries with borders shared with South Africa benefit from the low tariff policies 
instituted by the South African telecom operator for neighbouring countries. By far the 
majority of international Internet circuits in the region connect to the USA, with a few 
to the United Kingdom, Italy and France. The major international Internet suppliers are 
AT&T, BT, Global One/Sprint, UUNET/AlterNet, MCI, NSN, BBN, Teleglobe, Verio 
and France Telecom/FCR. A number of other links are provided by PanAmSat and 
Intelsat direct to private ground stations in the US and UK, circumventing local PTO 
infrastructure (Jensen, 1999).
Aside from South Africa, which acts as a regional hub, there are no other regional 
backbones or links between neighbouring countries, which means that most traffic
36 Nua Internet surveys. Available online at http://www.nua.com/surveys/Africa. Accessed 5 January 1999.
37 Ibid.
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between neighbours must travel via expensive satellite circuits to the US or Europe and 
back again. Consequently ISPs, in general, must pay the entire cost of the connection to 
Europe or the US, further increasing the already high costs that ISPs in Africa must 
bear. There are efforts being made by members of the Internet community in Africa to 
raise the issue in international fora and to partner with other similar efforts such as 
Singapore and Australia’s major telecommunication operator Telstra, which is also 
opposing a similar imbalance in Asia (Jensen, 1999).
4.3.1 Regional differences
On a sub-regional basis, the Southern African countries have benefited from 
telecommunications links to South Africa and as a result are, in general, the most 
advanced region in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the use of ICTs, followed by East 
and West Africa, with Central Africa lagging furthest behind. Francophone countries 
also appear to have a far greater presence on the Internet and greater institutional 
connectivity than the non-French speaking countries. This is due to the strong 
assistance provided by the various Francophone support agencies and the Canadian and 
French governments which are concerned with the dominance of English on the 
Internet. As a result, the Anglophone and Lusophone countries have considerable 
catching up to do to reach the same levels of connectivity and representation on the 
Internet. In many Francophone countries the PTO operates the major value added 
service provider as a joint venture with France Cable and Radio, usually called 
Telecom-Plus.
In summary, though Sub-Saharan Africa has been a late starter in terms of Internet 
development it is undergoing a rapid transformation, outpacing the global average for 
growth in number of host systems, according to statistics (For-Mukwai, 1999). From 
July 1998 to January 1999, the number of Internet hosts grew at a rate of 38 per cent, 
from 7,800 to 10,703, while the worldwide average growth rate stood at 18 per cent 
(For-Mukwai, 1999). This is largely due to the huge demand for Internet services and 
the relaxation of regulations governing competition in the telecommunications value 
added services sector. Evidently each country in the Sub-Saharan Africa region faces 
different obstacles. However, from a survey of Internet development in the region it is
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possible to identify common national traits that are constraining the growth of Internet 
connectivity, and suggest ways of resolving them.
4.3.2 Constraints to Internet growth
(a) Poor technical facilities
Poor general level of telecommunication facilities and high access costs are clearly the 
most critical inhibiting factors, but there are also a number of other constraints that 
need to be addressed to achieve a more amenable environment for Internet growth. In 
particular, the low level of computerisation in many organisations is one of the largest 
barriers to using new communications technologies (Woherem, 1993) Problems of 
access to telecommunications pale into insignificance beside those of gaining access to 
a working computer capable of connecting to the Internet. According to the ITU 
(1998a), an inhabitant of a high-income country is four times more likely to have 
access to a television set than an inhabitant of a low-income country; 25 times more 
likely to have access to a telephone; but almost 8,000 times more likely to have access 
to an Internet host computer. More basic still, one in three people globally lacks access 
to electricity (Mannisto et al., 1998) In many developing countries, demand for 
electricity continues to outstrip available generating capacity (UNDP, 1998b). Many 
rural areas do not have access of any kind to reliable electrical supplies. Alternative 
sources such as wind and solar-based solutions are often not viable because of the very 
high initial investment costs (UNDP, 1998b). This means that planning for new ICT- 
based projects often has to incorporate a consideration for reinforcing or creating new 
power supplies (Heeks, 1999b).
(b) Low levels of computerisation
Although individual countries exhibit differing levels of computerisation, a survey of 
the literature on information technology in Sub-Saharan Africa reveals a very low level 
of computerisation (Oshikoya and Hussain, 1998). Whilst there is growing awareness 
of the capabilities of computers in the public sector, existing machines are underused, 
the level of software development capability is limited, and higher level manpower 
such as system analysts and programmers are lacking. Other shortcomings include:
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• poor physical facilities and human resources;
• no well-established centres dedicated to software development;
• poor or non-existent procedures for equipment procurement;
• inadequate maintenance of hardware; and
• limited IT industrial base.
These problems, compounded by the high price of equipment relative to the available 
resources, mean that many organisations remain critically under developed in their use 
of computers and networks. Computers cost proportionately far more in developing 
countries (UNESCO, 1997). For example, the cost price of an average personal 
computer in Ethiopia is 15 times the average national per capita GDP.38 By the end of 
the 1990s, many machines were older 386 DOS based machines for which there are 
dwindling levels of support and very few are networked, locally or on a wide-area 
basis. Allied to this is the price of networking equipment; modem donations and initial 
communications subsidies continue to be an important method for development 
organisations to assist in building electronic links, but many require more extensive 
assistance with obtaining low cost computers and local area network (LAN) facilities 
(UNECA, 1995).
The tendency to import equipment means that obtaining local support remains an 
outstanding issue, especially as there is usually very limited indigenous knowledge in 
basic computer maintenance. Woherem (1995) asserts that ’most African countries are 
littered with machines...and other kinds of technical artefacts that are no longer in 
working order, or that worked for only a short time before they were abandoned’ 
(Woherem, 1995, p. 5). Castells (1997b) estimates that in the 1980s, half of the 
computers in Sub-Saharan Africa were aid donated, most of them now technologically 
obsolete. He goes on to argue that as a result Africa has become a dumping ground for 
a mass of equipment made obsolete by the pace of technological change. As for the 
private computer market, it is dominated by multinationals that generally ensure that 
they carry out their own maintenance. Most of the systems within the region are 
brought off the shelf, leading to some local knowledge of how to operate, but not of
38 Survey of computer prices in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia conducted by the author in June 1998.
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how to program or repair the systems (Adam, 1996; Kluzer, 1993). The scarcity of 
computers and small base of skills also contributes to the low level of institutionalised 
networking activity. E-mail and Internet access is usually limited to those with the 
ability to pay: a small elite who typically are employed on international projects or are 
comparatively wealthy. This is exacerbated by the lack of guidelines in making services 
more publicly available and allocating the appropriate resources for their effective use. 
The low level of computer literacy evidenced in the majority of African countries 
means that even though access may be available to users, their lack of experience can 
tie up the facility for inordinate lengths of time (Adam, 1996).
(c) Shortage of skills and lack of training
At a general level, low levels of education and literacy are crippling the ability of a 
whole new generation of Africans to exploit information and communication. In 1997, 
according to UNESCO, more than 97 per cent of the population of low income 
developing countries had no access to secondary education (UNESCO, 1997). Limited 
use of English is another constraint: although increasingly multilingual, the Internet is 
still largely an English-language medium because of its origins in the United States. It 
may be that the long-term deployment and exploitation of the Internet by developing 
countries will depend less on technology and costs and more on their capacities to 
educate their young populations.
More specifically, the limited technical skills for the establishment of electronic 
network services and the lack of literacy in the effective exploitation of network 
applications by users, are clearly major impediments to the spread of these 
technologies. While there have been a few workshops and training courses organised in 
developing countries, and a number of worldwide events attended by developing 
countries, the numbers who have received training is still very limited. Also, there have 
been insufficient efforts to train the trainers in pedagogical techniques (Bell, 1998). 
Often trainers are co-opted from their normal roles as networking technicians and very 
few have any background in appropriate training methods. In addition, relevant training 
guides, documentation and online tutorial software to support trainers have been 
insufficiently developed (Adetunji, 1999).
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(d) High cost of Internet service provision
According to the ITU, the main factor keeping Internet costs so high in developing 
countries is government control of telecommunication services (ITU, 1998b). In most 
African countries, for example, communication services are provided under the 
monopoly control of the national carrier and although the number of ISPs is growing, 
there are still too few. Competition among ISPs also helps to keep costs down. South 
Africa, for example, has managed to buck the trend in Africa of high Internet access 
prices through intense competition among ISPs; there are now more than 100 South 
African ISPs (Jensen, 1999). According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), peak-rate calls were, on average, 38 per cent cheaper in 
countries that allow competition between telecommunications providers compared to 
those that did not (OECD, 1998). Competition may not be a universal recipe for success 
however.39
Table 5 overleaf shows that, in 1998 the average cost of using the Internet for five 
hours a month in Sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at US$60 per month (ITU, 1998b). 
This contrasts with figures of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) which estimated that 20 hours of Internet access in the U.S. 
costs US$29, including phone and provider fees (OECD, 1997). Although European 
charges are greater (US$74 in Germany, US$52 in France, US$65 in Britain, and 
US$53 in Italy) all of these countries have per capita incomes which are 10 -  100 times 
greater than the African average. Given the inherent diversity of the countries in the 
region, it is unsurprising that monthly ISP dialup charges in Africa do vary greatly -  
between US$10 and US$100 a month.
These variations largely reflect the immaturity of the markets, the varying tariff policies 
of the public telecommunications operators and the different national policies on access 
to international telecommunications bandwidth. The World Bank estimates that 
telecommunications costs for local and international circuits often constitute about half 
of an ISP's operating costs. One of the problems is that international leased line tariffs
39 Cuba is frequently held up as an example of a government that closely regulates Internet development but, 
despite the US embargo, accounts for over a third of the whole of the Caribbean’s computer-network traffic 
(Pruett and Dean, 1999).
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are up to five times higher than rates available from alternative providers to the 
monopoly PTOs (ITU, 1997c).
Table 5: Ranked Internet Access Cost Comparisons Sub-Saharan Africa40
July 1998
Country Annual cost in $US
Botswana 136
South Africa 226
Burkina Faso 288
Senegal 290
Mauritius 300
Mozambique 348
Ethiopia 384
Gabon 440
Mauritania 582
Sierra Leone 600
CAR 616
Djibouti 640
Burundi 645
Morocco 660
Guinea 780
Algeria 880
Cameroon 965
Uganda 1105
Benin 1247
Madagascar 1341
Kenya 1681
Angola 1740
Source: Jensen, 1999. Available at http://www3.apc.org. Accessed 3 July 1998.
The high price of Internet services in some countries, as shown in Table 5, and the 
absence of local rate dial-up access outside almost all of the capital cities severely limit 
access. As for the largely rural population that are typical of countries in the region, so 
far there have been few attempts to provide low-cost public access facilities at drop-in 
centres for those without computers. Kenya, for example, despite its status as one of the 
most advanced African Internet markets with five licensed ISPs in 1998, exhibits all the
40 Costs based on 5 hours a month of dialup access time, and includes cost of local calls during office hours.
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classic signs of Internet service provision in Africa. The chairman of the East African 
Association, Suchindranath Aiyerhas compared Kenya’s Internet experience to that of a 
dirt track, as opposed the information superhighway of the West, adding that the 
Internet in Kenya was highly elitist. Despite the low bandwidth and frequent poor 
performance of the Internet, Kenyan bandwidth charges were an average of US$10, 800 
per month for a 64Kbps line in January 1999. Internet licensing fees start at US$13, 
900 and the state Internet regulator body, Kenya Posts & Telecommunications Corp 
(KPTC), takes a one per cent royalty of annual revenue. Kenya’s state owned 
telecommunications company does not as yet operate as an Internet Service Provider. 
Moreover, their inability to implement downlink communications means that the 
preferred 64 kilobytes per second (kbps) line cannot be easily accessed by end users, 
rather users have to accept speeds as slow as 9.6 to 14.4 kbps compared with a Western 
average of 28kbps in 1998.41
4.4 Towards improving Internet connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa
The plunging price and rapid spread of mobile telephony suggests that telephony could 
be increasingly available but widespread access to the Internet remains a distant goal. 
Many policy-makers echo the words of Dr Abdul Mejid Hussein, Minister of Transport 
and Telecommunications in Ethiopia who states that ’the Internet is not our priority in 
the communications sector...we are giving priority to giving telephone lines to our 
people'.42 For countries such as Ethiopia, with some 80 per cent of the population living 
in often inaccessible rural areas, the obstacles to Internet development are formidable. 
Even when rural areas get a telephone line, they usually have to pay far more for it than 
urban equivalents, and the cost difference is often magnified when it comes to Internet 
access. A very low density of Internet nodes in developing countries, mostly 
concentrated in capitals, prevents easy and local phone call access from areas outside 
an urban centre, according to the UNDP; thus user costs continue to be prohibitive. 
(UNDP, 1998b).
41 "Kenya on an Information Dirt Track". Nua Surveys, available at http://www.nua.ie 
/surveys/archives/Kenya120798. Accessed 12 June 1998.
42 Interview conducted by the author for a case study of information infrastructure in Ethiopia.
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Such problems have been ameliorated in the industrialised nations by low-cost and 
even free calls that apply nationally for Internet access. In the US, for example, AT&T 
has set up more than 200 Internet access points, allowing 80 per cent of the US 
population to access the Internet via local telephone calls (Shetty, 1998b). Similar 
initiatives in a handful of developing countries are also trying to increase Internet 
access beyond urban centres. In Senegal, for example, Sonatel, the main 
telecommunications company, charges a fixed local rate country-wide to encourage the 
spread of Internet. The country is developing a rural/provincial Internet "backbone".
In response to the seemingly intractable problem of rural access, the telecentre concept 
is being promoted as an appropriate and low cost solution. According to the World 
Bank, such centres can provide residents, non-governmental organisations and 
businesses in poor rural and urban areas with economical, easy and ready access to 
much needed information. They could be the hub at the community level, through 
which a large number of information services -  telephone and fax, local bulletins, 
document searches on demand, video libraries for entertainment and education, health 
and nutrition training, government services, market prices -  can be dispensed. These 
centres are seen as multi-sectoral facilities that will eventually be self-sustaining 
through fees and contracts (Talero and Gaudette, 1996).
The number of telecentres and cybercafes is growing rapidly. Efforts are underway in a 
host of African countries including Senegal, Ghana and Uganda to provide walk-in 
computer centres. In the interim, as with almost any development concerning new 
information and communication technologies, it is simply too early to assess the impact 
of these initiatives. However, there is little sign of telecentres being extended to areas 
where they cannot at least cover their own costs -  and in most developing countries this 
means the relatively wealthy urban areas. The signs are that market forces will 
guarantee fast and effective access to the Internet wherever there is a market to sustain 
profits, and where the necessary infrastructure exists to allow its introduction. The 
telecentre concept appears appropriate to Sub-Saharan Africa in that it consolidates 
private and public service sector needs and provides economies of scale to serve both at 
the community level. Various private sector companies have begun to offer such 
services as "communication shops" and rural telecommunications kiosks. For example, 
the African Communications Group (ACG) raised some US$37 million in 1999 to
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finance a roll-out of wireless payphones in rural areas in Tanzania, Ghana and Sri 
Lanka. The firm is also developing wireless kiosks for Internet access (Adetunji, 1999).
(a) Lack of cooperation and coordination
An additional issue is the debate over control over Sub-Saharan Africa’s domain 
registrations. In 1999 the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) assumed 
responsibility for the administration of Internet Protocol (IP) address space for Africa 
(along with North America, South America, and the Caribbean). As a result address 
space is no longer free of charge and in the absence of a local African registry, 
networks will be required to pay US$2500 per year to obtain a domain address. A 
proposal for an Africa Network Information Centre (NIC) has been discussed for some 
years but little progress has been made, partly because of the lack of on-the-ground 
national networking associations to support it and partly because of the political 
difficulties of identifying the appropriate host country and organisation to operate it 
(Jensen, 1999). Despite this, significant momentum is building up for the resolution of 
the issue as there are now local Internet Society chapters in all of the African regions 
and in most of the countries with large Internet user populations.43
A less immediate, but no less worrying issue is the short-sightedness inherent in 
Africa’s Internet infrastructure planning. According to Labor (1999), Sub-Saharan 
African countries are only building connections to the Internet as opposed to their own 
proprietary networks. With only Internet Protocol (IP) connections, Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s contribution to the Internet (links, content, infrastructure, applications, policy) 
will remain marginal at best. The digital age will remain a remote phenomenon for 
Africans if the indigenous ICT players resign themselves to IP connections and do not 
press on to build IP networks. Admittedly the small size and potential user base of 
some African countries militate against the construction of proprietary networks. 
However, larger countries and regions should justifiably be engaged in the construction 
of entirely new IP networks (gateway and backbones) separate from, but strategically 
linked to the international telephone exchange and public telephone networks. There is 
an urgent need for the coordinated planning and development of IP networks instead of
43 See http://www.afrinic.org. for the proposal to set up an African Internet registry. Accessed 12 November 
1999.
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just retrofitting the telecommunications network (Adam, 1996).
Internet backbone operators have responded to the increased demand for Internet 
services by building more bandwidth to the United States; this, in turn, has reinforced 
the US’s role as an infrastructure hub. Consequently, the fastest route between two 
regions, even neighbouring countries, is often through the United States. A cursory 
glance at any connectivity map tells a vivid story: the Internet is spreading, but the 
United States remains its central switching office (Goodman et al., 1994). This is 
unsurprising given the American origins and support of the Internet; however, this 
dominance has led to the use of the Internet as simply a bridge to and through the 
United States rather than as a tool to access and disseminate local knowledge. 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on aggregate clickstreams -  that is the 
destination of Internet users -  is virtually non-existent. However, given the lack of local 
content it is evident that, for the foreseeable future the Internet is far from becoming a 
local medium. Without concerted efforts on the part of government and the 
international development community, it will remain a springboard to somewhere else. 
To reap the maximum benefits, African countries must ensure the development of local 
content that the continent can properly package and capitalise on.
In summary, Sub-Saharan African countries in particular, and developing countries as a 
whole, face four main constraints in improving Internet services rapidly: poor 
telecommunications, an inability to afford computers, lower levels of education and the 
higher cost of providing Internet services. As a result, despite the rapid rise in growth 
of Internet connectivity in the region, it still remains an extremely marginal 
communications medium. Arguably, in the current macroeconomic environment in 
Sub-Saharan African there is little demand for the Internet emanating from the majority 
of national populations. Installing a simple, affordable telephone service comes much 
further up most rural farmers' priority lists than a connection to a global, computerised 
network -  installing a safe water supply is often more urgent still. Whilst radio covers 
approximately 75 per cent of Africa's population and television 40 per cent, the 
Internet's 0.1 per cent shows just how marginal a medium it still is. Until such time as 
these problems are addressed, it will remain the preserve of the tiny elite who can 
afford the exorbitant cost of being online. What little experience there is suggests that 
Internet access can spread, even to remote areas, where there are enlightened attitudes,
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political will and financial backing; but such examples are still rare. In countries where 
access to the basic needs of food, water, shelter and health care are still major 
problems, providing access to the Internet will have to work hard to justify a high 
prioritisation.
The above analysis of both the telecommunications and Internet sectors in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has revealed the poor state of infrastructure in the region. However, the analysis 
is limited to an extent by its recourse to traditional approaches to data collection. The 
inherent accuracy of the available data leads to the enormous difficulty of measuring 
information and communication technology growth and application. ’Counting 
telephones’ continues to be an inaccurate measure of telecommunications diffusion, 
with lines more often than not shared within a community. Moreover, such narrow, 
empirical approaches fail to capture critical information: namely, the valued added of 
information and communication technologies, how and whether they are being used 
productively or contributing to confusion and disorder. As Mansell and Wehn (1998) 
have pointed out:
Even with the statistics available on telecommunications services...we do not 
know which of the minutes are being used to converse with relatives and which 
are being used to arrange for the financing or production of goods and services 
(Mansell and Wehn, 1998, p. 40).
An additional limitation of these indicators is their inability to capture the importance 
of the societal dimension of information and communication technology development. 
Ohkawa and Rosvsky (1972), for example, refer to the crucial importance of social 
infrastructural elements if information and communication technologies are to be 
effectively leveraged. They argue that these are:
...the levels of general education and technical competence; the commercial, 
industrial and financial institutions that bear on their abilities to finance and 
operate modem large-scale business; and the political and social characteristics 
that influence the risks, the incentives and the personal rewards of economic 
activity, including those rewards in social esteem that go beyond money and 
wealth (Ohkawa and Rosvsky, 1972, p. 213).
159
If we are to address these common questions and concerns effectively, the development 
of new and different ways to measure and benchmark electronic communications is a 
necessity. Current definitions and measurements of infrastructure, accessibility, and use 
are inadequate and misleading. For example, despite the importance of other versatile 
and competitive delivery systems such as cellular, VS AT, and cable, not to mention the 
expanded role of computers and televisions, the only widely accepted measure of 
electronic communications deployment remains teledensity. Teledensity is a useful but 
outdated concept in developing countries; rather, other factors must be considered if we 
are to effectively measure or benchmark what information and communication 
technologies are having a beneficial impact and why.
4.5 Catching up, falling behind
These caveats aside, it is clear that progress to date has been far too slow to justify an 
optimistic future appraisal of the information and communications sectors on the 
African continent. The poor quality and provision of information and communications 
services, combined with the decline in the social infrastructure and governmental 
reticence towards deregulation and coordinated planning, continue to militate against 
effective information infrastructure construction. Nor is it just the case that Africa’s 
information infrastructure is lacking; rather, it is that the rest of the world is 
increasingly pulling away and leaving the region behind. An analysis of 
telecommunications infrastructure growth rates on a regional basis reveals that while 
other developing countries are busily and, on the whole, effectively upgrading their 
information infrastructures African growth rates in comparison are derisory.
According to a IDC/World Times report the gap between the most and least developed 
regions grew significantly in 1999; and the gap is forecast to grow. Other developing 
regions are also showing what can be achieved with concerted and consistent 
government policies. For example, the Asia-Pacific region has overtaken some 
European countries in the development of information age infrastructures.44 Evidently
44 The 1999 IDC/World Times Information Society Index Summary available at http://www.idc.com/Data/ 
Global/content/GB040699ISIPromo.htm. Accessed 3 June 1999.
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the strategy being pursued by African countries is failing to achieve the requisite result. 
The report does not cover Sub-Saharan Africa, partly because of the constraints on 
accurate data collection, but also because of the minimal impact information and 
communication technologies have had in the region. However, researchers have noted 
the long-term implications of the rest of the world pulling away and leaving Africa 
further and further behind. A senior research analyst at IDC is quoted as saying that:
With so many countries improving their ability to create, manage, and use 
digital information so quickly, the pressure on the more slowly moving 
countries is intensifying. The very real threat is countries that do not create a 
national information policy -  and make the attainment of this policy a priority -  
will fall further and further behind.45
Table 6 highlights Mansell and Wehn's (1998) argument that at the current rate of 
growth of diffusion, the probable time frame for developing countries to "catch up" 
with developed nations -  i.e. attaining the same levels of teledensity currently enjoyed 
by industrialised countries -  is between 50 -  100 years.
Table 6: Convergence projections
Convergence criteria to the lowest level in industrialised countries
Industrialised countries, first tier NIEs Advancing at the frontier or nearly converged
Second Tier NIEs, China, European 
developing countries, West Asia
Convergence will take a decade
Eastern Europe, China (more realistic), 
Other Asia, Mahgreb, Caribbean,
South America
Convergence will take a generation 
(15-20 years)
Other Northern Africa, and developing 
Oceania
Convergence will take 30 years
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia Convergence is out of sight (50-100 years)
Source: Mansell and Wehn, 1998, p. 25.
45 Stephanie Hutchinson, quoted in The 1999 IDC/World Times Information Society Index Summary available 
at http://www.idc.com/Data/ Global/content/GB040699_ISIPromo.htm. Accessed 3 June 1999.
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The inability of African countries as a whole to keep pace with growth in other regions 
raises the very real spectre of exponential loss. Moreover, it highlights the 
ineffectiveness of current strategies to improve the information infrastructure in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Despite the consensus that Africa is falling behind, it is highly likely 
that given the size of these markets and the persistent search for high value added, by 
the foreign private sector, that the information infrastructure in Africa will be 
constructed. One only has to look at the rapid growth rates of Internet connectivity over 
the period 1996 -  1998. However, the question raised by what little empirical evidence 
exists is, in the absence of government who is creating information infrastructure in the 
region.
With no clear and consistent efforts by African governments to formulate policy in this 
area, other actors have continued to shape the African information infrastructure 
agenda. In the case of the information infrastructure international actors and structures 
play an important role throughout the process. Key players, such as the World Bank, 
are pressing governments to reform their telecommunications sectors. With their 
technical expertise, international consultants are shaping the design of policy, and in 
more advanced stages of the process, international investors and the foreign private 
sector are influencing the final regulatory framework and determining the degree of 
openness of domestic markets (Chambers, 1997).
The process of information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
and continues to be a complex phenomenon, typically involving actors playing various 
roles at various levels. In line with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, 
research into the process of the construction of information infrastructure necessitates 
an identification of the actors that are relevant to the process, and the nature of their 
influence. According to Bijker and Law (1992) technology and artefacts are shaped by 
actors who participate in the international negotiating process. From a survey of the 
literature and the available data the main actors in information infrastructure 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa can be identified as:
• indigenous policy-makers;
• international development agencies;
• the international governance regime;
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• the local private sector; and
• the foreign private sector.
These actors are exerting influence on the development of information infrastructure in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of policy advice, technology support and provision, 
regulation and financial assistance.
4.6 The main actors in information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
4.6.1 National governments
A survey of the informatics policies in Sub-Saharan Africa bears out the fears aired 
above. While national promotional policies are largely absent on the continent, the 
majority of countries still have in place an implicit information infrastructure policy: a 
substantial number of laws and regulations that have a negative impact on the area of 
information and communication technologies (Okut-Uma, 1991). These mainly come 
in the form of tariffs on the import of these technologies and constrain competition in 
the communications sector. As a result, the legal and fiscal policy environment 
continues to hinder rather than promote the optimal utilisation of information 
technologies. High tariffs and complex customs procedures have limited imports, and 
the absence of a correlation between telecommunications development and 
telecommunication policies has been an obstacle to growth. Regulations requiring type 
approvals of equipment and bans or other limitations on communications equipment 
(faxes, modems, satellites and satellite dishes) have also prevented the wider 
dissemination of information technology.
The vast majority of African governments have yet to define strategies for using 
information and communication technologies to foster social and economic 
development. Table A l, in Appendix A, shows that up to 1999, out of the 48 countries 
that comprise the Sub-Saharan Africa region, only five had clearly articulated a 
national information infrastructure policy, whilst less than a third had set up a dedicated 
Nil agency. Thus, there is still a policy vacuum at the most critical of stakeholder 
levels. As a result, the role of other, better informed actors, is heightened.
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In such a climate of governmental neglect, any talk about a serious reduction in existing 
information infrastructure disparities between advanced industrialised and developing 
countries is misguided, at least for the foreseeable future. It is an illusion to think that 
poor countries can "catch up" or keep pace with advances in the most technologically 
advanced societies. In the advanced industrialised countries the rate of technological 
development is very high and is supported by enormous research and development 
resources. This is certainly not to say that poor countries should not try to upgrade their 
systems. But they should not do so in the unrealistic expectation that those who are 
ahead will wait for them (Abramovitz, 1996). The situation may improve for poorer 
countries, but the present disparities are unlikely to go away. Unfortunately, in most 
countries concern about access to these new technologies is met by public policies that 
tend largely to react to an already defined technological environment -  in part because 
the capacity to identify appropriate information and communication technologies is not 
locally available. This postpones necessary efforts to consider the kinds of technologies 
that might be appropriate for their specific development trajectory.
Such public inertia is in stark contrast to the urgent efforts of countries in other 
developing regions. Almost all countries in the Asia-Pacific region have articulated 
information infrastructure plans and are relatively well advanced in upgrading their 
infrastructures. In Latin America, there is a similar of level of public commitment to 
national information policy management (Mansell and Wehn, 1998). The public policy 
vacuum in Africa appears to have multiple causes. Firstly, with more pressing 
concerns46, and in the face of technological uncertainty, few have constructed policy 
strategies to ensure that the benefits of these technologies accrue equitably. The sheer 
pace of technological growth has caught policy-makers off guard and somewhat 
perplexed at the myriad technological options. It is only since 1994 that most 
governments worldwide have begun to realise that significant structural changes are 
afoot in the global economy as a result of the spectacular dissemination of ICTs. It is 
therefore perhaps unsurprising that African governments have reacted slower than 
most. Secondly, suffering from information asymmetries, policy-makers find 
themselves unprepared to make rational trade-offs between competing technological 
systems. Thirdly there has been some element of 'crowding out'. Economically fragile,
46 In 1999 over half of the countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa were engaged in some form of military action.
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many African governments have traditionally relied on official assistance in 
technological matters. This has stifled public efforts to develop indigenous 
technological capacity. With the immediate merits of these technologies still unproved, 
and only the promise of potentialities, most continue to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.
At the regional level there have been belated efforts to create an African-driven agenda. 
Africa’s awareness of the opportunities of the knowledge-based economy was reflected 
in the 1998 African Regional Symposium on Telematics for Development which was 
organised by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in collaboration with other 
organisation including the International Telecommunication Union. Following this, a 
high-level working group consisting of experts on information technology in Africa 
was set up to draft an action framework to take advantage of information and 
communications technology for African development. The working group produced a 
document entitled "Africa’s Information Society Initiative (AISI): An Action 
Framework to build Africa’s Information and Communication Infrastructure".
The AISI initiative envisaged that by the year 2010, a sustainable information society 
would have been established, such that:
• information and decision support systems are used to support decision-making 
in all sectors of every country;
• all Africans would have access to information and knowledge resources through 
computers;
• access is made available to international "information highways"; and
• information and knowledge are disseminated and used by the public at large.
This initiative, combined with the Abidjan African Regional Telecommunications 
Development Conference in the same month, created internally generated pressure 
from the concerned ministries to urge their administrations to adopt appropriate 
regulatory, tariff and service provision policies. Additionally, the Global Information 
Infrastructure Commission (GIIC) has launched GIIC Africa, a regional initiative 
developed to promote the African private sector and support it in its efforts to deploy 
and develop knowledge and information industries.
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4.6.2 The foreign private sector
Foreign private sector companies47 are playing an increasingly important role in 
information and communications development on the African continent in three key 
areas:
(a) Telecommunications and Internet service provision
(b) Information technology hardware and software
(c) Content provision
Table B1 in Appendix B shows the extent of the involvement of the foreign private 
sector in both telecommunications and Internet service provision, with a number of 
international ISPs creating local subsidiaries to serve the African market. For example, 
Africa Online is now the largest ISP in Kenya. In 1999 the group consolidated its 
presence in Africa with new local branches opening in Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe, adding to its stable in Ghana, Kenya, and Cote d'Ivoire. The other three 
multinational ISPs which operate subsidiaries or franchises in the region are UUNET, 
(in South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Namibia) and Swift Global (Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda).
One of the major problems for African telecommunications expansion has been the 
difficulty of expanding the physical telecommunications network to remote locations. 
The costs of building physical infrastructure is these areas has proved so prohibitive 
that many public operators see it as uneconomical to provide links to the network to 
these areas. Coupled with the high cost of connecting this geographically dispersed 
population is the small amount of telecommunications traffic that is generated by the 
rural population. This vicious cycle has reinforced the reluctance of PTOs to invest in 
rural telecommunications infrastructure. Rather, attempts have been made to find a less 
expensive route to improving information infrastructure in rural areas. An apparent 
solution to this problem has come in the shape of new connectivity options. Satellite 
technology, for example, ideally suited to geographically isolated regions, has been 
proffered as an obvious and relatively straightforward solution to the problem of rural
47 Defined as private companies operating in foreign locales and including local subsidiaries of foreign firms.
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telephony. It is only with the advent of technological innovations and plummeting costs 
that these new technologies are now within the possibility frontiers of policy-makers in 
developing countries. It is in this respect that the foreign private sector is playing an 
important role in developing Africa’s information infrastructure.
(a) New Connectivity Options
Hawkins (1999) points out that over the past decade, consortia have become a structural 
feature of technology and market coordination in the information and communication 
technology industries. Especially in the capital-intensive submarine cable and satellite 
industries. The huge initial entry costs involved in setting up such "global" projects 
have necessitated cross industrial alliances.48 The implications for developing countries 
are that it is far more difficult to negotiate against such formidable alliances of private 
interest. The world’s oceans are now criss-crossed by undersea cables laid by a number 
of consortia, all of which are in competition to provide high-capacity global 
connectivity in exchange for higher profit margins.
A number of international telecommunication infrastructure building initiatives have 
been announced which are likely to substantially affect the provision of infrastructure 
on the African continent. One of the most well-known of these is Tyco Submarine 
Systems’ Africa One which aims to put an optical fibre necklace around the entire 
continent; however, following its announcement in 1995, it has still not been finalised 
and a large number of other competing projects have emerged.49 Within the next 
decade, other satellite-based communication systems will be launched, and new 
projects are expected to radically improve access for the most remote areas of the 
continent. However, these technological innovations raise difficult questions in the 
realm of political economy, centring on such issues as access, control and expense. 
Who will have access to the emerging digital grids and at what price, and who will 
control the networks? Where will the intelligence that guides the network be stored and 
who will own it: the network operator or the end-user?
48 For example the Teledesic project is seeking approximately US$ 9 billion for its broadband satellite scheme.
49 Africa Analysis (1998) "Africa One Sliced Up", World Reporter, 20 March 1998.
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Given the prohibitive costs associated with information infrastructure development, the 
only strategy may well be to try to keep costs down by building alliances through a 
mixture of regional allies and strategic alliances with the foreign private sector 
(Vonortas and Safioleas, 1997). Yet such alliances are inherently asymmetric, and 
unlikely to correlate with the long-term development objectives of African countries. 
This situation suggests the desirability of cooperation by regional or language 
groupings on communications development. Despite frequent international conflict 
between neighbouring countries, it is hoped that small or poor countries can cooperate 
in creating regional and global consortia for domestic as well as international 
communication. Moreover, international cooperation will be necessary to ensure crucial 
issues such as interoperability, and international intellectual property rights.
In reality, it is often difficult for policy-makers to assess the relative merits of one 
technological system over another. Policy-makers must ask how these new 
technologies can contribute not only to improved telecommunications but also to the 
wider development of a national information infrastructure. It is beholden unto policy­
makers, therefore, to assess the relative merits of these providers and utilise the most 
appropriate technologies to upgrade their infrastructures. Otherwise, given the 
informational asymmetries between Sub-Saharan African countries and the 
industrialised nations, these issues will be decided in absentia.
(b) Local production capacity
Another key area in which the foreign private sector exerts influence is in the provision 
information and communication technology hardware and software. Local production 
capacity of ICTs is, to all intents and purposes, negligible in Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
lack of indigenous capacity raises major issues about obtaining access to vital 
telecommunication and other computer-based equipment. Very few developing 
countries have direct access to world-scale ICT production plants. Moreover, for the 
world’s poorest countries, the application of finite foreign exchange reserves has to 
compete with other pressing requirements such as imports of pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural equipment. Production capacity has been expanded in developing 
countries, but the sector continues to be dominated by facilities located in high income 
industrialised countries. Several of the Asian economies have enjoyed a significant
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measure of success in building indigenous ICT production capacity. Korean based 
multinationals, for example, have become the largest producers of computer memory 
chips, while Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan have become significant 
sources of supply of key electronic goods such as mobile telephones, personal 
computers, computer disk drives and computer monitors.
Evidently, the lack of local production capacity in the ICT sector need not be an 
obstacle to the expansion of ICT services. However, this reinforces their dependency on 
western research and development. Moreover, the technology will have to be adapted to 
the African environment. Sussman and Lent (1991) point out that there is at present no 
convincing evidence that the owners of advanced technologies will change their 
attitudes and policies towards the international transfer of technology. Throughout the 
past decades, the prevailing international policies in this field have erected formidable 
barriers to the reduction of North-South technology gaps. There is no indication that the 
current restrictive business practices, constraints on the ownership of knowledge, and 
rules on intellectual property rights that are adverse to developing country interests, are 
radically changing. Thus, there are no realistic prospects that the relations between 
ICT-rich and ICT-poor countries will change in the near future. Furthermore, the key 
actors in international ICT policy-making have expressed a clear preference for leaving 
the construction of the global information infrastructure to the "invisible hand": casting 
aside concerns about the development of an equitable information society, and letting 
the forces of global capitalism prevail (Kundnani, 1998).
In addition to asking critical questions about reactive public policy-making, as well as 
about the lack of assessment capacity and cross-border coordination within the Third 
World, one must also consider whether the current worldwide emphasis on 
deregulatory policies can contribute to reducing the digital disparity between North and 
South. The policies and programmes launched by many of the developing countries 
now seem to focus almost exclusively on the creation of favourable conditions for 
commercial operators in the ICT market. As the UNESCO World Science Report 
acknowledges that ’there has been a new shift in favour of indirect measures such as 
deregulation and reinforcement of market mechanisms at national and international 
levels’ (UNESCO, 1996, p. 277). But is this shift from direct public intervention to
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more indirect (deregulatory) policies adequate to enhance the potential for national 
development that can arise from information and communication technologies?
4.6.3 The international governance regime
Another important key player in the development of information infrastructure in Sub- 
Saharan Africa is the international governance regime. Comprised of a loose 
consortium of regulatory bodies, international institutions and governments their role in 
determining the shape of the so-called global information infrastructure has never been 
more important. Key planks of this governance regime include:
• The United States government and its communications bodies such as the Federal 
Communications Commission.
• The International Telecommunications Union (ITU).
• The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).
• The World Trade Organisation (WTO).
• The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
• The International Telecommunication Satellite Organisations (INTELSAT) and
INMARSAT.
• The European Union.
• The international development agencies, such as the World Bank and UN system.
• The Internet Assignment Number Authority (IANA)
• The Global Information Infrastructure Commission (GDC)
These institutions comprise an international governance regime that has an 
unprecedented level of influence on the development of the global information 
infrastructure. The increasing influence of the private sector in these organisations has 
tended to reinforce a belief in deregulation at all costs. For example, the 1998 World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement on basic telecommunications commits member 
countries to privatise their PTOs and to introduce competition in the provision of all 
services. Further, the 1998 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference led to an amendment of the 
ITU constitution to give greater rights and responsibilities to the ITU’s private sector 
members (Maclean, 1999).
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As a result one of the key mechanisms of redistributing telecommunications wealth to 
developing countries is under attack. The international system of revenue sharing 
between public telecommunications operators (PTOs) has long been one of the 
cornerstones of the international public telephone network. It is based on a wholesale 
price which operators pay each other for terminating their calls. Thus when one PTO 
sends more traffic to a particular PTO than it receives, it must pay the receiver network 
compensation in the form of a net settlement payment. These cash payments typically 
emanate from the core of a network to its periphery; from well-established players to 
new players; and from developed countries to developing countries. Consequently 
settlement payments systems should, in theory, act to sustain organic network 
development because the developed are subsidising the underdeveloped. The 
international accounting rate system has been subject to much criticism: namely that it 
keeps telephone charges artificially high, rewards inefficiency, promotes cartel-like 
behaviour by PTOs and institutionalises cross-subsidy. However, it has been a very 
effective mechanism for transferring revenue from traffic surplus countries to traffic 
deficit countries (Noam, 1999). Certainly a proportion of the settlements payments is 
diverted away from the telecommunications sector, but at least some of this much- 
needed revenue goes to PTOs to reinvest in network development.
Discussions as to what should replace the existing system of bilaterally negotiated 
accounting rates had to be completed by the end of 1999. The argument over 
introducing "cost-based" tariffs, calculated from the actual cost of supporting the 
network which delivers the call, instead of accounting rates, is now in its seventh year. 
The second factor that has thrown the accounting rate deliberations into sharp relief is 
the U.S. Federal Communications Committee’s decision in 1998 to unilaterally impose 
its own benchmark. Rates of between 15 cents and 23 cents a minute, depending on the 
level of telecommunications development, were set from 1999 for all carriers 
transacting with the U.S. These figures undercut some developing world accounting 
rates by 80 per cent in some cases, and have been met with a storm of disapproval from 
those who accuse the U.S. of unilateral action (Shetty, 1998b).
There also appears to be evidence of pressure from industrialised governments to 
further national interests. Hyun and Lent (1999), in an analysis of the Korean 
telecommunications industry, argue that the United States used the World Trade
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Organisation’s Uruguay Round to further the interests of its telecommunications sector. 
Whilst such evidence is hard to come by in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is true to say that the 
international governance regime has consistently pushed an agenda of the wholesale 
privatisation of the telecommunications sector in Africa (ITU, 1998b). In June 1999, 
for example, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) launched a new 
technical assistance initiative to help developing nations build independent regulatory 
regimes that will promote competition, liberalisation, and privatisation in their 
telecommunications sectors (Obiabaka, 1999). Unfortunately the ascendance of this 
agenda neglects to focus on key issues such as universal access and service. Rather, 
developing countries are being urged to open their telecommunications sectors to the 
foreign private sector without due consideration of the consequences.
In conclusion, the increasing collusion amongst the international governance regime in 
support of deregulation and the opening of markets has undermined the ability of 
African countries to argue for special treatment. Unfortunately, the majority of African 
governments lack the resources to leverage their position at the global negotiating table. 
Rather, African policy-makers are finding increasingly that key decisions that will 
affect their communications infrastructures are being taken in their absence (Mansell 
and Wehn, 1998). The problem is compounded by the fact that, in many cases, Sub- 
Saharan African states, ’seem to have no disinterested non-govemmental organisations 
to advise them on telecommunication technology and on the social objectives of 
regulation, in order to safeguard those interests that private profit will not protect’ 
(Mody et al., 1993, p. 270). Without adequate regulatory intervention to ensure 
accountability to the general public, market forces will continue to respond to the needs 
of those actors with purchasing power, which is bound to generate unequal 
development. And to make matters worse, there is also a critical absence of 
coordination of "digital" policies among the developing countries themselves 
(Hamelink, 1997). Unless more concerted attempts are made to pool the collective 
resources on the continent, Africa will find itself perennially without a voice on the 
international stage.
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4.6.4 The role of development agencies
The Internet has become one of the key development issues of this decade, prompting a 
reconfiguration in international development thinking and many donor and multilateral 
lending organisations are radically reshaping their policies for the so-called information 
age. The World Bank, for example, has begun to describe itself as the "knowledge 
bank" and devoted its 1998 World Development Report to the role of knowledge in 
development (World Bank, 1998). This shift follows a growing acceptance of the 
importance of the role of communications in development, an issue long debated by 
development theorists (Schramm, 1964, Lemer, 1958, Hudson, 1984). Development 
agencies have been at the vanguard of efforts to improve the information infrastructure 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The United Nations and its various agencies, the World Bank, 
the International Telecommunication Union, and the Canadian International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) have all pursued major initiatives in this area 
and have been largely responsible for bringing Internet connectivity to the continent. 
There are now over 100 organisations engaged in over 300 projects involving 
information and communication technology activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst 
these efforts have brought much needed expertise and at times physical infrastructure to 
the Sub-Saharan Africa region, they have been haunted by the traditional demons of 
haste, lack of coordination, and appropriateness (Kangulu, and Wood, 1995). These 
issues and a host of others that are discussed in greater depth in Chapter Six, point to 
the desperate need for actors in this area to actively cooperate to rationalise competing, 
parallel and overlapping initiatives.
4.7 Summary
Information and communications technologies are rapidly changing economic and 
social activities, providing both opportunities and challenges for making progress with 
accelerated growth and poverty reduction in Africa. If leveraged correctly these tools 
can help decision-makers to promote effective economic and social management and 
allow businesses to compete more effectively with timely and accurate market 
information. To exploit these opportunities, African countries need, as a matter of 
priority, to upgrade their capabilities through the improvement of their
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telecommunication infrastructures and the acquisition of computer and computer- 
related equipment. National institutions responsible for data collection and processing 
need to be strengthened and their traditional information collection and dissemination 
structures need to be modernised if they are to be full participants in the global 
economy. Governments have to facilitate information transmission and connectivity to 
the global infrastructure by passing the necessary laws and regulations. Governments 
need to create the supportive external environment for promoting the use of information 
and communication technologies. These desired improvements need to be pursued 
within the framework of comprehensive national or sub-regional plans to link African 
countries to each other and to the global information infrastructure.
This chapter has analysed the state of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in terms of two key elements: telecommunications and Internet development. The 
chapter has identified the various actors partaking in the development of information 
infrastructure in the region, assessing their roles and motives. Whilst the empirical 
evidence is incomplete, it does reveal statistical homogeneity in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region in terms of the paucity of information infrastructure. By any measurement, the 
inadequate information infrastructure in the Sub-Saharan African region is the major 
obstacle to countries leveraging information and communication technologies for 
national development. Nor are policy-makers aided by the multiplicity of actors with 
divergent interests in the region. What is needed are clear, consistent and concerted 
national efforts to create an effective national information infrastructure. The 
benchmark of efficacy must be appropriateness to the national context, sustainability 
and dynamism. Without such a strategy Sub-Saharan African countries will 
increasingly find themselves marginalised to the global economic periphery, as other 
developing nations catch up and Africa falls continually behind.
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CHAPTER 5 
New Connectivity Options in Sub-Saharan Africa
5.1 Introduction
In the wake of the slow pace of indigenous telecommunications reform, a host of large- 
scale information infrastructure projects have emerged that offer alternative 
connectivity options. These projects are being designed and funded by foreign consortia 
comprised of multinational corporations specialising in information and communication 
technologies. As a result, since 1994 a large number of cable and satellite projects have 
been announced or are being planned and implemented on the African continent. These 
projects are seen as bringing much needed communications capabilities to Africa. 
Whilst these projects have the potential to improve the Sub-Saharan African 
information infrastructure, they also present policy-makers with a range of issues that 
must be tackled.
These new solutions offer the opportunity for vastly improved communications, with 
increased volumes, speed and reliability, and a wider range of services, all at lower 
costs. However, as African governments and carriers have been approached by the 
private promoters of these projects, they have found it difficult to assess the merits of 
the various technological alternatives. Faced with rapid technological change and 
resource constraints, the bargaining position of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would 
seem to be rather weak. Compounding this problem is that no substantive research has 
been conducted on the potential strengths and weaknesses of these various connectivity 
options. Resolving these issues necessitates, firstly, an understanding of the economics 
of these projects and, secondly, an analysis of the systems themselves. This chapter 
examines new connectivity options emerging on the continent and asks how they can 
contribute not only to improved telecommunications, but also to the wider development 
of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. Taking satellite and submarine 
cable systems as proxies for technological innovations, a framework is developed to 
analyse the relative merits and disadvantages of each system in relation to national 
criteria. This comparative exercise is designed to illustrate the kind of strategy and
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decision calculus that policy-makers can employ to make rational trade-offs and seek 
synergies amongst distinct, complex and sometimes contradictory technical systems.
5.2 New connectivity options
The greatest difficulty in providing telecommunications services in developing 
countries has been the establishment of a comprehensive public telecommunications 
infrastructure (Saunders et al., 1994). Terrestrial transmission lines are expensive and 
time-consuming to construct and maintain. Further, demand for such services has 
rapidly exceeded supply and the infrastructure has necessarily, and for practical 
reasons, been concentrated in urban areas. The 1990s have seen mounting interest from 
multinational companies in offering such connectivity options in developing countries. 
Not content with supplying Africa with merely the apparatus of fixed telephony, 
European and U.S. companies are becoming increasingly involved in other market 
segments, from international satellite and transcontinental undersea cable services to 
cellular telephones and the Internet. These projects, along with an increasing number of 
new technological innovations, present policy-makers with a bewildering array of 
connectivity options.
5.3 Satellite projects
An important measure of the uneven state of global communications development is the 
pattern of international fibre optic cable and satellite services. Most, at present, serve 
the Northern Hemisphere and extend from the East to the West, leaving the Southern 
Hemisphere grossly under-served. As a consequence, a phone call from Nigeria to the 
Ivory Coast -  only 800 miles away -  for example, is often routed through London, then 
Paris and finally to Abidjan. Such a circuitous route takes away call traffic control from 
African carriers and results in enormous revenue loss. Whilst each African country has 
its own satellite facilities and earth stations for international connectivity, intra-national 
communications capacity is woefully inadequate. It is estimated that African countries
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are spending between US$300 and US$400 million on intra-country transit fees alone.50
Satellite systems can be used to provide basic telephony as well as radio and broadcast 
television with the principle advantages of reliability and durability. Capable of 
installation wherever necessary, they are considered to be well suited to the Sub- 
Saharan African environment (Gifford and Cosper, 1998). For example, small, low-cost 
earth stations such as those used to provide rural telephony with domestic satellites can 
provide isolated regions with voice and data communications. Satellite systems and 
operators in Sub-Saharan Africa can be classified into four categories:
1. Treaty organisations such as INTELSAT and RASCOM.
2. Private satellite systems such as PanAmSat and VITASat which offer specialised 
services not connected to national telecommunications operators.
3. Narrowband global mobile personal communications by satellite (GMPCS) systems 
such, Iridium and Globalstar.
4. Broadband satellite systems utilising low earth orbiting (LEO) technology, such as 
Skybridge and Teledesic.
Up till 1984, the international telecommunications satellite organisation (INTELSAT) 
maintained the international satellite space segment, operating two thirds of all 
intercontinental message traffic and virtually all live transborder television 
communication. Though INTELSAT still has by far the largest share of the market it is 
being increasingly challenged by private companies such as PanAmSat, which now has 
two satellites serving Africa. Prior to deregulation, INTELSAT was often criticised by 
developing countries for its bias towards developed countries (Blake, 1998). Its free 
market ethos dictated that satellite segments be allocated on a "first come first served" 
basis rather than an equitable sharing of a common resource. Partly as a result of this 
bias, and obviously due to cost considerations, there is now a huge disparity in the 
satellite communications capabilities of the developed and the developing world. As of 
1993, there were some 184 communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Of these 
only a small number had been launched by developing countries51, severely limiting the
50 ITU (1997b) World Telecommunications Development Report.
51 One by India, three each by Colombia and Indonesia; two each by Brazil, Mexico, and a consortium of Arab 
nations, and one by China.
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capacity of developing countries to exploit the benefits of satellite technology. In stark 
contrast to the majority of developing regions who are covered by domestic satellites, 
Sub-Saharan Africa remains without its own domestic satellite. Instead it relies on 
INTELSAT for intranational satellite communications.
Though practically all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have satellite earth stations, the 
technology has yet to be fully exploited. The high cost of using satellite telephony has 
necessarily restricted access to a handful that are willing to pay up to US$3 per minute 
for the privilege. In an attempt to resolve the lack of indigenous satellite 
communications capacity the Regional African Satellite Communication System 
(RASCOM) was established in 1992 to harness satellite communications and to address 
continent-wide sector development. RASCOM was conceived by the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) to cut the continent's estimated US$300 -  400 million spent on 
international carriers for external communications52, and to boost telecommunications 
traffic among African states. The RASCOM project, based in Cote d'Ivoire, is the 
largest pan-African investment ever conceived. The organisation is comprised of 40 
African countries whose principal focus is satellite communications. Its first mandate 
has been to pool satellite capacity53 purchased by individual national operators under 
the RASCOM umbrella which was achieved in September 1997. Bringing 
unprecedented satellite communications capabilities to Africa.54
RASCOM's second objective is to boost the communications capacity of Africa by 
undertaking the most ambitious pan-African project ever conceived. By launching the 
first pan-African communications satellite the aim is to reduce the average distance to 
the nearest phone in African countries by ten-fold from 50 kilometres to five 
kilometres. Connecting Africa's 500 million rural inhabitants to the world is a cardinal 
objective of the project, whose terrestrial phase alone is expected to cost US$800 
million. The organisation is aiming to install some 456,000 fixed solar-powered 
telephone stations with global connectivity across the continent over a period of seven 
years. The organisation was due to invite preliminary tenders at the end of 1998 from
52 At present the majority of the traffic emanating from Anglophone countries is routed via England, while all 
Francophone countries are routed to France.
53 Currently Sub-Saharan African telephone operators use more than seven different satellites.
54 See Satellite News (1997) "Groups move to improve communications In Africa", September (37:Q1).
178
international companies who want to join a "build, operate and transfer" (BOT) 
consortium to launch and manage the satellite. The organisation is also in the process of 
investing US$330 million on a spatial satellite system, of which US$130 million will 
go for space on an INTELSAT satellite to serve as backup. RASCOM estimates that 
calls from its phone stations would be around 10 U.S. cents a minute, with the cost of 
building one phone station projected at US$1,000.55
(a) Foreign Private Sector Projects
RASCOM is far from alone in its ambitions to boost the telecommunications capacity 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. A number of multinational consortia have been planning the 
deployment of new satellite systems designed to offer services ranging from global 
mobile communications to broadband fixed telephony. Current satellite constellations 
deploy geostationary orbiting satellites that suffer from a variety of restrictions that 
these new systems aim to bypass. Propagation time delays arising from the lag between 
signal transmission and reception are problematic, and noise deterioration in the form 
of echoing is unsatisfactory. Also, as the power required to send a signal the distance of 
36,500 km is high, large terminals for the receipt of signals are a requisite, thus making 
hand-held mobile communication, for the most part, impractical (Leite, 1996). In an 
attempt to bypass these problems new satellite communications systems are being 
planned and deployed which utilise the latest in satellite technology and have the 
potential to provide Sub-Saharan Africa with instant infrastructure. The common 
denominator of all these planned systems is their use of low earth orbiting satellites, 
which rest at relatively close proximity to the earth and therefore avoid some of the 
deficiencies that affect their forerunners. As of 1999, there were three types of low 
Earth orbit satellite systems that were being proposed.
The so-called Little LEO satellite systems are designed to use low Earth orbits to offer 
worldwide data communications in small tranches, at transmission rates akin to mid- 
1980s personal computer modems. Among the communications services offered by
55 "African Satellite Telecom Network Set for Launch", Newsbytes, 5 December 1997.
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little LEOs are automated meter reading, remote asset tracking, vehicle messaging, 
personal messaging and supervisory control and data acquisition. Next are the medium­
sized LEOs, that would allow global communications using hand-held GMPCS devices 
from any location on the planet. The system may be significant for Africa, as the 
coverage of terrestrial mobile services is very limited at present.
Finally, there are the super-LEOs such as Skybridge and Teledesic. The Alcatel 
Telecom Skybridge project is a satellite-based broadband non-geostationary orbit 
system that will use 64 LEO satellites and be operational in 2001. The Skybridge 
satellite system plans to be the first of the broadband systems using LEO satellites in 
2000, with Teledesic following closely in 2003. Teledesic’s 266-satellite system is 
designed to provide broadband communications to users globally. Teledesic’s 
copyrighted "Internet in the Sky" motto is an apt description of a system intended, from 
day one of operations in 2003, to enable broadband telecommunications access for 
businesses, schools and individuals irrespective of location.
Formed in 1990, and backed by Microsoft chairman Bill Gates, Teledesic plans to 
create the first satellite network designed to provide affordable, worldwide access to 
digital services such as broadband Internet, videoconferencing and high-quality voice 
communications. The Teledesic constellation will operate in low earth orbit, 
eliminating the long signal delay normally experienced with geostationary satellite 
communications. The lower orbit also enables the use of small, low-power, terminals 
and antennas. The laptop-sized terminals will be mounted flat on a rooftop and connect 
to a personal computer or network. The system is designed to support millions of 
simultaneous users, with access speeds more than 2,000 times faster than the 1998 
standard of 33 kbps analogue modems. However there are doubts about the launch date 
of the project. With the highly publicised failure of the Iridium system, similar schemes 
may fail to attract sufficient funding and become unfeasible.
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Table 7: Planned Sate.lite^Projects relevant to Sub-Saharan Africa, July 1999;
Nam e M ain Investors and  
industria l partners
Industrial Partners Estim ated  
Project Cost
(US$)
Type o f system No. o f  
satellites
Services Start
date
R elevance to A frica
ACTEL ACTEL Ltd. American Mobile Systems 385 million GEO 2 Mobile telephony, voice and 
data
2001 Initial coverage of 
Southern Africa and 
then pan-African
East Matra Marconi Space n/a I billion 1 Telecommunications and 
multimedia
2000 Pan -African coverage
Ellipsio Mobile
Communications 
Holdings Inc.
n/a n/a MEO 10 GMPCS, fixed telephony, fax, 
data, paging, positioning 
services
2001 Coverage in Sub- 
Saharan Africa
Globalstar Loral Space and 
Communications and 
QualComm
Aerospatiale, Alcatel,
Daimler Benz, Fimmeccanica 
and Hyundai, Teital and 
Ericcson
2.5 billion Narrowband LEO 48 GMPCS, telex, fax, data, paging, 
position services
1999 Partners in South and 
West Africa
ICO* Inmarsat Hughes Electronics, NEC, 
Ericsson, Samsung, 
Panasonic, Mitsubishi and 
Wavecom.
3 billion MEO 10 GMPCS, fixed telephony, fax, 
data, paging, position/emergency 
maritime services
2000 Earth Station in South 
Africa
Inmarsat Inmarsat
International
Consortium
n/a n/a Narrowband GEO 5 GMPCS, telex, fax, data, paging, 
position/emergency maritime 
services
1993 Global organisation 
providing specialised 
services
Iridium* Motorola Lockheed, Raytheon, 
DEVCOM, Siemens
3.8 billion Narrowband LEO 66 GMPCS, fixed telephony, fax, 
data, paging,
1998 Iridium Africa holds a 
1.2 per cent stake
Orbcomm Orbital Sciences 
Corp and Canadian 
telecom provider 
Teleglobe Inc.
Technology Resource Bhd 500 million Little LEO 36 2-way messaging, data, global 
monitoring and positioning
1998 Services available 
between the tropic of 
Cancer and Capricorn
PanAmSat Hughes Electronics n/a n/a Broadband GEO 17 TV, private communications 
networks, video conferencing 
paging,
1997 Already have a service 
provider in Africa
RASCOM African governments 
and 40 operators in 
African countries
Open to tender 1.2 billion Broadband GEO 2 Fixed telephony, distance 
education/health, TV, radio, data
2001 African organised
Skybridge Alcatel Ericcson 1 billion Broadband LEO 64 Telehealth/education/commuting 
Internet access, interactive 
entertainment
2001 Coverage in Africa
Spaceway Hughes
Communications Inc.
n/a 1 billion MEO/LEO 20 MEO/8 
LEO
Fixed telephony, fax, data 
Inter/Intranet access, 
telecommuting, CAD/CAM 
transmission, videoconferencing
2001 Coverage in Africa
Teledesic Microsoft and 
McCaw cellular 
communications
AT&T 9 billion Broadband LEO 288 Voice, data, video conferencing, 
Internet access
2002 Main focus on rural and 
sparsely populated 
areas.
VITAsat NGO- n/a n/a Little LEO 2 Global e-mail 1998 Service in North West 
Africa
Source: Collated from UNESCO World Communication Report, 1997, Fibre Optics News, Satellite Communications and BMP, 1998.
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* Both Iridium and ICO had filed for bankruptcy by the end of 1999.
5.4 Submarine cable projects
While competition increases apace in satellite communications, African policy-makers 
are also able to choose from a raft of ongoing initiatives to integrate Africa into the 
global information network through fibre optic underwater cables. Since the 1980s 
there have been several proposed projects to encircle the African continent with 
submarine cable systems. By utilising a system of diverse routing, the rationale behind 
submarine cable schemes is to provide global connectivity with the capability of direct 
transmission links between African countries. Optical fibre links to the outside world 
are already in South Africa and several North African countries. Integration of such a 
network into the microwave and satellite systems will enable Africa to penetrate the 
world network and increase the value of its existing resources. These schemes can be 
broadly situated within one of three categories:
1. Continent-specific projects such as Africa One.
2. Intra-continental projects planned to link Africa with other continents, such as 
SAFE, SAT-3 and WASC.
3. Projects designed to have landing points only in Africa such as FLAG and Sea Me 
We and Atlantis 2.
Africa One is perhaps the most trumpeted of a raft of fibre optic cable schemes. 
Originally developed under the auspices of the ITU by AT&T Submarine systems, the 
project consists of a 35,000 km submarine fibre optic ring that encircles the African 
continent. At the heart of the Africa One concept is its vast "ring-and-branch" 
configuration. This consists of branches connecting coastal landing points with the 
main fibre optic ring, allowing connection to Africa’s coastal and land-locked countries 
as well as its islands (Blake, 1998). The scheme has adopted the latest in fibre optic 
technology, utilising wavelength division multiplexing (WDM). This transmission 
technique increases fibre optic capacity by simultaneously transmitting signals over 
different wavelengths within one fibre. Thus, an important element of the system is the 
independence of each connecting node.
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5.4 Submarine cable projects
While competition increases apace in satellite communications, African policy-makers 
are also able to choose from a raft of ongoing initiatives to integrate Africa into the 
global information network through fibre optic underwater cables. Since the 1980s 
there have been several proposed projects to encircle the African continent with 
submarine cable systems. By utilising a system of diverse routing, the rationale behind 
submarine cable schemes is to provide global connectivity with the capability of direct 
transmission links between African countries. Optical fibre links to the outside world 
are already in South Africa and several North African countries. Integration of such a 
network into the microwave and satellite systems will enable Africa to penetrate the 
world network and increase the value of its existing resources. These schemes can be 
broadly situated within one of three categories:
1. Continent-specific projects such as Africa One.
2. Intra-continental projects planned to link Africa with other continents, such as 
SAFE, SAT-3 and WASC.
3. Projects designed to have landing points only in Africa such as FLAG and Sea Me 
We and Atlantis 2.
Africa One is perhaps the most trumpeted of a raft of fibre optic cable schemes. 
Originally developed under the auspices of the ITU by AT&T Submarine systems, the 
project consists of a 35,000 km submarine fibre optic ring that encircles the African 
continent. At the heart of the Africa One concept is its vast "ring-and-branch" 
configuration. This consists of branches connecting coastal landing points with the 
main fibre optic ring, allowing connection to Africa’s coastal and land-locked countries 
as well as its islands (Blake, 1998). The scheme has adopted the latest in fibre optic 
technology, utilising wavelength division multiplexing (WDM). This transmission 
technique increases fibre optic capacity by simultaneously transmitting signals over 
different wavelengths within one fibre. Thus, an important element of the system is the 
independence of each connecting node.
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In older submarine systems, telecommunications traffic is routed uniformly; all traffic 
passes through the same location irrespective of origin. With wavelength division 
multiplexing, each country’s traffic is represented by a separate colour on the fibre optic 
pair. Thus, only traffic originating and flowing to, for example, Nigeria will pass in and 
out of that country (Blake, 1998). This has been seen as a key element in convincing 
African policy-makers as to the efficacy of the project’s treatment of 
telecommunications traffic. An additional selling point has been that the project will be 
composed of two fibre pairs, one for providing the primary traffic path and the other for 
automatic restoration in the case of system failure. Hence, in the event of a break 
anywhere in the ring, traffic is automatically re-routed via the second line.
Africa One is proposed as a three-tiered network. The first tier focuses on the populous 
coastal centres in Africa. These locations serve as natural gateways for international 
trade and, more practically, as landing points that can divert international traffic to 
land-based destinations throughout the continent. The second tier will connect all 
African nations through a regional network, integrating and supporting Africa’s existing 
communications infrastructure. The third tier will provide global connectivity by 
linking the Africa One undersea fibre optic ring to existing transcontinental cable 
schemes. The volume of telecommunication traffic on the Africa One is projected at 
some four billion minutes in the first year of its operation (2001). The traffic base is 
then projected to grow to some 28 billion minutes by the year 201457, whereas the total 
traffic for the continent in 1995 was 4.7 billion minutes. It is estimated that a single 
fibre pair will provide over 240,000 full bandwidth (64 kbit/s) voice circuits, thus 
meeting all the cable circuit requirements of African countries up till 2020. A 
traditional problem with cable systems has been the lack of control over indigenous 
traffic. Most developing countries want to maintain sovereignty over their own traffic 
and do not want their neighbours to have access to it. The Africa One system resolves 
this sovereignty issue by placing the majority of the network on the sea floor. Each 
country obtains independent access to the network by means of undersea branching 
technology. Outbound traffic from the region is then aggregated at the point of 
connection to the inter-regional tier (Zsakany and Marshall, 1995).
57 "Africa One gamers support", Fibre Optic News, 20 October 1997.
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Traditionally, carriers who purchase capacity on the network have been the principle 
source of funding for submarine cable systems. However, a lack of capacity 
commitment precludes such an approach in Africa. Instead a build, operate and transfer 
(BOT) scheme has been set up. Entailing a private group of investors initially 
underwriting the project, limiting the liability of African carriers, but still providing 
them with an immediate and stable revenue stream. Consequently Africa One Ltd is to 
construct the project itself with African carriers buying capacity at US$15 million per 
landing point. Carriers would then get the revenues from the circuits they buy 
immediately and, at the end of 12 years, ownership of the scheme would revert in its 
entirety to the African carriers.
Though trumpeted as the ultimate connectivity solution for the African continent, the 
project has been plagued by a number of economic and political problems. Firstly, it 
has faced the formidable problems of coordinating so many countries of variable size 
and resources. Secondly, the macroeconomic and political instability on the continent 
has militated against effective fund raising. Fundraising arrangements for the scheme 
have been ’murky and surrounded by misunderstandings’ (Wilson, 1996b, p. 4). Though 
the project was launched by AT&T submarine systems, it was subsequently sold to 
Tyco Ltd in May 1997. Some governments have also been loath to commit themselves 
to such an expensive and grandiose project, when there are other smaller, more 
manageable systems available. These include competing cable schemes with landing 
points in Africa such as the Fibre Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG), Project 
Oxygen and Afrilink.
Political problems have continued to hinder the project. Though it was to be an African 
project, the scheme has been designed wholly "offshore" with little input from the 
policy-makers of the markets it hopes to serve. Critics have claimed that such a 
grandiose scheme is reminiscent of Cecil Rhodes’ Cape-to-Cairo railway and have 
denounced Africa One as an exercise in new-tech colonialism. There have also been 
claims that too much emphasis is being placed on coastal areas at the expense of the 
large number of landlocked countries. Figure 5 reveals the number of competing 
submarine cable projects, planned or operational that may provide additional 
telecommunications capacity to Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figure 5: Map of existing and planned submarine cable systems linked to Africa
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In June 1997, in an attempt to diffuse such criticism, the cost of the Africa One 
submarine cable was reduced from US$ 1.6 to 1.3 billion to release US$ 300 million 
for linking land-locked countries to the main fibre optic ring. Further political bridge 
building was sought with the creation of the Africa One Coordination Committee 
following a recommendation of the Consultative Meeting of African Member countries
185
of the ITU in Tunis, in November 1995. The Committee is made up of a group of 
African countries58 representing the continent’s five sub-regions, as well as the Pan 
African Telecommunications Union (PATU), the Regional African Satellite 
Communications Organisation (RASCOM), AT&T Submarine Systems Inc. (AT&T 
SSI), the African Development Bank (ADB), and the ITU.
In addition, each country has appointed a national coordinator to act as the focal point 
between the coordination committee and their administrations. Criticised by many as 
unfeasible, and having taken far too long to come to fruition, it remains to be seen if 
Africa One will provide effective communications capability on the continent. Even if 
it is constructed the question remains at what cost to Africans? The project appears to 
presume that telephone traffic is already there to be tapped. The probability is that 
Africa One will link up African countries and connect them to the world, but at a huge 
cost. Preliminary estimates are that call charges will be around US$1 a minute, cheaper 
than current international charges but out of the reach for the vast majority of rurally 
based Africans (Zsakany and Marshall, 1995). Moreover there has been little research 
conducted on the most applicable connectivity option for an individual country. Small 
landlocked countries with sparse rural populations may well find other options such as 
satellite systems much more amenable to developing communications capacity.
AT&T and Tyco Ltd are not alone in their attempts to enter the African 
telecommunications market. Table 8 overleaf shows the large number of planned and 
existing cable schemes that are offering connectivity options to African policy-makers. 
Of the planned intercontinental schemes, by far the largest cable system in operation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is SAT-2, which traces a route between the UK and South Africa 
and down the West Coast. SAT-3, though originally designed to increase capacity over 
the same route, is now likely to be combined with the proposed West African cable 
(WASC) and SAFE projects.59
58 The countries are Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.
59 Fibre Optics News, 30 March 1998.
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Table 8: Fibre optic cable projects connecting to Africa
Scheme Key Player Status Start
date
Capacity Cost
(US$)
FLAG Bell Atlantic Operational 1999 10 Gbit/s 1.2 bn
Africa One Tyco Planned 2000 40 Gbit/s 1.3 bn
SAT-2 Telkom South 
Africa
Operational 1993 565
Mbit/s
150 m
Sea Me We 2 France Telecom Operational 1994 n/a n/a
Sea Me We 3 France Telecom Installation 1998 40 Gbit/s 737 m
Sea Me We 3 
Extension
France Telecom 
and Singapore 
Telecom
Planned 1998 n/a 436 m
SAFE/ SAT-3/ 
WASC
Telkom South 
Africa
Planned 2000 20 Gbit/s n/a
Oxygen CTR Planned 2004 320 Gbit/s 14.7
bn
Afrilink Siemens Planned n/a n/a n/a
Atlantis 2 Embratel Planned 1999 5 Gbit/s 231 m
Source: Infodev, 1998; Foley, 1998; Gifford, James and Cosper, 1998
Sea Me We 3 will also connect to SAFE, thus providing a total circumnavigation of the 
African continent, though neglecting the East coast. This omission, however, may be 
rectified by Africa One and Afrilink which may have landing points in all the coastal 
states. The Atlantis 2 cable scheme links South America and Europe and has a landing 
point in Senegal, whilst project Oxygen remains by far the most ambitious project of 
them all. Designed to be the first truly global project, and still at the design phase, it 
envisages truly global cable coverage with links between the Americas, Africa, Europe 
and Asia, as well as a round Africa cable.
The service offered by Project Oxygen is a global undersea optical fibre cable network 
with 101 landing points in 74 countries and locations. It will have a minimum 
throughput of 640 gigabits per second on long-haul routes over 350 km in length, and 
1.9 terabits per second on shorter and terrestrial routes. Its first phase will consist of
158,000 km of cable; 150,000 km undersea and 8,000 km terrestrial. It will connect 
locations that account for 90 per cent of international telecommunications traffic. Phase
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2 will add further connectivity under a "living network" concept, with the network 
continuing to grow in response to global demand. In contrast to existing submarine 
cable systems, in which carriers buy point-to-point circuits, Project Oxygen is planned 
from the start as a network. Customers buy access capacity, which they can then use 
between any landing points on the network, changing the direction and volume of their 
traffic at will. They can also re-sell the capacity, and allocate or re-allocate it among 
any number of locations and routes, without restriction. A second important player is 
the Fibre Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG) project to provide increased 
telecommunications capabilities and access to Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Upon 
completion, the submarine cable system will stretch from London to Tokyo, landing in 
Africa in Egypt. Other landing points include India, Malaysia, Hong Kong and China.
The critical commercial question for any African cable scheme is whether, and how, 
sufficient traffic can be generated from the countries in order to provide a service that is 
competitive with current and envisaged communications systems. With the significant 
exception of South Africa, there is widespread acknowledgement that no one single 
African country generates sufficient volumes of traffic to justify the construction of a 
single cable link. Thus, co-operation will be the sine qua non of these cable projects. In 
particular, prospective schemes should be integrated with the PANAFTEL terrestrial 
network, the RASCOM satellite network, and any emerging global mobile personal 
communications by satellite (GMPCS) systems, as well as the national networks in 
every participating country.
5.5 Other technologies
An increasing number of African governments and businesses who operate over long 
distances are linking their telephones to wireless systems, so that voice and data 
telecommunications can get through without relying on terrestrial infrastructure. So- 
called wireless infrastructures are emerging as an important technology for developing 
countries. Emerging in the 1940s as a method of interconnecting telephone company 
facilities using point-to-point microwave systems, the locus of use has shifted towards 
providing untethered communications facilities. The evolution of higher frequencies 
and compression algorithms, coupled with cheap electronics, has allowed greater use of
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mobile telephony in African countries -  in some cases substituting for conventional 
fixed telecommunications (Faulhaber, 1995). Conventional hard wire copper cable 
telecommunications systems are prone to ruptures in the network due to environmental 
hazard or even thieves stealing the copper or chopping down poles for firewood. In 
order to circumvent these hazards, many countries now utilise multichannel microwave 
radio-based systems that obviate the need for laying copper cable. Instead telephony 
can be transmitted via microwave radio networks, comprising repeater stations.
This wireless technology is being increasingly deployed to solve the so-called "local 
loop" problem. Traditionally, the local loop is the most expensive segment in 
telecommunications installation (Faulhaber, 1995). This is especially true in Sub- 
Saharan Africa where placing copper cables in remote and often inaccessible areas has 
proved prohibitively expensive. With radio and satellite options for the local loop, 
widespread deployment of telecommunications becomes affordable, and national 
operators can provide better service at a much lower cost compared with prevailing 
rates (Forge, 1995). Wireless local loop technologies (WLL) are cheaper than mobile 
cellular and can be installed more quickly than fixed line. A growing number of 
countries in the region are installing WLL, including Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa (Palumbo, 1998).
Several benefits are claimed for WLL over alternative access technologies. Firstly, it 
can be deployed in places where, because of adverse terrain, building density or 
antiquity, wire and cable are simply not feasible. Second, for certain loop distances and 
population dispersions, wireless can be more economic than the alternatives. Labour 
and loop lengths are the two main cost considerations here. The cost of wired systems 
is critically dependent on the distance between households and the penetration levels 
achieved, whereas the cost of wireless is broadly independent of those factors. Rather, 
it is dependent on the cost of subscriber units, which tends to fall over time with 
increasing economies of scale (Palumbo, 1998). A third factor is that WLL is often 
much quicker to deploy than wired infrastructure. Faster to deploy than copper, it can 
reduce waiting lists for telephone lines in low teledensity countries (Palumbo, 1998). 
The use of radio to transmit traffic has additional benefits in the sense that as nothing 
physical exists in the space between the endpoints in a WLL system, wireless can be 
easier to maintain and protect than wired systems. In some countries, such as Africa,
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buried copper cable is routinely stolen. Even fibre optic cable seems to have some 
second-hand value (Palumbo, 1998).
Traditionally, point-to-multipoint (PMP) radio systems, often working at microwave 
frequencies, have constituted a rather specialised form of WLL. PMP solutions are 
primarily used to hook subscribers clustered in remote villages or small suburbs into 
the mainstream public network. In addition to the original PMP remit of connecting up 
remote subscribers in areas of sparse and dispersed population, WLL is now viewed as 
a relevant "quick fix" in moderately or densely populated locations with low telephone 
penetration. When existing service providers want to add advanced features quickly and 
inexpensively without laying additional copper or fibre into their customers’ homes 
(Dexter-Smith, 1998). However, this solution is itself infrastructure intensive, requiring 
repeater stations in line-of-sight, at least every 40 km, and a consistent power supply.
Irrespective of which of the above technologies or connectivity options policy-makers 
choose, it is undeniable that there are now a bewildering number of communications 
options open to African policy-makers. These options offer the distinct benefit of vastly 
improving the capacity to communicate on the continent. But policy-makers should not 
be seduced by the alluring concept of "instant infrastructure". Rather, the burgeoning 
number of connectivity options raise serious issues that must be tackled prior to their 
introduction. Firstly, there must be a recognition that no single technology -  no matter 
how advanced or powerful -  can alone solve the problem of connecting a continent as 
vast as Africa. These new connectivity options are not designed to supplant existing 
telecommunications infrastructure, but rather to work in full complementarity with the 
existing domestic infrastructure. Secondly, these projects will be run according to 
commercial criteria with little scope for developmental considerations. International 
operators whose only concern is profit maximisation will have little truck with ideals 
such as universal service. Finally, there is the control dimension: in all likelihood, these 
projects represent only the beginning in an era of global connectivity that will 
increasingly see information flows bypassing national boundaries. For countries used to 
the lucrative revenues from international call transmission and control over their 
citizens this period may well be a rude awakening.
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At the same time, policy-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa are not in the most enviable of 
positions. Faced with rapid technological changes, resource constraints and a long-term 
decline in commodity prices as well as international aid flows the bargaining position 
of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would seem to be rather weak. Compounding this 
problem is that no substantive research has been conducted on the potential synergies 
and trade-offs that exist between these various connectivity options. To improve 
international links, should a Sub-Saharan African country invest its limited foreign 
exchange in underwater fibre optic cable or should it focus on satellite communications 
and buy into a GMPCS system or Teledesic?
The highly publicised failure of the Iridium satellite system in March 2000 highlights 
the importance of investing in appropriate connectivity options. The company, formed 
in 1991, and backed by an international consortium that included Motorola launched its 
66 LEO satellites over the period 1997 -  1998. However, the ambitious service, which 
sought to connect people "anytime, anywhere" through satellite phones, failed to attract 
more than 50, 000 users worldwide. Factors including the US$3000 handset costs, high 
call tariffs, the large size of the phones and their failure to function indoors discouraged 
the build up of a large subscriber base. As a result, the company was forced to file for 
bankruptcy in August 1999, with debts totalling more than US$4 billion. Unable to find 
a buyer for the company, and forced to comply with US law on space debris, each 
satellite will be de-orbited, burning up in the Earth's atmosphere, leaving 50,000 users 
bereft of service and providing an ignominious ending to the first in a raft of GMPCS 
systems.60 Whether a GMPCS system is appropriate for a particular African country or 
which GMPCS to back is thus a crucial strategic decision. Resolving these issues 
necessitates firstly an understanding of the economics of these projects and secondly an 
analysis of the "pros and cons" of each system in relation to each individual country.
The following section analyses the economics of cable and satellite projects. First an 
individual consideration will be made of the respective systems, with illustrative cost 
structures produced for both. Then, taking two countries, Nigeria and Ethiopia, a 
hypothetical analysis is undertaken to determine the amenability of these connectivity
60 See Grimes (2000) "Iridium’s 66 satellites to crash", The Financial Times, 17 March 2000, p. 4.
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options within Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, an assessment is made of the potential 
impact of these projects and the role that government should play.
5.6 A comparative analysis of planned cable and satellite projects
Given the pent-up demand for extra communications capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the continent in general these cable and satellite schemes can bring much needed 
capacity to the continent. The question that must be raised, is at what price to Africans? 
These new schemes offer higher capacity and lower costs for international telephone 
calls, access to data and services with better quality of transmission, higher bandwidth 
and the benefits of digitalisation. Primarily, through a reduction in the economic cost of 
information retrieval, and an increase in national capacity, they represent an obvious 
way of improving access to information. Secondly, they can also provide much 
improved access, at a theoretically lower cost, to national and regional and international 
networks. However, just constructing or investing in these projects is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition. In order for cable and satellite projects to truly contribute to 
the construction of the African information infrastructure further conditions must be 
met:
• Need to upgrade the domestic infrastructure. These projects only represent 
potentialities. If countries fail to upgrade their national networks, users will 
continue to be frustrated by the availability of world-class international links that 
are dependent upon an archaic and inefficient domestic counterpart.
• Need for domestic service providers. In order to effectively exploit the services 
on offer, such as the Internet and distance education, a community of service 
providers is needed that can respond to users’ specific requirements.
• Reduction in call charges. The cost of international access to users will have to be 
reduced to give a truer reflection of actual transmission costs as opposed to profit 
objectives. With increased capacity and competition amongst transmission systems 
national operators have greater capacity to reduce call charges.
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These aggregate benefits may well appear enticing to Sub-Saharan African countries 
but it is impossible to ascertain the true worth of these projects without recourse to an 
analysis of the economics of the various connectivity options.
5.6.1 The economics of submarine cable systems
The variables involved in the economics of cable systems are varied and complex. The 
main factors to be taken into consideration for those considering connecting to 
submarine cable projects are length, capacity, number of landing points, network design 
and capital and operational costs (Blake, 1998). Whilst there is no standard pricing 
structure for cable systems, it is possible to illustrate a potential cost structure for a pan- 
African cable system based on hypothetical estimates of call traffic and costs. Though 
an approximation, it allows an illustrative comparison between cable and satellite 
systems to be made. The figure overleaf represents the potential capital and running 
costs for a 35,000 km cable around Africa connecting almost all coastal countries in 
order to achieve maximum connectivity. Based on AT&T Inc.’s estimates the model 
assumes 40 Gbits/s of capacity and that there are 45 coastal landing points (Zsakany 
and Marshall, 1995).
As can be seen from Figure 6 overleaf the project, from the assumptions above, 
provides transmission capacity far in excess of current levels of African traffic. As with 
land based cable installation, the laying of the cable is a sunk cost and, along with 
additional equipment such as repeaters, accounts for the majority of the project cost. 
Hence it is more efficient to create excess capacity over and above what is required. 
The critical commercial question is, then, how can sufficient traffic be generated to 
ensure that call costs are kept at a level commensurate with, and preferably below that 
of other competing systems?
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Figure 6: Illustrative costs of a round Africa Cable Project
1. Capital costs $US
Costs of cable laid with repeaters 1. 3 billion
Cost per landing point 15 million
No. of landing points 45
Projected capital cost =1.3 billion + (15*45) 1.975 billion
2. Running costs
Cable maintenance: US$7 million per ocean segment. For Africa, 
three ocean segments- Mediterranean, Atlantic and Indian.
21 million
Network management: US$5 million per year 5 million
Total project running costs 26 million
3. Annualised costs
Capital costs amortised over 12 years 165 million
Interest cost in first year (7%) 138 million
Running costs 26 million
Total annual running costs: 329 million
4. Total costs per call minute
Estimated total minutes to and from African coastal countries in 1998: 2.35 billion
Average cost per minute for international transmission: 0.14 c
Estimated originating and terminating costs: 
Total costs per minute (US$)
0.5-10 c/ end 
0.19-24 c
Source: BMP, 1998 and Foley, 1998, Zsakany and Marshall, 1995
One of the reasons for the lack of pan-African cable systems in the past has been that 
the small amount of individual traffic generated by the majority of countries. With the 
obvious exception of South Africa, no single African country generates sufficient 
traffic to justify the creation of a link to any other country or region. However, if the 
cable system were to carry the majority of traffic for landlocked countries and
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international calls for coastal landing points, then there would be sufficient levels of 
telecommunications traffic generated.
The capital costs of the project are estimated to be US$1.3 billion for laying the cable 
and repeaters, with a further US$15 million per landing station, giving a projected 
capital cost of US$1,975 billion, amortised over 12 years, after which ownership is due 
to revert to African carriers. Operational and maintenance costs are estimated at a total 
of US$26 million with a further five per cent interest charge. As Figure 6 indicates, the 
total annual cost is estimated at US$329 million. Though AT&T Inc. (Zsakany and 
Marshall, 1995) forecast traffic levels of 4.7 billion minutes in the first year, this seems 
wildly optimistic given that this figure represents close to the total annual traffic for the 
whole continent. For the purposes of illustration a more realistic figure of 2.35 billion 
minutes has been estimated. The cost per minute of international transmission by cable 
is then the annual cost divided by the projected number of minutes of international 
traffic, which is 14 cents. This figure is likely to be an overestimate of transmission 
costs as it is assumed, for the purpose of simplicity, that cable capacity is used 
exclusively for switched voice telephony. Though in reality there will be significant 
demand for leased circuits from large corporations and governments.
Figure 6 gives a realistic illustration of the likely costs and per minute costs that would 
arise if the cable scheme were built. It shows that at around 20 cents a minute the 
scheme would compare favourably with current transmission costs and would allow for 
significant reductions in the cost of telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa. If we 
extrapolate data from estimates provided by AT&T Submarine systems it is possible to 
illustrate an approximate level of cost. From a national point of view, the costs of 
connecting to the scheme at a landing point must be considered. Connection to a cable 
scheme will invariably be via a landing point, which is in turn connected to the network 
of the national operator.
Given that the majority of cable schemes which are connected to Africa are 
intercontinental, there will typically be only one landing point per country, with a 
limited number of countries connected. Evidently the most popular sites of landing 
points will be in coastal areas. Thus, for landlocked countries access agreements must 
be negotiated in order to allow participation in these schemes. Countries access
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submarine cable schemes via another country or directly depending on their location 
vis-a-vis landing points. For direct access to be feasible, international traffic originating 
externally can be concentrated across borders, or by linkages to other cable schemes. 
International links can be made by via terrestrial cable or microwave or satellite. For 
small coastal countries that do not generate significant levels of traffic and landlocked 
countries, connection throws up different cost scenarios. Connectivity to cable schemes 
for these countries will involve additional costs, whether connection is through satellite 
or terrestrial methods. Thus, the continued use of existing transmission systems may 
compare favourably with the advantages of newer systems.
5.6.2 The economics of satellite systems
(a) Technical specifications
Satellite systems are comprised of two segments: a space segment, the satellites and an 
earth segment comprising all ground-based equipment. The space segment consists of 
satellites that are commonly solar-powered, and have a maximum life span of 10 years 
or less. The earth segment consists of:
• earth stations which communicate with the satellites;
• operation centres that monitor and correct the satellite movement and position;
• gateways which connect satellite to the public switched telecommunications 
network (PSTN); and
• subscriber terminals which can either be mobile (a handset, for example) or fixed 
(for example, a payphone).
At present the treaty organisations61, such as INTELSAT and INTERSPUTNIK, own 
the satellites and the operation centres used to control them, whilst countries own the 
earth stations themselves. The distinguishing characteristic between satellite types is 
essentially the method in which they orbit the earth. There are three main satellite 
types:
61 RASCOM plans, eventually, to become a treaty organisation.
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• Geostationary or geosynchronous earth orbiting (GEO)
• Medium earth orbiting (MEO)
• Low earth orbiting (LEO)
Table 9: Satellite System comparison by orbit62
System overview GEO MEO LEO
Spectrum Resources
Satellites necessary for global 
coverage
3 10-12 48-840
Altitude (km) 35,680 2000-10,000 400-1401
Global Roaming Not available (but 
possible via 
connection to PSTN)
Yes Yes
Frequency coordination 
complexity
Medium Medium High
Telecommunications
Antennas Large multibeam Small Small
Hand-held No Yes Yes
Call Handover None Infrequent frequent
Coverage(footprint) Very large Large Small
Time for signal round trip 
(seconds)
0.25-0.5 0.1 0.05
Estimated Costs
Space Segment min/US$ -0.20 -0.40 -1.00
Ground Segment Low Medium High-medium
The GEO satellite appears stationary from earth as it revolves around the earth in 
exactly 24 hours. Its great distance from earth ensures that it has a large footprint; in 
principle only three are required to provide global coverage. INTELSAT and the other 
treaty organisations all use GEO satellites. However, their higher orbit means that there 
are noticeable delays in transmission and large dishes are required to receive satellite 
signals. LEOs on the other hand, due to their lower orbiting altitude, require less power 
to reach the satellite hence receptive antennas can be smaller. Whilst this leads to an 
almost imperceptible time delay in transmission, more satellites are required to provide
62 Collated from Leite (1996) and Noll (1996).
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global coverage. LEOs can be placed as close to 400km from the earth, transmission 
delay is therefore imperceptible and signal strength is greater. Moreover receivers can 
be truly mobile and hence these are utilised by GMPCS services. However, mobile 
LEO phones cannot be used indoors and are vulnerable to erratic weather systems.
In terms of pricing and costing GEOs are evidently the most expensive of satellites, 
being more expensive to build and launch. MEOs and LEOs are smaller and less 
expensive but consequently more satellites are required and they have a shorter life 
span (Ackroyd, 1996). The total cost of a LEO scheme is therefore higher. The business 
risks are also higher with LEOs as the satellites are less versatile, and if insufficient 
demand is created for GMPCS services, then operators may face serious financial 
loss.63 For these reasons the new GMPCS operators are planning to launch their 
services in as many countries as possible, banking on rapid growth of call traffic and 
revenues. Private satellite systems have tended to target niche markets such as 
television or proprietary networks. Countries with a large, sparsely populated landmass 
that is difficult to serve with terrestrial infrastructure can utilise satellite links as an 
economic alternative.
5.6.3 The GMPCS System
The Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) system has 
garnered much attention of late in developing countries. GMPCS is compatible with all 
the current non-stationary and geo-stationary orbit systems and can provide universal 
service for telecommunications services for all types. It is especially appropriate for 
rural and remote areas lacking conventional infrastructure. It is envisaged that operators 
will offer, from 1999, services such as global mobile telephony, fixed telephony, 
paging and data communications (Leite, 1998). Initially, due to the high cost and 
international treaty restrictions, GMPCS will focus on mobile telephony services with 
fixed services to payphones as a secondary line of business. Thus the market for 
GMPCS in Africa is projected to be quite small. According to the ITU there will only 
be eight million GMPCS subscribers by the year 2002 (ITU, 1997b). There are two
63 The first LEO scheme to go to market, Iridium, filed for bankruptcy in August 1999, and was judged to have 
failed for precisely these reasons.
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main markets for GMPCS satellite services: international business travellers and 
cellular phone users that need to roam into areas with non-existent cellular networks. 
Such users will utilise such systems as Globalstar and ICO, which are satellite-based 
systems designed to allow any type of transmission to reach its destination irrespective 
of geography. However, such a niche service, at such high costs cannot solve the lack 
of telecommunications infrastructure in rural areas.
GMPCS operators are likely to concentrate initially on the domestic market for mobile 
telephony (Leite, 1998). Given the available technology, GMPCS represents a less 
expensive service for mobile communications; a challenge to existing commercial 
operators. However, given the high cost of handsets, operators are likely to attract 
customers by positioning themselves as a complementary service and offering users 
dual mode handsets. As such, the new services they offer will have little impact on 
domestic communications capacity (Leite, 1998). In terms of fixed services GMPCS 
offers substantial opportunities to improve the communications capacities of countries 
with rurally based populations where the existing infrastructure in this area is 
practically non-existent. Fixed telephony tariffs are projected to be approximately 
US$0.60 per minute. Representing a substantial saving on current mobile cellular 
services, and also comparing favourably with the average US$1 per minute tariff for 
international calls. However, operational costs and subscription charges for GMPCS 
systems are envisaged to raise tariffs to US$0.85 per minute (Leite, 1998). Handsets are 
projected to cost from US$750 to US$3000. Each cell phone will be digital and 
assigned a unique phone number with a system-defined "country code". This code will 
allow those using the public network to locate a mobile user anywhere (Faulhaber, 
1995).
The GMPCS system should not, therefore, be seen as a competitive threat to national 
operators, more a complementary service, which can aid governments in their 
endeavours towards improving national service, without requiring expensive and 
unproductive infrastructure. Rather, the GMPCS system will generate additional 
revenue for the national fixed and mobile operators through the interconnection of calls 
generated by the system.
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Table 10: Estimated GMPCS interconnection charges
Transmission US$ per minute
Fixed to GMPCS 0.20
GMPCS to Fixed 0.05
Land Mobile to GMPCS 0.20
GMPCS to Land Mobile 0.09
Source: Global Telephony, May 1998
As it is unlikely that any one country will have sufficient demand for capacity to justify 
a single GMPCS satellite link, it is envisaged that there will be regional hubs on the 
continent (InfoDev, 1998). Intuitively these will be based in South Africa, Nigeria and 
probably Egypt, given the large numbers of projected users in these countries and also 
their relatively advanced existing international links. The more profound implications 
of mobile satellite services are their ability to side step the public switched network, 
which may have revenue implications for national telecommunications operators. In 
order to adjust for this loss of revenue governments may wish to levy licence fees on 
GMPCS operators that reflect the estimated loss from public network bypass. However, 
the consensus is that, at least for the foreseeable future, the amount of traffic generated 
by GMPCS systems will be modest (InfoDev, 1998).
Figure 7 overleaf is an illustration of the cost structure of a satellite system. Based on 
data from Inmarsat’s planned ICO system, it estimates that total costs per minute will be 
in the region of 34 -  39 cents. The method of calculating the satellite system cost 
structure is essentially the same as with the previously analysed submarine cable 
scheme. Costs are calculated on an annualised basis and total annual costs are divided 
by an estimated total volume of traffic. Here, the total projected level of traffic refers to 
the global market for the GMPCS, as opposed to just the Sub-Saharan African market.
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Figure 7: Illustrative costs of a satellite system
1. Capital costs US$m
Satellites and Control Systems 1,084
Launch and Insurance 1,064
Other capital expenditures 1,287
Business Operations 84
Early Operational Costs 709
Marketing and Branding 70
Total Capital Costs 4,298
Net Interest and Financing 354
Total pre-operational costs 4,652
2. Annualised costs
Annual operating costs 150
Pre-operational costs amortised over 12 years 388
Interest cost in first year (7%) 326
Total annualised costs 864
3. Total costs per call
Cost per minute at 3 billion minutes per year 29c
Estimated originating and terminating costs 5 -  10c
Total costs per minute 34-39c
Source: BMP, 1998
5.6.4 Submarine cable versus satellite systems
The new cable and satellite projects being promoted world-wide constitute an important 
new dimension in the struggle to develop modem information infrastructures. 
However, each system has advantages and disadvantages that must be placed in a 
national context in order to optimise infrastructural development objectives. 
Comparisons between such diverse systems remain fraught with complexity, given the 
multitude of factors to be assuaged in each project and their differing capabilities.
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Rather, an aggregation of a number of key factors must be taken into account when 
assessing their relative merits. In all likelihood the issue will not be one of straight 
trade-offs between competing systems, but rather divining the most effective 
combination of available connectivity options.
From a systemic and technological point of view it is relatively straightforward to 
decide which connectivity option is superior. Succinctly put the particular advantages 
of submarine cable systems are that they:
• offer far greater capacity;
• are unaffected by atmospheric conditions;
• are less expensive than satellite systems; and
• are more flexible as operators divide traffic amongst a host of users and charge for
direction and volume.
On the other hand the particular advantages of satellite systems accrue mainly to 
countries with sparsely populated rural areas. Theoretically, universal access can be 
achieved more effectively with a satellite system. Satellite also represent the closest 
thing to an "instant infrastructure", bypassing the national network, thus remaining the 
cheapest option in regions where the volume of telecommunications traffic is slim. 
Thus the advantages of satellite systems are that they:
• remain the cheapest option for countries looking to instantly boost 
telecommunications infrastructure without committing scarce foreign exchange;
• are more amenable to the concept of universal service. Satellite systems appear to
be the only viable option for countries with isolated populations and where the
volume of telecommunications traffic is low; and
• can provide mobile services beyond the reach of terrestrial fixed and mobile 
networks.
The above summary hints at the fact that straight comparisons, in the absence of 
factoring in the contextual dimension, are of little use to policy-makers. Any attempt to
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arrive at an optimisation strategy must encompass a variety of variables. Such variables 
include:
• tariff levels;
• revenues;
• infrastructure costs;
• geography and demographic characteristics;
•  current and projected levels of domestic and international traffic;
• existing communications infrastructure;
• demand for new services;
• development priorities; and
• connectivity purpose: people-to-people, or new services such as telemedicine.
In order to illustrate how some of the variables above should weigh heavily in strategic 
decisions, two countries in the Sub-Saharan African region, Nigeria and Ethiopia, with 
very differing demographic and infrastructural make-ups are examined below.
5.7 Case study: Nigeria
Nigeria is a coastal country with significant volumes of traffic and significant levels of 
unmet customer demand. Nigeria’s telecommunication infrastructure is well developed 
but not to such an extent that it is unrepresentative of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has made 
some progress in restructuring its telecommunications sector, having liberalised some 
elements of the communications sector. In terms of mobile telephony the country is 
relatively well advanced, having a number of competing operators. The national 
operator has, at present, a de facto monopoly in the fixed voice telephony market. 
There are ambitious plans to increase the number of lines from 1998 levels of 600,000 
to 1.5 million by 2001 (FMOC, 1996). As a result, commitments to investment are 
large and increasing. Despite plans to license a second national operator, international 
tariffs remain at a rate significantly higher than the global average and 
telecommunications remains a lucrative sector with an average annual revenue per line 
of US$720 (ADCG, 1998).
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(a) International services
Currently international calls are transmitted internationally via a combination of 
terrestrial microwave links to neighbouring countries and via an earth station to more 
distant countries. International calls to African countries are charged at the equivalent 
of US$1.00 per minute, and to other countries at US$3 per minute. The relatively high 
tariffs for international calls results in a lucrative imbalance between incoming and 
outgoing traffic. This imbalance has led to substantial net revenues for the national 
operator, in addition to the profits made on international call charges. In order to 
maintain this lucrative revenue stream national operators are reluctant to reduce the 
accounting rate for international calls. However, international accounting rates are 
declining by an average of nine per cent per year (ITU, 1998b).
(b) Impact of the submarine cable
As a coastal country, Nigeria chooses to construct a landing point, thus making a 
substantial investment in the submarine cable scheme. The landing point costs US$15 
million to construct, has a life expectancy of 25 years and costs US$1.35 million a year 
to operate and maintain. Depreciating the landing point over its life, and allowing for 
financing costs, the operator has annual costs of US$3.8 million from its involvement 
in the scheme (BMP, 1998).
The revenue from the scheme arrives principally in the form of lower transmission 
costs for international calls. The risk of losses is very small, assuming that enough 
other coastal countries participate in the scheme to create critical mass. If all outgoing 
international traffic is transferred to the cable scheme the reduction in costs for 
international traffic would be in the region of 18 cents per minute, worth US$11.5 
million in the first year (BMP, 1998). In practice re-routing all traffic in this manner 
will be spread over two to three years, and even then will only account for up to 80 per 
cent of international traffic. In addition some landlocked countries in Africa would still 
be reached by satellite and terrestrial cable or microwave. Taking all these variables 
into account, the annual cost savings arising from membership of the cable scheme are 
projected at US$7 -  8 million. The national operator will also gain from revenues
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generated from landlocked countries using its landing point to gain access to the 
submarine cable.
5.8 Case study: Ethiopia
Ethiopia is an independent republic that lies in the north-east comer of Africa and 
forms part of the North-East African region. Since the secession of Eritrea in 1993, 
Ethiopia has been a landlocked state. The country has an estimated 1995 population of
55.2 million people. Less urbanised than Nigeria, Ethiopia has a significantly lower 
population density and over 80 per cent of its population living in rural areas. Despite 
the fact that Ethiopia was the pioneer of telecommunications in Sub Saharan Africa64, 
the country has failed to capitalise on its early lead. The national operator is still the 
only licensed operator of fixed telephony and there are no plans to introduce a second 
national operator. Cellular services are also monopolised by the national operator. 
There are 200,000 lines in the country, mainly in the capital and yet average revenue 
per line is US$500 per year (ITU, 1997a). Given that much of the country is 
inaccessible by road, there are few telecommunications connections outside the main 
urban areas. The public telecommunications operator, the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation, receives lucrative revenues by charging a high price 
for international calls but much of this money is used to cross-subsidise other industries 
within the public sector. Thus, there is far greater resistance to reducing long distance 
call charges. As a result, these are only projected to fall minimally by one per cent per 
year.
(a) International services
Ethiopia is connected to other countries by a combination of terrestrial microwave links 
to neighbouring countries and via an earth station to more distant countries. The 
transmission costs for international calls is estimated at 25 cents per minute, but the 
average accounting rate is US$1.00 per minute to other African countries and US$4 for 
international calls (ITU, 1997a). The relatively high tariffs for international calls result
64 The first international call on the African continent was made from Addis Ababa in 1896.
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in a lucrative imbalance between incoming and outgoing traffic. This imbalance has led 
to substantial net revenue for the national operator, in addition to the profits made on 
international call charges. In fact the net profits from international services exceed 
those of national revenue from domestic usage.
(b) Impact of GMPCS
The less favourable economic environment reduces the potential market for GMPCS. 
With a GDP per capita of less than US$200 and a largely rural population it is unlikely 
that satellite mobile communication will make any significant inroads into increasing 
teledensity. However, in inaccessible rural areas, it is likely that GMPCS will represent 
a significant difference to disaster relief agencies and aid relief agencies in the field. In 
addition GMPCS has potential in terms of village payphones, which can have a 
significant impact if the national operator is willing to subsidise them. Thus, though the 
GMPCS system does not represent an effective mechanism for inexpensive rural 
telephony, it does complement the national network by providing some access in 
traditionally neglected rural areas.
(c) Access to submarine cable
In order to access a submarine cable system Ethiopia must connect to a landing point in 
a coastal country. This link is via terrestrial cable between two capital cities and would 
therefore be approximately 400 km long. Taking the cost of the cable link and the 
saving in transmission costs the cost saving will be in the region of 14 cents per minute 
for international transmission. This produces an annualised saving of about US$1.5 
million for the national operator. However, call charges will probably only fall by 3.5 
per cent due to desire on the national operator’s part to retain profitability.
5.9 The pivotal role of public policy
The above illustrative examples of two very different countries highlight that the 
choices facing policy-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa are far from straightforward. They 
constitute an extremely important added dimension to the current arguments on
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telecommunications restructuring. However, it is paramount that one remembers that 
the majority of international schemes are focused on one overriding objective: 
profitability through increasing communications capacity. Most of the schemes fall into 
one of two categories. Either they are designed to strictly increase the transmission 
capacity for international telecommunications traffic and/or they provide new or 
existing services to a wider audience and at a much-improved level of quality. These 
potentialities have thrown up three important dimensions that must be addressed by 
policy-makers:
1. The regulatory dimension which involves issues such as licensing and regulating 
operators, landing rights and planning permission.
2. The economic dimension which focuses on issues such as investment participation, 
allocation of revenue and interconnection issues.
3. The political dimension which focuses on issues of access to these new services, 
regional issues, such as co-operation and sharing of resources, and control issues.
5.9.1 The regulatory dimension
The regulatory dimension focuses on the need for regulatory approval by national 
polities. The fruition of these new cable and satellite schema is likely to give new 
impetus to reforms underway in the telecommunications sector in Africa. But 
governments now face a new challenge in terms of regulation. Already facing 
difficulties in privatising national carriers, the situation is being compounded by the 
rash of foreign private sector consortia bidding to exploit the African market. However, 
the capacity of national governments to cope is constrained by a number of key factors:
• information deficiency;
• weak bargaining position;
• lack of organisational and management competency;
• weak political will;
• little positive experience of regional cooperation;
• geo-political considerations; and
• cost considerations.
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In spite of this weak bargaining position countries must implement a drastic overhaul of 
tariffs, institute regional co-operation in various guises and new methods of operation 
for international telecommunications services. In the majority of African countries, the 
institutional capacity is not suitably developed to allow the effective handling of such 
complex regulatory issues. How, for example, the new global infrastructures will 
connect with existing public networks is a key issue that policy-makers have yet to 
address.
A critical area for regulation is the effect these projects will have on the deregulation of 
telecommunications within the domestic market. Undoubtedly, if countries allow 
access to these new connectivity options this represents a de facto acceleration of 
deregulation. All the schemes outlined above require the installation of new 
infrastructure, thus ownership issues would have to be dealt with. Moreover, national 
operators have historically enjoyed a monopoly over domestic telephony, this need not 
apply with infrastructure used for international communications. Traditional 
arrangements have dictated cooperation amongst national monopolies to provide 
international links. Given that the consortia planning to set up these satellites and cable 
projects are privately owned, there are now alternative arrangements for financing 
infrastructure. Thus, at least in the short-term, such arrangements will not directly 
challenge the domestic monopoly of national operators.
In terms of the accounting rates and the costs of international transmission, though 
increased capacity for transmission of international calls will inevitably lead to lower 
prices, such falls will be slow to arrive. Firstly, because the cost of call transmission is 
shared equally by two operators at a previously agreed price or accounting rate. Each 
operator then bears the cost of transmitting its half of the route. An annual payment is 
also made for any discrepancy between the number of call minutes flowing each way 
over the route. Thus the operator sending more call minutes than it receives pays for the 
difference at half the accounting rate. A reduction in costs benefits the operators but 
does not automatically feed into lower call charges (Forge, 1995). But charges are 
falling with the advent of competition from resellers and callback services.
Overall cable and satellite projects, and other connectivity innovations, present new 
opportunities for the provision of transmission capacity and access to new services. At
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the same time, they pose significant challenges to national operators and to regulatory 
authorities. For example, at a minimum, cable projects are likely to require planning 
permission, and a regulatory framework guarding against discrimination between rival 
schemes. However, they do not compel a fundamental change in sector policies, nor is 
it necessary to devise radical licensing schemes. Rather, licensing policies need to be 
adapted to facilitate the take-up of the services that will be provided over new 
infrastructures. In conclusion, regulatory intervention is needed to ensure that 
consumers benefit from the reduced cost of international access; rules are needed to 
ensure that any exclusivity granted should not restrict the choice available of new 
technologies and services.
5.9.2 The economic dimension
In terms of the economic dimension new connectivity options provide African policy­
makers with much food for thought and, more importantly, a need for action. A primary 
concern for national operators must be the fear of network bypass. Satellite services 
essentially offer users the opportunity to bypass the public network and link directly 
with international connections. Such bypass will lead to some loss of revenue for 
national operators. All international infrastructure projects could in principle 
circumvent national operators’ gateways and connect to public networks at the local 
level or even direct to customers. Thus technical by-pass is inevitable -  the question is 
how can it be accommodated without losses to national operators.
Answering this question is difficult due to the nascent nature of the majority of 
schemes. In the short term, the threat from these satellite operators is minimal for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, international treaties restrict their entry into international 
fixed voice telephony; secondly, from an economic standpoint it is unlikely that 
satellite services such as GMPCS can compete internationally in terms of price. 
GMPCS is rather a niche service which, as a result, will attract a suitably high premium 
(Infodev, 1998). At present the use of satellite systems is strictly regulated by 
international treaties, principally those governed by INTELSAT. Hence there are no 
private fixed satellite systems offering public telecommunications services, and none of 
the projects outlined above depend on amendments to this provision. However, current 
treaty provisions in this area are likely to be changed in the near future in the face of
209
international pressure to allow greater competition (InfoDev, 1998). Several countries, 
including some within the Sub-Saharan Africa region, are in the process of liberalising 
their international gateways. In countries that enjoy advanced networks callers have 
seen a corresponding drop in international call charges. Yet in Sub-Saharan Africa the 
avowed policy aim is different. Permission to operate an international gateway typically 
involves a quid pro quo to develop the domestic infrastructure, hence prices have yet to 
fall appreciably.
A second important area in the economic dimension is that of creating a climate 
conducive to private investment. Given the massive sums necessary for upgrading the 
telecommunications networks in almost all African countries, governments need to 
encourage private sector participation. Given the speed at which information and 
communication technologies are changing, policy-makers need to encourage the 
participation of the domestic, regional and global private sector. In order to do this the 
following investor expectations must be satisfied:
• good market prospects;
• attractive business environment;
• a reasonable well-defined regulatory framework and/or strong contractual 
arrangements; and
• access to foreign exchange.
At the same time those who finance these projects also have expectations that must be 
met, namely:
• commercially viable and bankable projects;
• assured return, with an upside potential;
• long-term commitment from lead sponsors;
• good management and proven technology;
• necessary permits, including interconnection agreements, completion arrangements; 
adequate security packages; and
• access to foreign exchange.
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5.9.3 The political dimension
In terms of the political dimension, new connectivity options will force policy-makers 
to confront a number of issues; namely those of regional and international co-operation. 
The political manoeuvrings over RASCOM and Africa ONE during 1998 have 
highlighted the political problems of coordination amongst such a diverse number of 
countries (Mouka, 1998). Given that the majority of African country 
telecommunications traffic is slim, it is vital that Sub-Saharan Africa unites in an 
attempt to improve information infrastructure within the region. As social shaping 
theorists such Bijker and Law (1992) have argued, it is actors who shape technologies 
in negotiation processes. The leading actors in the first phase of debates on the 
information society, were the manufacturers and suppliers of communication 
technologies. However, whilst in the U.S. and Europe the locus of attention has shifted 
to the role of public policy in structuring an effective information society, in Africa, 
these manufacturers and suppliers are still amongst the dominant actors seeking to 
shape the continental information infrastructure. As Cronberg (1997) points out at this 
critical juncture emerging technologies are still ’black-boxed, with power relations 
stabilised within the competing technologies as the actors participating in the 
negotiations agree on its particular meanings’ (Cronberg, 1997, p. 120). It is in the 
interests of African policy-makers to combine their negotiating strengths to work on 
improving the terms of trade for the region as a whole.
For example, moves towards the launching of a Pan-African satellite are welcome but 
have taken a long time to build momentum.65 Even at this late stage there are lingering 
doubts over the likelihood of nations overcoming the fractious nature of their regional 
relations (Mouka, 1998). The 1998 escalation of serious conflicts at the heart of Africa 
suggest that this may well rule out any attempts at regional information infrastructure 
solutions in this area for some time to come. However easy is it to succumb to Afro- 
pessimism, African policy-makers must realise that the continent as a whole is much 
stronger than the sum of its individual parts. A united front is essential at such a crucial 
stage in the face of the commercial onslaught from international players who are far 
better informed.
65 The idea was first proposed in the 1970s.
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Another example of the efficacy of a united front are negotiations over satellite 
frequencies. Policy-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa could, for example, demand that big 
LEO satellite services be subsidised by users in developed countries so their citizens 
can receive more affordable services66. In return providers could be given preferential 
market access. Though operators are unlikely to want to grant preferential rates to Sub- 
Saharan African countries, systems are likely to have extra capacity on satellites 
operating over less affluent areas and operators probably will have to offer better rates 
to attract business in those areas (InfoDev, 1998). Realistically, subsidies may be 
difficult to deliver even if operators were inclined to grant preferential rates as LEO 
users will roam from country to country and region to region, making it hard to 
establish who is eligible for subsidy. However, it may be more practical to set up 
subsidy programs for rural users of fixed big LEO services, such as those planned by 
Globalstar.
Whilst promoters of new connectivity options have argued that fundamental regulatory 
changes are unnecessary, there are a host of roles that government must play to 
optimise any benefit that may accrue from them. The majority of new connectivity 
options being touted will reduce the transmission costs of telecommunications. 
However, national and international operators are likely to want to maintain high tariffs 
in order maximise profitability. Yet affordability remains one of the key barriers to the 
effective use of these systems to improve information infrastructure in the region. 
African policy-makers must articulate explicit strategies that address the regulatory, 
economic and political dimensions in order to develop, implement and sustain 
affordable access.67
5.10 Summary
This chapter has concentrated on the burgeoning number of new connectivity 
innovations -  such as submarine cable and satellite systems -  that have emerged over
66 "Developing countries seek big LEO subsidies", Communications Daily, 9 October, 1996, Vol. 16, No. 197,
p. 2.
67 Organising the sharing of facilities can overcome the high cost of access in rural areas, through schemes 
such as village payphones, telecentres, and community information centres.
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the last decade. These connectivity options appear to offer seductively simple answers 
to the slow growth of Sub-Saharan African communications capacity. Yet few have 
asked the critical question as to what extent they can contribute effectively to the 
development of information infrastructure in the region. Illustrating the need for a 
closer analysis of these connectivity options with case studies of Nigeria and Ethiopia, 
the chapter has shown the areas in which government must play a pivotal role. It has 
shown that while new technological innovations increase the number of options open to 
African policy-makers to improve communications capacity, there is an urgent need for 
regulation and economic and political coordination. The choice of which technologies 
to modernise and improve the quality and extent of information infrastructure is a 
crucial one. As the above analysis has revealed, there is no universal solution, rather 
choices about which system to use are dependent on an in-depth analysis of 
requirements at the national level.
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CHAPTER 6 
The Role of Development Agencies
6.1 Introduction
The majority of initiatives in pursuit of information infrastructure are being designed, 
implemented and funded by international development agencies. As of May 1999, there 
were over 100 organisations engaged in over 300 projects involving information and 
communication technology activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst these efforts have 
contributed to the development of information infrastructure in the region, bringing 
much needed expertise and physical infrastructure, there are legitimate concerns as to 
the effectiveness of these initiatives. This chapter provides an analysis of the role of 
development agencies in constructing information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Firstly, an introduction is provided to the history of development assistance to African 
countries in the ICT-related field. Secondly, a survey of projects is conducted to
determine the main areas in which development assistance is being applied and the
rationale behind these activities. Finally a case study of the United Nations
Development Programme’s Internet Initiative for Africa is carried out.
6.2 Development theory
The role that the availability of information should play in economic development has 
historically been the subject of considerable debate (Schramm, 1964 and Lemer, 1958). 
Works such as Lemer’s "The Passing of Traditional Society" (1958) put forward a 
structuralist-functionalist view that industrialisation in developing countries would be 
accelerated by the transplantation of western media technologies and models 
(Nordenstag and Schiller, 1992; Boyd-Barrett, 1977). Nebulous and somewhat naive, it 
implied that the very introduction of media would lead to development. Proponents 
argued that if Third World countries would only invest in communication 
infrastructure...they would be able to begin the long arduous climb towards
development' (Jayaweera and Amnugama, 1987, p. 26). Despite the lack of empirical 
evidence and intellectual validity, this development model held considerable sway in 
the early 1960s. So much so that development agencies such as UNESCO were at the
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forefront of large scale, top-down efforts to develop the communications infrastructure 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Under the guise of promoting development through increasing 
communications capacity, the majority of African governments invested heavily in 
constructing broadcast infrastructures. Whilst these efforts on the whole were 
successful in improving the regions capacity to communicate, it soon became clear that 
structural distortions in African society saw elites benefiting disproportionately from 
the increases in the capacity to communicate. Moreover, policy-makers, keen to hold 
on to the reins of power, often exhibited a remarkable ambivalence towards efforts to 
extend uncontrolled communication into rural areas (Bourgault, 1995).
Despite the flaws in the development communications approach, the recognition of 
fundamental changes in the global economy has seen a resurgence in the importance 
attached to communication by development organisations. Replacing radio and 
television, much has been written of the potential of information and communication 
technologies to support economic development (Hanna, 1991; Oshikoya and Hussain, 
1998). However, it is only with the spectacular growth of applications such as the 
Internet and the explosive diffusion of information and communication technologies 
that talk of the information society has gained credence. This prompted a change in 
development thinking that has led to many donor and multilateral lending organisations 
radically reshaping their policies to take into account the importance of information and 
communication technologies. Yet this realignment and reassessment of the role of 
technology in development raises some.important issues.
Firstly, the enthusiasm for the potential of the so-called information revolution seems to 
be predicated on a bout of historical amnesia. Development agencies68 appear to be in a 
state of denial as to the historical pattern of technological progress (Kudnani, 1998). 
With any true revolution, there is an initial period of chaos in which established 
relativities are distorted and it seems as if almost any wondrous possibility can take 
shape. As Jones puts it:
68 For the purpose of this chapter, donor agencies are defined as those organisations or programs that fund the 
conduct, support, or coordination of information and communication technology initiatives in developing 
countries. The analysis of the chapter does not extend to the non-governmental organisational sector, but 
rather focuses on those international non-indigenous agencies that provide the financial assistance to these 
organisations.
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...canny theatregoers never assume that the pleasure of an enjoyable first act 
will necessarily be sustained throughout the entire play. In the drama of human 
change...explosive developments can lead to dark countervailing reactions. 
Initial chaos gives way to a longer and more involved phase of struggle and 
consolidation in which ancient relativities are reformulated in fresh forms 
(Jones, 1999, p. 13).
Secondly, one must ask whether the enthusiasm amongst donors for spending on ICT 
development is diverting funds from more traditional forms of development assistance. 
The focus of the current debate centres on the utility value of the Internet and more 
specifically on prioritising needs. Therefore, legitimate concerns can be raised at the 
sudden rise in the number of organisations dedicated to spreading connectivity in 
developing countries. The worry is that coordination between these initiatives is poorly 
developed. While there may be consensus that an effective information infrastructure is 
essential for the economic survival of developing countries, donors have yet to agree a 
common strategy to support this development.
6.3 International initiatives in information and communication technologies
From as early as 1979 development agencies began to envisage the introduction of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) to strengthen national capacities 
for the collection and dissemination of information on development themes. 
Organisations such as Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) 
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) pioneered efforts 
to improve networking amongst African countries and those working in the 
development field (Adam, 1995; Mansell and Wehn, 1998). However, it was not until 
the early 1990s, with the advent of low cost electronic networking, and greater 
awareness of the Internet that development agencies began to focus on the widening 
gap between the information "haves" and "have-nots". To prevent what they perceived 
to be a growing "technology gap" between industrialised and developing countries, a 
significant number of development agencies took it upon themselves to put into action 
programmes designed to improve the information infrastructure in developing 
countries. As a result information and communication technologies are becoming an 
increasingly important component of development initiatives. For example, the World
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Bank’s lending in the Sub-Saharan Africa region for information technology projects 
has been increasing at a rate of 30 per cent per year since 1981, reaching US$570 
million in 1989 (Moussa and Schware, 1992). Specifically, the international 
development community responded in a variety of ways:
1. Setting up a specialised internal departments or institutes. Notable examples 
include InfoDev, the World Bank’s "information for development" department 
and the United Nations Information Technology for Development department.
2. Creating special initiatives and networks aimed at the transfer of advanced 
technology to developing countries. Such as IDRC’s ACACIA programme, and 
USAID’S Leland Initiative.
3. Strengthening the international component and outreach activities of advanced 
national research institutes in industrialised countries.
4. Supporting special advisory programs on the policy and management aspects of 
information and communication technologies.
Consequently there is now a loose coalition of development organisations who 
provide grants to a wide spectrum of organisations -  supporting efforts that use 
technology to improve education and health, reduce poverty and mitigate the 
exclusion of low-income countries and social groups from the benefits of 
information and expertise. Such projects cover a very wide array of activities and 
sectors, but they inevitably seem to involve the transfer of these technologies from 
Western to developing nations (Newsum 1994, Roche and Blaine, 1996).
According to the Bellanet Donors Database69, as of May 30 1999, there were some 437 
initiatives supporting the development of information and communication technologies 
in transitional and developing countries. Of these, 273 were devoted to the Sub-Saharan 
African region. According to one estimate, from 1996 -  1998, the various organisations 
covered by the Global Knowledge database contributed an estimated US$ 60 million in
69 The Global Knowledge donors’ database is itself a product of project funding from the Partnership for ICTs 
in Africa (PICTA). PICTA is composed of donors and executing agencies that have made a commitment to 
collaborating and sharing information on their African ICT strategies. One of the most important outputs of 
PICTA has been the creation of an online donors database, maintained by Bellanet, that allows authorised 
agencies to update their activities via the Internet, and also see who is doing what in each region. It is 
available at http://gkaims.globalknowledge.org.
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*70grant funds to the support of international ICT initiatives in developing countries. 
Institutions providing support for the introduction or enhancement of ICTs in Sub- 
Saharan Africa can be categorised as follows:
• The Bretton Woods Institutions: for example, the UN system of agencies, and 
the World Bank: Information for Development (InfoDev) department.
• Bilateral Donors: for example, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and Canada’s International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC).
• Private Foundations: for example, the Global Education Network for Africa 
(GENA).
6.4 Project areas
From a textual analysis71 of all the projects it is possible to fit the majority of ICT 
projects into one of three overarching areas: capacity building, employment of 
information and communications technologies and advisory activities. The sample 
reveals that whilst some 221 projects were devoted to capacity building and the 
employment of information and communication technologies, only a fifth of these 
projects were devoted to advising governments and aiding them in the design of their 
national information infrastructure. This neglect of the advisory aspect of information 
infrastructure development is partly a reflection of the lack of research into the 
developmental impact of these technologies. Table 11 overleaf categorises the ICT- 
related projects listed on the Bellanet donors’ database by project type. The table shows 
that the majority of projects fall within the capacity-building sector, with development 
agencies contributing to the development of telecommunications and networking within 
the region.
70 Estimate from the GKD database available at http://gkaims.globalknowledge.org. Accessed June 1999.
71 Abstracts from all projects based in and around Sub-Saharan Africa were analysed using the NUD*IST 
qualitative analysis software, which allows the identification of common themes in texts.
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Table 11: ICT-Related projects by Category
Project category No. of Projects 
May 1996 -  May 1999
Capacity Building:
• Internet connectivity and Networking 93
• Telecommunications 23
• Telecentres 30
Total 146
Employment of ICTs:
• Education 30
• Supporting women’s development 9
• Health 9
• Environment and resource management 11
• Private sector development 16
• Rural development
Total 75
Advisory
• National Information infrastructure design and policy 3
reform
• Telecommunications reform 49
Grand Total 273
Source: Global knowledge database, available at http://gkaims.globalknowledge.org
6.5 Major African initiatives
(a) The United Nations System
The United Nations System of agencies remains the most active of the multilateral 
agencies in the field of ICT development in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a reflection of the 
fact that Africa is a major priority for the United Nations system as a whole, there is 
now the New Agenda for Development in Africa as well as the System -Wide Initiative 
on Africa. ICTs are one of the major components of these efforts, now named the 
HITD/SiA, which is supported by the various UN partners and executed by UN 
Economic Commission for Africa and UNDP. These two agencies are the most prolific 
of development agencies in the ICT support field.
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UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
African Information Society Initiative (AISI)
The ECA has been at the vanguard of attempts to improve the capacity of Sub-Saharan 
Africa to overcome the information and technological gap. A landmark event, the 
Conference of African Ministers, drafted a resolution on 3 May 1995, entitled 
"Building Africa’s Information Highway" and resolution (XXXI) entitled 
"Implementation of the African information and communications infrastructure". From 
these resolutions came the African Information Society Initiative (AISI). The AISI is 
designed as a framework to mobilise governmental support and strengthen 
collaborative efforts within Africa to create information and communication networks 
for planning and decision-making.
United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP)
The United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) is one of the largest single 
source of grant funds for development projects. Its many initiatives include:
• The Sustainable Development Networking Programme (SDNP), a US$12 million 
project which focuses on increasing electronic networking. In Africa, there are 
operational or formative nodes in Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Malawi, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Chad, Togo, and Tunisia.
• The Internet Initiative for Africa (IIA), the UNDP Africa Bureau’s programme to 
reinforce national Internet development in 12 countries through two to three-year 
project partnerships between government, UNDP, the national PTO and the private 
sector.
Other significant initiatives include UNESCO’s Regional Informatics Network for 
Africa (RINAF) project, the United Nations University (UNU) Africa Network 
which provides research input and UNCTAD’s Tradepoint initiative.
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(b) International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
The Canadian government’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has 
taken a pioneering role in promoting the use of information and communications 
technologies in developing countries since the late 1970’s. The innovative stance of 
IDRC has been supported by a solid program of technical assistance in the form of 
grants to developing country institutions for studies in the use of ICTs. One of the 
significant projects of its Africa-focused initiatives is the Acacia Programme. A major 
IDRC initiative for Sub-Saharan Africa which is expected to invest CAN$60m over the 
period 1998-2002 researching the use of ICTs in communities in Africa. South Africa, 
Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda have been identified as the initial priority countries 
and a number of major projects have been launched, such as:
• Telecentre development: South Africa, Mozambique, Senegal, Uganda.
• SchoolsNet: South Africa and Mozambique.
• Support for developing National ICT strategies: Mozambique and Senegal.
(c) The World Bank
The World Bank, too, has fully committed itself to supporting the development of 
information infrastructure in developing countries. Most notably through its creation of 
an information for development department -  InfoDev -  that continues to be an 
important source for funding. Key InfoDev initiatives include:
• The African Virtual University (AVU), a $1.2m project using satellite technology to 
deliver distance education with telephone callback for voice intervention from the 
pupils from 25 sites. Internet and video-based lectures courses are envisaged to 
provide freestanding education to those involved. A digital library program to make 
scientific information available to African students and faculty was developed and 
negotiations with content providers have provided access to 1700 journals using a 
customised library interface gateway.
Conceptually the World Bank has also realigned itself as a "Knowledge Bank", which 
was reflected in the Bank's "Knowledge for Development Report" (World Bank, 1998).
221
Other initiatives of import include:
• WorldLinks for Development (WorLD), providing support for linking 1200 public 
schools in developing countries to the Internet.
• Regional Environmental Monitoring Programme (REIMP). A programme to 
support environmental information management in Central Africa (Cameroon, 
Gabon, Zaire, Congo, Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea).
The Bank also continues to be a critical source of finance provision for ICT-related 
projects. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s financing arm, 
was lending to forty connectivity projects in 25 African countries (InfoDev, 1998). In 
1999, most of those projects included some form of privatisation of public companies 
and a wide range of telecom technologies, fixed phone, payphone and cellular.
(d) International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
Given the paucity of the telecommunications network in Sub-Saharan Africa the ITU 
has recently resolved to allocate more funds to alleviating this problem. It is 
implementing a significant number of projects including:
• Centres of Excellence for Human Resource Development. Designed to develop the 
telecommunications marketplace in Africa by training policy-makers and regulators 
in the development of national priorities and regulations.
• Afritel, which is designed to provide seed money to attract other funding partners, in 
order to strengthen the capabilities of national telecommunications operators to 
develop and better manage, operate and maintain the African telecommunications 
networks.
• Industrialisation Africa, an initiative aimed at promoting know-how in the creation 
and operation of manufacturing at national, sub-regional and regional levels.
• Application of new technologies. A series of pilot projects to establish the feasibility 
of using new technologies and new organisational methods to deliver information 
and telecommunications services.
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(e) La Francophonie (ACCT) and other Francophone Agencies
Known collectively as La Francophonie, the Ministere de La Cooperation Frangais, the 
Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the provincial government of Quebec play a 
key role in supporting the development of information infrastructure in Africa. The 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and more recently the Swiss 
Government are the principal funders of the activities of Agence de la Francophonie 
(ACCT). This role has been almost exclusively confined to French-speaking countries 
and is an attempt to ensure the maintenance of a significant French language presence 
on the Internet. Major initiatives to support ICT development in Francophone countries 
have been channelled through the following organisations:
• Institut frangais de recherche scientifique pour le developpement en cooperation 
(ORSTOM).
• Association des universites partiellement ou entierement de langue frangaise.
• Agence francophone pour l'enseignement superieur et la recherche (AUPELF).
• Le reseau electronique francophone (REFER).
• Le conference des ministres de l'education des pays ayant en commun l'usage du 
frangais (CONFEMEN).
• Le Centre international pour le developpement de l'inforoute en frangais (CIDIF).
These agencies are providing a great deal of support for ICTs in African Francophone 
countries. According to one estimate, approximately US$16 million has been made 
available for ACCT's ICT related programmes in 1997/98 (Jensen, 1999).
(f) The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Like many countries with bilateral aid agencies, the US has not been slow in creating a 
programmes of initiatives in the support of ICT diffusion in Africa. The most 
publicised of these is the Leland Initiative, a project to provide about US$500,000 per 
country to assist with developing Internet connectivity in 20 African countries. 
Assistance has initially been directed toward national telecom operators and has been in 
the form of equipment, expertise, training and free circuits for the first year. Support is
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contingent on agreements to liberalise the market to third-party Internet service 
providers and to adopt policies that allow for the unrestricted flow of information.
Other significant USAID initiatives include:
• AfricaLink, which provides support for dial-up Internet or e-mail connections and 
modems for specific African researchers, mainly in the agricultural field.
• GLOBE initiative, designed to electronically link US high schools with secondary 
schools in developing countries for environmental monitoring projects.
• Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI): support for institutions in the countries of 
the Horn of Africa concerned with food security planning, including the Ministries 
of Agriculture and Foreign Affairs, to connect to the Internet.
The preceding sections show that an impressive range of activities have been 
generated by development organisations in support of information infrastructure 
development in Africa. Yet, whilst development organisations continue to play a 
key role, little academic analysis has been conducted of the efficacy of these efforts. 
This section represents a preliminary examination of the dichotomy between the 
promise and problems of ICTs in development assistance projects. Firstly, a textual 
analysis of a sample of projects listed on the Partnership for ICTs in Africa 
(PICTA) database is conducted in order to convey a generalised understanding of 
the issues that affect these projects. Secondly, an in-depth case study of the UNDP’s 
Internet Initiative for Africa is presented that allows a more specific illustration of 
the issues raised earlier.
6.6 An evaluation of development assistance in support of ICT development
Evaluation can be defined as process in which, at a certain point in time, the outcome of 
a defined input in to a system is systematically assessed and analysed (Rebian, 1996). 
Whilst the result of a project or its outcome can be assessed in a variety of ways, the 
underlying assumption is that assessments are based on defining causality and impact. 
Various organisations have taken it upon themselves to standardise evaluation 
techniques. For example, the OECD defines evaluation as an ’examination as
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systematic and objective as possible of an ongoing or completed project or programme, 
its design, implementation and results, with the aim of determining its efficiency, 
effectiveness, impact, sustainability and the relevance of its objectives’ (OECD, 1998). 
Evaluation of the effectiveness of these projects involves an assessment of the extent to 
which the resources and methods deployed have succeeded in achieving the agreed 
objectives set out in the project document.
One of the major difficulties in evaluating the impact of an ICT project is the problem 
of measurement. Hudson (1997) has pointed out the inherent difficulties in assigning a 
measure to the indirect benefits arising from improving, for example, a community’s 
capacity to communicate. The indirect benefits of investment in ICTs are generally 
short-term and more tangible than other investments. They may include increases in 
output, productivity or exports. However, though these approximations as to the value 
added by these technologies remain uncertain, they still represent an important 
yardstick forjudging the relative merits of projects. The logical conclusion arising from 
this discussion is the importance of project evaluation. Such evaluations, both pre and 
ex post can be invaluable in assessing the constraints and issues in project 
implementation and providing a yardstick of the benefits that should arise. In the 
absence of a conceptual framework for dealing with ICT evaluation strategies it is hard 
to link project outputs, results and impacts to the role played by technology. Evaluation 
tends to treat ICT as a technology and factor input in the project’s pursuit of its mission. 
Yet the pursuit of evidence about the role of ICT, either implicit in questions asked or 
singled out as a direct question, is seldom adequate (Lanfranco, 1997).
In reality an explicit conceptual framework is important when evaluating 
developmental factors or evaluating the project’s capacity building in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. The majority of evaluation mechanisms are 
constructed around a results-based approach and single out project management and 
operational factors for evaluation. In practice an effective evaluatory mechanism must 
pay more that lip service to the project at hand and is vital to correctly framing the 
correct investigative techniques; aiding in the effective collection of appropriate 
empirical evidence. This will help to draw out transferable lessons learned, for use 
within the ongoing project but also for other projects.
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The history of development assistance in Africa has generated a wealth of literature and 
apocrypha on the problems of implementing aid projects that have at their core 
information and communication technologies (Kirkpatrick, 1991; Crewe, 1998). 
Despite these problems, external funding for the development of information 
infrastructure on the continent remains a key resource for Sub-Saharan African 
countries. In an attempt to examine the efficiency of their initiatives, project evaluation 
has typically been based on cost-benefit methodologies (Palmedo, 1989). Yet, such an 
approach fails to capture the true impact of these technologies in development projects. 
Development agencies are also guilty of seeing information and communication 
technology as deus ex machina, stressing a technical solution to existing development 
problems as opposed to seeing information and communication technologies as a tool 
for supporting existing activities (Dow, 1989).
Much has been written on the appropriateness of information and communication 
technologies in development projects (Cyranek and Bhatnagar and Bj0m-Andersen, 
1992 and Woherem, 1993). Yet little in-depth research has been conducted by the 
academic community on evaluating ICT-related development assistance projects. Those 
evaluation frameworks that are in existence have been designed by the implementers of 
projects themselves. Such systemic bias has meant that evaluation of these projects is 
often superficial at best. A review of evaluatory approaches within information and 
communication technologies application reveals a serious lack of rigorous testing and 
methodology (Lanfranco, 1997). Despite the absence of effective evaluatory 
mechanisms, the number of projects with information systems as their main concern 
continues to spiral. According to the Bellanet donors' database there were some 57 
current or planned activities as of April 1996 supporting the development of ICTs in 
Africa. However, by December 1998 the figure had risen by over 500 per cent to over 
300 current or planned activities.
The fact that a significant proportion of project descriptions still focus on broad policy 
frameworks is a reflection of their infancy. More importantly, though, it points to the 
reality that the type of positive rhetoric often present in project descriptions is as yet 
largely untested. It is thus premature to suggest either that their rhetoric is unjustified, 
or that they have some legitimate foundation. However, there are legitimate concerns
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over their potential impact (Lanfranco, 1997). These concerns stem from three major 
problematics in donor assistance to developing countries. These are:
1. Issues deriving from project design and conceptualisation.
2. Issues deriving from the nature of information and communication technologies.
3. Issues deriving from the nature of the African context.
6.6.1 Issues deriving from project design and conceptualisation
(a) Poor project conceptualisation
As Bell (1998) points out information and communication technologies and 
development projects have not been easy companions. The approach taken by the vast 
majority of development agencies has been to jump on the technology bandwagon with 
inadequate thought as to improving the impact of the projects that they purport to 
implement. There appears to be little conceptual thought behind the introduction of 
information and communication technologies as a developmental aid. A textual 
analysis of the project abstracts of 273 of such projects that were completed or current 
between 1 January 1996 and 31 May 1999, reveals a startling homogeneity in the stated 
justifications and rationales behind these projects. The vast sums of money that are 
being spent on increasing the use of information and communication technologies are 
justified by vague and nebulous statements about technological potentialities and 
"leapfrogging". For example, the United Nations Development Programme’s Internet 
Initiative for Africa has, as one of its avowed goals ’fostering a new generation of men 
and women in Africa who use information and communications technologies to 
leverage the development of their nations’.72 These projects are seemingly imbued with 
the spirit of the "Field of Dreams"73 metaphor, which simply states rif you build it they 
will come’. Consequently, information infrastructure is often being thrown up with little 
regard for issues such as equity and access.
72UNDP (1997) RBA Internet Initiative for Africa Project Document, p. 4.
73Based on the film "Field of Dreams" which concerns the plight of an impoverished farmer who is visited by 
the ghosts of legendary baseball players and encouraged, with the words "if you build it they will come", to 
transform his remote farm into a baseball pitch. Despite the absurdity of building a pitch in such a remote 
area with no apparent demand, on its completion, people come from miles around to visit it.
227
(b) Over-ambitious objectives
It is also clear that many projects have set unrealistically ambitious objectives. Such 
ambitious projects are thrown into sharper focus when one examines their financial 
provision for achieving stated objectives. Their budgets often simply do not contain 
sufficient money to ensure sustainability of initiatives. This is most clearly seen when 
one examines the amounts of money set aside for maintaining projects and for training 
those people who are expected to benefit (Dow, 1989, Baark and Heeks, 1998). Indeed, 
it can rightfully be claimed that the establishment of unrealistic objectives in some 
projects is a symptom of a lack of thorough implementation planning (Honadle, 1986). 
It is, however, clearly also a reflection of the enormity of the tasks at hand:
In setting project outputs, and the related roles of the project organisation, the 
temptation to do "a little bit of this, and a little bit of that” should be 
avoided...By contrast, project achievements were greatest where there had been 
a clear focus of staff and resources on a very small number of roles and outputs 
(Baark and Heeks, 1998, p. 15).
While stated project objectives such as "improving Internet connectivity" are 
intrinsically valid, and worthy of donor funding, there is often a discontinuity between 
the social validity of project objectives, and the narrow focus of project outputs. Baark 
and Heeks (1998) point out that outputs often appear to be overly technical, too heavily 
focused on processes within the recipient organisation, and too little focused on 
beneficiaries and the external social environment. Almost all development agency 
projects have identifiable human beneficiaries, yet too little is known about them at the 
planning stage. In the process of project appraisal or -  less favourably -  in the early 
days of project implementation, such beneficiaries need to be identified and surveyed. 
Armed with such information, it would be easier to create outputs that were oriented to 
the beneficiaries, and which were more in line with project objectives (Baark and 
Heeks, 1998).
A more serious concern of these projects is the rationale behind them. For example, a 
significant proportion of ICT-related initiatives are attempting to connect developing 
country schools to the Internet as a way of improving educational delivery. However,
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the Internet remains a truly unpredictable environment. Whilst there are hundreds of 
thousands of educational and learning sites, there are probably even more sites with all 
manner of attractions, distractions and temptations for students -  all within a few key 
presses or mouse clicks. Because of the Internet's increasingly advertising-driven 
culture, these sites are in fact easier to find than the educational ones. Used carefully, 
the Internet can be helpful for doing a number of things, but it is currently a poor 
environment for education and learning because it can destroy the carefully designed 
school learning process (Hazemi, et al., 1998).
Nor are development agencies devoting adequate human resources to what, by their 
own admission, is a critical area development assistance. The fourfold increase in ICT- 
focused development assistance has not been matched by a concomitant rise in human 
resources. Given the pressures -  often political -  to spread aid money to as many 
different projects in as many different sectors and regions as possible, and given the 
pressure to reduce administrative costs development agencies have begun to suffer 
from the "more is less" phenomenon (Baark and Heeks, 1998). Namely, that as the 
number of projects rises they are handled less and less efficiently, resulting in 
diminishing returns for more effort.
(c) Underutilisation of local expertise
Neither have many of these projects sought or taken on board the views of local 
experts. Chambers (1997) has emphasised the fallacy of the "expert" consultant and has 
criticised the traditional development project as being essentially non-participatory and 
working from the "expert's" perspective rather than that of local stakeholders. He 
concludes that expert opinion, grounded in local need and undertaken with local 
consent and participation, has a greater likelihood of success and sustainability than 
approaches that are characterised as remote, aloof, and technology-driven (Chambers,
1997). Chambers goes on to argue that many projects in this region are founded on a 
tabula rasa framework in which the culture of taking stock of existing knowledge, 
skills, experiences and information as an input to planning and project management 
remains rare. Coupled with this is the lack of local ownership of development projects. 
ICTs are most effectively leveraged when the projects designed to benefit communities 
are initiated and driven by people from those communities (Crewe, 1998). Visions for
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social development created by international or national agencies simply cannot 
replicate the energy and understanding of people whose future is inextricably linked to 
the success of these initiatives.
(d) Lack of coordination
Despite efforts to improve coordination there is still a widespread acknowledgement 
that the majority of development activities in these areas are insufficiently coordinated 
with each other. As Jensen (1996) points out:
Multiple foreign consultants with similar expertise are sent to the same country, 
different types of equipment are provided for the same tasks and parallel 
communication links are established (Jensen, 1996, p. 24).
Given this reality the key, then, is for improved coordination and more appropriate 
planning by those development agencies. Carlos Braga, the Director of the World 
Bank’s InfoDev programme acknowledges that ’there is much greater scope for 
coordination’ (InfoDev, 1998, p. 34). Since 1997, efforts have been made to increase 
the utilisation of information networking among donors and NGOs themselves, 
especially through electronic Internet networks such as Bellanet, which offers support 
for incorporating ICT-enabled electronic workspaces into the development 
community’s institutional structures and programme activities. As shown in Table 12 
overleaf, the effects of a lack of coordination are already manifesting themselves in a 
bewildering array of network protocols that have led to little interoperability between 
networking projects. It would appear that, so far, the African computer network 
infrastructure has been installed mainly taking into account the strategies, and perhaps 
even interests, of aid providers (Adam, 1995). The proliferation of incompatible 
network protocols reflects the evolutionary nature of electronic networking and the lack 
of internally generated capacity to identify appropriate network design (Cyamukungu, 
1996; Mansell and Wehn, 1998).
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Table 12: Electronic networks in Africa74
Types of Network
Country FIDO Hnet UUCP Co.IP Comm.IP
Algeria X X X
Angola X
Botswana X X X X
Burkina Faso X
Cameroon X X X
Central African Rep. X
Chad X X
Congo X X
Cote d'Ivoire X X
Egypt X X
Eritrea X X X
Ethiopia X X X
Gambia X X
Ghana X X X
Guinea X
Kenya X X X
Lesotho X X X
Madagascar X X
Malawi X X
Mali X X X
Mauritius X X
Mozambique X X X X
Namibia X X
Niger X
Nigeria X X
Senegal X X X
Seychelles X
Sudan X
Swaziland X X
Tanzania X X X
Togo X
Uganda X X X
Zambia X X X
Zimbabwe X X X
Source: Adam (1995)
(e) Aid conditionality
In the case of donor-supported ICT development, there is explicit evidence of aid 
conditionality obfuscating the effectiveness of donor assistance. Collier et al. (1997) 
argue that the use of conditionality to induce reform has led to rather disappointing 
results. However, increasingly development agencies are redesigning the aid contract 
toward a shorter period and more detailed conditions. For example, the criteria for
74 These acronyms, FIDO, Hnet, UUCP, CO.IP and Comm.IP are methods of transferring data over networks.
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receiving assistance under the USAID’s Leland Initiative is an agreement to liberalise 
the telecommunications market to third-party Internet service providers and to adopt 
policies which allow for the unrestricted flow of information.
The prevailing form of information and communication technology transfer continues 
to be grants, donations, and closed packages, with multinationals supplying and 
installing equipment that their home countries have paid for75. In addition technology 
transfer agents, such as multinational corporations, often manage the operations or 
training of local technicians and engineers (Kluzer, 1993). This has resulted in 
developing countries importing closed technologies, limiting the opportunity for 
effective technology transfer, and maintaining technological dependency (Sonaike, 
1989; Odedra, 1990b). Such aid conditionality undermines efforts to ensure an even 
and equitable development of information infrastructure on the continent. For example, 
Ethiopia was originally chosen as one of the countries to benefit from the Leland 
Initiative: however, a refusal to fully deregulate its telecommunications sector led to 
USAID’s removal of support. This "inducement" function of aid conditionality 
continues to be intrusive and damaging to the overall effectiveness of project-based 
assistance.
(f) Poor project planning
Some ICT projects have also exhibited the classic signs of poor project planning. Zetter 
and Hamza (1997), in a study of three cases of development projects in Egypt, found 
limitations arising in the following areas: project formulation; the desire for short-term 
project visibility and the lack of adequate conceptualisation of models of participation. 
Others argue that ICT- centric projects have little in-built sustainability, as planners fail 
to incorporate the future-proofing essential to ensure that the technology chosen will
75 In 1977, the Ghanaian government decided to install an earth satellite station, which was designed to 
improve the telecommunications landscape. Spar Aerospace, of Canada, won the contract and supplied an 
international telephone switch that was obsolete, poorly designed and incompatible with the specifications of 
the station. In addition, the TV transmission chain they developed soon became defective after the station 
was commissioned in 1981. The company also failed to supply the automatic tracking system required to 
readjust the dish were it to go out of focus with the satellite. As a result Ghanaian technicians have to focus 
the dish manually by climbing up its mast (Rogers-Akpatah, 1986).
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still meet project needs in the medium term. Allied to the paucity of effective project 
planning has been the failure to address the issue of local content. The "Field of 
Dreams" approach to these projects has concentrated on building the infrastructure first 
without questioning the implicit value of the information provided by these networks. 
The absence of the development of local content has meant that, more often than not, 
Internet users in Africa are unable to fully leverage the networks at their disposal 
(Adam, 1996).
Allied to this short-termism is a distinct lack of research into the more fundamental 
issues raised by these technologies, such as equality of access. An analysis of the 
sample of projects within the PICTA database reveals a preponderance of top-down 
initiatives that focus on improving, for example, Internet connectivity in urban centres. 
Inevitably this neglects rural dwellers who represent the vast majority of Sub-Saharan 
African populations, thus exacerbating inequality. Moreover, despite long lists of target 
beneficiaries, those most likely to benefit from an Internet service are the donor 
community themselves and relatively wealthy urban dwellers (Mansell and Wehn,
1998). There is also a lack of initiatives devoted to the more fundamental problems of 
building indigenous capabilities in these technologies. Without a greater emphasis on 
this aspect, Sub-Saharan African countries face being tied into even greater 
technological dependencies.
(g) Provision of Finance
A key reason contributing to the above problem is the fact that the vast majority of 
projects in this area rely on "soft" money -  money from funding agencies or earmarked 
finances -  for their funding. Thus, models of financial sustainability do not emerge, 
rendering the medium -  to long-term future of projects very fragile. These financial 
models must change if projects seeking to harness the capacity of ICTs to accelerate 
social development are to make a meaningful impact. Moreover, in the lending 
programs of multilateral institutions, the information and communications sectors are 
yet to receive the priority they deserve. It is estimated that in the period 1990 -  1997,
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multilateral spending on ICT development in developing countries constituted less than 
one per cent of their total lending for development assistance worldwide.76
(h) Lack of effective evaluation mechanisms
Development agencies have increasingly seen the evaluation of their projects as an 
essential mechanism for assessing the efficacy of design and implementation, and an 
attempt to avoid repeating past mistakes (Dow, 1989). However, the evaluation 
mechanisms built into these projects tends to take a rationalistic cost-benefit approach 
(Lanfranco, 1997 and Hecht, 1989). This evaluatory bias approach fails to capture more 
subjective factors that are critical to understanding how and why projects fail or 
succeed. For example, projects designed to increase Internet connectivity have 
traditionally been adjudged successes or failures based on the number of users added or 
quality of service improvements. These empirical results fail to record more meaningful 
data such as the patterns of usage and the utility value of information gleaned. Even if 
more accurate evaluation mechanisms are introduced there will always be the problem 
of "moral hazard".
Evaluation, by definition, will tend to expose shortcomings in the rational and objective 
purposes of such projects when, in fact, the projects often serve other, more subjective 
purposes. Namely the political capital for the agency that ensues from investments in 
recipient countries. Clements (1999) presents evidence of informational standards and 
development impacts from four US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and four World Bank projects in Africa. He found significant positive bias in project 
document arguments and that promotional and analytical purposes are often in conflict. 
Further, that weak informational standards undermine incentives to manage for impact, 
and reduce the prospects for bureaucratic learning. Finally, effective, thorough 
evaluation of many projects is relatively rare because recipient managers have a strong 
preference for funds to be spent on tangible goods rather than evaluation.
76UNDP (1997) RBA Internet Initiative for Africa Project Document.
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(i) Crowding out
There is also a legitimate fear that the scramble of development agencies to improve the 
information infrastructure in developing countries has in fact stifled indigenous efforts. 
This crowding out, while on a small scale, is the result of the expectational nature of 
donor recipients. African governments have become accustomed to development aid, 
and this dependency reduces, to an extent, their desire to utilise scarce resources when 
development agencies are more than willing to plug the gap.
6.6.2 Issues deriving from the nature of ICTs
As Bell (1998) points out, information and communication technologies and 
development projects have not been easy companions. Others have commented on the 
appropriateness of projects with a significant information technology component to the 
development process (Cyranek, Bhatnagar and Bj0m-Andersen, 1992 and Woherem, 
1993). It would appear that there are unique problems raised by the utilisation of ICTs 
in development projects (Montealegre, 1999). Firstly, there is a very real danger that 
the technology becomes an end in itself. In other words, the threat that the information 
system is mistakenly shifted from an enabling to a core function. Such approaches are 
technologically deterministic and represent aloof, technology-driven fixes which 
neglect to bear in mind that the most important facet of these technologies is the 
information they purport to give access to. Secondly, there is the issue, touched upon 
above, of obsolescence. This can be a particular problem for aid-funded technology 
transfer projects because there can be significant time delays between decision-making 
and installation (Dow, 1989). Allied to this is the widespread problem of 
incompatibility and lack of flexibility, making it sometimes problematic to upgrade and 
expand information systems with new hardware or software components. Together 
these factors often lead to a situation where users who have purchased advanced 
computer systems feel after a few years that they need to purchase completely new 
computer systems or abandon the previously installed system (Woherem, 1995).
Finally there are also the difficulties inherent in information technology project 
management. There must be an explicit acknowledgement that ICT-centric projects 
may be more difficult to implement due to the inherent problems associated with
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information systems implementations. Taylor (2000), in recent research on why IT 
projects fail in the UK, found for example, that out of 1207 projects sampled only 12.7 
per cent were deemed to have succeeded.77 Delving further he found that managers 
were asked at which stage failure could occur and the majority cited the project 
definition stage. He found that projects are often started when they are not clearly 
thought through or without measurable deliverables. He goes on to argue that 
requirements definition, change management and scope management are major causes 
of project failure. These particular problems must be borne in mind by development 
practitioners. Greater emphasis should be placed on effective project design in the 
initial phase and closer monitoring during execution.
(a) The technology transfer problem
Technology transfer has long been identified as a key issue within the development 
process, (Odedra, 1990a). It is a fallacy of the highest order to assume that countries 
can "leapfrog" technologies by buying these technologies "off the shelf'. Many of the 
most productive applications of ICTs require not just one process or piece of 
equipment, but also a host of capacities that are not present in the majority of African 
countries (Grant, 1996; Hanna and Boyson, 1990). For example, effective Internet 
usage requires users to have more than a familiarity with basic computing, not to 
mention a good understanding of the English language. All these are necessary before 
we even consider the technological requirement of access to a personal computer, the 
requisite software and a reliable and consistent phone connection to an Internet service 
provider. From a systems point of view there are significant problems associated with 
the choice of the individual components of a system (Palmedo, 1989). In a developing 
country the job of choosing components and integrating them is particularly difficult 
because of a lack of current information, a multinational cast of vendors, and a variety 
of sources of equipment and program financing. Odedra (1990a), for example, cites a 
case in Zambia in which computing equipment remained unused due to a lack of 
necessary systems development skills within the recipient organisation.
77 Success is defined as ’delivering to the sponsor everything specified to the quality agreed on and within the 
time and costs laid out at the start’ (Taylor, 2000, p. 24)
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It was appropriate technology advocate E.F. Schumacher, author of the widely 
acclaimed book Small is Beautiful (1993), who once said that technologies often carry a 
built-in ideology which is so deeply embedded that one cannot have a technological 
transplant without getting, at the same time, an ideological transplant. ICTs embody 
within themselves a host of ideological assumptions that are based upon the market for 
which they were originally intended. Thus the problem of technology transfer is 
compounded by a lack of neutrality. These technologies embody a host of biases that 
have yet to be tackled. The first and most obvious problem is that of language. Almost 
80 per cent of the world’s software is produced for the English-speaking market, but 
English is only the official language of five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Software 
is becoming an increasingly important component of the total information system. This 
means that there is a need for systems integration bringing together the computer 
hardware with suitable applications software.
Sussman and Lent (1991) argue that the majority of the expenditure for information 
infrastructure development is earmarked for high-technology imports. These 
technologies tend to leave little scope for local labour or expertise development. They 
assert that invariably these investments will ’ultimately end up as huge subsidies to 
leading industrial capitalist equipment manufacturers and consultants’ (Sussman and 
Lent, 1991, p. 139).78 In an in-depth examination of the World Bank’s operations in the 
Philippines, they found that the advice espoused by the World Bank led to ’an increased 
dependence of scarce Filipino capital upon advanced imported technology...[which] 
contributed significantly to the country’s US$28 billion foreign indebtedness' (Sussman 
and Lent, 1991, pp. 125-149). Development projects, it can be argued, focus on areas 
that offer the quickest returns, and have made the location of communications 
infrastructure a matter of the ability to pay. Projects designers also appear to favour 
multinational corporations and their local partners over national capital formation. 
Sussman and Lent also assert that 'all digital telecommunications infrastructure of this 
sort...serves to help restructure the economy, supporting the absorption of Philippine 
human and material resources into subsidiary, largely marginal, "trickle-down" 
relationships in an emerging new international division of capital and labour' (Sussman 
and Lent, 1991, p. 138).
78 See Payer’s (1982) landmark study of World Bank project lending in the energy sector.
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Simply purchasing hardware is seldom an appropriate solution. On the other hand, 
software engineering tools and methodologies are becoming essential to ensure that the 
programs and systems created are of high quality and are effective in meeting the needs 
of the users. Furthermore, manufacturers of ICTs in the industrialised countries often 
incorporate particular social and cultural assumptions that may not apply in developing 
countries. Lind (1991), for example, blames the failure of some information systems 
introduced into Egypt on their Western assumptions of a business environment in 
which formal information was valued, the supply of goods relatively certain, and 
legislative stability the norm. Manufacturers also assume the existence of a reliable and 
abundant supply of electricity, which again is not the case in the majority of African 
countries. Climatic factors vary widely, and air-conditioned environments are often 
necessary to protect against extremes of temperature and high humidity levels (Byass, 
1989). Consequently installation costs may be considerably more expensive than the 
purchasing costs alone.
6.6.3 Issues deriving from the nature of the African context
(a) Political considerations
One of the fundamental premises of the transition to a knowledge-based economy is 
that timely, relevant and accurate information represents a new form of competitive 
advantage (Drucker, 1970; Freeman, 1987); that access to this information is power. 
However, in government bureaucracies power traditionally arises from withholding 
information (Peterson, 1994). Proponents of the merits of information and 
communication technologies argue that an effective information infrastructure is 
predicated on the decentralisation of power and the creation of a new social structure in 
which decisions are decentralised and made by an array of actors. However, such a 
decentralisation implicitly undermines the traditional balance of power. The advent of 
technological systems such as the Internet, has led to the unprecedented sharing of 
relevant and timely information amongst precisely those communities African 
governments have tried to disinform.
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The speed with which information now navigates the globe has led to the ironic 
phenomenon of African expatriates often having a greater insight into affairs at home 
than the locals on the ground. Constant news feeds and the inability of governments to 
censor journalists who are only an e-mail away from filing reports with a potentially 
global audience, has led to growing suspicions in some quarters as to the value of the 
Internet. For example, there have been much publicised efforts by the Chinese and 
Singaporean governments to censor content on the Internet. Some African leaders have 
also expressed their discontent. Former President Sani Abacha of Nigeria, for example, 
stated in 1997 that his opinion of the value of the Internet had been undermined on 
using it for the first time. On entering "Nigeria" into a search engine, he was alarmed to 
see a page of results that depicted him as, amongst other things, a "barbaric dictator", a 
"military thug" and the "scourge of Nigeria".79
(b) Policy and regulatory framework
The effectiveness of projects have also been hampered to some extent by the realisation 
that complex and sometimes byzantine regulatory regimes in African countries have led 
to an over preponderance of the top-down approach to improving networking in the 
region. Despite some very public pronouncements, a significant number of 
governments are loath to deregulate those areas that involve control over the flow of 
information. Development agencies have on the whole been able to circumnavigate 
these restrictions if their initiatives are partnered with the government. However, grass 
roots initiatives, for example, are more likely to flounder in the wake of punitive import 
restrictions.
(c) Political risk
Another factor for consideration is the seemingly endemic political instability in the 
Sub-Saharan African region. Madon (1993) asserts that ’systems designers have 
assumed that development planning is a rational process and therefore ignored the fact 
that planning is heavily shaped by socio-political and cultural factors’ (Madon, 1993, p. 
126). Project designers must therefore gauge country risk factors prior to project
79 Reported in Punch, Lagos, 1 May 1998, p. 8.
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implementation. The instablity in the central African region led to, for example, the 
cancellation of the proposed UNDP Internet for Africa initiative in Zaire. Also the 
escalation of civil strife in Sierra Leone saw the suspension of Leland initiative 
activities at the end of 1998. Ironically it is often precisely those countries that 
periodically implode who are in need of the most development assistance. Angola, for 
example, has had to virtually reconstruct its information infrastructure from scratch in 
the wake of an internecine struggle that continues to smoulder menacingly.
(d) Information asymmetries
Having neither the necessary information nor financial resources to tackle this difficult 
problem effectively on their own, developing countries are somewhat dependent on 
exogenous help. As a result, they have been all too keen to allow development agencies 
to pursue their agendas without thoroughly analysing the impact of their projects (Dow, 
1989). In order to ensure that these projects offer sustainable methods of improving the 
information infrastructure policy-makers must subject proposals to far more rigorous 
examinations, based on long-term objectives rather than short-term needs.
(e) Infrastructural deficiencies
Evidently, the existing infrastructure in a target country plays a key role in determining 
the functionality and sustainability of an ICT-related project. As touched on above, 
much of the basic physical infrastructure that is taken for granted in developed 
countries is either non-existent or poor (Woherem, 1993; Bhatnagar and Bjom- 
Andersen, 1990). Public goods such as an effective transportation network and utilities 
such as electricity are severely lacking or unreliable and restrictive. These deficiencies 
lead to a list of additional project requirements such as air-conditioning, surge 
protectors and generators that adds significantly to the cost of implementation for 
development agencies. The lack of human resources is particularly acute in the 
information and communication technologies sector, thus donors invariably find that 
this takes a significant proportion of their project budget (Palmedo, 1989). Another 
serious constraint to the sustainability of these projects is the lack of indigenous ICT 
support services. Though the information technology market continues to exhibit signs 
of healthy growth in the region, initiative implementers often find it extremely difficult
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to source spare parts and servicing. This represents a serious constraint to the long-term 
sustainability of ICT projects.
6.7 The contribution of development agencies
Despite a seemingly interminable list of problems associated with development projects 
it is undeniable that development agencies continue to play a key role in the 
development of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. They have been 
especially valuable in the following areas:
• Agenda setting and consensus building.
• The utilisation of ICT applications in key development areas.
•  Capacity building.
(a) Agenda setting and consensus building
Through the hundreds of meetings on the continent involving policy-makers, 
development agencies have managed to sensitise policy-makers as to the importance of 
information infrastructure construction. Examples of such initiatives include the 
African Global Connectivity Conference, co-sponsored by InfoDev together with the 
World Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the ITU 
and the African Development Bank. This conference brought together industry, 
government and consumers in Addis Ababa in June 1998 to examine the options for 
connectivity in Africa. Discussions at a ministerial level, and with major 
telecommunications providers covered several options, including satellite technology 
and undersea cables. The momentum from this conference has resulted in planning and 
discussion at the national level in several African nations. Another significant output 
has been the Economic Toolkit and workshops for Internet connectivity in Africa 
(created by the World Bank’s InfoDev department), which provide insights on how to 
extend the reach of the Internet.
One of the areas in which the development agencies have achieved the most has been in 
the area of increasing public awareness. The effect of countless workshops, conferences
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and small-scale projects has been to favourably alter the perception of information and 
communication technologies (Hecht, 1989). However, the extent to which development 
agencies have succeeded in forging an information and communication technology 
agenda in Africa is difficult to gauge. Policy-makers continue to debate the issue, but 
there has been little sign of concrete strategies.
Policy reform is often a difficult and costly endeavour involving many partners, 
including government and highly specialised experts. Yet though this has been an 
avowed intent of many development agencies, few have the capacity or the resources to 
engage in major and complex policy reforms in the realm of ICTs. Nonetheless, 
development agencies continue to play an instrumental role in facilitating the reform 
process by improving both the quality and quantity of information available about the 
options and the consequences of policy issues, ensuring a more informed debate. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that organisations such as the World Bank and 
bilateral agencies such as USAID have been at the forefront of attempts to push the 
deregulation of the ICT sector in Africa at all costs. An example of this has been the 
debate in international communications concerning the impending collapse in the 
method of charging for international telephone calls, a system known as the accounting 
rates regime; which has seen one of the key mechanisms of redistributing 
telecommunications wealth to developing countries come under attack.
Rather than proposing alternative mechanisms to support the growth of 
telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa, the major donor organisations have 
accepted the collapse of the accounting rate system as a fa it accompli. This illustrates 
that while development agencies have on the whole provided much needed awareness 
to policy-makers in the region on information and communication technology 
development, they have at the same time advanced an agenda that seems, at times, at 
odds with development objectives.
(b) The utilisation and employment of ICTs in developing countries
The application of ICTs in addressing development issues continues to be a primary 
focus of many development projects. Results from these projects have demonstrated
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that applications of ICT in such areas as education, health care and environmental 
issues can yield important economic and social benefits to developing countries. For 
example, the education system in developing countries faces a number of problems in 
which technology can theoretically help provide solutions (Cassiolato, 1997). With 
limited infrastructure and a large population of under-trained teachers, one of the most 
important areas is teacher training. However, despite the numerous projects devoted to 
the use of information and communication technologies to facilitate the delivery of 
education in Africa, it is too early to gauge their effectiveness. Projects such as the 
African Virtual University have set in motion mechanisms to facilitate information 
sharing, but without a greater generosity and commitment from educational content 
providers such projects will remain merely interesting educational experiments.
In the sphere of healthcare, development agencies have successfully shown the 
feasibility of applying cutting-edge technologies to solve traditional problems. The 
HealthNet project, for example, utilised low earth orbiting satellite technology to 
establish a network of satellite earth stations to establish a store-and-forward e-mail 
system for the dissemination of medical information. Such projects, while small-scale 
in orientation, nonetheless provide an important demonstration effect as to the efficacy 
of using such technologies. Moreover, they have improved the quality and reach of 
health care in selected African countries and laid the framework for improved 
collaboration.
(c) Capacity building
Perhaps the area in which development agencies have had the greatest impact has been 
in capacity building. They deserve credit for introducing electronic networking to the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region through such initiatives as the SDNP, CABECA and 
PADIS. They have also been instrumental in building indigenous human resource 
capacity in these technologies. But such praise must be qualified by the lack of 
coordination amongst agencies that has led to the implementation of a complex web of 
data networks whose only shared quality is their lack of interoperability (Adam, 1995). 
Moreover, there is really very little evidence that development agency initiatives have 
done anything other than improve their own and urban elites’ communications capacity 
in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Many of the major initiatives have succeeded in
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improving Internet connectivity in urban locations whilst neglecting the rural areas. 
Whilst latterly, more emphasis has been placed on smaller grass roots efforts in rural 
areas, these are typically pilot projects that are still exploring the most effective 
dissemination method for these technologies.80
In conclusion, the above section has explored a range of initiatives that attempt, in 
different ways, to harness ICTs to accelerate social development. In analysing the 
trends emerging from this, it becomes clear that the potential of ICTs remains largely 
unfulfilled. The sample survey above, of the 273 projects centred on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, reveals a surprisingly high level of duplication of effort. Many project leaders 
are unaware of similar initiatives in the same city, let alone in the same country 
(Jensen, 1996). From a technological standpoint many projects have different 
technological and implementation philosophies which have resulted in incompatible 
approaches. Furthermore, the lack of sufficient local participation in these projects has 
meant that issues such as equality of access are being displaced by narrower, technical 
concerns.
An overall assessment of the efforts of the main development agencies reveals a mixed 
picture. The United Nations’ attempts to improve the Sub-Saharan Africa information 
infrastructure would receive a satisfactory mark for effort but a somewhat lower score 
for achievement. Despite much pomp and circumstance, the United Nations system of 
agencies continues to ineffectually tackle the issue of Africa within a global 
information society. One only has to look at one of the UN’s most trumpeted initiatives, 
the Africa Information Society Initiative, for confirmation of this. According to a slim 
pamphlet81 -  the only public relations documentation produced on the initiative -  the 
AISI is designed to act at the national level, encouraging, and supporting governments 
in their endeavours to create national information infrastructures. In 1999, four years 
after its inauguration, it has yet to design a single information infrastructure. Rather,
80 According to the InfoDev 1998 annual report, during the period June 1995 -  June 1998, 41 per cent of its 
initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa were classified as pilot projects.
81 UNECA (1995), "An action framework to build Africa's information and communication infrastructure 
African information society initiative (AISI)", Addis Ababa: UNECA.
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like so many grand pan-African initiatives, it has become stuck in the rut of the 
conference circuit.
Nor have bilateral development agencies fared much better. The overt political and 
economic conditionality of USAID’s ICT-related initiatives brings into sharp relief the 
often hidden agenda of national development agencies (Hyun and Lent, 1999). Whilst 
on the one hand acting publicly out of enlightened altruism, they are all too often the 
modem equivalent of battering rams, breaking down regulatory barriers in developing 
countries and allowing their national cohorts to storm the ramparts. National 
development agencies often make it a condition of the extension of aid that their 
expatriate firms provide the necessary equipment and expertise. Evidently, this has a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of development efforts. The close ties of the 
French government to their former colonies and the decline of the French language 
globally has ensured continued support for "la Francophonie". But serious questions 
must be asked about the fact that France Cable and Radio, the French public 
telecommunications operator, has a stake of at least 30 per cent in the public 
telecommunications operator of over 70 per cent of former French colonies in Africa.
There is also little evidence that organisations such as ITU have Africa’s best interests 
at heart. The 1998 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference led to an amendment of the ITU 
Constitution to give greater rights and responsibilities to the ITU’s private sector 
members (Maclean, 1999), diluting the likelihood of a more ethical approach to 
telecommunications planning. Rather, developing countries are being urged to open 
their telecommunications sectors to the foreign private sector, without due 
consideration of the consequences. The ITU’s failure to defend the position of 
developing countries in the dispute over the accounting rate system does not bode well 
for an organisation that claims it is committed to improving telecommunications 
development in developing countries.
The above analysis has examined the literature and a sample of development agency 
ICT related projects to convey a generalised picture of the key issues. The following 
section takes this analysis further by conducting a case study of a UNDP funded and 
executed initiative to improve Internet connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The case 
study was designed to illustrate the issues, touched upon above, that arise in donor
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assistance for the support of information and communication technologies in Sub- 
Saharan Africa.
6.8 Case study: The Internet Initiative for Africa
The case study was designed to test some of the assumptions underpinning the use of 
ICTs in development assistance projects and to illustrate some of the issues raised 
above in the survey of 273 sample projects. Although the project is still ongoing and is 
not due to finish until June 2000, the compartmentalised nature of the 12 countries 
participating in the Internet Initiative for Africa means that it is possible to draw 
conclusions prior to the project running its full course.
6.8.1 Background
In 1996, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched an Internet 
Initiative for Africa (IIA), a three-year program designed to introduce and promote 
Internet access across Sub-Saharan Africa. The aim of the project is to establish or 
enhance direct national Internet access where such access does not exist or where it is 
limited. The project is based on the rationale that access to reliable and up-to-date 
information is a prerequisite for sound decision-making throughout the sustainable 
human development policy process, and the Internet is a medium that provides an 
efficient and reliable means of achieving this objective. The aim of the Internet 
Initiative for Africa is to establish Internet services, as well as enhancing the current 
services in 12 Sub-Saharan African countries, as a means of strengthening economic 
and social development. The project is designed to be collaborative, seeking to 
establish links with African governments, UNECA and the UNDP Country offices. It is 
estimated that African governments and UNDP country offices will provide 50 per cent 
of the cost of the installation, with the remainder being supplied by the UNDP Regional 
bureau for Africa (RBA). UNDP country offices are envisioned as acting as the fulcrum 
of activities, communicating with governments, NGOs, academics and the private 
sector on establishing Internet services, as well as being subscribers to the services 
themselves. The project is in line with the UNDP Strategy for sustainable human 
development, ECA’s Africa Information Society Initiative and the UN system-wide
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Special Initiative for Africa. However, the Initiative is not designed to be entirely 
altruistic in that there is an explicit acknowledgement that local UNDP country offices 
will be beneficiaries of each project:
The benefits of the regional project will not only pertain to the economics and 
social development of the selected countries, it will also provide benefits for the 
donors and the UNDP, providing reliable and cost-effective communication 
links between the Country Offices and with Headquarters (UNDP/RBA, 1997, 
p. 4).
6.8.2 Project overview
Two years after its launch in July 1997, the Internet Initiative for Africa (HA) has 
conducted eight Internet Assessment missions to the following countries: Burkina Faso, 
Chad, The Gambia, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria and Swaziland. All of these 
countries have signed cost-sharing memoranda of understanding (MOU) between the 
respective governments and UNDP. These agreements have listed a number of 
activities to develop Internet access and technical capacity in the respective countries. 
Each of the country initiatives of the US$12 million project is based on a cost-sharing 
mechanism whereby selected countries agree to contribute half the costs of the project. 
Each project is allocated approximately US$1 million, thus the participation from 
African countries is typically in the region US$500,000. Originally, 12 countries were 
picked: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Mauritania, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Swaziland, Togo, Zaire. The selection of these 
countries was based on a number of criteria:
• that they were not already receiving funds from other development agencies;
• there was a firm commitment from the government;
• there was a commitment from the country for allocation of 50 per cent of the activity 
cost for the next two to three years; and
• that there was evidence of a viable private sector that is capable of competing in an 
open and level playing field to become Internet service providers.
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6.8.3 Objectives
The project was designed to contribute to the strengthening of the information 
infrastructure of the selected countries by achieving the following objectives.82
• the creation and consolidation of a national information infrastructure that will be 
the coordinating vehicle for civil societies to join the information age;
• enhancing and building capacity in the use of information technologies and 
formulating a policy environment that ensures the free flow of information;
• increasing the level of employment in both the public and private sectors;
• building technical capacity in the information communications sectors, highlighting 
the Internet as a tool for sharing information, experiences and knowledge;
• assisting in the design and implementation of appropriate polices and actions in the 
pursuit of national goals and objectives;
• enhancing capacity for informed and participatory decision-making by stakeholders 
in the pursuit of sustainable development at all levels of society;
• increasing Sub-Saharan Africa’s capacity in the use of information and 
communications technologies to leverage the development of their nations;
• encouraging and facilitating the coordination and growth of national regional and 
international technological and institutional networks;
• encouraging the growth of regional networks utilising direct links between African 
countries; and
• fostering a new generation of men and women in Africa who use information and 
communications technologies to leverage the development of their nations.
If we assess these objectives in the light of the previous section it is clear that the 
project design failed to build in the requisite mechanisms for achieving the stated 
objectives. Section 6.6 highlighted that one of the typical flaws of ICT-related project 
design is the setting of over-ambitious objectives that are rarely achieved. For example, 
though one of the objectives of the Internet initiative project in Ethiopia was the 
encouragement of the free flow of information and the reduction of government
82 UNDP/RBA Internet Initiative for Africa Project Document, unpublished.
248
restrictions on access to information, there was no mechanism for achieving such an 
objective built in to the project. Rather, given the political sensitivities of the 
government to allowing free flowing information, no mention was made of this aspect 
during the course of interactions between the project coordinators and government 
representatives. Nor were there mechanisms for ’encouraging and facilitating the 
coordination and growth of national, regional and international technological and 
institutional networks’ (UNDP, 1998b, p. 6). Rather, it appears that the stated objectives 
of the project as a whole are vague and typified by generic statements that fail to 
convey a precise impression of the potential impact on participating countries.
Whilst the technological objectives appear straightforward, namely improving Internet 
connectivity in the selected regions, the wider implications of the Initiative are not 
elucidated. Again it appears that the rationale behind the UNDP’s Internet Initiative for 
Africa project is in the spirit of the flawed "Field of Dreams" approach highlighted in 
section 6.6.1 (a). This flawed approach to project design has led to an initiative that is 
technocentric and pays lip-service to important issues such as who will access and 
ultimately benefit from these improved Internet infrastructures.
6.8.4 The implementation process
In order to ensure the suitability of the countries selected, a preliminary feasibility 
report was prepared by regional consultants for each country. On the acceptance of the 
report by the steering committee the next stage in the implementation process was the 
organisation of a mission to each country in order to obtain a commitment of funds and 
a detailed operational plan, a memorandum of understanding, for the country 
concerned. This memorandum of understanding:
• lists the principles which will guide the project;
• clarifies the goals of the project;
• specifies the activities and obligations of each of the partners; and
• indicates a timetable for completion of the activities under this project.
Once a memorandum of understanding had been signed by the respective parties, the 
project coordinators, in concert with local partners, proceed with identifying the most
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suitable organisations capable of installing and implementing the technological aspects 
of the project. The bid process involves the submission of bids by companies, which 
are in turn reviewed with the government and local partners. The actual implementation 
of the Internet node is subcontracted to institutions that are deemed to have the required 
expertise. The training of the national public telecommunications operators and private 
sector members is also subcontracted to institutions with prior experience in the field.
6.8.5 The evaluation process
The performance criteria against which the project is to be measured is that Internet 
nodes will be available in the 12 chosen Sub-Saharan African countries and will be 
fully accessible by target beneficiaries. Other criteria include:
• commitments from the selected countries to a long-term strategy for maintaining 
Internet access points;
• the number of Internet service providers to have increased in the selected countries;
• the establishment of national partners and committees who will be responsible for 
formulating a strategy to broaden access to the Internet;
• an increased percentage of the population that has access and can comprehensively 
use the Internet; and
• establishing and enhancing Internet connectivity for universities, schools, and 
medical institutions, so that they can share information nationally regionally and 
globally.
The project was to be reviewed by a steering committee which was to meet twice a year 
in the first year and then once in the next two years, with a final evaluation meeting in 
the final year.
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6.9 The Internet Initiative for Africa: Ethiopia
6.9.1 Background
As of June 1998, Ethiopia’s Internet service was still run on a monopoly basis by the 
Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC). The Internet network is configured 
for both dial-up and leased line capabilities. Dial-up users are charged on average US$ 
25 for five hours of monthly connection. ETC has set leased line rates at $3000 for a 
64kbps bandwidth. Services provided include electronic mail, news, WWW and FTP 
services. ETC has received several applications for leased lines and has stated its 
intentions to offer dedicated internet access to organisations such as UNECA, Addis 
Ababa University (AAU), Ethiopian Airlines, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, NGOs 
and embassies based on their request. However, the current system is not quite ready 
for this service. As of July 1998, in addition to 1330 active Internet users, Ethionet had 
1020 registered potential users who could not be added to the network because of the 
technical problems mentioned earlier. As part of efforts to assess the feasibility of an 
Internet initiative for Ethiopia project, an end-user survey was conducted to assess the 
extent of Internet use. The survey found that in June 1998 there were only an estimated 
2000 users in Ethiopia. The service was only available in the capital, Addis Ababa and 
that there were widespread complaints over the reliability of the service. One 
interviewee said that on average he had to attempt to log on 30 times before 
succeeding. There were also complaints about the subscription costs and the lack of 
network bandwidth and support.
6.9.2 Project origins and guidelines
Though not one of the original 12 countries selected by the Regional Bureau for Africa, 
the political upheaval in the Congo region led to the substitution of Ethiopia for Zaire 
as a project beneficiary. Although Ethiopia already has an Internet gateway, UNDP 
assistance was requested in extending the Internet into eight rural towns and also in 
expanding the capacity of the existing gateway. The three-year project involves 
coordination of the public, private and other sectors (including academic institutions, 
research institutes and non-governmental organisations) to expand and enhance the 
existing national Internet network in Ethiopia.
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(a) Project objectives
The project will enhance the Ethiopian National Information Infrastructure and will 
specifically foster Internet access in the country. The specific components are as 
follows:
• Implementation of an Internet gateway in Ethiopia
The project is designed to strengthen the national Internet gateway to foster Internet 
access to universities, hospitals, businesses and rural communities in Ethiopia. The 
gateway will be managed by ETC in such a way as to ensure access to the Internet by 
all segments of Ethiopian society on a non-discriminatory basis and at a reasonable 
price. While the current gateway has a 256k bandwidth connection to the Sprint 
network, the project will add an additional gateway in Addis Ababa with 512kb of 
bandwidth to either the GlobalOne network or an alternative bandwidth provider.
• Establishment of telecentres
One major goal of this project is to help extend Internet access to the Ethiopian 
population beyond the capital, Addis Ababa. To help accomplish this, Internet nodes 
will be implemented in eight regions. An important component of the project is the 
establishment of telecentres in the same eight cities where the Internet nodes will be 
implemented as described above. The telecentres are seen as tools that will allow the 
average citizen to send and receive e-mails without having to own a computer.
• Training
Another major component of the project is capacity building. Training is a critical 
element of building capacity and ensuring sustainability of the project. A training 
centre, which already exists at the ETC, will be enhanced. The project will help provide 
instruction for various categories of Internet-related training.
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• Promotion of an enabling regulatory and policy environment
The project is designed to promote an enabling regulatory and policy environment for 
Internet use and growth within Ethiopia. Specific objectives include the following:
• to encourage universal access as appropriate through deployment of Internet 
infrastructure, particularly in the rural areas and in schools; and
• to encourage the adoption of a reasonable fee structure for access to the national 
network, including leased lines and dial-up services, for the purpose of accessing 
the Internet.
(b) Roles and responsibilities
UNDP Africa
The UNDP agreed to provide approximately half of the funding for the project, 
estimated at US $600,000 for the project. In addition the UNDP was to provide the 
necessary coordination and logistical support for the three-year duration of the project 
through its Ethiopian country office. The UNDP also agreed to subscribe to the service 
created by this project through its local country office. In addition the organisation was 
to assist in the bidding process for the project by identifying organisations to undertake 
the agreed upon activities.
Ethiopia Telecommunications Corporation
Under the project document ETC was to be the owner of the national Internet gateway 
and associated backbone facilities developed under this project. The government agreed 
to coordinate with the local UNDP Country office to provide their portion of the cost of 
the project in accordance with the agreed payment schedule. The government also 
stated that it would create an enabling policy environment to provide for the greatest 
access to the Internet. This was largely to be achieved by ETC providing synchronous 
digital hierarchy (SDH) lines in the major regional cities (Awassa, Dessie, Mekele, and 
Jima) to facilitate the planned Internet connectivity in these four regions.
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(c) Timetable for Implementation
First Year
• Enhancement of the national Internet gateway in Addis Ababa.
• Implementation of training program.
• Assessment of first year’s activities.
• Review of Internet access and usage (Internet culture).
• Review of training requirements and development of additional training programs. 
Second Year
• Upon completion of SDH lines, implementation of regional nodes and telecentres.
• Review and expansion of Internet access.
• Continuation of training programs.
• Further review of local content creation.
Third Year
• Wrap-up activities.
• Evaluation of project.
6.9.3 Methodology
A project team was sent on a mission to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1998, and was 
charged with the following major tasks:
• To assess the information technology and Internet connectivity environment in 
Ethiopia, including the technology, policy, economic conditions as well as the user 
needs.
• To discuss a strategy for implementation of the Internet project with government, 
businesses and various user communities and offer recommendations.
• To negotiate the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was to 
serve as a formal agreement between UNDP and the Government of Ethiopia.
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The group held one or several meetings with the following individuals and/or groups 
during the period 8 - 1 8  June 1998:
• The Minister of Economic Development & Cooperation.
• The General Manager, Ethiopia Telecommunications Corporation (ETC).
• Head of Ethio Internet Centre (ETC's Internet Centre).
• The Training School Manager.
• ETCs Senior Management.
• Members of the Chamber of Commerce.
• Officials of the Local UNDP office.
• Addis Ababa University Officials.
• Several NGOs.
• Senior staff of the University of Addis Ababa.
These meetings were designed to enable the project team to accomplish the following 
specific objectives:
• Produce a list of the technical, policy, staffing, training and tariff requirements for 
the Internet project.
• Design an Internet backbone based on the existing infrastructure.
• Produce a budget for the project.
• Make specific policy recommendations for creating an enabling environment for 
Internet provision in Ethiopia.
• Negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Ethiopian 
Government and UNDP.
As part of the assessment process of the Internet Initiative for Africa a series of fact 
finding meetings were held with the private sector, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and academia in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 8 - 1 9  June, 1998. These 
meetings focused on a range of issues arising from the provision of Internet services by 
the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC). Specifically, the discussions 
centred on the following issues:
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• Quality of Internet service provision.
• Training.
• Pricing.
• Support services.
The core recommendations derived from these meetings can be summarised as follows:
• greater gateway capacity to enhance internet connectivity and the provision of web 
pages;
• a subsidy for internet access and web page creation and hosting for non-profit 
making organisations;
• the creation of a committee to assist and establish dialogue with ETC on its Internet 
development plans;
• opening of Internet provision to the private sector; and
• the articulation of government policy on the development of information and
communications technology.
6.9.4 Status of the Internet Initiative for Africa: Ethiopia
A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the Ethiopian 
government and the UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Africa on August 10, 1998. This 
MoU coupled with the report was to be used as a basis to prepare the Request for 
Proposals (REP). The REP for the development of Internet gateway and rural 
communications was then sent to the government and cleared. In 1999 the contract 
was awarded to an Ethiopian firm based in Washington and will be implemented in 
2000.
6.10 An evaluation of the Internet Initiative for Africa: Ethiopia
The case study is not designed to test a hypothesis, but rather is of an exploratory
nature and is designed to illustrate issues arising from ICT-related development 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. The primary unit of analysis is the Internet Initiative for
256
Africa project. Within this unit two elements of investigation are conducted. Firstly, the 
overall design of the Internet Initiative for Africa is examined. Secondly, an evaluation 
of the Ethiopian Internet Initiative for Africa project is conducted. Both segments are 
evaluated according to the three categories used to illustrate the traditional problems 
surrounding donor assistance support for ICT development in the preceding section, 
namely:
1. Problems deriving from project design and conceptualisation.
2. Problems deriving from the nature of information and communication technologies.
3. Problems deriving from the nature of the local context.
In order to ascertain the answers to these questions 21 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with individuals from one of four key sectors, identified as NGOs, academia, 
the indigenous private sector, and international development agencies. Appendix D, 
provides an account of the methodology employed. Table D1 in the appendix shows a 
comprehensive listing of the individuals interviewed along with their respective. This 
section of the research summarises the findings and recommendations from the 
meetings/interviews.
6.10.1 Non-governmental organisation perspective
Interviewees from the following Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were 
interviewed:
• ActionAid -  Ethiopia;
• Africare;
• CARE-Ethiopia;
• Christian Relief and Development Association
There are a substantial number of international and national NGOs (approximately 140) 
in Ethiopia, with the majority based in Addis Ababa. Prior to ETC’s introduction of 
Internet services, January 1997, the majority of NGOs used PADIS or FIDONET 
mainly for e-mail services. Subsequent to ETC's introduction of Internet services, 
FIDONET has been stopped, and indications are that the PADIS offering may wind
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down in the near future. All the interviewees from the NGO sample sector had an 
initially positive reaction to the project. With the exception of AFRICARE, all the 
NGOs visited were connected to ETC’s Internet service, and all reported having major 
problems with their connectivity to the ETC network, pointing out that it sometimes 
took up to 70 attempts before they could connect. Thus any initiative that was designed 
to improve the situation was welcome.
In terms of the strengths of the project all interviewees highlighted the extension of the 
Internet to the rural centres as important. Positive comments were also made on the 
design of the proposed Internet node in Addis Ababa, which included the ability to 
cache content on the three main servers and to have a back-up router in case of primary 
failure. The majority of interviewees also saw the training component as an important 
element in ensuring the sustainability of the project. In terms of project weaknesses, 
four interviewees expressed concern at the small number of people that were to be 
trained by the project. There is a chronic shortage of human resources in the ICT field 
in Ethiopia, and the interviewees felt that UNDP should expand the training aspect of 
the project. All the respondents commented on the lack of local content available in 
Ethiopia. As NGOs, all but two of the organisations had homepages on the World Wide 
Web, but these were hosted by partner institutions in the U.S. Ideally, such content 
should be held locally to facilitate information dissemination in Ethiopia. Finally, 
concerns were voiced over the relationship with the Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Corporation (ETC). Six of the eight interviewees argued that by entering into a joint 
agreement with ETC the UNDP were condoning its monopoly position and reducing 
the likelihood of private sector competitors emerging. One respondent argued that ETC 
should only be provided with advice rather than funds as it was already ’awash with 
cash from lucrative international call revenues’.
Despite the long list of beneficiaries highlighted in the project document, the overall 
view of NGO interviewees was that in the short-term the beneficiaries would be 
international development agencies and organisations such as themselves. The prices 
for phone calls were thought to be far out of the reach of the average Ethiopian. 
However, in the long-term the regional telecentres would help to broaden access. No 
interviewee felt that the project would have anything more than a minimal long-term 
impact on the rural communities. Access for these communities -  80 per cent of
258
Ethiopia's population -  would be hampered by illiteracy, the lack of communications 
infrastructure in the hinterlands and cost.
In terms of constraints, all interviewees voiced a number of concerns that were viewed 
as constraints. Namely the war with Eritrea which was destroying infrastructure in 
some rural areas, the ability of ETC to sustain the network once the project had finished 
and the attitude of the government to the free flow of information over the Internet. In 
order to overcome these constraints the interviewees from the NGO sector made a 
number of recommendations. It was unanimously felt that there should be a greater 
gateway capacity to enhance Internet connectivity and the provision of web pages. 
Moreover, that training programmes should be extended to more ETC employees and 
there should also be courses on web page design to encourage local content 
development. It was also felt that the UNDP should actively lobby the government to 
deregulate the Internet service provisions sector.
6.10.2 The private sector
Respondents from the following private sector organisations were interviewed:
• Afcor
• City Business Services
• Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce
• Ethiopian Airlines
• Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
• National Bank of Ethiopia
Both Afcor and City Business Services are key players in the Ethiopian IT vending 
industry. Afcor is the official IBM partner in Addis Ababa and City Services has 
licensing deals with the U.S. company Compaq. The Commercial and National Banks 
of Ethiopia are both ostensibly private sector firms, but their status is qualified by their 
strong connections with the government. Ethiopian Airlines is the only airline in 
Ethiopia. Formerly a public sector firm, it is one of the most sophisticated of IT users in 
Ethiopia.
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Given the high level of private sector dissatisfaction with the quality of ETC’s Internet 
service provision, all interviewees were very favourable to the UNDP project, when 
asked about their initial impressions. However a number of weaknesses were perceived. 
There were concerns that the project was strengthening ETC’s control over the sector. 
Five out of the six interviewees feared that such ICT-related projects were crowding 
out the private sector, and made it even more unlikely that the service would be 
deregulated in the short-term. Three out of six interviewees echoed the NGO 
interviewees and argued there should be a greater emphasis on training. There were 
severe doubts that ETC would run the service efficiently at project end. Concerns were 
also voiced at the lack of indigenous consultants on the project.
On the issue of project strengths, again all interviewees pointed to the much needed 
extension of telecommunications services to the rural areas as a key strength. However 
Recommendations from the private sector included a unanimous feeling amongst 
interviewees that Internet service provision should be deregulated as soon as possible. 
To this end, it was felt that UNDP should lobby for an immediate privatisation of 
Internet service provision, and a reduction in tariffs on importing ICT-related goods. In 
terms of the project itself there was again consensus that it should offer training to the 
private sector as well as ETC employees. One respondent argued that in order to 
improve the quality of the Internet service, the project should fund an integrated call 
management system which would allow ETC to better cope with maintenance and 
operational issues. Two interviewees also argued that the project should offer training 
to private sector firms that encompassed marketing Internet services and web page 
design. Concerns were also voiced about the paucity of local content and applications. 
Four interviewees bemoaned the fact that the project seemed intent on only upgrading 
the technological infrastructure without improving the capacity of locals to produce 
local content.
6.10.3 Academia
In this sector interviewees were drawn from the following academic institutions:
• National Computer & Information Centre (NCIC), Ethiopian Science and 
Technology Commission
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University of Addis Ababa
The academic community in Ethiopia is well founded, especially in Addis Ababa and 
the neighbouring regions. Relations between the academic community and ETC are 
good, especially as a number of students from the University of Addis Ababa go on to 
work for ETC. The NCIC formulates government policy on information technology 
issues, and also coordinates research amongst institutions throughout the country. Due 
to the lack of funding many academic institutions cannot finance full connectivity to 
the Internet. The University has limited access for mainly post-graduate students, who 
can finance access through external grants. NCIC was not fully connected, but was a 
pioneer in the use of the PADIS system and FIDONET, which allowed the sending and 
receiving of e-mail at very low cost. As a result initial impressions of a project designed 
to improve accessibility were favourable. All interviewees highlighted the extension of 
the Internet to the rural centres as an important strength. Both interviewees argued that 
the telecentre concept was an innovative approach to solving the lack of information 
infrastructure in rural areas.
However, both interviewees expressed concern at the small number of people that were 
to be trained by the project. It was felt that UNDP should expand the training aspect of 
the project to include academic institutions. An important concern voiced by one of the 
interviewees was that the project seemed to be too focused on the technological aspects. 
Hence there was little in the project document concerning how UNDP would target 
beneficiaries. It was pointed out that issues such as language barriers and user-friendly 
interfaces were not mentioned.
The overall opinion of the academic interviewees was that in the short-term they the 
academic sector, would benefit from a faster service. However, there were fears that as 
more and more students used the service congestion would return to current levels. 
Echoing the views of the NGO interviewees, both interviewees had little confidence 
that the project would have any long-term impact on the rural communities. Like 
interviewees in the other sectors all respondents voiced the same raft of concerns with 
regard to constraining factors, namely: the continued conflict with Eritrea, the capacity 
of ETC to sustain the network once the project had finished, and the government’s 
hostility towards the Internet.
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The recommendations from the academic interviewees revealed a desire for greater 
freedom in utilising the Internet and frustration at the lack of service choice. The 
academic interviewees appeared to be better informed with regards to the issues at 
hand. This, it emerged, was as a result of their ties with research institutes abroad. 
There was a recognition of the large number of development agencies working in this 
area and three out of the four interviewees expressed the need for greater coordination 
amongst donor initiatives. All interviewees argued that UNDP should lobby the 
Ethiopian government to create an information and communications infrastructure 
policy which would, amongst things, encourage ETC to reduce connection costs for 
academic institutions. Project-specific recommendations included the need for 
increased Internet bandwidth to be built into the project, and one respondent 
recommended a back-up Internet gateway be built.
6.10.4 International development agencies
Interviewees from the following local offices of international organisations were 
contacted:
• United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
• Emergency Unit for Ethiopia, UNDP.
UNECA remains the most active of international development agencies in Ethiopia. It 
pioneered the use of electronic networking with the store and forward FidoNet e-mail 
service -  PADIS -  and through its Africa Information Society Initiative is coordinating 
a number of key initiatives designed to improve the information infrastructure in the 
Sub-Saharan African region. The UNDP's Emergency Unit for Ethiopia is also 
pursuing a raft of initiatives in the region focussed on providing emergency support 
during natural disasters. It was one of the earliest users of the PADIS network in 
Ethiopia
Both the interviewees from this sector expressed favourable opinions of the project. In 
terms of project strengths, both interviewees highlighted the extension of the Internet to 
the rural centres as an important strength and that the telecentre concept was an
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innovative approach to solving the lack of information infrastructure in rural areas. 
However, a number of project weaknesses were identified. One respondent expressed 
concern that the "UNDP was rubber stamping the government monopoly of local 
Internet service provision". Moreover that the huge latent demand for Internet services 
would exceed the current bandwidth that the project was to provide. Both echoed the 
sentiments of the other interviewees with regard to the minimal training element within 
the project. It was pointed out by both interviewees that while there was detailed 
justification for the hardware and software, and other technical issues in the project 
outline, there was little or no information on the user population. The project document 
had no information on how many users would be added, who these users would be and 
what effects could be expected in terms of improved service.
One respondent pointed out that though the project was designed to increase capacity 
and quality of service there was no mention of a commitment by ETC to reduce its 
prices for Internet access. Given its monopoly position ETC could happily maintain the 
current high prices and increase its profit margin. Strengthening ETC’s belief that it was 
capable of providing the service, rather than encouraging local entrepreneurs. One 
respondent, citing experience on a similar project, worried that some trainees who went 
abroad would not return. This form of "brain drain" was extremely costly and should be 
guarded against. The same respondent also pointed to the expectation that trainees 
returning from abroad were expected to undertake further training of their colleagues 
involved in the project. More often than not, it was argued, there was no such post­
training dissemination, thus limiting the benefits from the money invested. The 
interviewee went on say that overcoming this may be difficult given the tendency to see 
training -  and the skills/information thereby gained -  as a personal possession.
When asked their opinions on who were to be the likely beneficiaries of the project, the 
overall opinion of the international development agency interviewees was that in the 
short-term they, and other expatriates based locally, would benefit the most from 
improved Internet connections. Both, however, added that their organisations had 
proprietary connections via VSAT, which allowed them to bypass the inefficiencies of 
the public switched telecom network. Thus the likely local beneficiaries would be the
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NGO and academic sectors. However, a host of constraining factors were highlighted 
which threatened to restrict the effectiveness of the project, namely:
• the escalation of conflict with Eritrea;
• the ability of ETC to sustain the network once the project had finished;
• the attitude of the government to the Internet;
• the cost of telephone calls and computer hardware and peripherals; and
• the punitive ICT tariff regime.
In order to lessen the impact of these constraints the international development agency 
interviewees recommended:
• greater coordination amongst donor initiatives;
• dissemination of lessons learned to other development agencies;
• lobby the Ethiopian government to create an information and communications
infrastructure policy committee; and
• encourage ETC to reduce connection costs for target beneficiaries, especially rural 
dwellers.
6.11 Summary of sector survey
Overall, there were a number of consistent themes that emerged from the 
respondents interviewed above. Almost unanimously it was felt that the Internet 
Initiative for Africa was a worthwhile project and would have a positive impact on 
the development of Internet services in Ethiopia. The majority of interviewees felt 
that the extension of telecommunications capacity and Internet services to rural 
areas through telecentres was an important element of the project. However, 
concerns were echoed as to the design of the project itself. Far and away the biggest 
concern was the lack of adequate training provisioning. Interviewees unanimously 
felt that the project should expand its small commitment to training to encompass 
groups other than ETC. Another consistent theme was the lack of focus on the end- 
user. It was pointed out by over half of all interviewees that there was scant mention 
in the project document of the creation of local content. Rather, the emphasis was
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firmly technocentric, concentrating on the physical infrastructure and neglecting the 
all-important human dimension. As a result of this bias it was felt that the impact of 
the initiative in rural areas would be lessened.
It has been widely acknowledged that the successful introduction of any new 
technology, or even idea, requires a careful elaboration of the strategy of inducing the 
users to participate and to have a sense of ownership (World Bank, 1996). Although the 
strategy is evidently dependent on a particular situation, a common requirement is 
achieving best fit between the users’ behaviour patterns with the use of the intended 
new technology. Aggregate measures of the ability of the project to fulfil this 
prerequisite, such as productivity and capacity, are rooted in end-users’ behaviours and 
their usage of the technology. Content development would help African institutions to 
become not only passive consumers of imported technology but also active contributors 
to the global knowledge bank. The primacy of the end-user is especially applicable in 
the context of projects such as the HA, which seek to improve networking capacity in 
developing regions. The process of introducing a technology into a region or 
environment that is unaccustomed to it, is fraught with enough challenges as it is, 
without having to worry about the additional problems arising from a lack of planning.
An issue raised by a number of interviewees in the private and also international agency 
sectors was that of crowding out. The fear emanating from interviewees in these sectors 
was that by improving ETC’s Internet service provision the UNDP was implicitly 
condoning its monopoly position reducing the likelihood of private sector competition. 
The Initiative’s project document states one of its avowed intents as:
...ensuring conditions of fair competition, the local PTT will manage the 
infrastructure of the Internet, but should not be the only Internet Service 
Provider. The local PTT will determine a reasonable fee structure for the 
distribution of a bandwidth, that will allow any entrepreneurs access to the 
infrastructure (UNDP, 1997, p. 5).
Yet no such strictures were placed on ETC, rather as some interviewees pointed out, it 
appears that ETC has been given carte blanche to do as it sees fit with the upgraded
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Internet service. As a result a unanimous concern emanating from the interviews 
centred on ETC’s ability to maintain the service in the face of undoubted user growth.
In terms of constraints, it was unsurprising that all those interviewed saw the escalating 
border clashes with Eritrea as an important issue. The fighting in the months leading up 
to the UNDP mission had been confined to the border regions, and it was felt by the 
project leader that the conflict would be short-lived. As it happened such optimism was 
worryingly naive. The fears voiced by all interviewees turned out to be prescient, as a 
week prior to the signing of the memorandum of understanding the head of ETC was 
deported to the Eritrean border. Despite the fact that he had lived in Ethiopia and 
worked for the ETC for over 15 years, the fact that he was of Eritrean origins and in 
such a position of power meant that, to the government, his position was untenable. 
Consequently, the mission team found themselves in the awkward position of having to 
postpone the entire initiative whilst a new incumbent was chosen. Luckily for the 
UNDP, the support of the government and the uncontentious nature of the initiative 
meant that the only result of this incidence of political risk was a slight delay of one 
month. However, it does illustrate the lack of foresight that can endanger a project, and 
therefore the need for in-depth political risk analysis prior to implementation on the 
ground.
Finally, there was scant mention in the project document with regards to evaluation. 
The project review, reporting and evaluation section merits only four lines in the 
document. The project document states:
The project will be subject to review after the first three Internet nodes are in 
place to determine if the intent of the project is being achieved. At this stage, 
the format will be evaluated to determine if any changes are needed. There will 
be a second review after the sixth node is established, and a final review after 
the last one (UNDP/RBA, 1997, p. 7).
The intent in the quote above is simply that it can be demonstrated that there is a 
broadening of the Ethiopian population of users, and that they can send and receive 
information more efficiently. Such simplistic performance evaluation criteria appear to 
be common currency in the majority of development agency-funded ICT-related
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projects (Picciotto and Wiesner, 1998). Such narrow evaluative criteria fail to capture 
empirical evidence that can be utilised in any meaningful way. Such one- 
dimensionality fails to tell us what kind of traffic was being sent, whether users were 
spending their time productively, and what proportion of users benefited from the 
increased capacity.
Whether the UNDP, despite its avowed aims to increase access for a broad cross 
section of users, will actually do little more than decrease the Internet frustrations of the 
tiny elite who could afford to wait remains to be seen. However the results above reveal 
that even prior to implementation there were a number of issues that had not been 
adequately addressed, namely:
• The lack of adequate training provisioning.
• The lack of sufficient political risk analysis.
• The lack of emphasis on the creation of local content.
• The lack of any strictures on ETC to maintain a favourable price regime.
• The absence of effective evaluation mechanisms.
6.12 Recommendations
The analysis above, both in the case study and analysis of 273 sample projects, reveals 
that there are serious concerns with regards to development agency projects designed to 
improve the information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly, there is a need 
for more effective approaches to overcoming the traditional problems highlighted 
above that affect ICT-related initiatives.
a) The need for better planning and design of projects
ICTs will only be leveraged effectively when considerable attention is paid to several 
issues, including:
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• equality of access to ICTs;
• strategies for harnessing ICTs to maximise South-to-South and South-to-North 
communication and information-sharing, and not just North-to-South 
"dissemination" of information;
• programs that embed ICT deployment in broader knowledge and empowerment of 
strategies for poor communities, rather than assuming that the mere provision of 
ICTs will by itself solve poverty, social and economic inequity, and power 
differentials; and
• the need for international agencies to focus more on supporting, and helping to 
replicate the successes of small-scale projects that engage the active participation 
and "ownership" of, local communities in developing countries;
At the same time development agencies need to be more innovative with the resources 
at hand.
b) Effective leveraging of information and communication technologies
There is an urgent need to foster greater lateral knowledge-sharing in the field. 
Development agencies are guilty of hypocrisy when, despite the rhetoric that is 
continually preached to developing countries on the merits of information sharing, 
development agencies fail in the self-application of their advice. Many of the problems 
above, including the lack of coordination and information sharing amongst donors, can 
be effectively tackled by the innovative application of technology. One way forward is 
for the development agency or donor organisation to identify and capture all the 
knowledge created within its ambit and channel it into an organised retrieval structure 
(human or computer) within the organisation itself; and then develop mechanisms by 
which it can be disseminated narrowly or broadly. In practice, this might mean that 
knowledge generated by all participants (agency staff and others) within a given 
development project funded by the agency is recorded through evaluation and 
monitoring techniques. This could then be documented and transferred to a database 
and made available to other projects. This approach has its benefits: it can lead to 
genuine sharing of experience and knowledge within and between agencies and their 
projects, avoiding mistakes and replicating successes. But there are also a number of 
problems associated with this model. For one thing, the resources available for the
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identification and documentation of knowledge generated by development projects are 
far too small.
More serious, perhaps, is that the methodologies deployed to do this work are put 
through the prism of the organisation funding the project. It is a development agency 
that decides what is relevant and useful knowledge, and how it should be documented; 
In addition projects are often implemented by external consultants or agency staff. 
Thus, a huge proportion of the knowledge created is lost; especially, that generated at 
the ground level by local participants and NGOs (including indigenous knowledge), 
which may lie beyond the reach of the methodologies used (Chambers, 1997). 
Furthermore, the proportion that finally gets recorded is undergoes a centralisation 
process, with access through headquarters or offices of the agency involved. And of 
course the use of that knowledge may, in practice, be largely restricted to the agency 
itself and other similar ones, from where, hopefully, it filters back down to the 
development project on the ground.
There is possibly another way, which has yet to be explored or tested -  to support the 
creation of a horizontal exchange network between development projects themselves, 
unmediated by the agencies. The first step here would be to build the capacity to 
identify and document knowledge within projects themselves, and by the local experts, 
beneficiaries and organisations implementing them. Through internet-based exchange, 
such knowledge could then be communicated and networked directly with other 
development projects, building up a database along the way of proven useful 
exchanges. The identification of such knowledge would be undertaken on the basis of 
what the project staff themselves feel is useful to others, and what they would like to 
receive from others. Furthermore, the network should not be limited to one agency, but 
rather extended across the spectrum.
The difference between these two approaches is, in many respects, fundamental. In the 
second case, the local capacity to identify and document knowledge is built up, and 
remains local; the knowledge resides there and benefits are received directly through 
interaction with other projects as against being mediated through western-based 
agencies. Knowledge is also more likely to address real needs, felt by local participants. 
Much deeper exchanges and interactions between projects could develop alongside the
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more formal system of knowledge exchanges. The fact that the agency may centralise 
the knowledge is merely a by-product of the horizontal exchanges between projects -  
the "ownership" of the network and the knowledge that remains with the project 
participants.
What is necessary is a development agency wide "knowledge audit" of a few projects, 
assessing what useful knowledge is produced, by whom and where; and what might be 
needed from other projects. This could form the basis for a process by which 
identification, documentation and exchanges could be implemented by the project 
itself. Guidelines for replication elsewhere could also be developed. Such an approach 
faces many challenges -  indeed it is more difficult than a vertical, centralised approach. 
It must build not only the capacities described above, but also develop project 
connectivity and the skills needed to network effectively. It requires a rethink of 
information and communication within projects, and presumes a highly participative 
approach by the projects themselves.
Given the huge number and range of information and communication technology 
projects that have taken place and are taking place on the African continent, it is 
imperative that project designers and implementers mine the rich seam of extant 
literature on lessons learned. The project leader can increase the chances of a successful 
implementation, by incorporating a group of factors that are known to facilitate project 
success. These factors and the part they play in a project's success or failure have all 
been well documented.83 While each case is evidently different, there are some common 
themes that emerge as vital for consideration. For example, issues such as the expertise 
of consultants, relationship with the government and the role of the public 
telecommunications operator are all known to determine the outcome of a project 
(Baark and Heeks, 1998). By observing these characteristics as part of the pre- 
evaluation process, rather than discovering them as unexpected obstacles at 
implementation time, it may be possible to increase the degree of success and to avert 
unnecessary expense for donors and end-users.
83 For example, see Rosenthal, 1986; Picciotto and Wiesner, 1998; Angelsen et al., 1994.
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Development agencies can also become a source of information for developing 
countries. Organisations such as the World Bank could lower the cost of information 
systems for African countries by providing an information systems clearinghouse. 
There are only a few key information systems that governments require (budget, 
accounts, tax, inventory, etc.) and each government need not reinvent the wheel. By 
cataloguing the systems developed and by providing a clearinghouse to African 
governments, custom information systems relevant to their requirements could be 
borrowed, adapted and quickly implemented. An indirect but important effect of the 
clearinghouse would be to improve the documentation of information systems, an often 
neglected area.
In general terms, projects need a greater focus on the processes of diffusion and 
dissemination. These are the elements that finally bring project results to the 
beneficiaries and the wider world, yet they are not seen as sufficiently important. There 
needs to be more training in dissemination skills: writing, locating channels for 
dissemination from the traditional (conferences, journals, newsletters via mailing lists) 
to the more recent (e-mail lists and the World Wide Web), running training courses, 
and opening access to in-house information. Project documents also need to consider 
how diffusion will take place, to build in time and money for this, and to provide 
training. All this needs to be built in early, whilst donors are still focused on immediate 
projects and before attention drifts onto subsequent projects. By leveraging information 
and communication technologies, development agencies can tackle such problems head 
on and increase the knowledge return from projects.
c) The urgent need for practical research
There is little disagreement with the premise that information and communications 
technologies can be powerful tools for empowering individuals and communities with 
information and knowledge relevant to their development. However, insufficient 
research has been conducted into how this can be achieved. A reflection of the 
conceptual confusion haunting development agencies in the ICT field is the striking 
number of pilot projects that are being conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 1998 
InfoDev report, for example, reveals that 41 per cent of its ICT-related activities are
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pilot projects (InfoDev, 1998). No one is precisely sure of how these technologies can 
be leveraged most effectively to support development. One major concern, for example, 
is the lack of debate on the impact on developing countries arising from the domination 
of major international communications and information media by a shrinking number 
of global companies.
During the 1960s and 1970s development agencies such as the Untied Nations 
pioneered research and investigation into the information dependency of developing 
countries (Bourgault, 1995). A notable output of this era was The MacBride 
Commission report of a UNESCO commission in 1980, which accurately reflected the 
fears of developing nations. The report called for a "new world information and 
communications order" which would reflect more accurately the particular problems of 
the developing nations, guarantee the rights of citizens to communicate, and take action 
to right the acknowledged imbalances in the ways in which international 
communication was run. However, such critical questions have been lost in the fog of 
information revolution rhetoric. Such issues have been swept away as organisations 
such as UNESCO have been compromised by member states into promoting the mantra 
of the "free flow of information" (Woods, 1993).
The great risk for developing countries is that they will end up with the worst of both 
worlds: a glut of Western "information" and entertainment content, and a scarcity of 
specific, contextualised information and knowledge that helps them face their specific 
development challenges. The challenge for international agencies, then, is not simply to 
help developing countries increase the aggregate amount of global information 
resources to which they have access. Rather, they must help them derive concrete 
information and knowledge strategies that permit them to gain access to the specific 
information they need to enrich their lives and prospects.
6.13 Summary
The above analysis reveals that the use of information and communication technologies 
in development assistance projects is characterised by a lack of coordination, and a 
short-termist technologically determinist approach to planning. This approach is
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unnecessarily wasteful of time and resources, neither of which Sub-Saharan African 
countries can afford. What is necessary is a more coherent framework for planning and 
implementing ICT projects. The implication is that ICTs must be driven first and 
foremost by needs, rather than a "Field of Dreams" approach. The adoption and 
appropriate use of information and communication technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
will not happen spontaneously; hence the crucial role of development agencies and 
NGOs. Development agencies for their part must understand where and how these 
technologies can be applied to the problems of development, choose the appropriate 
technology, and implement programs so that the potentialities of these technologies 
cease to be a moot point. Above all it must be remembered that information and 
communication technologies have value only as they contribute to an objective. Their 
most effective use occurs when the potential impact of the adopted medium is well 
understood and a strategic action plan developed. The use of the medium needs to be 
grounded in the community and local forms of expression. The most fundamental 
lesson is that the euphoria surrounding the use of these technologies should not 
override the fact they are a means to an end, not an end by themselves.
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CHAPTER 7
An Assessment of Information Infrastructure in Ethiopia
7.1 Introduction
The Ethiopian government, like those in the majority of developing countries, has yet 
to apportion significant resources to solving the complex issue of information 
infrastructure development. Without concerted and consistent effort Ethiopia will find 
that, bereft of access to timely and relevant information it must formulate policy and 
negotiate in the global economy from a point of weakness, and will still be unable to 
effectively manage its resources. In an attempt to reverse the paucity of information 
infrastructure in Ethiopia, efforts have been made to expand the telecommunications 
network and utilise innovative information and communication technologies. Though 
efforts over the period 1990 -  1997 have succeeded in reversing the stagnation of the 
telecommunications network these efforts remain, as in the majority of Sub-Saharan 
African countries, piecemeal and ad hoc (Adam, 1996). Into this policy vacuum 
coalitions of varying levels of influence are taking shape around the 
telecommunications and information technology industry. This chapter analyses the 
forces that are influencing the construction of information infrastructure in Ethiopia. 
The analysis conceptualises the activities of the main actors in terms of two key 
dimensions: their sphere and degree of influence over the development of the 
telecommunications and information technology sectors.
7.2 National context
Ethiopia is an independent republic that is situated in the north-east comer of Africa. 
The capital city is Addis Ababa, headquarters of the Organisation for African Unity and 
other major development agencies such as UNECA. Since the secession of Eritrea in 
1993, Ethiopia has been a landlocked state. The country had an estimated 1995 
population of 56.9 million people, comprising some 76 ethnicities and 95 languages. 
The official language is Amharic, but English, Arabic and Italian are also used in 
commerce.
274
After a brief period of Italian colonial rule (from 1936 to 1941), Ethiopia was ruled 
autocratically for nearly 40 years by Haile Selassie. He was overthrown by a military 
council known as the Derg, in September 1974. The Derg installed a government that 
was socialist in name and military in style. However, led by Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, the country was plunged into perhaps the darkest period of its history, marked 
by a totalitarian-style government. Adopting Marxist-Leninist policies and financed by 
the Soviet Union and Cuba, Mengistu embarked on a programme of mass militarisation 
(EIU, 1997b), in the process torturing and killing thousands of suspected enemies in a 
purge known locally as the "red terror". Communism was officially adopted during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s with the promulgation of a soviet-style constitution, 
politburo, and the creation of the Workers’Party of Ethiopia (WPE).
This period of internal unrest saw a marked rise in external conflicts. Firstly with 
Somalia which, taking advantage of the deep rifts in the country, invaded and occupied 
nearly a third of the country before being forced back by a hastily conscripted peasant 
army. Secondly, in the north, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which had 
long campaigned for independence, began to step up its hostilities. This war has proved 
more difficult than that with Somalia and, as the EPLF gained strength, the situation 
within Ethiopia worsened.84 Coupled with fending off both external aggressors and 
internal factions, a succession of environmental disasters increased the fragility of the 
state. Though the country has periodically experienced severe drought, the period 1984 
to 1985 saw a prolonged drought that was to be forever etched in the consciousness of 
the West. Perhaps as many as a million people perished through disease or lack of food. 
The situation was further exacerbated by the forcible resettlement of over 700,000 
people to other parts of the country that were wholly unsuited to agriculture or 
settlement, serving only to turn a disaster into a catastrophe (Diriba, 1995). The Derg’s 
collapse was hastened by successive droughts and famine, as well as by insurrections, 
particularly in the northern regions of Tigray and Eritrea. Further weakened by the 
collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, the widely unpopular Derg was 
overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
84 Eritrea, which had been a separate country until it was ceded to Ethiopia by the United Nations in 1952, 
allowed Ethiopia access to the sea. However, in 1993, after a long and bitter struggle, Eritrea regained its 
independence and consequently Ethiopia is once again a landlocked state. With the recent resumption of 
hostilities with Eritrea Ethiopia has had to devote resources, of which it has precious few, to maintaining its 
national security.
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(EPRDF), comprising opposition groups drawn mostly from the northern province of 
Tigray.
While the new political situation has provided a degree of stability in Ethiopia, 
pressures elsewhere are mounting. Throughout the central highlands, in which the 
majority of the population lives, deforestation and soil erosion are evidence of 
pressures on the environment. In a country where some 85 per cent of the population 
depend on agriculture, and where farming methods have changed little since over the 
centuries, the land is under severe pressure (Diriba, 1995). At the start of the century, as 
much as half the country was forested; in 1998 the figure was below four per cent (EIU, 
1998).
For those who live in urban areas the situation is little better. The capital, Addis Ababa, 
is finding it increasingly difficult to cope with its growing population. Urban-rural 
migration has seen the population of the capital city swell from about 1.6 million in 
1984 to an estimated four million in 1999 (EIU, 1998). Such rapid growth has 
outstripped the capacity of the city’s already inadequate infrastructure. As a result few 
have access to running water and Addis Ababa remains the largest city in the world 
without mains sewerage. The living standard for all but the most wealthy of Ethiopians 
has declined significantly (Diriba, 1995). Matters have worsened with the 1995 
devaluation of the currency, the birr, coupled with the removal of subsidies on a wide 
range of essential foods. These measures were part of a structural adjustment 
programme as a condition for receiving aid from the World Bank and several western 
nations. Although devaluation provides an incentive to export more goods, in practice, 
apart from coffee, there is little that Ethiopia produces for the overseas market. Over 
and above the effects of devaluation, the price of coffee has fallen on the world market 
in recent years and the long-term trend for commodities prices remains downwards 
(EIU, 1998). Meanwhile the cost of foreign goods has increased significantly, making it 
difficult for industries dependent on imported machinery and raw materials to survive 
(Diriba, 1995). Some attempts at import substitution have occurred, such as the 
growing of tea, and a few export industries have developed, such as the manufacture of 
leather goods in and around Addis Ababa. But, by and large, structural adjustment 
seems to have made it even harder for the country to develop its economy (Diriba,
1995).
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Under pressure from Western nations to liberalise the economy, current government 
policy is to promote a free market and to create a federal state, a process that may 
unleash a tide of ethnic unrest. For example, instead of learning Amharic in school, 
children from the main linguistic groups -  and there are over 95 distinct languages 
spoken in the country -  will be taught in their own ethnic tongue.85 This may help to 
preserve cultural diversity and to foster regional autonomy but it may make the task of 
political unity even harder to achieve. In an attempt to legitimise and consolidate 
political power the government adopted a constitution that established the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995 and adopted a five-year development plan in 
which the nation's development efforts focus on improving the macroeconomic 
environment through agriculturally led industrial development (Diriba, 1995).
One of the key planks of improving the macroeconomic environment is the creation of 
an environment conducive to foreign investment. The revised government policy is 
expected to result in the opening of additional sectors of the economy for investment 
and lowered initial foreign investment requirements. As part of its economic 
development program, the Ethiopian government has engaged in a privatisation 
program over the past two years, during which 150 state-owned stores, hotels, 
restaurants, and factories have been sold through public tendering. Foreign investment, 
however, is prohibited in large-scale power production, telecommunications, financial 
services, and many small-scale personal services.
Since 1992, the new government has undertaken economic reforms under the auspices 
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In an effort to transform a 
centrally planned economy into a market-oriented economic system, Ethiopia has 
removed price controls and many regulations and restrictions which had been stifling 
market forces and private sector initiatives. Macroeconomic stability has been 
maintained through a tightening of fiscal and monetary policies (EIU, 1998). Gross 
domestic product growth was more than seven per cent in 1996 and is expected to 
exceed seven per cent again in 1997. Inflation was less than 1 per cent in 1996 (EIU, 
1998). However, the relative stability over the period 1996 -  1998 cannot hide
85 Under the new federal system, there are eleven ethnically based semi-autonomous regional governments.
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underlying points of stress that threaten to undermine the country’s fragile success. 
With the resumption of hostilities with Eritrea, a long-term projection of falling 
commodity prices, and the ever-present spectre of environmental disaster, Ethiopia 
stands, once again, at a crossroads. For example, official foreign aid assistance now 
comprises over three-quarters of all foreign imports in Ethiopia and as much food is 
being shipped into the country as during the height of the famine in 1984 and 1985 
(Diriba, 1995). Meanwhile, the pressures for Ethiopia to conform to the requirements of 
the international community mount, and the country’s future hangs delicately in the 
balance.
7.3 The telecommunications network
Historically, Ethiopia has been at the vanguard of telecommunications development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The first long-distance telephone line in the world was installed 
between Boston and New York in 1885, yet it was only nine years later that Ethiopia’s 
long-distance telephone line between Addis Ababa and Harar (spanning 480 
kilometres) became operational. Indeed the first telephone call on the African continent 
was conducted in Addis Ababa in 1897. Despite such an auspicious start, a 100 years 
hence Ethiopia is home to only 200,000 telephone lines serving a population of over 55 
million -  a low "teledensity" of one for every 367 people (ITU, 1998b). The majority of 
the Ethiopian population has little access to phones and the waiting list is long. The 
government-owned Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) was established 
in 1953 in order to provide both national and international telecommunications 
connectivity services and remains the sole provider of telecommunication 
infrastructure. At the end of June 1995 the number of telephone subscribers in Ethiopia 
was 142,452, an increase of 3.4 per cent over the previous year. In its annual report 
the ETC came to the conclusion that the subscription demands are increasing every 
year at such a fast rate that the corporation could not cope with it. As a result, the 
growth trend of subscription realised from 1991/92 to 1994/95 was only about 3.9 per 
cent while the growth trend of demand alone for the same period was 13.6 per cent.87
86 Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority (1995), ETA Annual Report 1994, Ethiopia.
87 Ibid.
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The number of people on the waiting list for a telephone line was 178,992 at the end of 
June 1995 (Damena, 1996).
The Ethiopian telecommunications network is comprised of one national centre and six 
district centres selected according to traffic density. The district centres are located in 
provincial capitals and towns. In total there are 36 automatic exchanges in 22 towns, 
and 375 manual exchanges. The bulk of the telecommunications service is concentrated 
in urban centres. At present 543 cities and towns are connected to the public network 
within the country. 187 towns are provided with automatic and semi-automatic 
exchanges. The remaining 247 rely on manual systems and 109 are rural radio call and 
payphones. The country’s sole fibre optic trunk line is located in Addis Ababa, 
connecting two major exchanges in the centre of the city. There are 254 direct 
international satellite circuits to 18 countries. The corporation provides its services to 
the public through various communication media such as microwave, UHF, VHF 
satellite and open wire systems. A newly introduced facility, digital radio multi-access 
system (DRMAS), was added to the national network in 1998 to serve remote towns 
(Demessie, 1998).
Over the periods 1983 -  1984 and 1992 -  1993, the Ethiopian telecommunications 
network has exhibited substantial growth. The volume of telecom traffic has also 
increased substantially, with international calls representing the fastest growing sector. 
Over the same period, the volume of international calls increased from 0.21 million to 
2.8 million, representing an average annual growth rate of 34.8 per cent.88 In general 
terms, the telecommunications network has been expanding since the early 1970s. The 
expansion in terms of telephone line units can be seen from Table 13 overleaf.
88 Ibid.
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Table 13: Number of telephones in Ethiopia
Year No. of telephones in 
1000 Units
Telephone 
Density per 100
1970 46 0.2
1975 67 2.4
1978 80 2.7
1979 82 2.7
1980 86 2.8
1995 140 2.8
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation at http://www.telecom.net.et.
Accessed 15 September 1999.
ETC restructured in 1997 in order to respond to the general move towards a market- 
based economy within the country. One of the outcomes of the restructuring study was 
its integrated accelerator Seventh Development Programme, which began in 1998 and 
will run until 2001. According to the ETC the programme is set to increase the 
telephone penetration rate from 0.3 per cent (three to 1000 people) to at least one per 
cent (one to 100 people). The number of telephone lines, according to ETC’s plan, 
would be raised from the 1999 level of 192,806 to 760,000. By December 1999 some
600,000 lines had been procured and over 200,000 of these had been installed in some 
rural and urban areas of the country. In addition to these, it is planned that over 650 
villages in rural areas would have access to telecommunications by installing 470 very 
small aperture terminals, 270 Digital Radio Multi Access Subscriber Systems 
(DRMAS) and a Wireless Local Loop (WLL) system. According to ETC's ambitious 
plans, by the end of the Seventh Development Program, almost all villages will have at 
least one telephone each. African governments are often guilty of failing to deliver on 
ambitious development plans, however, it is reported that ETC installed 84,000 
telephones over the period August 1998 -  June 1999, in both the capital Addis Ababa 
and the regions.89 An unprecedented growth rate for telecommunications capacity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This figure thus puts the total number of telephones in Ethiopia at 
over 200,000.
89 "Ethiopia: 84 Thousand Telephones in 12 Months", Addis Tribune, 7 September 1998.
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Cellular services were introduced to Ethiopia at the end of 1998, thus squaring the 
circle on a process that has taken some 11 years to come to fruition. ETC signed an 
agreement in 1998 with Ericsson for the installation of the mobile network around 
Addis Ababa to serve around 36,000 subscribers, based on the GSM standard. Cellular 
telephony now covers Addis Ababa, the road to Sodere (a resort centre 120Km from 
Addis Ababa) and the town of Nazereth (lOOKm from Addis Ababa).90 The system will 
be gradually extended to other cities. Subscriber fees in 1999 were set at 597 birr 
(US$85) annually, with subscribers required to deposit about 30 per cent of the total 
sum for registration. The subscription fee, considered to be one of the lowest in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, is designed to make mobile telephony more affordable to potential 
subscribers. Registrations, which began in June 1998, were predictably heavily 
oversubscribed and by August 1999 there were 7000 subscribers, all based in Addis 
Ababa.
The Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation has traditionally been one of the few 
well-managed and effective public agencies in Ethiopia. It has attracted some of the 
best talent in the country and has been aggressive in its introduction of new 
technologies and service. As a major hard currency generator, however, it has always 
been a victim of its own success. The state has been unwilling to loosen its grip on the 
agency for fear of losing one of its major sources of hard currency. This monopolistic 
control has stifled innovation and retarded expansion (Da Costa, 1996). As a result, the 
non-profitable sectors, mainly in the rural areas, have been left bereft of 
telecommunications infrastructure. Though the relative quality of telecommunications 
in Ethiopia is good in comparison to other developing countries, the public network is 
still far from adequate. Waiting times for new telephone installations can be up to five 
years. The title of an article in African Business, "Ethiopia stuck in telecoms stone- 
age", sums up the extent to which ETC has to improve the level and quality of its 
service provision. One person interviewed in the article lamented that, "I have been 
waiting for 20 years now to get a telephone, but it is all in vain. I think I will die before 
I get one".91 Those without phones make do with the 1,027 coin-operated public 
telephones in the country; most of the time, however, they are out of order. The few
90 "Ericsson awarded contract by Ethiopia telecom", European Report, 23 July 1998.
91 50-year-old Telahun Habtu quoted in Ethiopian Telecoms’, African Business, January 1998.
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public telephones that exist are virtually non-operational, as a result of a combination of 
neglect and vandalism (Ruphael, 1995). Most rural towns do not have digital exchanges 
and the quality and standard of the urban telecommunication network leaves a lot to be 
desired. At the same time, as Table 14 shows, call transmission charges are still high.
Table 14: Call transmission charges in Ethiopia, July 1998
Category Installation charge (US$) Monthly Rate (US$) Local automatic 
call (US$)/minute
Business 305.00 17.00 0.20
Residential 305.00 8.00 0.20
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation at http://www.telecom.net.et, July 1998.
7.3.1 Constraints to network growth
Historically the telecommunications network in Ethiopia has experienced two types of 
problems that have hindered the provision of fast and reliable telecommunications 
service and inhibited the desired rate of telecommunications development in the 
country: external macroeconomic and political factors, and internal operational factors.
(a) External Factors
(i) Macroeconomic environment
The massive debt accumulated by the country to finance its civil war and its consequent 
dependency on foreign aid to meet its budgetary requirements, coupled with the lack of 
foreign exchange, have seriously hampered the capability of the country to upgrade its 
telecommunications infrastructure. Ethiopia, regarded as one of the poorest countries of 
the world, even by African standards, has a low level of customer purchasing power, 
which is very small and unevenly distributed among the population. Since 1974 the 
economy has exhibited a chronically weak macroeconomic profile. The civil
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disturbances and regional conflicts of the 1970’s and the 1980’s have badly damaged the 
already fragile telecommunications infrastructure. Continued political instability, 
inconsistent government policies, and the regional partitioning of the country have also 
created an environment that is less than favourable to inciting confidence in any large- 
scale capital investment in the country (Ruphael, 1995). The dependency on rain-fed 
agriculture remains the country's main structural weakness. Whilst recent success has 
seen Ethiopia's economy growing at an average annual rate of seven per cent since 
1992, the economy's dependence on agriculture will continue to cause fluctuations in 
growth and the impact of the deregulation policy has so far been disappointing.
(ii) Monopoly status
The institutionalised nature of the telecommunications sector in many developing 
countries is often highlighted as the major cause of communications infrastructure 
stagnation. The ETC has traditionally been one of the few institutions in the country 
that provides a relatively reliable service. However, given the levels of revenues it 
generates it is something of a cash cow for the Ethiopian government. This has led to 
an unhealthy level of interference and control by government (Da Costa, 1996). This 
has in turn stifled innovation, retarded expansion beyond the relatively well off areas, 
and has resulted in massive and continued unmet demand.92 The telecommunications 
operator in the country is restricted by a lack of autonomy and lack of incentive to 
perform as a commercial entity. Low and distorted tariffs, political objectives that 
conflict with the main business of the entity, and lack of access to capital markets are 
some of the symptoms of this lack of autonomy. Kiplagat and Wemer (1994) highlight 
what they call the paradoxes of the telecommunications sector in the majority of 
African countries: where monopoly national operators reap high rewards by catering 
for a captive market and yet, paradoxically, have shortfalls in reinvestment revenues. 
The high revenues accruing from the provision of a national network are effectively 
used to cross-subsidise other areas of the public apparatus. As a result there is little left 
for much needed reinvestment in the public switched telecommunications network.
92 In 1995, for example, there were about 320,000 customers that expressed demand for basic telephone 
service, and about 161,000 of these customers have been registered as "actively waiting" (Bekele, 1996).
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(b) Internal Factors
(i) Operational inefficiency
Acute shortage of basic telephone connections, poor maintenance and non-existent 
customer service has brought the efficiency and effectiveness of the Ethiopian network 
well below that which would be considered standard in the rest of the world. Absence 
of advanced services such as data communications networks as well as the restricted 
flow of information in and out of the country has dwarfed the development of 
information technology and related services. Poor maintenance of the public network 
has contributed in no small way to the inefficient utilisation of Ethiopia’s existing 
network. The maintenance problem itself can be attributed to such factors as a lack of, 
or inadequate supply of tools, test equipment, and materials for maintenance; 
government policy on procurement of spare parts; poor maintenance organisation; and 
the poor work attitude of maintenance personnel (Damena, 1996). The corporation also 
continues to suffer from overstaffing, employing 6573 employees as of June 1999.
(ii) Lack of indigenous technological capacity for plant construction and 
installation
Ethiopia has been unable to build indigenous capacity in telecommunications 
technology development, hence it remains almost totally reliant on foreign suppliers for 
critical spare parts. Thus, in times of foreign exchange restrictions the maintenance of 
the public network has suffered.
(iii) Weak government policy
With little hope of maintaining control over the revenues it generates there is little 
incentive for management to be more efficient or increase productivity. Nor is there 
much scope for innovation and long-term strategic planning. These factors have all 
adversely impacted on the development of telecommunications in Ethiopia. Though 
there is a considerable amount of expressed and unexpressed demand for
93 "Intemet-Ethiopia: Information Control Slows Economic Development Business and Industry", Inter Press 
Service, 19 November 1997.
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telecommunications facilities in Ethiopia, the ETC continues to struggle with providing 
the most rudimentary of services to its existing customer base. However, the sector 
remains one of the most profitable sectors of the country’s economy as 
telecommunications remains a vital service, for which significant sections of the 
population are prepared to pay a premium. The above constraints to the improvement of 
the telecommunications infrastructure suggest that the most pressing problems that face 
the Ethiopian telecommunications sector are the product of a heady cocktail of 
historically specific factors and internally generated operational deficiencies.
7.3.2 Reform efforts
Since the beginning of 1991, the public operator has relaxed some aspects of its long- 
held monopoly position. Up till 1996 the regulatory framework concerning 
telecommunications was particularly onerous. For example, only one type of facsimile 
machine was approved for use by the government and fax paper could only be 
purchased from the ETC. However, in 1996 a policy was promulgated that allowed 
subscribers to operate their own facsimile equipment on the ETC’s network. This policy 
further stipulated that the private sector could import facsimile machines that met the 
ETC’s specifications as well as distribute them to subscribers. This move was the 
beginning of a new, more liberal policy toward private sector participation in the 
provision of Ethiopia’s telecommunications services.
The emerging trend of encouraging private participation in the provision of terminal 
facilities should ease some of the burden carried by the ETC. In order to increase the 
significance of the liberalisation policy, the ETC will first have to allow wider private 
participation to cover at least the telephone apparatus and teleprinters. Second, private 
participation will have to be extended to cover the provision of certain 
telecommunications services on value-added networks (VANs). The areas of data 
communication and information may also be included in the list of services for private 
sector participation. In an effort to improve the existing telecommunications 
infrastructure the government commercialised the telecommunications industry by 
incorporating the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) in early 1997 and 
establishing a separate telecommunications regulatory body, the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Agency (ETA). The ETC is supervised by its own Board of
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Directors, which reports to the Board of Public Enterprise Supervision (as opposed to 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications). The ETA operates under the Minister 
of Transport and Communications. The ETC is charged with:
• constructing and maintaining telecommunications equipment;
• providing domestic and international telephone, telex, telefax, Internet, and other 
communications services;
• providing integrated information technology services, including re-broadcasting 
television signals;
• repairing, assembling and manufacturing telecommunications devices; and
• rendering training services to telecommunications personnel.
The ETA has responsibility to:
• ensure that telecommunications services are operated to best serve the country’s 
economic and social development;
• specify technical standards and procedures for telecommunications services;
• ensure telecommunications quality;
• regulate telecommunications tariffs;
• license and supervise operators of telecommunications services;
• regulate types of telecommunications equipment which may be utilised;
• authorise and supervise allotted frequency use;
• represent the government at international conferences and organisations concerned
with telecommunications;
• ensure the implementation of telecommunications treaties to which Ethiopia is a 
party;
• collaborate with educational institutions to promote technical training in 
telecommunications; and
• collect licence fees.
Though there are signs that the government will deregulate the sector further the 
telecommunications sector remains the largest profit-making, state-controlled industry 
next to the national airline, so full-scale privatisation is unlikely to take place before
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2002 (Da Costa, 1996). Moreover, the impressive growth rate of new lines since 1998 
has highlighted ETC’s ability to implement change quickly.
The Ethiopian government has given attention to the transformation of the telecom 
sector, and according to ETC’s web site the government has realised that ’the state- 
owned and monopolistic approach to the sector is now found incompatible [sic] with 
the new trend of the telecom world’.94The government is thus looking to create a 
strategic partnership through transferring partial ownership of the public operator to an 
international company or a consortium; thus it is hoped enhancing ETC’s capacity in 
terms of capital, technology and management. Those who want to be strategic partners 
with the existing public operator will be given licenses for one or part of or all of the 
following four telecom services:
1. Public switched telecommunication service
2. Cellular mobile service
3. Internet service
4. Data communication service
As an indication of the desire for foreign investment the government is offering 
potential licensees ’a monopoly, with exclusive right(s) for the provision of the services 
listed in its (their) license(s) for a period of five years with the possibilities of extension 
depending on performance records. The license(s) could remain valid for 25 years’.95
7.4 Main actors
Dahl’s "interest groups" approach argues that domestic policy formulation arises out of 
the interaction between key interest group coalitions (Dahl, 1967). Though in Ethiopia, 
as in almost all developing countries, the state is predominant, less attention has been 
paid to other influential interest groups. As in many Sub-Saharan African countries 
there are a multitude of actors within the telecommunications sector. In Ethiopia, the 
government is evidently the main actor in the industry, on its own and through the
94 The ETC Web site, http://www.telecom.net.et/services.htm. Accessed 25 December 1999.
95 Ibid.
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telecommunications regulatory agency (ETA) and the public operator the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation. Table 15 identifies the main actors, and highlights 
the spheres and degree of their influence.
Table 15: Actors and their influence on the Ethiopian telecommunications sector
Actor(s) Spheres of influence Degree of influence
Government Regulation and public policy High
ETC Provision of public network High
Development agencies: 
UNECA, USAID, World Bank
Development assistance, policy 
advice, technical knowledge 
and funding
Medium
Foreign private sector: 
Gilat, Ericcson, Sprint. 
Teledesic, ICO, Iridium
Telecommunications equipment 
and network provision and 
management.
The development of new 
connectivity options
Low
Domestic private sector Network provision and retail of 
telecommunications equipment Low
Regional African 
organisations: Panaftel, PATU, 
RASCOM
Regional telecommunications 
policy Low
7.4.1 The Ethiopian government
The present system of regulation seeks to protect the sovereignty and security of the 
country by keeping the national telecommunications operator under government control 
while, at the same time, making the telecommunications service less dependent on the 
government. In this respect the administrative and policy matters of 
telecommunications remain under the remit of the Ministry of Communications, which 
represents the country at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and other 
international telecommunications organisations. Evidently the Ethiopian government 
remains the most influential actor in the telecommunications sector. It remains the chief
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architect of telecommunications policy and, through its ownership and regulation of 
ETC is the final arbiter of the dispensation of revenues accruing from the national 
service.
7.4.2 The Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation
During the first two decades of its existence, the ETC enjoyed a certain degree of 
autonomy: for example, its board of directors determined its annual capital 
expenditures, and appointed the general manager. However, following the 
nationalisation drive of the previous government, the management autonomy of the 
ETC, along with all other state-owned enterprises, had been drastically curtailed. This 
was the case until a new enterprise law issued in 1992 paved the way for hundreds of 
public sector companies to be run on commercial principles. Though still part of the 
public sector, the Ethiopian government has been keen to restore some of the autonomy 
that ETC enjoyed prior to the incumbency of the Mengistu regime in 1974. The new 
incorporation of the public operator into the Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Corporation has rendered it capable of making its own investment decisions and it has 
been able to reinvest a healthy part of its revenues. However, it is still beholden unto 
the government, and political manoeuvrings continue to play a part in its management. 
For example, the 1998 resurgence of conflict with Eritrea, saw the forced repatriation 
of all those of Eritrean origin in the capital, to the Eritrean border. This included the 
head of ETC who found himself repatriated with thousands of his countrymen who, 
despite full integration and acceptance into Ethiopian society, were deemed security 
risks. Future restructuring of the ETC, however, should at least restore the level of 
management autonomy that prevailed in its early years (Demissie, 1998).
7.4.3 The private sector
There is currently little scope for private sector participation in the Ethiopian 
telecommunications sector. Regulations strictly forbid any competition in the provision 
of telecommunications or equipment. However, there are numerous illegal payphones 
set up in small shops which manage to flout the law and provide a clandestine service 
to the public. Whilst the influence of the private sector is small, it is likely that as the 
government relaxes its grip on the sector, it will increasingly look to the domestic 
private sector as providers and users of value added services. At present the
289
involvement of the private sector in the telecommunications sector is limited to the 
retail of government-approved facsimile and telecommunications apparatus.
7.4.4 Regional and continental organisations
Though regional organisations in Africa have had, by and large, a negative press over 
the past decades (Kasumu, 1998), there have been renewed calls of late to strengthen 
regional ties. An offshoot of this in Sub-Saharan Africa has been the creation of the 
Abidjan-based Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation (RASCOM). 
RASCOM’s plans for regional telecommunications development in Africa include 
installing 500,000 fixed solar-powered telephone stations with international access 
across the continent over a seven-year period. This represents an important dimension 
for the development of telecommunications infrastructure in Ethiopia: the use of new 
innovations in information and communication technologies to extend services to rural 
areas at lower cost. Ethiopia is also a member of Panaftel and PATU, however, the 
degree of influence of these regional bodies remains quite low. Historically they have 
failed to achieve their objectives -  increasing interconnection between African 
countries -  and with increased liberalisation of the sector will probably see their 
influence on regional telecommunications infrastructure development diminish.
7.4.5 Foreign private sector
Whilst the provision of telecommunications services in Ethiopia remains firmly within 
the remit of the government, the participation of the foreign private sector continues to 
grow. For example, in 1998 a contract was signed between NEC and ETC for the 
installation of a second earth satellite station in Mekele in Northern Ethiopia that would 
serve as a second international gateway and would provide reliable telephone, data and 
Internet services in the country. Evidently, with no indigenous capabilities in the 
manufacture or design of telecommunications equipment Ethiopia is dependent on the 
research and development of the foreign private sector.
One of the major problems for Ethiopian telecommunications expansion has been the 
difficulty of expanding the physical telecommunications network to remote, rural 
locations. Coupled with the high cost of connecting this geographically dispersed
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population is the small amount of telecommunications traffic that is generated by the 
rural population. This vicious cycle has reinforced the reluctance of ETC to invest in 
rural telecommunications infrastructure. Rather, attempts have been made to find a less 
expensive route to improving information infrastructure in rural areas. An apparent 
solution to this problem has come in the shape of satellite technology. Ideally suited to 
geographically isolated regions, satellite technology has been proffered as a solution to 
the problem of rural telephony. However, it is only with the advent of technological 
innovations that satellite telephony is now within the possibility frontiers of policy­
makers in developing countries. It is in this respect that the foreign private sector may 
have an important hand in developing Ethiopia’s telecommunications infrastructure.
The 1990s have seen a raft of technological innovations that have presented countries 
such as Ethiopia with economically viable technological alternatives that correlate with 
their particular contexts. One of the most applicable of technological innovations for 
developing countries has been very small aperture terminal (VSAT) technology. 
Traditionally utilised by large corporations and international organisations that need to 
ensure reliable communications irrespective of cost, the inherent cost of the technology 
has continued to fall with successive technological breakthroughs. Specifically, the 
introduction of more efficient and cheaper PC-based network control systems, along 
with new low-cost switching technologies have reduced infrastructure costs (Leite,
1996). VSAT’s now allow for reliable data, voice and video communications using 
small satellite antennas.
Service providers have traditionally been hesitant to commit large amounts of revenue 
to finance rural telecommunications infrastructure. The cost of creating infrastructure in 
often inhospitable and inaccessible areas has far exceeded the revenue that could be 
garnered. Thus substantial investment in rural regions is hard to justify. However, with 
the advent of communications innovations such concerns are mitigated. Utilising 
VSAT technology the first telephone line in a village can be installed for a minimum 
investment. This soon becomes profitable after deployment, as traffic increases, the 
number of channels can be increased at little marginal cost.96 This then becomes a
96 "Rural telephony comes in to town", Satellite Communications, October 1998.
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feasible option for those countries with a high percentage of their population in 
relatively inaccessible rural locations.
It is the ability to install such a low cost wireless network that has attracted the ETC to 
VS AT technology. In its bid to increase telecommunications capacity in the regions, 
the ETC has chosen to adopt a VSAT network comprising 500 site terminals 
transmitting via Intelsat’s Indian Ocean satellite. This allows for service to over 50,000 
telephone subscribers. Each site has been tailored to the population it serves. In the 
smallest sites, terminals provide around 13 lines in a village. Villagers then typically 
make calls at a payphone or in a local shop whose owner collects fees for service. 
Larger sites are designed to replace or extend the existing telephone network. Whereas 
villages of about 1000 people typically shared one or two rather unreliable lines, they 
will now have up to 16 new, and above all reliable, VSAT lines. The country also plans 
to implement distance learning over its VSAT network to provide enhanced teacher 
training around the country (Gifford, and Cosper, 1998).
7.5 Needs assessment
The analysis above has shown the wide coalition of actors in the development of 
telecommunications infrastructure in Ethiopia. Evidently there are conflicting interests 
amongst competing coalitions, and it is in the interests of allocative efficiency that the 
indigenous policy-makers coordinate these multivariate groups in the interest of 
national development. Whilst the ETC have begun to look at alternative ways to at least 
attempt to fulfil universal service objectives, they have yet to clearly outline an 
effective strategy. Nor are there plans, in the near future, to further deregulate the sector 
and allow greater competition.
Ethiopia, thus, continues to be poorly served by its existing telecommunications 
infrastructure. Much research points to the importance of telecommunications 
infrastructure for economic development (Saunders et al., 1988; Hardy, 1980; Hudson,
1997). Whilst the flow of causality is difficult to prove it is undeniable that a lack of 
telecommunications infrastructure hampers international and domestic commerce. 
Moreover with Ethiopia dependent on increasingly narrow channels of aid, the need to
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attract foreign investment becomes tantamount. However, foreign investment is 
unlikely to flow to countries with poor communications links to the global economy.
Nor can Ethiopia hope to compete in a new world of electronic commerce when the 
foundation of this new trading environment is an effective information infrastructure. 
Even if such new forms of economic commerce are deemed to be niche services, 
catering to only the industrialised countries, its impact on international trade in the near 
future will have serious implications for those countries which find themselves 
technologically disenfranchised (Castells, 1997b). With the telecommunications 
infrastructure the foundation of newer value added services such as the Internet, 
effective service provision is vital if Ethiopian policy-makers are to fully leverage the 
power of new information and communication technologies. In order to tackle such 
particular concerns as environmental and resource management, disaster prevention and 
education, policy-makers must design an information infrastructure that is firmly based 
on a set of strategic goals and developmental objectives.
The developmental objectives for the telecommunications infrastructure should 
encompass the following dimensions:
• the reform of the telecommunications sector to increase operational efficiency;
• extension of services to rural areas;
• the digitalisation of current networks;
• investment in new value-added services; and
• regulatory reform.
The direction of current Ethiopian telecommunications policy broadly mirrors the first 
four of these objectives, namely: the reform of the sector, the digitalisation of current 
networks, a planned extension to rural areas and investment in value added services. 
However, there is concern as to the commitment of the government to these objectives 
(Ruphael, 1995). Moreover, the government has yet to announce operationally feasible 
plans for establishing standards of interoperability. Nor has attention been paid to 
upgrading indigenous skills in the technical and operational management of domestic 
telecommunications services. Rather, Ethiopia, in common with its developing country
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counterparts, seems content to allow external actors to develop their information 
infrastructure in their own image.
(a) The reform of the telecommunications sector to increase operational efficiency
There has been a significant slowdown in the modernisation effort of the Ethiopian 
telecommunications network in the last few years. The legacy of continued 
mismanagement and lack of planning on the part of successive governments is that a 
large percentage of the country’s population has limited or no access to basic 
telecommunications services. What is required is an efficient policy and regulatory 
framework that is transparent, minimises instability and uncertainty, and fosters 
confidence in the country. There are a host of reform options open to Ethiopian policy­
makers in terms of deregulation, ranging from full-scale privatisation to regulatory 
reform. Given the socialist legacy of the country and the revenue generating 
capabilities of the sector, it is unlikely that the Ethiopian government will consider full 
privatisation of the sector; nor is this necessary. Rather, what is important is that the 
overall operational efficiency of ETC is maximised through improved financial 
performance, enhanced economic efficiency, and sustained improvements in the quality 
of service it provides to subscribers. Hence what is needed is extensive regulatory 
reform within the sector.
(b) Regulatory reform
The regulatory framework in Ethiopia, like the few remaining pre-reform-era countries, 
lacks authority and sufficient powers. There is a need for a new regulatory framework 
that encourages the liberalisation of the industry, and promotes competition, regional 
cooperation and globalisation. This regulatory framework has to be based on 
liberalisation and flexibility of policies in compliance to, and adherence with, 
prevailing international and regional regulations. In a country like Ethiopia that does 
not yet possess well-developed institutional capabilities, and has constantly been under 
prohibitive regulations of one kind or another, the design and implementation of a 
regulatory structure can be problematic. At the same time, the replication of existing 
regulatory regimes in other Sub-Saharan African countries is likely to lead to sub-
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optimalisation. Rather, what is needed is the application of a regulatory framework that 
represents a suitable fit with the context in which it is to be applied.
Once regulatory requirements are clearly identified and grouped, responsibility should 
be assigned to the appropriate administrative bodies who in turn will draft and 
administer the corresponding regulatory environment. Concomitantly there is a need for 
a national legal framework that clearly outlines the procedures to be followed by 
regulators. Without legislative authority and clearly defined procedures, a regulatory 
entity may have truncated jurisdiction and power, especially, in times of political 
instability. Thus, the administrators of this new regulatory environment should enjoy 
some degree of autonomy. Their accountability should be to the judiciary as opposed to 
the pragmatism of political expediency.
At the same time any such regulatory framework must be rigid enough to safeguard 
against commercial abuse whilst at the same time flexible enough so as not to stifle 
entrepreneurship and innovation. The rapid pace at which technology changes dictates a 
certain degree of flexibility in any proposed regulatory framework. Outdated regulatory 
frameworks inhibit initiatives from users as well as service providers for developing the 
industry. This has been the case in Ethiopia where the regulatory regime continues to 
monopolise the provision of Internet services.
(c) Structural reform
There is a need for greater liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in Ethiopia. 
The introduction of competition in the telecommunications sector can accelerate the 
implementation of new services and restricts the monopolistic definition of service 
prices (ITU, 1997c). More capital, both local and foreign, is attracted to a competitive 
market than a market where only a state monopoly is functioning. Competition speeds 
up the pace of change for the dominating operator, like the ETC, to become more 
commercial in orientation. Basing investment decisions on commercial criteria rather 
than political expediency. Policy-makers have expressed, albeit sotto voce that shares in 
ETC will eventually be available to the indigenous population and perhaps the foreign 
investment community. However, in order to attract the requisite levels of investor 
participation, investment security and efficiency of the sector are of paramount
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importance. To attract a reasonable amount of foreign investment, especially for long­
term infrastructure development, the country has to be competitive by ensuring a good 
rate of return, and reducing uncertainty as well as potential risk.
(d) Operational reform
Good management structure and practice, both at the macro-level and micro-level, are 
critical for the proper development of the telecommunications sector (West, 1997). At 
the macro-level, such issues as national telecommunications strategy, radio frequency 
spectrum, satellite orbit position, and national information infrastructure initiatives, 
have to be planned, drafted, and managed effectively. At the micro-level, there are a 
host of operational aspects that are critical to successful development ranging from the 
management of technology and human resources development to service development 
and marketing. Ethiopia’s many apparently conflicting infrastructural priorities make it 
essential for the creation of a management structure at both the macro-level and micro­
level to ensure that the effective development of the industry is guaranteed. A 
management structure and business practice based on sound engineering management 
and business administration principles should be instituted in the industry. Management 
at every level of the industry should aim at market growth, infrastructure development, 
customer satisfaction, quality of service, and achieving overall economic efficiency 
(Kiplagat, 1994).
The development of Ethiopia’s telecommunications infrastructure should be assessed 
primarily in relation to the overall economic and social development of the country. 
The external macroeconomic and political environment, as well as internal operational 
factors, have all played an important role in the development of the telecommunications 
sector. Despite the resource and policy constraints that the telecommunications sector 
has endured in the past, there has been progress. Ethiopia has a relatively efficient 
telecommunications services sector, affordable to thousands of citizens and a 
telecommunications administration run by an adequately trained, all-Ethiopian staff.
From the analysis of this chapter, it is clear that the most critical issue facing Ethiopia’s 
telecommunications industry is the huge gap between the demand for the most basic 
telecommunications service and the existing level of service provision. Other problems
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of increasing importance include quality of service and the demand for new services. 
The provision of efficient, adequate, and reliable telecommunications services requires 
the availability of adequate resources -  financial, human, and material. Overcoming the 
constraints described in this chapter is a prerequisite for modernising Ethiopia's 
telecommunications network and extending services to the rural areas. This will be a 
protracted process, calling for short-term measures to remove immediate hurdles and a 
long-term plan that takes into account the need for the sustainable development of local 
telecommunications manufacturing capabilities.
7.6 Information technology in Ethiopia
Information technology was first introduced in Ethiopia in 1961 when Ethiopian 
Airlines pioneered the application of information technology in its daily operation 
(Kebede, 1996). At the same time data processing was also introduced into the country 
when the Central Statistics Office began utilising data-processing equipment for the 
compilation of census statistics. The Ministry of Finance began in 1968, with budget 
and capital authorisation and payroll computerised in the period 1969 -  1976 (Kebede, 
1995, p. 93). Over the years, with the growth of the economy, the country has 
witnessed a concomitant rise in the number of computer installations, most notably in 
local satellites of international development agencies and in the major sectors of 
banking and telecommunications and airline transportation. Yet despite these early 
instances of information technology utilisation, the dissemination of computing 
technology as of 1999, is a very limited phenomenon in Ethiopia. According to 
Odedra's (1993) classification of the information technology sophistication of 
developing countries, Ethiopia is at the "initial-basic level" of computerisation. The 
information systems in use are mainly deployed for data and transaction processing, 
little hardware and software is produced locally, there are low levels of IT education 
and training and no policies or plans have been made for the computerisation of the 
public sector (Odedra, 1993, p. 113)
Whilst more advanced business applications such as decision support systems, and 
planning and decision-modelling tools are evident in some niches, on the whole 
computer installations in Ethiopia are clustered around data and transactional processes,
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and operational and management control systems. Moreover, local, wide and 
metropolitan area networking has yet to be adopted on a large scale. At the end of 1999, 
the use of information technology in Ethiopia appears to be very much the exception 
rather than the rule. It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of computer 
installations in the country, but according to a recent survey conducted by the UNDP 
there are between 20,000 and 30,000 units in Ethiopia, with approximately 500 home 
personal computers. The estimated growth rate is 50 -  60 personal computers (PCs) per 
month in the capital.97 The biggest customer in the PC market is the government which, 
through its central procurement agency, accounts for some 80 per cent of new PC 
purchases.98 The rapid economic growth in Ethiopia in the early 1980s saw a dramatic 
increase in the number of computer users and a concomitant rise in the number of firms 
offering computer-related services. The industry is still, however, plagued by unreliable 
maintenance services. Even where service facilities exist, replacement parts are often 
unavailable or prohibitively expensive. The quantity and range of spare parts are often 
insufficient and waiting times for imported spare parts are notoriously lengthy.
7.6.1 The Internet in Ethiopia
By 1995, Ethiopia had yet to develop its own national communications network and, 
for electronic mail use depended on a network established by the Pan African 
Development Information System (PADIS) based at UNECA. Established under the 
auspices of UNECA with funding from Canada's IDRC, the project was part of a wider 
capacity building initiative (CABECA) that was designed to establish low-cost 
store-and-forward Fido-based" electronic connectivity to some 24 African countries in 
the region. In Ethiopia the CABECA project established a node with a user base of over 
1000 users by 1995. By 1998, the PADIS e-mail system had attracted 2,600 subscribers 
-  20 per cent of whom lived outside the capital Addis Ababa -  who benefited from a 
highly subsidised and relatively efficient service linked to an ISP in the UK. This 
Fidonet network raised awareness, developed the human resource capacity in Ethiopia 
and established a large user base. A 1996 survey undertaken in Ethiopia, Uganda,
97 Forthcoming report on " UNDP Africa Internet Initiative: Current levels of Internet Usage in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia", New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa.
98 Ibid.
99 Fido is a public phone-based store and forward network which connects users with personal computers. Fido 
has proved effective for countries with a poor telecommunications infrastructure.
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Zambia and Senegal on the impact of electronic communication technology, under a 
project sponsored by IDRC, showed that academic and research institutions were able 
to conduct joint projects effectively, improve resource mobilisation and carry out 
research between distant sites inexpensively (Rorissa, 1996).
Another networking initiative operating in Ethiopia is HealthNet. Utilised exclusively 
by the medical community, users have access to health information via the HealthNet100 
satellite, part of an international project, SatelLife, based in the USA. The ground 
station in Ethiopia was licensed in April 1994 and the medical faculty library of Addis 
Ababa University is the national node. A number of health, research and training 
institutions are connected including the African Health Resources Institute library, the 
library of the National Health and Nutrition Research Centre and the National 
Computer and Information Centre (NCIC). The HealthNet link assists communication 
between health professionals and aims to expand medical knowledge to and within 
rural areas. In addition the NCIC also established a satellite node under the PADIS 
network which links a number of research and academic institutions in Ethiopia. The 
network, EthioNet, began in November 1995 and has generated over 20 institutional 
users, most located outside Addis Ababa. Institutions benefiting from this network 
include the majority of universities as well as the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce 
and the Science and Technology Commission. (Rorissa, 1996).
In May 1995, indigenous efforts to provide a domestic Internet provision were given a 
fillip by the formation of a technical and advisory committee to push for Internet 
provision by the ETC. The "Bring Internet to Ethiopia" or BITE group consisted of 
representatives from the Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority, the NCIC, Addis 
Ababa University, PADIS, UNDP, the Constitution Commission and the non­
government organisation sector. The group’s aim was to investigate the necessary steps 
to establishing an indigenous node for the country and, more importantly, to produce a 
working document to be delivered to government. The 80-page final working 
document, "Proposal for Internet Connectivity in Ethiopia",101 details the resources
100 Utilising FIDO technology the HealthNet uses radio technology instead of the public telecommunications 
network. Relying on Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) technology, this system has a free connection to a 
communications link that can send and retrieve information two to four times a day.
101 "Proposal for Internet Connectivity in Ethiopia", unpublished report available from UNECA, Addis Ababa.
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necessary to set up and maintain a national network and proposes an organisational 
framework within which Internet connectivity could be managed. One of the key 
recommendations is the setting up of a national public service network in Ethiopia that 
would expand as the telecommunication infrastructure develops and is able to 
accommodate data communications. Addis Ababa is envisaged as being the hub of the 
Ethiopian Internet network but its introduction would be primarily aimed at bringing 
vital information to locations where the development effort is most urgent. The report 
also recommends that a public network service provider be established to assist the 
broadest range of users. This public service network would be managed and operated 
on a non-profit basis, with the main objectives of serving the public and developing 
services. On completion of the report a detailed project proposal and action plan was 
submitted to the Ethiopian government.
The initial reactions to the proposals were positive and there were signs that its 
recommendations would be implemented. However, it soon became apparent that 
whilst the technical aspects of the BITE report were palatable to the government, 
ceding control to some non-governmental Internet management organisation was not.102 
The problem for the BITE group was that it was envisaged originally as being an 
independent autonomous and semi-permanent group that would advise government on 
matters of information infrastructure construction. But by recommending, amongst 
other things, competition in provision of Internet services it offended the government’s, 
and ETC’s, delicate sensibilities about ceding control (Da Costa, 1996). The security 
conscious mentality of the Ethiopian government is such that control of the flow of 
information is deemed essential to the survival of the regime. As Da Costa (1996) 
points out, this mentality, engendered under the former Marxist President Mengistu 
Haile Mariam, accounts in part, for the underlying wish of the current regime to control 
information. More pertinently, President Zenawi’s experiences of the Internet have 
probably been far from positive, with several Ethiopia-specific Internet discussion 
groups generating a lot of messages on the Internet attacking individuals in the 
government. Evidently, keeping such politically negative information out would 
necessitate total control of all indigenous Internet nodes, with strictly monitored
102 Personal communication to the author from UNECA staff.
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firewalls. Mirroring the attempts of other developing countries, such as Singapore, to 
control the flow of information on the Internet.103
Following the recommendations of the BITE group, and in the face of growing public 
demand for public Internet service provision, the ETC signed an agreement in 1997 
with the U.S. telecommunications company, Sprint, to bring full Internet connections to 
Ethiopia. However, rather than coexisting with the PADIS network, the only dial-up e- 
mail service to the Internet in the country, ETC ordered UNECA to cede its network 
provision to ETC. The PADIS network was effectively told to terminate its operations 
and was asked to hand over all relevant expertise and equipment to the 
telecommunications authority104; an acute indication of the unwillingness of the regime 
to devolve any responsibility for building the information infrastructure. It also reflects 
the regime’s desire to have total control over the flow of information within the country. 
Following ETC’s decision to establish itself as a network provider, there has been 
widespread dissatisfaction with the level and quality of service provision. The 
government underestimated the level of demand for the service and failed to adequately 
prepare for the complexities of Internet service provision.105
In July 1998, there were an estimated 2,600 Internet subscribers within Ethiopia, all 
based in the capital, Addis Ababa. The service is only available in Addis Ababa, but the 
public operator is in the process of adopting a local call tariff throughout the country 
for Internet calls. A survey of users conducted by the UNDP reveals that the majority of 
users emanate from UN-affiliated agencies and NGOs, embassies, SITA (the airline 
network) and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (UNDP, 1998a). It is evident that 
important sectors such as the agricultural sector, educational establishments and the 
public sector are either unaware or grossly under-informed as to the potential of 
computer-based information services. In reality, indigenous use of the Internet, as of 
1999, remains a rarity. Though some national institutions have access to the Internet, 
important local institutions, such as local government institutions and educational 
establishments, rank low in Internet usage terms.
103 "Intemet-Ethiopia: Information Control Slows Economic Development Business and Industry", Inter Press 
Service, 19 November 1997.
104 However, UNECA continues to operate an e-mail service (PadisNet) which has now been subsumed under 
the new Department of Information Services and Documentation (DISD).
105 "Ethiopia: Internet Center Suspends Login Inquiry Service", Source Express, 3 October 1998.
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The reasons behind the apparent poor take-up of Internet services in Ethiopia are clear 
cut. Firstly, high access cost remains a decisive factor for many. Under the PADIS 
network e-mail access for low-end users, who comprised nearly half of the users, 
averaged around US$10 to US$15 a month (Furzey, 1996). ETC was charging two to 
three times that amount for monthly subscription in 1998 (see Table 16 overleaf). This, 
combined with the high cost of telephone calls, has meant that the Internet remains an 
expensive luxury for the average Ethiopian. The estimated annual cost for Internet 
subscription in Ethiopia is US$ 384; more than Ethiopia’s GNP per capita. In a country 
where a university lecturer earns the equivalent of US$150 a month, these connection 
charges are exorbitant.
Secondly, despite the detailed technical recommendations contained within the BITE 
report, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation has failed to adequately prepare 
for the high level demand for Internet services. As a result, almost two years from 
inception, ETC continues to have problems providing dial-up and leased line services. 
The dial-up service is often busy or does not answer, necessitating at least 10 dials to 
obtain a connection, whilst leased line services have been promised for many months 
but have yet to be implemented.106
As Damena points out, Internet usage in Ethiopia is characterised by low quality of 
service, confined to a minuscule and often expatriate clique’ (Damena, 1996, p. 24). 
The United Nations Development Programme recently conducted a survey of a broad 
cross section of Internet users in Ethiopia as part of an assessment for their Africa 
Internet Initiative. Given that practically all current users of the Internet in Ethiopia 
connect through their workplace or institution, a sample of 30 such establishments were 
visited. In series of semi-structured interviews, interviewees were asked to provide their 
experiences of ETC’s Internet provision. Without fail, all interviewees were critical of 
the quality and extent of service. One respondent detailed how he had made over 70 
attempts to connect to the service before being successful. Another spoke of how his
106 "Ethiopia: Internet center suspends login inquiry service", Source Express, 3 October 1998.
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institution employed a member of staff to log on at five o’clock in the morning in order 
to avoid network congestion.107
Table 16: Rates and subscriptions for Internet services, July 1998
Subscriber Connection
(US$)
Monthly 
Fee (US$)
Charge Per 
Hour (US$)
Free Hours/ 
Month
Individual (reduced rate, 
student)
56 19 4 8
Individual normal rate 75 34 4 15
International, NGO’s, 
Embassies, and Business 
sectors
113 75 4 40
Public educational, 
health and agricultural 
sectors
38 25 2 40
All non-profit 
organisations
56 38 2 40
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation at http://www.telecom.net.et
Despite its seeming inability to provide an effective service, the ETC continues to rule 
out any competition in the domestic Internet service provision market. This ignores the 
mounting evidence that competition in the Internet providers’ market impacts positively 
on the level of prices and degree of Internet penetration within countries (ITU, 1997a). 
In Ethiopia, those favouring privatisation as a means of generating greater accessibility 
to information, say that the government monopoly over Internet services is 
incompatible with moves to increase Internet use in Africa.
107 Forthcoming report on " UNDP Africa Internet Initiative: current levels of Internet usage in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia", New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa.
303
In summary the main factors hampering the growth of Internet services in Ethiopia are:
• high connection costs;
• poor levels of service and coverage;
• lack of competition in the sector;
• poor telecommunications infrastructure;
• a chronic shortage of skilled networking professionals; and
• absence of appropriate public policies.
7.7 Main actors
An analysis of the spheres and degrees of influence of the various actors, shown in 
Table 17 overleaf, in information infrastructure development in Ethiopia reveals a 
contradictory and complex web of interactions that has led to both the strident 
promotion and government neglect of information infrastructure issues. Ethiopia has 
been fortunate in many respects in comparison with other Sub-Saharan African 
countries. The broadly constituted advisory group, BITE, produced the most detailed 
plans on information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa and actively 
lobbied government to act on their recommendations. Secondly, as the home to a vast 
array of international development organisations and a correspondingly high number of 
NGOs, it has been the beneficiary of their wider efforts to improve information 
infrastructure in Africa. For example, UNECA’s Africa Information Society Initiative is 
based in Ethiopia and is one of the most high profile Africa-specific development 
projects to promote information infrastructure. Additionally, Ethiopia benefited 
enormously from UNECA’s PADIS project, which introduced electronic networking to 
the country for the first time. At the same time, public pronouncements on national 
information infrastructure plans have been few and far between, and the dissemination 
of information technology is still hampered by a negative policy regime.
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Table 17: Actors, and their influence on the development of the Ethiopian IT
sector
Actor(s) Sphere(s) of Influence Degree of 
Influence
Government Regulation and public policy High
Government-funded institutions: 
Ethiopian Science and Technology 
Commission (ESTC), the National 
Computer and Information Centre, Addis 
Ababa University
Expert input into public policy, 
dissemination of public policy, 
research and development and 
provision of training
High
Development agencies: UNECA, USAID, 
World Bank
Development assistance, policy 
advice, technical knowledge and 
funding. Network provision 
through PADIS and other 
initiatives
High
ETC Internet service provider High
Foreign private sector:
PC manufacturers: IBM, Compaq etc. 
Sprint/Global One
Telecommunications equipment 
and network provision
Internet provision
Medium
Domestic private sector Retail of information technology, 
provision of training
Medium
Interest groups: BITE consortium Public policy advice, networking 
expertise
Low
7.7.1 Public policy: The role of the government and its agencies
Given Ethiopia’s turbulent past, the reasons for the dearth in information technology 
utilisation seem almost understandable. Typically policy-makers have viewed new 
technology with extreme suspicion. A "national threat" as opposed to a potential 
national asset, which had to be legislated against rather than encouraged (Damena, 
1996). The reasons for this attitude are complex and stem from a traditional resistance 
to technology and information sharing. As in many Sub-Saharan African countries, the
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resistance to new technology seems to stem from a protective culture on the part of 
those who make policy decisions (Woherem, 1993). The seeds of this resistance appear 
to have been sown in the ignorance and mystification of information technology at one 
extreme, and from fear of loss of power and control to the unknown, on the other 
(Damena, 1996). Consequently Ethiopia suffers from an underdeveloped culture 
towards information and information sharing at the governmental level. The level of 
penetration of information technology in the public sector is low and the application of 
computing is restricted to data and transaction processing systems, and operational and 
management control systems. However, the ruling EPRDF party has recognised, in its 
five-year programme, the importance of infrastructural development in promoting 
economic growth and facilitating integrated rural development.
More importantly, at senior government level a small group of electronic 
communication "champions" were instrumental in sensitising ministerial colleagues to 
the importance of a national network with full Internet connectivity (Furzey, 1996). 
Though it has yet to make any coherent and long-term plans for information 
infrastructure development, discussions are in progress to draft a policy framework 
within which a national network can be established.
Specifically, the government has relaxed the restriction on the importation of some
information technology appliances, and has implemented initiatives such as the
observation of a "national information day" to increase awareness of information
technology applications. These initiatives, whilst welcome, fall short of what is
necessary. A 1998 survey of the domestic information technology retail industry in
Addis Ababa, revealed widespread frustration at delays of up to a year for imports to 
108clear customs. There continues to be tremendous scarcity in terms of computer 
peripherals, educational materials, software, networking components such as modems, 
and trained professionals to sustain a steady growth of the sector. Whilst the Ethiopian 
government has been slow to announce any concrete plans for the development of its 
information infrastructure, it has been active through its funded institutions.
108 Forthcoming report "UNDP Africa Internet Initiative: Current levels of Internet usage in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia", New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa.
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(a) Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission
Attempts to address the issue of technology at the public policy level began in the early 
1970s, with the establishment of the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission 
(ESTC) in 1975. The commission was designed to be the principal public body 
deciding on issues relating to science and technology issues. Its raison d'etre was to 
create a conducive environment for the development of indigenous scientific and 
technological capacity within Ethiopia. A typical policy area within its remit is the 
evaluation and monitoring of imported technologies and identification of areas where 
indigenous technologies can be developed (Kebede, 1995: 87). Through the creation of 
a number of specific institutions under its aegis the ESTC is the most influential public 
sector institution in the field of national information infrastructure.
(b) The National Computer Committee
Established under the auspices of the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission 
in 1987, the remit of the committee is ostensibly to prepare policy statements on 
national information technology policy. But it also plays an important role in 
monitoring and controlling the evaluation of computer-related projects. The NCC is 
responsible for the approval of information technology products and makes decisions 
according to a number of criteria, namely: appropriate cost and foreign exchange 
criteria, availability of local maintenance facilities, software availability and 
compatibility, and upgradeability. Equally important objectives include: the conduct of 
research and development into information technology; the promotion and development 
of computer knowledge in the country; provision of maintenance and consultancy 
services; and human resource training through its national computer centre.
(c) National Computer and Information Centre (NCIC)
The NCIC is a semi-autonomous government institution operating under the overall 
direction of the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission. Since 1987 it has been 
responsible for promoting computer technology and information systems and services 
in the country. The objectives of the centre include:
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• capacity building at the national level in the areas of information systems and 
services, computer hardware and software training, consultancy and data 
communication;
• collecting, processing, analysing and organising information sources on science and 
technology to provide computer-based library and information services; and
• developing, strengthening and coordinating national and sectoral information 
systems to improve information sharing and data communication (Furzey, 1996).
The NCIC has achieved notable successes in the development of indigenous 
applications. It has been the guiding force in the development of a range of Amharic 
software, producing the Amharic operating system "AGAFARI" and creating the 
Amharic publishing system "MAHTEME". To make these operational under the MS- 
DOS operating system, the NCIC developed a peripheral device and printer codes for 
Amharic script and developed a range of Amharic keyboards. One of the key areas 
being actively addressed by the NCIC is the problem of information dissemination. To 
this end, it is developing a strategy to improve the information resources infrastructure 
particularly between the federal states and the central government. The NCIC has 
played a pivotal role in increasing the capacity for information sharing amongst 
academic institutions. Prior to the introduction of full Internet connectivity the NCIC 
utilised a satellite node of the PADIS network in order to link, for the first time, 25 
institutions that had hitherto been isolated by geography.
One of the key recommendations of the BITE report was the creation of a full Internet 
hub, based at the University of Addis Ababa campus, which would form the nucleus of 
a phased expansion toward a national network academic and research network, linking 
ESTC’s 18 national research centres (BITE, 1996). However, due to a lack of funds 
these plans were indefinitely postponed. Since the cessation of the PADIS network, 
ESTC now utilises ETC’s Internet service, and has been granted permission to act as a 
service provider for linked institutions. Yet repeated requests for a dedicated leased line 
to the public switched network have, as of 1999, remained unfulfilled. If and when the 
link is approved it is not envisaged that undergraduate students will have access to this 
academic network due to the limited resources of universities (Adam, 1996). Even 
though the ETC has reduced prices for public institutions, the costs are still so high 
relative to budgets available that many subscriptions have lapsed and others are only
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used for urgent communications. Consequently, while the ESTC has done a 
commendable job of increasing awareness of the potential of electronic networking, 
prohibitive connection costs militate against the effective exploitation of the resources 
and services made available through the network.
(d) The Commission for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
The Commission for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (CDPP) recognised the 
need for computer networking in 1994, to integrate early warning, relief transport 
operations, air services and food-aid management in line with the national strategy of 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness. The Commission has been implementing a 
management information strategy based on a wide area network, integrating three 
independent networks based in Addis Ababa. The long-term objective is to develop a 
networking structure, which systematically integrates the ports, warehouses, and the 
various CDPP departments to enable access to data and information both by the CDPP 
and regional bureaux, partners in the UN system, donors and NGOs through 
establishing a common database.
(e) Addis Ababa University (AAU)
Addis Ababa University is the key academic institution in the country and a major user 
of international data communication networks. The • university, with considerable 
support from the Ethiopian Scientific Society (ESS) in the U.S. and UNECA, has 
developed a university-wide network, inter-connecting many stand-alone computers 
into local area networks (LANs). Over 18 departments are actively involved and the 
university has its own networking committee. According to the recommendations for 
AAU departmental computer networking109 a university-wide network with 
international connectivity will be established through a phased approach. The 1998 
appointments of a new university president and Academic Vice-President who is also 
the Chair of the University Networking Committee are likely to promote and champion 
existing initiatives in the belief that the university has much to contribute to regional,
109 Nemo Semret, http://www.ctr.columbia.edu/~nemo/ESS. Accessed March 1998.
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sub-regional and African networking. The university is also a partner in the 
InfoDev/World Bank African Virtual University project, which may provide some 
resources for student access to the Internet.
7.7.2 Development agencies
Stepping into the policy vacuum, which should be filled by government, development 
agencies are major players in the development and diffusion of information 
infrastructure in Ethiopia. The country has benefited enormously from the presence of a 
large number of development agencies based in Addis Ababa. It is host to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa which was established in Addis Ababa in 
1960 to spearhead and coordinate the efforts of the United Nations in Africa. At the 
same time, in the aftermath of a series of highly publicised environmental and human 
disasters, the country is host to a multitude of non government organisations, dealing 
with issues ranging from famine prevention to AIDS Prevention. From a practical 
standpoint UNECA has played a crucial part in the development of networking in 
Ethiopia. Most development agency initiatives being conducted locally fall into one of 
two categories:
• Practical development assistance: namely developing local area networks that 
facilitate institutional and inter-institutional computer and information resources 
sharing and communication. Examples of this are the PADIS, CABECA, TINET, 
IGADD and RTNS projects. Practical assistance is also offered in developing the 
user base and promoting optimal utilisation of the networks through training users 
and system operators.
• Policy advice: The last five years has seen a mushrooming of activities designed to 
improve awareness in Ethiopia of the importance of information and 
communication technologies. UNECA is spearheading the most high profile of 
these initiatives, the African Information Society Initiative (AISI). This is designed 
to harness the use of information and communication technologies for development 
with an emphasis on the participation of all stakeholders. As a result UNECA, in 
partnership with other development agencies, has held a series of high profile
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conferences and workshops designed to sensitive policy-makers to the importance 
of information infrastructure.
These development agencies have played and continue to play, a crucial role in the area 
of technological transfer. Through a number of key projects, above all the PADIS 
project, organisations such as UNECA, UNDP and USAID have been instrumental in 
the setting up of networks and raising awareness of the importance of information and 
communication technologies in Ethiopia. Development agencies have also been 
instrumental in improving the level of skilled information and communication 
technology specialists in Ethiopia. For example, the School for Information Studies in 
Africa (SISA) was established in 1990 by the IDRC and UNESCO to help southern and 
eastern African countries build indigenous capacity for human resources in the 
information sciences. The institution now offers a Masters degree program in 
information sciences for students from eastern and southern Africa and a Bachelor 
degree program for Ethiopians.
7.7.3 The Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation
The Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) exercises total control over 
Internet services in the country. As the only Internet Service Provider (ISP) ETC 
controls probably the most salient proxy of information infrastructure. As there are no 
immediate plans to allow competition in this sector the ETC wields a disproportionate 
level of influence in the development of information technology infrastructure in 
Ethiopia.
7.7.4 The domestic private sector
The almost total dominance of foreign suppliers in the information technology market 
in Ethiopia leads to a vestigial role for the domestic computer manufacturing industry. 
Though local assembly of computers is increasing and local software houses are 
becoming more and more commonplace, most companies source their information 
technology requirements from abroad. Most software in usage in Ethiopia, by both 
government and private sector, is pirated. Though no official statistics exist, 90 per cent 
of the interviewees questioned in a UNDP survey of information technology usage in
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Ethiopia, had no qualms in admitting that they engaged in software piracy (UNDP, 
1998a). The main domestic drivers of information technology usage in the private 
sector are the Central Bank of Ethiopia, and Ethiopian Airlines. Given the nature of 
their businesses, both organisations are intensive users of information technology. 
However, neither is particularly advanced in comparison to other Sub-Saharan African 
countries. For example, in 1998 the Central Bank of Ethiopia had yet to introduce a 
wide area network between its Addis Ababa branch and its branches outside the capital. 
The private sector is also an increasingly important sector in human resource training. It 
has responded quickly to the growing demand for basic computer training in software 
applications. For example, most computer retailers now offer information technology 
courses in popular software applications. But the number one complaint amongst 
retailers remains the lengthy import process that can result in goods clearing customs a 
year after first entry. In addition, the inherent difficulty of sourcing correct spare parts 
has significantly hampered the growth of the PC repair and service industry (Kupkes, 
1996).
Reflecting the large diaspora in the USA, there is also an active Ethiopian Scientific 
Society, (ESS) which is based in Washington which has held a series of annual 
conferences on information and communication technologies. One of the goals of ESS 
is to encourage collaboration among technical experts in Ethiopia or abroad on projects 
that would contribute to development in Ethiopia.
7.8 Constraints to the growth of the information technology sector
The major problems facing the expansion of information technology in Ethiopia are:
• The policy vacuum in the sphere of national information technology policy, import 
restrictions and outdated government policies towards the sector.
• The scarcity of experienced and skilled software and management personnel trained 
in information technology.
• The macroeconomic environment which has resulted in a small and weak middle 
class with very low purchasing power for such items as computers and information 
goods.
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• Infrastructural deficiencies, namely a weak and expensive telecommunication 
infrastructure, which has hampered the growth of information networks and an 
erratic electricity supply.
• The lack of an information culture.
Having already discussed the reasons for the lack of and effectiveness of government 
policy in the area of information technology development, the next biggest constraint to 
information technology diffusion is the lack of skilled personnel.
(a) Lack of skilled personnel
In order to maximise value added from information infrastructure, a fundamental 
reappraisal of capabilities is required. This calls for an increase in expenditure on 
human resources; precisely the opposite of what is happening in the majority of 
developing countries (UNESCO, 1998). The basic characteristics of these technologies 
all point to an indelible fact. To be an effective user of them requires skills and 
capabilities that far exceed those received from the simple importation of sophisticated 
technology (Grant, 1996; Odedra, 1990b). Gaining access may be a first step, but it 
only leads to static efficiencies; what is necessary is dynamic gains. These will only 
arise through a long interactive process of leaming-by-doing, where the user-producer 
relation plays a crucial role (Cassiolato, 1997).
The introduction of information technology training in Ethiopia has generally coincided 
with the importation of computing equipment. Thus the earliest forms of training were 
normally for proprietary equipment by companies such as NCR and BURCO in the late 
1960s (Kebede, 1993). Since this period Ethiopia has gradually begun to develop a 
small but competent base of qualified computer professionals. The quality of technical 
training in the country is low but slowly improving. The number of professionals 
trained in areas of computer science and information technology is growing due to 
improved training opportunities and also due to an increase in the number of Ethiopians 
returning to their country after extended periods abroad. While these are very positive 
trends, technical skills in computer science and information technology are still scarce. 
Although the overall level of computer literacy in Ethiopia is low, as more private
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businesses and public institutions are becoming computerised, the demand for 
competent computer users is rapidly escalating.
Whilst there has been an appreciable increase in the number of qualified personnel 
during the last decade, the current level and quality of expertise available in the 
information and communication related fields is far from adequate (Adam, 1995). 
Rather, shortages of skilled information and communication technologists have 
militated against many information technology initiatives in the country. In an attempt 
to resolve this skills crisis the Ethiopian government has sought to build institutional 
capacity to improve and increase the existing human resource levels in the country. The 
main providers of computer training are the Ethiopian Science and Technology 
Commission (ESTC), Addis Ababa University, ETC, the CABECA project and the 
private sector. The academic and research institutions are the main source of experts in 
the field of data communications and networking, while the private sector is meeting 
the demand for basic application training in word processing, spreadsheet and database 
use (Rorissa, 1996). The largest single training provider in the country, the ESTC, 
began to offer a wide range of accredited courses at different levels in 1988. The 
commission has a good reputation and is well respected in the country. It has a software 
research department for developing Amharic applications110 and a strong maintenance 
and repair department. A wide range of courses are also offered by the computer 
department based at Addis Ababa University. The University has been offering a range 
of courses and training programmes in computer science since 1986, which are run by 
the faculty of Mathematics’ Computer Department. However, further development of 
additional training courses is needed so that graduates from the university can become 
both computer and network literate. Meanwhile, the ETC is using its Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Training Institute (ETTI) to provide Internet training courses for 
users in aspects ranging from basic introductory courses to more advanced website 
development.
Considerable resources are needed to support the efforts of academic institutions in 
Ethiopia to develop skilled resources in communication engineering and computer
110 Amharic is the official working language of the government and is spoken by the majority of the population 
in addition to their mother tongue.
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science. Considering the future needs of the country, emphasis should be given to 
developing a national computing science curriculum and the establishment of a faculty 
or department in computer science. Data communication, networking and 
communications engineering should be developed at higher education institutes to 
underpin and assist the growth of the industry and telecommunications sectors (Furzey, 
1996). In the long-term, human resource development needs cannot be fulfilled without 
diffusion of knowledge to younger generations and a national strategy for the 
computerisation of high schools, training centres, and colleges should be developed.
In the public sector, staffing levels are often adequate to handle only routine data 
processing tasks using accounting packages that may have been modified and are 
maintained in-house. In such an environment, there is little time or incentive to engage 
in original software development aimed at extending or intensifying the degree of 
computerisation. However, the problem arising from inadequate staffing is not the 
result of a lack of trained personnel, but more a lack of highly skilled computer 
specialists. The problems facing data processing departments are, according to 
Nwachuku (1992), low status, lack of management support, poor staffing levels, and 
lack of cooperation bordering on outright hostility from departments "in danger" of 
computerisation’ (Nwachuku, 1992, p. 63). As a result, there exists a severe under 
utilisation of computing equipment as well as low productivity amongst staff.
(b) Macroeconomic environment
The huge sums involved in funding the ongoing internecine civil war with Eritrea 
continue to divert resources away from national development. Though Ethiopia has 
made significant strides towards market liberalisation and has achieved commendable 
growth rates in GDP over the period 1995 to 1998, its economy is still delicately 
poised. Attempts to diversify the economy have as yet failed to lessen the country’s 
dependence on agricultural exports such as coffee, cotton and oilseeds and the 
hallucinogenic drug Khat. Reliant on agriculture for more than 80 per cent of its GDP, 
the country now finds itself hostage to the vagaries of weather systems that determine 
the viability of national crops. Such a fragile economy has not been conducive to 
national income growth. Following the devaluation of the birr in 1995, the GDP per
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capita in dollars was only US$40 (in 1995). This has prohibited the vast majority of the 
population from information technology products that remain very much a luxury.
(c) Infrastructural Deficiencies
An acute problem that continues to affect the use of information technology arises from 
the erratic provision of electricity in Ethiopia. The supply of energy is restricted to the 
large cities and some of the smaller surrounding towns. Some of the rural towns only 
have electricity supplied for a limited number of hours per day. Power interruptions are 
frequent, and it invariably takes several hours to restore the electricity supply. During 
periods of drought there is a shortage of hydroelectric power and large areas of Addis 
Ababa are deliberately shut off from electricity for one day per week. Due to power 
fluctuations computer users are forced to buy additional equipment, such as adapters 
and power surge protectors to protect sensitive equipment, adding significantly to the 
cost of computing.
(d) Socio-cultural factors
One of the major constraints to the spread of information technology has been linguistic 
diversity. Though the Science and Technology Commission has managed to develop 
Amharic keyboards and an Amharic operating system and software, other minority 
languages utilise different alphabetic scripts. Information technology use is further 
constrained by educational levels. Though Ethiopia enjoys a relatively high literacy rate 
of 66 per cent, thanks to the government’s enlightened policy of free education, the 
majority of the population have enjoyed only a few years of primary education 
(UNESCO, 1998). National levels of computer literacy remain virtually non-existent, 
as computer literacy remains the reserve of a tiny minority at universities and colleges, 
and those who can afford tuition offered by the private sector. Nor have the lack of 
library facilities, inadequate resources for journals and books, poor documentation and 
archive collections, and central resource sites, helped to overcome the lack of 
information sharing. Public libraries are small in number and poor in quality. 
Information in public or ministry libraries is out of date and usually are not available to 
the public. As Benalfew argues in Ethiopia, tfor] researchers, historians, private
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enterprises and various individuals and organisations, information is something to be 
won in a battle, not with guns but usually through "connections" (Benalfew, 1999, p. 
1). Though Ethiopia is a prodigious producer of information, getting access to archives 
can prove a formidable task. Benalfew (1999) conveys this frustration succinctly:
First, you don’t know where to look, as there is no public information, and even 
if you know where it is, there is no proper cataloguing. Second, the information 
is deposited irregularly. Many research results are not found in the right place 
and in the right order and number, thereby endangering their safety as well as 
their future availability and accessibility (Benalfew, 1999, p. 1).
The inadequate facilities and difficulties of accessing information have led to low 
expectations, and a consequent under utilisation of the existing information 
resources.111 The lack of access to relevant information is acknowledged as a major 
factor affecting the success and quality of research and development activities, trade 
and industry.112 At the same time there is a critical need for greater evaluation and 
monitoring of government action. There is fundamental need for checks against 
government failure, and in general for greater transparency.
The paucity of accurate data collections and archive material has an obvious knock-on 
effect on development planning, which appears to be done without accurate statistics. 
Poor information systems for macroeconomics and sectoral policy formulation and 
monitoring, impinge upon the ability of policy-makers to accurately forecast or even 
plan for the immediate future. For example, government statistics on the agricultural 
sector invariably throw up interdepartmental inconsistencies between the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Regional Agriculture Development Bureaux and the Central Statistics 
Authority (CSA). Or the livestock data of the International Livestock Research Centre 
and CSA both provide differing figures on the size of the agricultural sector in 
Ethiopia. This lack of access to reliable information also extends to the private sector. 
According to Berhane Mewa, president of the Ethiopian Private Industries Association,
111 Adam, L (1995) Draft Proposal for Internet Networking in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa: UNECA.
112 Editorial note, Nastis Newsletter, National Computer and Information Centre, ESTC, December 1995.
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Information is considered a privilege and not a right’.113 Benalfew (1999) reveals the 
frustrating route that an information seeker must tread in Ethiopia:
The scenario of access to information is that in most places, they don’t have 
information desks, and even if they have one, it will be limited to giving 
information on office numbers -  only if you manage to mention the appropriate 
department. After you get to the right place, nobody is willing to talk to you 
first of all. If you are seeking information, you will be referred to somebody 
else, and this may go on until you are finally told that it is difficult to give out 
the information you’re looking for. It will take days, if not weeks, depending on 
the type of information you require, before you get it officially. Of course, you 
always have the option to get what you want through the back door. Nor does 
the educational system provide adequate knowledge and techniques on how to 
receive and disseminate accurate and up-to-date information. Children are thus 
brought up in a society where information is a "forbidden fruit" (Benalfew, 
1999, p. 6).
Some authors have pointed specifically to a different "African" mentality towards 
information. For example, Owomoyela (1996) argues that, 'African culture tends to be 
less individualistic or rationalistic than most western cultures. The idea that information 
should be freely accessible to everyone whenever required is a new concept in most 
African settings. The withholding of information has, up to this time, been the 
dominant mode of maintaining power' (Owomoyela, 1996, p. 112).
The reasons behind the low level of information sharing in Ethiopia are due in part to 
the lack of information-sharing facilities and the poor level of communications, but also 
to the repercussions arising from Ethiopia's recent history. An article by Sutton (1994) 
provides an illuminating example of the effects of the civil war on the cultural attitude 
towards telecommunications in Ethiopia's neighbour, Eritrea. Sutton found that 30 
years of isolation, war, and espionage have meant that amongst Eritreans, the telephone 
is still associated with the murky world of spying and espionage, that 'for years the 
telephone was regarded with extreme suspicion by the ordinary Eritrean'. She goes on
113 Quoted in Benalfew, 1999, p. 7.
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to point out that ’even [in 1999] telephone requests to pass messages on or to provide 
data are often met with a refusal. Information is relayed by hand on tiny scraps of paper 
painstakingly tom from scarce notepads and business is largely a face-to-face affair 
conducted over endless cups of tea and pleasantries’ (Sutton 1994, p. 33). Though 
Ethiopia is vastly more developed than Eritrea, there are parallels with Eritrea in the 
lack of a culture of information sharing. The period of Marxist-Leninist rule under 
Mengistu undermined community relations and led to a lack of trust.114 The managing 
director of one of the companies interviewed in a UNDP survey of the information 
technology sector bemoaned the lack of cooperation amongst information technology 
vendors that is so common in developed countries (UNDP, 1998a).
Amongst the military junta in Ethiopia there is more than a lingering suspicion of 
computing and the access to information it brings. For example, there was a widespread 
lack of awareness of the Year 2000 issue in Ethiopia. The government had done next to 
nothing to test the compliance of the thousands of computers strewn through its 
ministries. Nor had it endeavoured to sensitise the private sector as to the potential 
pitfalls that it may see in the new millennium. Rather, it has been left up to the 
developing agencies, namely the World Bank, to hold workshops and increase 
awareness about compliance and critical systems. There is a widespread feeling that the 
level of computerisation in Ethiopia is so low that any impact felt would be minuscule. 
Indeed, some interviewees in a UNDP survey of information technology in Ethiopia 
said that the Year 2000 problems were not an issue as, according to the Ethiopian 
calendar it would only be 1993. The attitude of the government as well as the private 
sector appears to be a mixture of indifference and ignorance. For example, the state 
minister for higher education Abel Rwendeire, was recently quoted in a magazine 
calling for a national ban on the importation of computers that are not Year 2000 
compliant.115
114 "Intemet-Ethiopia: information control slows economic development business and industry", Inter Press 
Service, 19 November 1997, p. 32.
115 "Ethiopia susceptible to Millennium Bug" Addis Tribune, 26 June 1998, p. 6.
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7.9 Needs assessment: Ethiopian information technology policy objectives
The goal of any information infrastructure policy in developing countries must be, first 
and foremost, to support national developmental goals. One of the key factors in 
allowing policy-makers to be effective decision-makers is access to timely and relevant 
information. Greater strategic use of information technology in the public sector can 
help in this endeavour. By utilising information technology, the efficiency of the 
delivery of public services can be improved. The level of technology introduction into 
the state’s operations must of course be commensurate with the capacity of the state and 
the current technology level in the country. National databases of different data must be 
organised and made available to policy-makers, the public and potential foreign 
investors. The systematic collection of such national data can improve the effectiveness 
of the public sector and reduce administrative costs. At the same time access to timely 
information can improve Ethiopia’s ability to manage its fragile environment and 
increase its agricultural efficiency.
The above review of the existing capabilities of Ethiopia in information technology 
reveals an industry increasingly left to develop on its own. The reduction of 
government intervention in the importation of computers is welcome but the lack of 
concrete proposals in such key areas as education does not bode well for long-term 
dynamics. This thesis is underpinned by a theoretical framework, which places public 
policy at the centre of a world in which information and communication technologies 
appear increasingly important. However, the Ethiopian government is doing little to 
create domestic capabilities in this field.
7.10 Summary
The above case study of the Ethiopia information infrastructure has shown the extent of 
its underdevelopment. Within the telecommunications sector, despite the early 
introduction of service in 1896, only 100,000 lines had been added a century later. 
Since then, however, the government has implemented a number of ambitious 
development plans which had managed to double the existing capacity of the network. 
Moreover, the public telecommunications operator is profitable and relative to other
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African countries, well managed. However, the government has yet to full deregulate 
the sector and the country still subsists with a public network that covers only a small 
of the population.
The primary need for Ethiopia in the area of information infrastructure development is 
for long-term coordinated and consistent national public policy. In the information 
technology sector hardware and software are being acquired by different organisations 
with little coordination and planning. Such ad hoc acquisition and use of information 
and communications technology militates against effective utilisation and reduces the 
developmental potentiality of the technology. Government must introduce a legal 
framework to protect intellectual property rights, simplify information technology 
acquisition procedures, and institute a positive fiscal stance towards information 
infrastructure activities. What is required is public policy that promotes, structures and 
supports the orderly development of information technology.
This chapter has provided an in-depth analysis of the information infrastructure in 
Ethiopia in terms of the telecommunications and information technology sectors. It has 
provided a review of existing capabilities, identified short-term needs, and pointed to a 
strategy to achieve longer-term objectives. The chapter has also identified the key 
actors in the development of information infrastructure in Ethiopia and assessed the 
sphere and degree of influence they exert on the creation of information infrastructure.
Given the political and economic instability that have been typical of Ethiopia since 
1970 it is unsurprising that the current level of sophistication of the country’s 
information infrastructure is inadequate. With over 80 per cent of the country living in 
rural, often inaccessible areas, the vast majority of Ethiopians are reliant on the 
traditional forms of communication, and national usage of information technology, 
even in government, is limited. Given the structural problems facing the country it is 
vital that the indigenous information infrastructure is upgraded. The long-term solution 
to Ethiopia’s seemingly intractable problems lies in the creation of an effective 
information infrastructure that furnishes policy-makers with timely and accurate 
information. This information in turn will improve the capacity of government to 
manage such information-intensive issues as environmental deterioration and 
demographic management.
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CHAPTER 8
An Assessment of Information Infrastructure in Nigeria
8.1 Introduction
Despite its abundance of natural resources Nigeria has consistently failed to fulfil its 
potential as the economic giant of Sub-Saharan Africa. Rather, its post-colonial history 
has been typified by political and economic instability, to such an extent that living 
standards for all but a tiny elite have not improved since 1960 (UNDP, 1998a). With 
less than 10 years of civilian rule since independence, successive military regimes have 
been typified by policy inconsistency and short-termism resulting in economic 
mismanagement. This ad hoc approach to national development has led to an 
inadequate level of public infrastructure provision. This inadequacy is so pronounced 
that it is seen as an obstacle to national development and a constraint on economic 
growth. In this atmosphere of political instability and financial weakness it is 
unsurprising that Nigeria has yet to tackle the subject of information infrastructure with 
any serious conviction.
While the government has finally begun to deregulate the telecommunications sector, it 
has yet to announce concrete and operationally feasible plans to upgrade its information 
infrastructure. The approach of this chapter is to analyse the forces that are influencing 
the construction of information infrastructure in Nigeria. This framework 
conceptualises the activities of the identified main actors in terms of two key 
dimensions: sphere of influence and degree of influence. Specifically this chapter 
analyses the Nigerian information infrastructure in terms of the telecommunications 
and information technology sectors.
8.2 National context
Nigeria remains one of Africa’s most influential countries blessed with vast oil reserves 
and unique human resources. It represents Africa’s most populous state with a 
population estimated at around 100 million and the capacity for enormous prosperity
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and regional leadership. However, the country has consistently failed to live up to its 
potential, embodying both the worst and best aspects of typical development 
trajectories in Sub-Saharan Africa. British conquest brought together, within Nigeria’s 
borders, a wide range of cultures and ethnic groups. This colonial "unity", however, 
was a top-down authoritarian creation (Garba, 1995). In spite of the efforts of the 
nationalist movement for independence to foster a sense of national identity, the 
continued existence of ethnic and religious cleavages have meant that building a nation 
based on popular political participation remains a work-in-progress.
Despite the recent transition to a civilian government, the Nigerian economy continues 
to be plagued by political uncertainty, corruption, and poor macroeconomic 
management. Nigeria’s military rulers have failed to make significant progress in 
diversifying the economy away from a dependence on the capital intensive oil sector 
which provides more than half of the country’s GDP, 95 per cent of foreign exchange 
earnings, and about 80 per cent of budgetary revenues (CBN, 1997). Officials also 
appear divided on how to redress fundamental economic imbalances that result in 
persistent inflationary pressure and the discouragement of foreign investment. The 
government’s resistance to initiating greater transparency and accountability in 
managing the country’s multibillion dollar oil earnings continues to limit economic 
growth and prevent an agreement with the IMF and bilateral creditors on debt relief 
(EIU, 1999). The largely subsistence agricultural sector has failed to keep up with rapid 
population growth, and Nigeria, once a large net exporter of food, now must import 
food to feed its growing population.
8.3 The telecommunications network
In recognition of the importance of a national telecommunications network the Federal 
government of Nigeria formed a partnership with Cable and Wireless in 1962 to create 
Nigerian External Telecommunications Limited (NET). In 1972 the Nigerian 
government bought out Cable and Wireless’ 49 per cent holding and provided external 
telecommunications services to the populace. NET was a self-financing parastatal 
which, apart from monitoring by the Ministry of Communications, enjoyed relative 
autonomy from the state. Internal telecommunications traffic was transmitted and
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controlled by the Posts and Telecommunications Department which remained a 
department within the Ministry of Communications and depended wholly on the state 
for funding. The existence of these two separate bodies led to a duplication of 
investment and allocative inefficiency (ADCG, 1998).116 Moreover, the lack of 
coordination between the two organisations, which had very different objectives, did 
not augur well for the creation of an efficient national telecommunications network.
In an attempt to reduce these inconsistencies, Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL) 
was established in 1985 to provide more efficient telecommunications services to all of 
the states in Nigeria. On 25 March NITEL became a commercialised public limited 
company. As of 1998, the Nigerian telecommunications sector comprises the Federal 
Ministry of Communications (FMOC) as the supervising authority, the Nigerian 
Communications Commission (NCC) as the regulatory agency, and NITEL pic, 
currently the only public telecommunications operator. It also includes private 
commercial operators offering telecommunications services like private network links, 
fixed and mobile cellular services, voice mail and paging services. There are also 
telecommunications equipment vendors and manufacturers. The FMOC, as the 
supervisory agency through the NCC, sets goals for the overall development of the 
sector, monitoring performance and improving the regulatory environment.
The public telecommunications network is structured into four levels: The first level, 
the international level, consists of three digital and one analogue satellite earth stations, 
with current capacity of 7500 international trunks to other countries. The second level 
of the PSTN hierarchy consists of six digital secondary switching centres, while the 
third and fourth levels, representing infrastructures for regional traffic and local traffic, 
are made up of 49 primary centres and 195 local exchanges (ADCG, 1998). Total 
telecommunications capacity in Nigeria has risen to approximately 780,000 lines with 
about 15,000 cellular telephones (NITEL, 1998). There are some 14 telex exchanges 
with a total installed capacity of 12,800 and 20 voice frequency telegraph terminals.
116 For example there was no effective means of compelling subscribers to settle their international bills, and 
revenue sharing between the two bodies proved overly complicated.
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In terms of the telecommunications transmission system there were 264 microwave 
terminal stations and 172 unmanned repeater stations in 1998. In addition fibre optic 
cables were developed to link primary and secondary telephone exchanges in the 
capital city, Lagos. In addition Nigeria operates a domestic satellite system by leasing 
three transponders from INTELSAT, which are serviced by 19 earth stations. Initially 
these transponders were under-utilised: mainly being used for television transmission 
for only a few hours daily. However, they are now utilised for both television and 
telephony. There is a submarine cable link that provides a transmission system from 
Lagos through Abidjan, Dakar, and Casablanca to Europe. In terms of international 
telecommunications transmission there are two gateways at Lanlate and Kujama linked 
to switching centres at Lagos and Kaduna respectively. In 1992 two new gateways were 
commissioned -  one at Victoria Island, Lagos to cater for the ever increasing traffic in 
the South West and the other in Enugu to cater for the traffic in the Eastern part of the 
country.
8.3.1 Scope of national service
Nigeria's telecommunications services -  especially telephony -  are not sufficient to 
meet the needs of all those who require them, especially in the big cities such as Lagos, 
Ibadan, Enugu and Kano. This has led to long waiting periods for obtaining facilities 
(the average was above 10 years in 1993) and congestion of existing exchanges. New 
telecommunications facilities such as facsimile, international business services, and 
high-rate data transmission are not readily available. The quality of the service is 
regarded generally as unsatisfactory from both the technical and the customer service 
points of view. Line quality is characterised by frequent failure, especially in the case 
of the older analogue exchanges and trunks, while customer services are notable for 
frequent disconnections, irregular and often inaccurate billing, and a poor credit control 
system (ADCG, 1998). Nigeria's telephone penetration rate was still low, in 1994, at 
about eight direct exchange lines (DELs) per thousand inhabitants (ADCG, 1998). Its 
major challenge in extending its facilities continued to be the provision of 
telecommunication services in the rural areas, where there is little or no penetration. In 
the mid-1990s, however, the telecommunications facilities in the urban areas continued 
to be inadequate as well. Nevertheless, in recent years, attempts were made by the
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Nigerian authorities to spread the telecommunications facilities throughout the country, 
and in the mid-1990s all the 21 state capitals as well as the new capital, Abuja, and 
many of the 589 local government headquarters were connected to the national 
network. Over the period 1985 to 1995 an estimated 300,000 new telephone lines were 
added to the public network. Rural exchanges were installed in some states in order to 
extend telecommunications services to smaller, geographically dispersed communities; 
under the Rural Communications Service (RCS), the official policy name given to 
governmental efforts to broaden telecommunications services to the rural areas.
Table 18: Statistics of the Nigerian Public Switched Telephone Network
Service 1992 1993 1994 1995
International
(No. of paid minutes in millions)
52.6 40.4 44.3 106.8
Domestic
(No. of trunk calls in millions)
1,298,3 1,798.5 2,277.4 2,611.5
Total connected lines 320,934 363,285 368,066 405,073
Network capacity 494,663 505,780 592,826 597,325
No. on waiting list 263,879 231,357 194,793 n/a
Source: CBN (1995) Annual Report and Statement of Accounts and Ministry of Communications
Digest 1992-1995.
8.3.2 Pattern of telecommunications traffic
Despite declining standards of living for almost 99 per cent of the population (EIU, 
1998), NITEL continues to enjoy consistent growth in telecommunications traffic. 
International traffic rose to 106.8 million paid minutes in 1995. Similarly internal 
traffic rose from 1.3 billion units in 1992 to 2.6 billion units in 1995 (ADCG, 1998). 
However, as shown in Table 18 above, the number of those on the official waiting list 
has declined only slightly. It is estimated that about 45 per cent of international traffic 
generated by Nigeria is directed toward continents other than Africa. 40 per cent of this
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large traffic volume terminates in the United Kingdom, which has had a long-standing 
historic and economic bond with Nigeria. About 30 per cent of the traffic from Nigeria 
is now directed toward North America, a reflection of the growing trade relations 
between the two and the large Nigerian diaspora. Although there are terrestrial 
networks linking Nigeria with its neighbours, most of these networks are either non- 
operational or frequently unavailable (ADCG, 1998).
8.3.3 Constraints to Network Growth
Historically the telecommunications network in Nigeria has experienced a number of 
problems that continue to hinder the provision of a fast and reliable telecommunications 
service:
(a) Inadequate capacity
Inadequate capacity has hindered considerably the rapid and cost-effective 
expansion of telephone services. Considering the size of the population and the 
level of economic development in the country, the number of installed telephone 
lines is inadequate to meet demand, and the resulting shortfall in capacity is 
responsible for poor call completion rates, subscriber dissatisfaction, and hence loss 
of revenue. According to official figures established and suppressed demand in 
1997 is estimated at three million telephone lines and 200,000 cellular lines 
(FMOC, 1997).
(b) Poor maintenance
Poor maintenance continues to be one of the biggest obstacles to achieving 
operational efficiency. The maintenance problem itself can be attributed to such 
factors as lack of or inadequate supply of tools, test equipment, and materials for 
maintenance; government policy on procurement of spare parts; poor maintenance 
organisation; and the poor work attitude of maintenance personnel (Osaghae, 1998).
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(c) Low revenue generation
The revenue being generated from the existing public telephone service continues 
to be low in comparison to the cost of providing the service. This is attributable 
partly to inefficiencies in management, partly to unproductive use of capital, and 
partly to an inefficient billing system (ADCG, 1998). Historically NITEL has often 
found that for political reasons it cannot collect revenues owed from larger users of 
telecommunications. According to one author, practically every government agency 
or parastatal is indebted on utilities (Osaghae, 1998). Compounding this problem 
are the large number of domestic users who fail to pay their monthly bills. As a 
result, NITEL is dependent on international telecommunications traffic and 
settlements arising from the surplus of Nigerian’s calling home (ADCG, 1998).
(d) Lack of indigenous capacity for plant construction and installation
The basic support industries for telecommunications manufacture and assembly in 
Nigeria can be found mainly within the private sector. A growing number of 
enterprises, mostly sole proprietorships, sell telecommunications equipment. These 
small companies sell customer premise equipment such as teleprinters, facsimiles, 
answering machines and radio transceivers. Production levels for some of these 
products, however, remains small: typically 5,000 telephone handset units per year,
30,000 intercom units per year and 500 key telephone units per year (NCC, 1996). 
Both Nigeria’s telecommunications and electronics subsectors are in their infancy 
stages. Because domestic manufacturing input to telecommunications development 
is very small, large amounts of foreign funds are required for telecommunications 
projects. Export of electronic and telecommunications products is non-existent in 
Nigeria, and importation still continues on a large scale in all sophisticated 
consumer and industrial electronics. Nor can domestic assembly fulfil the demand 
for simple consumer items, with importation widely used to supplement local 
production (ADCG, 1998).
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(e) Monopoly status
Though a commercial entity, NITEL has always been treated as an extension of 
government (Osaghae, 1998). As a result, management has often been forced to 
place social and political considerations above commercial criteria. A 1998 report 
on the telecommunications sector in Nigeria asserts that:
Political considerations often dictated investments in terms of size and location, 
and social pressures impacted on charges, leading to sometimes uneconomically 
low tariffs and sometimes unreasonably high charges, particularly on high net 
worth customers (ADCG, 1998, p. 105).
(f) Weak or non-existent government policy
The lack of a clear and consistent policy lead from the government has exacerbated 
the structural weaknesses of the public operator. The lack of coordination and 
strategic planning has led to the proliferation of technologies, and the lack of 
consistency in standard setting has exacerbated the problem of maintenance. As a 
result no less than five types of automatic switching systems are in use in the 
country. Standardisation of network equipment has yet to be achieved and this 
imposes further problems, creating inflexibility in the use of human resources and 
spare parts. Moreover, as Table 19 shows, the government continues to maintain a 
negative fiscal stance towards the industry.
Table 19: Tariffs for Telecommunications Products
Item
Customs Duty Rates (%) 
1995-2001
1995-1998 1999-2001
Telephone sets, videophones 25 20
Line telephone sets with cordless handsets 25 20
Other (Telex and teleprinters) 25 20
Fax machines 25 20
Telephone parts 25 20
TV/ cameras 25 20
Source: Nigerian Customs Duty Rate Approved 1995-2001
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8.4 The main actors in the Nigerian telecommunications sector
The main actors in the telecommunications network in Nigeria, as set out in Table 20 
below, can be divided into one of two categories: internal and external actors.
Table 20: The main actors, internal and external, in the Nigerian 
telecommunications sector
Actors Sphere of influence Degree of influence 
on sector
Internal
Government: NITEL, 
NCC
Telecommunications supply 
and regulation
High
Domestic private sector: 
Association of 
Telecommunication 
Companies of Nigeria 
(ATCON).
Telecommunications supply 
and maintenance
Medium
External
Foreign private sector Telecommunications supply Medium
Development agencies Telecommunications policy, 
financial assistance
High
Regional organisations
i
Interconnection agreements, 
collective bargaining for 
regional telecommunications 
development
Low
8.4.1 Main internal actors
(a) The Nigerian government
Four prominent institutions have been identified as crucial to the success of the 
Nigerian telecommunications industry. These institutions are expected to cooperate 
with one another and to streamline their operations in the best public interest. The
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institutions are the government executive, the Ministry of Communications (MOC), the 
National Communications Commission (NCC) and NITEL. The present system seeks 
to protect the sovereignty and security of the country by keeping NITEL under 
government control while, at the same time, making the telecommunications service 
less dependent on the government. The motivating force behind the decision to 
incorporate rather than privatise is the fear that control of the national network might be 
lost to foreign companies. The incorporation has also brought about increases in the 
cost of telecommunications services in the country. The administrative and policy 
matters of telecommunications remain within the remit of the ministry of 
communications, which represents the country at the ITU and other international 
telecommunications organisations.
(i) Management Structure of NITEL
In the mid-1990s, NITEL continued to operate under a government appointed board. 
The structure of the company is based on a three-tier system of territorial 
administration, zonal administration, and headquarters in order to decentralise functions 
and optimise operational efficiency. Abuja, the federal capital, and each of Nigeria’s 
twenty-one states117 constitute a single territory, while Lagos constitutes two territories. 
There are five zones: the north-west, north-east, south-west, south-east, and Lagos, and 
each zone is made up of between four and six states or territories. The zones are semi- 
autonomous in their operations, however, the functions of the zones are coordinated at 
the centre through the office of the managing director, who is the chief executive.
(ii) Telecommunications regulation
The Cable and Wireless Act of 1962 established the Ministry of Communications (the 
Ministry) as the regulatory body for telecommunications in Nigeria. The Ministry 
regulated NITEL until a decree in 1992 established the Nigerian Communication 
Commission (NCC), which was charged with the duty of regulating the 
telecommunications sector. The NCC became operational in September 1993. The 
Decree established NCC as an independent regulatory body. The broad objectives of
117 Nigeria was divided into 36 states in 1997.
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the Commission include creating a regulatory environment for the supply of 
telecommunications services and facilities and promoting fair competition and efficient 
market conduct, among others. The NCC’s is responsible for the following:
• licensing telecommunications operators;
• facilitating private sector participation and investment in the telecommunications 
sector;
• ensuring the improvement of Nigerian telecommunications penetration;
• establishing and supervising technical and operational standards and practices for 
network operators;
• overseeing the quality of service provided by operators;
• setting terms for the interconnection of carrier networks; and
• ensuring that the interests of telecommunications consumers are protected by 
promoting competitive pricing and guarding against abuse of market power.
(iii) Public telecommunications policy
Historically public service imperatives have determined the shape of public policy in 
the telecommunications sector. Such influences continued in the aftermath of the 
deluge of public expenditure in the light of revenue windfalls from the 1970s OPEC oil 
price increases. Nigeria set out on an ambitious plan of expansion in all public services. 
However, despite the surplus of financial resources, few of the telecommunications 
growth targets were met (Okome, 1998). With the subsequent collapse of the oil price 
in the mid-1980s, Nigeria was forced to implement a stringent structural adjustment 
programme which focussed on deregulation as a condition of receiving IMF loans.
It was not until 1992, however, that the government actually began to deregulate the 
telecommunications sector. Decree No. 75 of 1992, the first explicit government 
statement on the issue of deregulation stated:
• an acknowledgement of the poor state of NITEL;
• the government inability to continue subsidising the sector;
• the need for private sector participation; and
• the need for a more efficient and comprehensive national service.
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In the wake of this landmark decree, Nigeria embarked slowly on the road to 
deregulation. Indeed, for four years after the promulgation of Decree 72 not a single 
licence was granted. Rather, vague policy statements appeared periodically regarding 
the need for incrementalism and guarding against "over hasty" action. However, by the 
end of 1995 over 700 applications had been screened, and in 1996 the first full licence,
for a mobile telephone operator, was approved. By March 1997, an additional 23
licences were released for activities within the entire range of deregulated 
telecommunications services. NITEL, however, maintains a monopoly over the 
provision and operation of public switches and trunks and their associated 
infrastructure, and the provision and operation of international network links. Since 
becoming operational, the NCC has taken aggressive steps to open the 
telecommunications sector to private investment and enterprise. In June 1994, the 
following services were open to private sector participation:
• Customer Premises Equipment (CPE);
• the provision and operation of public payphones;
• the provision and operation of private network links;
• the provision and operation of community telephones for rural areas and industrial 
parks;
• the provision and operation of value added network services for the banking and 
airline sectors, including packet-switched networks;
• the repair and maintenance of telecommunications facilities; and
• telephone cabling.
By March 17, 1997, over 250 companies had been licensed by the NCC. The activities 
for which these companies are applying for are diverse and span the whole 
communications spectrum. Most of the companies are based in Lagos and each of the 
companies is licensed to provide one or more of the following services:
• satellite broadcasting;
• high-frequency radio facilities;
•  payphone installation and operation;
• the provision of community telecommunications with exchanges;
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• provision of value-added network services;
• repair and maintenance of telecommunications facilities;
• cabling; and
• mobile telecommunications services.
In addition, some are licensed to provide private network links and public mobile 
communications services. As of 1999, to participate in Nigeria’s telecommunications 
sector a company must be either owned by a Nigerian citizen or be registered in 
Nigeria; this measure is designed to encourage joint ventures between foreign 
companies and Nigerian companies. The NCC also requires that a licensee submit 
technical and organisational plans that demonstrate a commitment to sustained service 
and that the equipment is compatible with the existing infrastructure. Concerns have to 
pay five per cent of the capital value of the system as a license fee and 2.5 per cent of 
the turnover as an annual concession fee. Additionally, there is a 2.5 per cent surcharge 
for special licenses. Since 1997 the policy environment has become more favourable to 
accelerated deregulation and has shifted to more radical measures.
A second national carrier is expected to be licensed to compete with NITEL by 2001. 
This duopoly regime will be expected to subsist for a given period, before an open 
market can be declared. Two international telecommunications carriers, AT&T and the 
MCI, both of the U.S., and a telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Siemens 
AG of Germany, have expressed an interest in running the second carrier that the 
Government hopes to appoint to compete with NITEL. Also mooted is the privatisation 
of NITEL. While NITEL is a public limited company, it is nevertheless wholly owned 
by the government. Current indications are that some degree of privatisation of the 
company can be expected by 2002, when some or all its equity will pass into private 
hands. There is however, a certain anxiety over the transfer of a public monopoly to a 
private monopoly (ADCG, 1998).
In the spirit of deregulation, appropriate and cost-effective technology is also being 
encouraged. For example, wide-scale wireless local loop technology is expected to 
dominate the expansion of telecommunications, particularly, as regards rural coverage. 
The European digital standard for mobile cellular telephony, GSM, has been adopted 
for national coverage. But regional or local mobile cellular services will be permissible
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on any standard or technology, whether analogue or digital, European, American or 
others.
There are also efforts to increase local manufacturing capability in telecommunications 
equipment. The Government is focusing on achieving a 30 -  50 per cent local 
manufacture capability in telecommunications equipment such as switches and 
telephone handsets, in a market conservatively estimated to grow to US$5 billion, by 
the year 2005 (ADCG, 1998). The planned public network expansion under NITEL's 
strategic plan requires a manufacturing base for telecommunications equipment. 
NITEL's major equipment suppliers will be required to set up assembly plants, as a 
condition for continued patronage. NITEL has announced its intention to consider 
joint-venture agreements for local manufacture of telecommunications equipment and 
spares, and to conclude such arrangements by 1998. More licences are being given for 
repairs and maintenance and the trend is expected to increase as the local manufacture 
of telecommunications equipment picks up.
Plans have also been announced to modernise the network. Up till 1989, all the 
exchanges and transmission facilities were based on analogue technologies. Since then, 
however, NITEL has began the digitalisation of the telecommunications network, with 
the result that over 160,000 digital lines have now been set up. The telecommunications 
administration decided to adopt digital technology for the national network with a view 
to improving services for the existing customers as well as meeting new demands. 
Since then, more than 70% of NITEL's network has been digitalised, and expectations 
are that the entire network will become fully digital by 2002. Optical fibres are being 
laid in various parts of the country to boost transmission of data and large volume 
traffic which will result from expanding the network. These are expected to 
complement the international gateways in Lagos, Enugu and Kaduna.
Due to financing issues, the implementation of the digitalisation was divided into three 
phases with the priority areas -  mostly multi-exchange areas and the international 
gateways -  being digitalised during the first phase. It was also decided that: Abuja, the 
nation's new capital, should be made a "digital island," that all existing analogue 
switches should be gradually phased out, to be replaced at the end of their lifetime by a 
digital switch; and that all new exchanges would be digital. In addition, all further
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telecommunications expansion and development in Nigeria was to be digitalised in 
order to surmount the problems associated with maintaining the old analogue network 
and to meet the increasing demand by customers for value added network services. 
Specific targets include:
• achieving an increase in teledensity from 1 telephone line per 200 people to 1 per 
50;
• attaining the goal of universal coverage, "access to anywhere, at any time," global 
connectivity, with a communications network connected to the international 
information superhighway; and
• boosting rural telecommunications services. About 70 per cent of Nigerians reside 
in the rural areas, hence there is the urgent need for the extension of 
telecommunications facilities to the rural areas in Nigeria. NITEL’s strategic plan 
for the period 1997 -  2010 provides that about 548 local government areas 
identified as lacking telephone services will be linked using a combination of 
VS AT and a microwave system to connect small capacity switches to the national 
network (FMOC, 1997).
(b) Private sector: phone companies and value added network service suppliers
The first private company to compete with NITEL was Multi-Links Ltd, a wholly 
owned Nigerian telephone company. Multi-Links is due for rapid expansion with
50,000 fixed wireless lines planned for 1999 in the commercial capital, Lagos. It plans 
to eventually expand into the rest of Nigeria. Five private telephone operators have 
since followed in the wake of Multi-Links, beginning to provide services as of March 
1998, strengthening the deregulation of the telecommunications sector which began via 
Decree 75 of 1992.118
In 1999 the government announced a major tax relief and import duty reduction for all 
telecommunication equipment coming into Nigeria from January, in order to help 
private telecommunications operators to amortise their investments before paying tax.
118 The five companies -  Em-International Systems Limited (EMIS), Intercellular Nigeria Limited, Mobitel 
Limited, Independent Telephone Network and Communications Infrastructure Limited -  will among them 
deploy 45,000 digital lines within Lagos and its environs.
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With the new policy on taxation, it is expected that the prices of a telephone line 
offered by these private companies, which range from N 140,000 (US$1,627) to 
N182,000 (US$2,116), will fall. The prices are about 50 per cent above what NITEL 
charges and about 60 per cent above what the ITU prescribes for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(ADCG, 1998).
The domestic private sector is also pioneering the deployment of cellular telephony. 
This service was first introduced in 1992 with the introduction of two mobile cellular 
services, a national one (NITEL) with about 10,000 subscribers and a Lagos service 
(MTS) with some 2,500 subscribers. A joint-venture agreement between NITEL and 
Digital Communication Limited (DCL), an American private company, led to the 
formation of Mobile Telecommunications Services (MTS) Ltd. In 1994, MTS had a 
nation-wide monopoly over cellular services, providing an analogue mobile cellular 
telephone network and some value-added services such as voice mail and pager 
services from the three switches at Lagos (Lagos and south-west), Enugu (south-east) 
and Abuja (North). MTS began with a capacity of 10,000 lines, and due to the high 
level of unmet telecommunications demand, the system was filled to capacity within 
one year. Subsequently, in February 1994, MTS added an additional 20,000 lines and 
had plans to add an additional 25, 000 lines. Even with this additional capacity, lines 
are frequently engaged during periods of network congestion. Nigeria’s cellular market 
is expected to grow at a rate of 25 per cent annually through 1997 (ADCG, 1998). In 
1996, over half of the cellular equipment was supplied by U.S. companies; and over 
half of the equipment purchased was produced by Motorola (ADCG, 1998).
8.4.2 Main external actors
(a) Regional and continental actors
As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Nigeria has been collaborating with the member 
nations of these organisations to develop telecommunications services at the sub­
regional as well as continental levels. The telecommunications project of the Economic 
Community of West African States is an example of regional collaboration. About 85
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per cent completed as of March 1998, the project involves the linking of all capital 
towns through telephones and telex facilities conceived to improve the
telecommunications facilities in African States and enhance trade relations. The project 
is being funded by the ECOWAS fund with loans from the European Investment Bank. 
Further collaboration has taken place in the form of meetings among the
telecommunications engineers and planners of the various member countries to discuss 
the technical issues involved in planning, operating, and designing telecommunications 
systems suitable for use in Africa’s environment. The segment of the Pan-African 
Telecommunications Network (PANAFTEL) linking the eastern part of the continent 
with the western part passes through Nigeria and uses portions of its domestic network.
(b) Foreign private sector
Foreign private sector firms are active in the Nigerian telecommunications sector in a 
number of areas. Firstly, in the provision of telecommunications equipment where there 
is essentially no local production of equipment. Multinational corporations such as the 
German company Siemens have been active in the Nigerian telecommunications 
equipment market for over 20 years and constitute 35 per cent of the market (IBS, 
1999). The ongoing upgrade of the public switched network from analogue to digital 
switching system has seen increasing reliance on foreign manufacturers for equipment 
and installation expertise. Aside from the provision of equipment, the foreign private 
sector is increasingly playing an important part in the provision of alternative 
telecommunications services. Aside from the traditional telecommunications new
connectivity options such as satellite links, microwave radio systems and
intercontinental submarine cable systems are increasingly offering the potential of 
cheaper telecommunications capacity. Other submarine cable systems that provide 
telecommunications facilities to Nigeria include the East African Submarine Cable 
System which links West Africa to Europe.
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(c) Development agencies
Development agencies continue to play a key role in Nigeria in terms of funding and 
agenda setting. During the 1990s, the European Union funded various projects in 
Nigeria, including the Aeronautical Satellite Telecommunications Project, which 
sought to improve air traffic safety in Central and the West African. However, efforts to 
source funding from development agencies have been hampered by Nigeria’s political 
instability and status as pax non grata. Table 21 reveals the extent to which Nigeria has 
managed to lose significant funds from development agencies for telecommunications 
development due to the nature of its governing regime.
Table 21: Major Development Agency Telecommunications Projects in Nigeria
Agencies Target Area Value
World Bank/IBRD Lagos US$225 million*
OECD/Japanese Government East US$110 million*
EEC NITEL ECU 10 million*
Turkish Government National US$125 million
Siemens North DM 441 million
Source: ITU Stars Telecommunications database. *Offers cancelled.
The most high profile example is the World Bank which entered into agreement with 
NITEL, with the guarantee of the Federal Government of Nigeria, for a loan of over 
$225 million for a telecommunications project in 1990. The major objectives of the 
project were to support the strengthening of the institutional and policy framework, 
facilitate commercialisation of NITEL and improve the access to and quality of 
telecommunications services. In 1993, a European Community grant of 10 million ECU 
was negotiated for manpower development and training in support of the 
commercialisation programme of NITEL Pic. Both projects were cancelled in the wake 
of political sanctions against Nigeria, following the annulled 1993 national elections 
which would have handed power to a civilian regime. In a similar vein the Japanese 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund’s loan package for the provision of 63,800 
digital lines at a cost of US$110 million was also withdrawn. However, the new
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civilian regime installed in May 1999, and is likely to be more amenable to the donor 
community.
8.5 Needs assessment
According to the review of the telecommunications sector above it would appear that 
the main priorities for improving the telecommunications sector in Nigeria are:
• the reform and accelerated deregulation of the telecommunications sector to 
increase operational efficiency;
• extension of services to rural areas;
• investment in new value-added services; and
• a clear and consistent telecommunications policy.
The direction of current Nigerian telecommunications policy broadly mirrors the first 
three of these criteria, namely: the reform and deregulation of the sector, the 
digitalisation of current networks and a planned extension to rural areas. However, 
there is concern as to the commitment of the government to these objectives. The 
government has yet to announce operationally feasible plans for investing in value 
added services and establishing standards of interoperability. Nor has attention been 
paid to upgrading indigenous skills in the technical and operational management of 
domestic telecommunications services. Rather, Nigeria, in common with its developing 
counterparts in Africa, seems content to allow external actors to bring efficiency to the 
communications process.
Despite this policy shortfall, there are considerable opportunities for private sector 
investment in Nigeria’s telecommunications sector. Hence, the main focus of 
government is to deregulate the sector and allow competition, since the existing 
infrastructure cannot satisfy demand. It is estimated that Nigeria needs US$6 billion to 
improve its telecommunications network and is seeking foreign investment to help 
achieve this (ADCG, 1998). Apart from the initial US$6 billion investment, it is 
estimated that Nigeria would also require US$600 million annually for network 
expansion resulting in, it is envisaged, eight million lines in Nigeria by 2010 (EIU,
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1997b). With such ambitious goals, it is quite obvious that NITEL would not be in a 
position to finance these ambitious objectives alone. The investment is expected to 
come largely from the following: corporate consumers/customers of
telecommunications services, such as the oil-producing companies and the banks, new 
private telecommunications operators (PTOs), end-users, and NITEL itself. In addition 
financial assistance is being sought from multilateral development agencies.
However, the reform process has been fraught with difficulties. Whilst nescient 
observers have argued that the government has been stalling the process, in reality, for 
Nigeria, and for the majority of developing countries, such deregulation must be a 
carefully managed process. Foreign investors are not queuing up to put their money 
into Nigeria, which has won a reputation for bureaucracy, corruption and crime. In 
order to overcome this risk aversion, the temptation is to offer far too large a slice of 
the national pie to international telecommunications companies. One can take the 
extraction of petroleum as an apt parallel to what may happen in the 
telecommunications sector. Nigeria’s lucrative petroleum resources are extracted 
offshore by multinational corporations, so powerful that they are seen by many as 
quasi-governmental (Garba, 1995). Whilst the profit from the sale of oil accounts for 95 
per cent of GDP, the communities in the midst of these explorations are some of the 
most underdeveloped in the country. In reality offshore multinational oil companies 
have no stake in the developmental goals of countries, and are purely concerned with 
profit maximisation followed by swift and total profit repatriation. Thus an element of 
caution is necessary if Nigeria is to maximise its share of the benefits arising from 
deregulation. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, the price of liberalisation is eternal 
vigilance. This is especially applicable to Nigeria, where successive ruling juntas have 
been content to seek personal enrichment from multinational operations at the expense 
of long-term national development.
In November 1999, the new Nigerian civilian government announced its preliminary 
ideas on the development of the telecommunications sector. Firstly, the incoming 
government disowned all the licences for telecommunications services granted by the 
previous administration. Secondly, it asserted the importance of maintaining NITEL’s 
public monopoly on data and international traffic, effectively banning private 
competitors from offering international services for the foreseeable future. As part of
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the new policy, the Nigerian government announced that it was opening up the bid 
process for six licences to provide GSM mobile services on a national basis. Each 
bidder had to post a bond of US$100 million, in order to qualify for the bid process. 
However, despite receiving 17 bids from local and foreign consortia, the government 
cancelled the bid process in March 2000 and announced that the whole process was to 
be delayed and handled by the World Bank. Such policy inconsistency and 
procrastination serves only to discourage foreign investment in the sector and does not 
bode well for further deregulation.
8.6 Information technology in Nigeria
Information technology was first introduced into Nigeria in 1960 by the Federal Census 
Office of Nigeria in order to analyse the 1962/3 census data. In the following 10 years 
the total number of computers remained under 30, with six of these belonging to 
multinational corporations. Despite growing interest from educational establishments 
and public companies, up to 1977 there were only three suppliers. These were, 
respectively, ICL, IBM and NCR; all three were local subsidiaries of overseas 
computer manufacturers dealing almost entirely with mainframes and mini-computers. 
Government policy in this area was, unsurprisingly, non-existent. The extent of 
domestic usage of information technology was minimal and information technology as 
a whole had made little impact on the continent. The information technology industry’s 
first brush with public policy came in the wake of the 1977 indigenisation decree. 
Designed as a populist measure and bom of the radicalism of the time, its goal was to 
return certain industrial activities to local control, or at least increase the participation 
of Nigerians in industrial activity (Nwachuku, 1992).
One of the activities deemed ripe for indigenisation was the fledgling information 
technology industry which, at the time, was composed entirely of foreign corporations. 
Rather than comply with the strictures of the decree IBM decided to divest itself of its 
operations in Nigeria. The decree had two other important effects: firstly, it led to an 
increase in the level of indigenous suppliers of information technology equipment. 
Secondly, the sudden emergence of domestic retail rivals to traditionally captive 
markets led to more aggressive marketing and competition amongst suppliers
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(Nwachuku, 1992). Consequently the number of computer installations in the country 
rose dramatically. At the same time the discovery of oil led to massive expenditure on 
public sector services, and with it came a headlong and disorganised rush to modernise. 
The first real attempt to measure the extent of information technology in Nigeria began 
in the 1980s. In 1983 the first edition of the Nigerian Computer Users’ Directory119 
(NCUD) was published. Table 22 shows data from this and subsequent editions. The 
figures published by the NCUD also reveal the extent to which these installations were 
concentrated in the then capital, with Lagos accounting for 72 percent of the total.
Table 22: Growth of industrial computer installations since 1977120
Year Total no. of Installations Industrial installations
No. As % of total
1977 115 20 17.4
1980 235 45 19.1
1983 390 80 20.5
1985 496 110 22.2
1988 754 177 23.5
Source-. NCUD Directory 1988121
(a) Size and composition of market
Current official statistics of the size of the installed computer base in Nigeria, whilst 
showing growing demand, fail to reflect the burgeoning demand for computers. Table 
22 reveals that whilst some statistics of the number of computer installations 
nationwide do exist no recent empirical survey has been conducted. The most recent 
government research, conducted by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), 
claimed that there were about 400,000 computers in use in Nigeria (NCC, 1996).
119 Ogis and Ododo Assoc. Ltd. (1983) The Nigerian Computer Users’ Directory, Lagos, Nigeria.
120 Despite the limited number of computer installation per year the annual was published sporadically and 
thus the table lists available statistics.
121 Ogis and Ododo Assoc. Ltd. (1988) The Nigerian Computer Users’ Directory, Lagos, Nigeria.
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Industry experts and market analysts, on the other hand, estimate that the population of 
computers in Nigeria lies somewhere between 600,000 and one million (ADCG, 1998; 
IBS, 1998).
In the event these estimates are likely to be understated as, since 1998, there has been a 
surge in the demand and importation of computers. Accurate statistics of imports do not 
exist largely because of the rent-seeking behaviour of officials at points of entry. Many 
importers do not submit accurate import data to inspection agents and tax officials, in 
order to cut costs. In fact, market analysts estimate that over 60 per cent of computer 
hardware and peripherals imported into the country are not declared in import statistics 
at the point of entry (Agu, 1997). Many circumnavigate the prohibitive bribes that must 
be paid to pass items through customs, by transporting computer hardware and 
peripherals imported from the U.S. as accompanying passenger baggage on 
international flights. Market analysts estimate that large numbers of Nigerian resellers 
and distributors are importing a total of between US$800,000 and US$1 million a year 
(IBS, 1999). However, the consensus is that the total population of computers in 
Nigeria lies between 600,000 and one million and the annual growth rate is projected to 
remain high (over 25 per cent) over the next five to 10 years (Agu, 1997).
Nigeria is almost totally reliant on foreign manufacturers for supplies of information 
technology. Over 80 per cent of computer hardware and peripherals sold in Nigeria is 
made by U.S. firms or U.S.-licensed firms located around the world, but much of the 
imports reported in Nigeria’s official statistics of imports come from Europe, mainly the 
United Kingdom and France (NCC, 1996). Imports from the Far East have grown 
significantly since 1996, as Asian firms expand their total share of this market sub­
sector, drawing on the goodwill and dominance they enjoy in Nigeria’s consumer 
electronics market. Major U.S. brand names marketed in Nigeria include IBM, 
Compaq, Dell, Lucent, AT&T, Hewlett Packard, Digital, APC, Unisys, Apple, 
Gateway 2000, Texas Instruments and Sun.
Imports from East Asia and Europe account for most of the local assembly of computer 
clones in Nigeria, especially those being used by most small and medium sized 
enterprises and home offices. Fierce competition resulting from the influx of computer 
clones, mostly from Asia, is an important feature of the market. Imports from Asia
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consequently are challenging the continued U.S. dominance of this huge market, which 
serves as a gateway to several smaller markets in West and Central Africa. Price is the 
most competitive factor in this market. Asian firms supplying IBM compatible clones 
have learned to cash in on this critical selling factor, especially where individual end- 
users and private commercial establishments are concerned. Recently, market reports 
indicate that IBM compatible clones assembled locally have been used to implement 
even major orders from government establishments (IBS, 1999). With regards to 
software there is very little locally produced software available. The majority of 
software is still purchased from abroad and adapted to the domestic environment. 
Software piracy is rife with some estimating piracy rates of up to 98 per cent (IBS, 
1994).
(b) End-user profiles
Previously a preserve of multinational corporations and a wealthy minority, 
information technology in Nigeria is becoming more commonplace in most medium to 
large enterprises (IBS, 1999). During the 1980s the majority of computers in industry 
were used for financial accounting and payroll processing (Nwachuku, 1992). In this 
respect the financial sector plays an important role in terms of its employment of 
cutting edge technologies. It remains the most intensive user of information technology 
in Nigeria, followed closely by the oil industry. These two sectors have an intense need 
for state-of-the-art information technology to enhance their growing operations and are 
expected to buy much of Nigeria’s imports of computer hardware and peripherals over 
the next few years.
A new generation of banks have brought with them a keen desire to keep abreast of the 
latest technologies, spawning several new banking services and products. Rather than 
relying on outdated erstwhile technologies the banking sector is blazing the trail in the 
utilisation of cutting-edge technologies. Apart from accessing one’s account from any 
branch nationwide, certain customers in 1999 could access their accounts directly 
through their own computers in their offices. Electronic savings cards also enable 
customers with accounts to get service from any branch of the banks. Diamond Bank 
introduced the "PayCard" in 1999, an electronic purse that enables customers to carry 
large sums encoded in the card, with several others banks planning similar services. It
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was announced in 1998 that an Irish smart card software company, Card Services 
International (CSI), in partnership with IBM, was to supply the technology for a 
multibank smart card payment scheme in Nigeria. The £1.48 million contract is to 
provide application software, smart cards and point-of-sale devices for a national 
electronic purse smart card scheme awarded by Smart Card Nigeria (SNP), a 
consortium of 19 banks. The first phase of the contract began in the summer of 1998 
reaching 22,000 cardholders and 200 merchants representing the largest multibank 
smart card payments project in Africa to date (Lyons, 1998).
New private commercial establishments, universities, colleges and computer schools 
are also prominent end-users of computer hardware and peripherals. For these groups, 
price is the key purchase factor, and they tend to use less expensive, locally assembled 
IBM compatible clones. Nigeria's government ministries and agencies are beginning to 
computerise some of their activities. Most of these establishments operate on a tight 
budget and buy most of their supplies through a ministerial tender board (IBS, 1999).
(c) Demand for information technology
Growing awareness and interest in electronic commerce, plus the urge for better 
information management, are fuelling demand for information technology products in 
Nigeria. This in turn is generating demand for computer hardware and peripherals. The 
Nigerian government is also urging its ministries and agencies, including educational 
institutions, to computerise their operations and also to introduce computer appreciation 
and data management courses in their training curricula (Agu, 1997). This demand is 
reflected in the growing interest in computer training and applications across Nigeria. 
Even government establishments are computerising their activities despite tight budgets 
and bureaucratic bottlenecks. There are a burgeoning number of computer training 
schools springing up seemingly daily, especially in Lagos and oil producing areas such 
as Port Harcourt and Warn Town, and in the capital city of Abuja.
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(d) Standards
Computer hardware and peripherals imported into Nigeria are expected to conform 
with internationally acceptable standards. However, market analysts and vendors 
confirm that neither the Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON), the Computer Firms 
Registration Counsel of Nigeria, the Computer Association of Nigeria (COAN) nor the 
Computer Vendors Association of Nigeria (COVAN) have been able to ensure that 
Nigerian imports comply with internationally acceptable standards (Agu, 1997).
(e) The computer manufacturing and service industry
A significant number of computer vendors and distributors have begun or are beginning 
local assembly of computer systems using casings manufactured locally or imported 
mainly from Asia, and IBM compatible components such as mother boards, microchips 
and power units, originating from Asia (IBS, 1999). Though Nigeria does not as yet 
have the requisite infrastructure to manufacture such high precision components, this 
sector can be developed via distribution arrangements that recognise and tap into local 
talents and the enterprising spirit of the Nigerian private sector. This business 
philosophy seems to be the bedrock of the marketing strategies that most Asian 
suppliers to this market are adopting. In dealing with local distributors and value-added 
resellers, Asian suppliers have encouraged the local private sector to embark on local 
assembly of computer systems using less expensive IBM-compatible clones and 
peripherals imported mostly from East Asia (NAN, 1998).
The economic boom in Nigeria in the early 1980s saw a dramatic increase in the 
number of PC users and a concomitant rise in the number of firms offering computer- 
related services. The industry is still, however, plagued by unreliable maintenance 
services. Even where service facilities exist, replacement parts are often unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive. The quantity and range of spare parts are often insufficient and 
waiting times for imported spare parts are notoriously lengthy (IBS, 1999). There are 
no official statistics to determine the volume and spread of local assembly across the 
country. Additionally, COVAN has begun training and certification programs for 
members wishing to become industry specialists. Service support is playing a more
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significant role in selling computer hardware and peripherals in Nigeria. Service 
support denote a number of after-sales services. Namely training for end-users, 
availability of spare parts at competitive prices, repair services and replacement of 
faulty equipment and training resellers, distributor sales and engineering staff. Major 
distributors organise training workshops and seminars for their valued customers and 
prospective clients. Most of these firms focus on their engineering and service support 
capabilities, product performance, cost-benefit analysis and free professional services 
such as systems analysis and recommendation (Agu, 1997).
8.6.1 The Internet and networking in Nigeria
The growth in networking has been hindered by Nigeria’s poor telecommunications 
network. The very limited telephone network means that only four or five cities have 
international direct dialling, thus limiting usage to the main urban centres. In addition, 
those Internet service providers that are available remain prohibitively expensive. For 
example, in 1999, InfoWeb, a Nigerian ISP, charged US$25 for connection and then 50 
cents per minute and US$1 to send electronic mail per addressee. While these prices 
may appear reasonable relative to global rates they are out of reach for the average 
Nigerian. Through funding by various development agencies the majority of 
universities have radio links and rely on telex at a minimum, with four having full 
Internet access. There are about 30 universities and 25 colleges in Nigeria, of which 20 
have large computing facilities. Table 23 overleaf reveals that there were, as of August 
1999, a significant number of ISPs operating in Nigeria. However, the diffusion of ISPs 
has been limited by the reluctance of NTTEL to provide local ISPs with leased line 
access to international gateways. As a result all ISPs are forced to connect to the 
international gateway via the PSTN and thus incur large telecommunications fees in so 
doing.
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Table 23: Internet service providers (ISP’s) in Nigeria
Internet Service Providers in Nigeria, March 1998
Name of ISP Country of Origin Location
Centel Nigeria Lagos
Dimensions Systems Technology Nigeria Lagos
Global Access Nigeria Lagos
Infoweb Organisation Nigeria Lagos
Linkserve Communications Ltd Nigeria Lagos
ONATEL Netherlands Lagos
Ross Clayton Ltd. Nigeria Lagos
Solutions Online Inc. Nigeria Kano
Stork Ltd Nigeria Lagos
Teleglobe UK Lagos
Vanrem Enterprises Corporation Nigeria Lagos
Source: www.ripe.org. Accessed March 1998
8.6.2 Human resources in the information technology sector
In Nigeria information technology training began with the foundation of the IBM 
African Education Training Centre at the University of Ibadan in 1963. This centre was 
established to train local technicians in operating procedures and basic maintenance of 
IBM computers (Nwachuku, 1992). The first full degree programme in computer 
science began in 1971 at the University of Ife. Since that period computer science has 
become firmly established as an academic discipline in almost all of the major 
universities. There are now over 400 computer science programmes on offer at 
educational establishments in Nigeria, including computer engineering courses at four 
universities. With the 1998 National Universities Commission (NUC) minimum 
standards decree, all university students are required to attend a computer science 
course during their first year of university. In addition the commission has been 
supporting efforts at curricula development, via newly established computer science 
programmes at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. The computer literacy 
programme is designed to establish a computer culture that permeates all activities at
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university level, producing a general level of computer literacy in all graduates 
irrespective of discipline.
In conjunction with these university level initiatives the National Board for Technical 
Education (NBTE) has responsibility for ensuring standards of education in 
polytechnics and technical colleges, and also in coordination the development, 
management, and funding. Within this framework the NBTE has had an important role 
to play in the introduction of computer education in the institutions under its 
jurisdiction. It has been responsible for integrating the curriculum for computer literacy 
at the secondary and tertiary levels, into the programmes of polytechnics and technical 
colleges nationwide and developing syllabuses for a higher national diploma. Under the 
guidance of NBTE, polytechnics have been utilising information technology to fulfil a 
number of important roles, such as the training of technicians in hardware maintenance 
and software design and adaptation and providing courses in software design. 
Computer courses are also increasingly being catered for by private companies. These 
companies are filling an important demand for computer education. Unfortunately they 
are hampered by a lack of hardware and software resources (Olamiji, 1999). Although 
there would seem to be a wealth of training facilities, there is a greater need for the 
provision of training courses targeted at developing applications more specific to 
Nigeria.
8.6.3 Constraints to information technology diffusion 
• Lack of adequately trained staff
The low levels of qualified or skilled computer specialists means that most employees 
in firms and government departments are typically engaged only in routine data 
processing tasks using accounting packages that may have been modified and are 
maintained in-house. In such an environment, there is little time or encouragement to 
engage in original software development aimed at extending or intensifying the degree 
of computerisation. The problems facing data processing departments are, according to 
Nwachuku (1992): low status; lack of management support; poor staffing levels; and 
lack of cooperation bordering on outright hostility from departments "in danger" of
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computerisation’. As a result, there exists a severe underutilisation of computing 
equipment as well as low productivity amongst staff.
• Infrastructural Deficiencies
The most acute problem arises from the erratic provision of electricity in Nigeria. 
Though there has been no attempt to quantify the impact of this on information 
technology users, one can intuitively sense that the additional requirement of private 
generation of electricity acts as a serious financial deterrent to wider information 
technology diffusion. The Nigeria Electricity Power Authority (NEPA) does not 
publish official statistics on the reliability of their power supply; however, during the 
author’s most recent visit to Nigeria in July 1999, over a three-week period there were 
on average five power cuts per day, each lasting up to an hour. Consequently, 
generators are obligatory for anyone wishing to use a computer for a significant length 
of time. This evidently raises the cost of computer ownership and acts as a deterrent to 
potential purchasers. It has been estimated that it would take US$15 billion to bring 
reliable power to 85 per cent of the population by 2010, thus it is unlikely that the 
government can fund such a huge investment without recourse to private investment.122
• Macroeconomic environment
The economic crisis in Nigeria over the period 1990-1999 has caused real wages to fall 
significantly. This deterioration in the official value of the currency has seriously 
undermined consumer purchasing power. As a result, consumers have had to rationalise 
their demand for many products. The situation has kept Nigerian manufacturing 
capacities underused by 32.5 per cent in 1996 (EIU, 1998).
8.7 Main actors in the information technology sector
Table 24 overleaf shows that there a variety of actors participating and determining the 
development of the information technology sector in Nigeria. These actors can be
177 Wallis, W. "Crisis prompts direct control", Nigeria FT Survey, Financial Times, 30 March 2000, p. 6.
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divided into internal, indigenous actors of which the government and the private sector 
are the biggest players, and external actors such the foreign private sector and 
development agencies.
Table 24: The main actors, internal and external, in the Nigerian IT sector
Actor Sphere of influence Level of 
influence
Internal
Government Policy, tariffs, end user High
Domestic private sector Supply, maintenance and training High
Banking/Oil industry Significant source of demand, use of 
latest technologies
Low
External
Development agencies Networking infrastructure, agenda 
setting, training
High
Foreign private sector Supply of hardware and software, 
training
Medium
(a) The Nigerian government
The first attempts to coordinate information technology in Nigeria began in the late 
1970s when the Central Computer Committee (CCC) was instituted with the aim of 
assembling available national data on computing. The main objective of the committee 
was the development of standards for users, retailers and consultants on computer 
projects. The committee was also charged with laying the groundwork for a national 
policy on information technology. The most direct influence the committee had was 
over the reviewing of all applications for the importation of computers and making 
recommendations to the Ministry of Finance for the approval of licences. It was not, 
however, designed to address issues of planning and policy. In fact, as soon as the 
initial import and regulatory measures were abandoned the CCC ceased to function 
actively.
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Though, the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by the 
absence of an explicit strategy towards the information technology sector (Okut-Uma, 
1991), the sector in Nigeria continues to suffer from implicit policies that discriminate 
against it. Such policies include government procurement agencies, import restrictions 
or tariffs on the purchase of computers, and bureaucratic and lengthy import 
procedures. The government has also been guilty of policy inconsistency towards the 
IT sector. For example, in April 1996 it reviewed its import guidelines and decided to 
subject all imports regardless of value to pre-shipment inspection at the point of export; 
with the importer bearing the inspection cost. Nevertheless, two years later the 1998 
budget abolished pre-shipment inspection for imports originating from most Asian 
countries, Great Britain, the United Arab Emirates and Africa. Further, the Nigerian 
government promised to phase out pre-shipment inspection for imports from other 
countries including the U.S. before the end of 1998, but as of October 1999 this 
procedure was still in place (Agu, 1997).
Overall public policy in Nigeria towards information technology has been negative, 
with the maintenance of unfavourable tariff regimes and a few ad hoc government 
initiatives. For example, in an effort to boost local initiatives and private sector efforts 
toward local production of computer and electronic equipment, the Nigerian 
government established the National Committee on Acquisition of Computer and 
Electronics Technology (NACACET) in 1997. By 1998 the committee, which 
consisted of representatives from the government and private sector, had yet to achieve 
any recognisable objectives and was in fact disbanded in 1999.
In response to the stagnation of the Nigerian economy and in an attempt to prepare the 
country for a new era of global competition the Nigerian government convened a 
committee of experts in the summer of 1997 to articulate a definitive statement of 
policy intent which would articulate a policy blueprint to reposition Nigeria by 2010123. 
The so called “Vision 2010” committee consisted of 172 "experts" drawn from a 
collection of career politicians, retired military officers, businesspeople, technocrats 
and economists. However, this very public policy exercise was fraught with difficulties. 
Ernest Shonekan, committee chairman admitted in 1998, at the inception of the
123 "Nigeria announces set up of Vision 2010 Committee", Reuters, 12 April 1997.
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exercise, that Nigeria’s Vision 2010 policy blueprint was "too complex" for immediate 
clarification. "One cannot at this stage delineate the scope of the assignment," said 
Shonekan.124 Moreover, even if the absence of clarity and the problems of working with 
such an unwieldy body were overcome, there were serious doubts as to how Vision 
2010 could be achieved in the atmosphere of political instability that continued to 
plague the nation. Shonekan acknowledged that "without political stability, meaningful 
planning will continue to be frustrated".125 In reality, the average Nigerian knew too 
little about the government’s Vision 2010 project. The "Vision 2010" Committee failed 
to provide any substantial insight as to how Nigeria could utilise information and 
communication technologies for its development goals. The only objective mentioned 
by the committee was to attain the goal of universal coverage, "access to anywhere, at 
any time," global connectivity, with a communications network connected to the 
international information superhighway.126 In the end the committee failed to produce a 
clearly articulated long-term policy document and what recommendations it did 
produce were pointedly ignored by the incoming civilian administration of Olesegun 
Obasanjo in May 1999.
There is thus general scepticism over the ability of Nigerian government’s to draft long­
term policy plans that will be adhered to by successive regimes. There have been at 
least five development plans since independence from Britain in 1960, all detailing 
grandiose schemes to revitalise the economy. Not only did these plans fail to lead 
Nigerians to the promised land of economic, social, and political advancement, but 
those that were implemented suffered from mismanagement. According to a UNDP 
(1993) report on development in Sub-Saharan Africa, none of the high-flown intentions 
of the Nigerian government could change the fact that Nigerians are at present worse 
off than they were at the time of independence in 1960. The report noted the reasons for 
the malaise as:
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 NAN (1997) "People Have Little Faith in Vision 2010 Plan", Inter Press Service, 6 September, Lagos.
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...local managerial incompetence, failure to translate policies into projects, 
bribery and fraud, external intervention with particularly devastating social 
effects of externally inspired, and other incoherent policies of reform.
(UNDP, 1996, p. 43)
Despite the lack of an explicit policy on information technology, the Nigerian 
government plays a key role as the biggest user of information technology. Government 
procurement departments still represent by far the largest market for local computer 
vendors. At the same time the increasing drive to computerise government offices 
provides key exposure for a significant section of the population. With the transition to 
civilian regime in May 1999, there have been renewed hopes of a more coordinated 
policy response to improving the climate for information technology growth in Nigeria. 
However, information technology continues to suffer from weak public policy in this 
area. Despite the absence of clear direction from government, the domestic private 
sector are doing their utmost to fulfil the burgeoning demand for computing.
(b) Private sector
The over preponderance of foreign suppliers in the information technology market in 
Nigeria leads to a vestigial role for the domestic computer manufacturing industry. 
Though local assembly of computers is increasing and local software houses are 
becoming more and more commonplace, most companies still import off-the-shelf 
hardware and software from abroad. In contrast to the paucity of advanced computing 
in the public sector, the private sector is busily computerising operations. With the 
streamlining of import procedures and the fall in the price of computing it is envisaged 
that the private sector will become an increasingly important actor in the drive for 
information infrastructure.
(c) The development agencies
The development agencies have largely been responsible for raising awareness of value 
added service such as the Internet in Nigeria and funding a number of significant 
initiatives to improve the networking capacities in the country. For example, the UNDP
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is contributing US$500,000 to upgrading the Internet capacity of NITEL during the 
period 1998-2000.
8.8 Needs assessment
The above review of the existing capabilities of Nigeria in information technology 
reveals an industry increasingly left to develop on its own. The reduction of 
government intervention in the importation of computers is welcome but the lack of 
concrete proposals in such key areas as education does not bode well for long-term 
information infrastructure development. The Nigerian government is doing little to 
create domestic capabilities in this field. A well-designed national information 
infrastructure policy should address the weaknesses identified above. In the short-term 
government should firstly undertake a thorough and holistic appraisal of existing 
capabilities as outlined above. The feedback received from this exercise is crucial in 
pinpointing areas of weakness on which public policy should be focussed. This 
identification of current and long-term needs will hopefully avoid the tendency towards 
ad hoc public policy-making. The second stage is the identification of a suitable 
strategy to facilitate the achievement of objectives.
8.9 Summary
The country case study above revealed that the diffusion of information infrastructure 
in Nigeria continues to be hampered by lack of an effective public policy strategy. In 
the telecommunications sector, as of 1999, there are still no firm plans to fully 
deregulate the provision of public telecommunications. As a result value added 
services, such as Internet provision, remain a niche phenomenon and out of reach for 
the vast majority of Nigerians. In an era of rapid technological change Nigerians still 
find themselves saddled with an inefficient public telecommunications network that 
functions sporadically at best, and continues to serve only a small section of the 
population. Without the deregulation of the sector it is unlikely that Nigerian’s will be 
able to leverage the gains that can be wrought from the information economy.
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This chapter also investigated the extent of information technology diffusion Nigeria. 
The level of computerisation of government and the general extent of IT diffusion in 
the country remains low. This was found to be due to a combination of the ongoing 
macroeconomic crisis and lack of public policy in the area. There is, however, clear 
evidence of burgeoning demand for IT products despite high government tariffs and the 
unreliability of key related industries such as electricity provision. Though the 
indigenous production of IT products continues on a tiny scale, the private sector is 
increasingly satisfying demand through local production. The level of sophistication of 
information technology use is being spurred on by Nigeria’s off-shore oil industry and 
banking sectors which continue to be most intensive users of advanced 
communications.
Government policy towards both sectors remains negligible and consistently negative. 
One of the biggest hurdles to national information infrastructure planning has been the 
endemic political and economic instability in the country. Despite the 1999 change to a 
civilian regime the present government continues to exhibit the tell tale signs of 
procrastination and policy inconsistency that has become a trademark of successive 
Nigerian regimes. A year after the swearing in of a new regime there is still an absence 
of any clear statement on a coordinated strategy for information infrastructure 
development. Moreover, should the current civilian regime fall it is likely that, as is the 
norm, any such policy would be swiftly disowned. This chapter has provided an in- 
depth analysis of the information infrastructure in Nigeria in terms of the 
telecommunications and information technology sectors. It has provided a review of 
existing capabilities, identified short-term needs, and pointed to a strategy to achieve 
longer-term objectives. The primary need for Nigeria in the area of information 
infrastructure development is for long-term coordinated and consistent national public 
policy in this area.
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CHAPTER 9 
Policy Recommendations
9.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the foundation provided by the earlier research and applies the 
conceptual framework articulated in Chapter Three to arrive at policy recommendations 
for information infrastructure development throughout Sub-Saharan Africa region. It is 
argued that the best approach to meeting the challenges to Africa of globalisation and 
the information economy is strategic planning and implementation that involves public, 
private and voluntary sector participation and partnerships, at national, regional and 
international levels. The case studies of Ethiopia and Nigeria presented respectively in 
Chapters Seven and Eight and the general survey of the information infrastructure 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa region reveal that the key challenges include:
1. The stagnation of the Sub-Saharan African economy and the continuing challenges 
faced by countries struggling to meet basic needs.
2. The lack of an effective installed base of information and communications 
infrastructure capabilities in both the physical and human dimensions.
3. Political instability and the lack of good governance that has restricted the growth 
of the private sector and led to sub-optimal returns on public policy.
These unique challenges have made the development of information infrastructure in 
the region all the more difficult for African policy-makers. These challenges call for a 
multilevel strategic framework for information infrastructure development.
9.2 National information infrastructure planning at the national level
Strategic planning and implementation to confront these challenges has to begin at the 
national level. There are critical roles for both internal and external actors to play in this
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complex process. Key actors such the development agencies and the foreign and 
indigenous private sector must be at the heart of this process as their exclusion will 
only hinder the development of an effective vision and national plan that will meet the 
needs and objectives of all relevant parties. Within a national information infrastructure 
framework government acts as the supplier, user and regulator of information 
infrastructure. But there is an explicit recognition of its role as a coordinator of 
disparate resources, ranging from the indigenous private sector to the international 
governance regime.
The conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Three details a multilevel strategic 
framework for information infrastructure development, which has at its core the role of 
government. This sequential and multidimensional matrix begins with an 
acknowledgement of the importance of information infrastructure for supporting 
national development. It is only with the advent of such value-added services as the 
Internet and the ubiquity of information technology that African policy-makers and 
their industrialised country counterparts have begun to devote the requisite resources to 
assessing the impact of these technologies. This belated realisation has emerged in 
response to a number of factors, namely: the sensitisation efforts of development 
agencies, the global supply push of the foreign private sector and the general consensus 
emerging from the media that Africa is increasingly being left behind (Castells, 1997b). 
This realisation is, however, necessary but not sufficient. Whilst few African policy­
makers would decry the importance of information infrastructure, at this critical 
juncture African policy-makers must move beyond the simple acknowledgement of the 
issue to active and constructive engagement.
9.2.1 Getting the right team in place
Research in developed and developing countries supports the thesis that successful 
information infrastructure development is to an extent contingent on the existence of 
"champions". David Runge (1985) observes that in 83 per cent of the information 
systems deployments studied, a particular individual was deemed to have played a vital 
role in the implementation process. The role of the product champion was most often 
considered the single most important enabling factor in determining the outcome of 
systems deployment. Extrapolating this concept to national information systems
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deployment, a number of authors have highlighted the importance of a "champion" in 
developing countries as the sine qua non of the successful deployment and application 
of information systems (Liebenau and Harindranath, 1997; Odedra, 1993; Madon, 
1993). In the light of this research it is imperative that any proposed committee reports 
directly to the highest office in the land be it the office of the Prime Minister or the 
Vice President or the President in order to ensure that their recommendations are 
enforced. In African politics there is often only a thin distinction between those who 
design policy and those that make decisions. It is imperative that the institutional 
mechanism created for the coordination of information infrastructure development 
activities has the ability to implement the policies it designs.
Information technology is often misperceived on the African context as a destroyer of 
jobs and a facilitator of the control mechanism (Obijiofor, 1998). For example, the 
introduction of an information technology-based resource management system is likely 
to lead to a reduction in the opportunities for rent-seeking. The Sub-Saharan Africa 
context, which is characterised almost without fail by a top-down, risk averse 
bureaucratic culture, necessitates a champion or a number of champions who have the 
power to force through reforms which may well prove unpopular in the short-term. The 
ability of developing countries such as Malaysia, China and Singapore to achieve 
widely acknowledged ICT-related success can be credited to the importance placed on 
technology by the ruling elite. Sisodia (1992) argues, for example, that Singapore’s pre­
eminent position as the most advanced national information infrastructure is the 
apotheosis of the importance of technology champions assuming an instrumental 
position in shaping and managing the environment. To initiate and sustain such a 
reform in the face of social ostracism requires uncommon dedication. Prospective 
champions must be committed to the reform process and have sufficient political 
connections to insulate the implementation of information infrastructure projects. It is 
imperative that there is consistent and persistent advocacy of information infrastructure 
issues throughout the upper echelons of power and that this advocacy be insulated from 
the political instability that is so common in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Thus the initial steps in the first critical stage in the information infrastructure 
development process are: a recognition of the challenges emerging from a shift to a 
new technoeconomic paradigm, the emergence of an information infrastructure
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champion(s), and the identification and mobilisation of the requisite human resources 
and stakeholders that will comprise the key decision-makers in the strategy formulation 
process. Many commentators have pointed to the lack of efficacy that characterises the 
African policy-making process. Highlighting in particular the inexperience of decision­
makers and role of patronage and cronyism in dictating political appointments (Adam 
and O’Connell, 1998). It is vital that the process of "getting the right team in place" is 
based on merit rather than political expediency. It may be beneficial to employ an 
advisory committee of experts whose designated role would be to aid in policy 
implementation by ensuring effective coordination in all sectors concerned. This 
committee should represent a broad coalition of stakeholders who rather than just 
representing the various interests in society must be knowledgeable enough to 
understand the economic and technological intricacies of information infrastructure 
development.
This national committee should have the following broad missions and functions:
• designing and coordinating information infrastructure policy;
• designing and coordinating information infrastructure vision-setting;
• developing information infrastructure strategic thinking within the country by 
organising sensitisation seminars and identifying objectives in all sectors;
• supporting the promotion of information and communication technologies in all 
sectors of the economy;
• setting the rules for competition in the information and communication technology 
market;
• refining the regulatory and ethical framework at the national level;
• defining and implementing a coordinating mechanism for all ICT-related projects in 
public institutions and playing a harmonising role for their development in the 
private sector;
• developing a mechanism for periodical technological review and information about 
new technologies;
• serving as an interface for donors and external parties interested in investing in the 
domestic infrastructure; and
• developing strategies for proper cooperation and coordination between private and
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public sectors, for continued, harmonious and secure ICT development.
9.2.2 Surveying the existing national information infrastructure and needs 
assessment
The next important stage in the information infrastructure development process is the 
assessment of the existing information infrastructure and national needs. The key step 
at this stage should be the development of an inventory of the elements of information 
infrastructure within the country. These can be classified as infrastructure: the physical 
infrastructure comprising key elements such as the telecommunications and 
information technology sectors, and human resources, applications and content, and 
finally the macro environment.
The role of assessment will be to identify the various policies, both explicit and 
implicit, and associated policy instruments, which influence the use of information and 
communication technologies within the national context. This inventory needs to be 
highly selective and yet provide an economy-wide view. It must include data for each 
area, agencies responsible for implementation, budget and staff resources, sources of 
funding, main stakeholders and their representatives, current schedule and budget 
status, critical success factors, main constraints and problems encountered, and 
suggested inputs or policy support for successful completion.
For telecommunications infrastructure, the assessment criteria should include target 
population; type of services (basic telephony, and value-added services); service 
standards; broad institutional set-up (ownership, and regulation); likely investment 
needed; and prospective financing strategies. Data collection must extend above and 
beyond the mere quantification of telecommunications lines, to more useful indicators 
such as line location, how they are being utilised and by whom. Progress measures 
should move from internationally proposed benchmarks, toward national benchmarks 
defined by internally generated criteria. This empirical exercise is designed to fumish 
the coordinators of information infrastructure policy with critical data on the 
affordability, reliability, sustainability, and quality of existing services. Data analysis 
will then allow for the formulation of a strategic policy response that prioritises
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national needs. For strategic information systems, the definition should include a broad 
description of each system, investment cost, and financing strategy. This assessment 
will lead to an identification of the key areas for national applications deployment in 
areas such as trade facilitation, business and property registration, payment clearing and 
settlement systems.
For human resource development this stocktaking exercise should also include an 
assessment of the knowledge and skill gaps that threaten successful implementation of 
the information infrastructure development strategy. To devise and recommend the 
creation of institutional structures and procedures for the continuous and effective 
formulation and assessment of national information infrastructure policies. There is 
also a need to assess the level of indigenous knowledge and skills required in the 
workforce to implement the national information infrastructure (Nil) strategy and 
formulation of related education policies and institutional reforms. An Nil requires 
researchers and technicians in the spectrum of information technologies, a workforce 
skilled in the use of these technologies, and a general population capable of operating 
electronic appliances and computers and able to consume information products 
intelligently. Appropriate education and training policies and institutions need to be 
proposed to develop these human resources.
9.2.3 Creating a vision
The next logical stage after examining the existing information infrastructure and 
assessing national needs, is to translate these findings into a vision in which national 
aspirations and needs are taken into account to describe the destination of the 
information infrastructure development process. This national vision articulates where 
and how a national information infrastructure will facilitate and support national 
development in the future, whereas the policy formulation process strives to map out 
the journey. A national vision should not be a flight of fancy rather it should be 
realisable and future-oriented. Evidently the creation of a vision is intimately bound up 
with the unique needs and aspirations of each country, but it should be sufficiently 
broad and inspiring to encompass most sectors of society and be long-term in 
orientation.
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A national information infrastructure vision should represent a statement of intent, 
predicated on common principles and shared values. Firstly, the centrality of the user is 
of paramount importance. In the African context this entails devising policies that 
democratise access. The information infrastructure, and the applications that utilise it, 
must not become another factor that serves only to distinguish the rich from the poor. 
Secondly, it should be aspirational and proactive. The process of designing and 
information infrastructure vision must not be determined by the current sophistication 
of information and communications technology. Such an extrapolation of current trends 
will only serve to restrict the boundaries of public policy. Rather, an information 
infrastructure vision should be based first of all on national need and not current 
technological possibility frontiers.
The major value-added of creating a vision is its symbolic value. The largely illiterate 
and rural populations in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to find it easier to grasp the 
importance of information infrastructure, if they are encapsulated in a simple 
expression of intent rather than being conveyed as a series of statements on the 
intricacies of technological architecture. In addition, by being aspirational an 
information infrastructure vision is optimistic in orientation and is therefore designed to 
bolster national pride at what can be achieved in the long-term if the foundations are 
put in place in the short-term. Singapore's "IT2000 -  a vision of an intelligent island”, 
is perhaps the most commonly cited example of a concise statement of intent which 
heralds an initiative designed to transform Singapore into an "intelligent island” by year 
2007. The vision should concentrate on a number of concrete objectives in areas such 
as:
• information industry development: a primary objective may be to create a domestic 
information technology or software industry;
• economic growth: policy-makers may hope to promote the awareness, take-up and 
use across the population, industry and government, of sophisticated and productive 
computing, communications and multimedia services and applications; and
• transformation of government business process and service delivery: utilising the 
power of new information and communication applications to transform the public 
sector and improve public service delivery.
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Though 1999 saw the articulation of a number of information infrastructure plans in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region, few have proceeded past the expression of their "Vision 
2010’s". As Adeya and Yahaya (1999) point out ’African policy-makers appear to have 
jumped on the information society bandwagon and, keen to be seen to be doing 
something, have announced visionary statements that amount to little more than 
wishful thinking’.127 For example, the case study of Nigeria in Chapter Eight revealed 
that the government announced a "Vision 2010" blueprint at the end of 1999 yet failed 
to mention concrete objectives. The survey of national information infrastructure 
policies in Chapter Four revealed that this was representative of Sub-Saharan Africa.128 
By the end of 1999 few countries had proceeded past the exploratory stages and many 
are even yet to begin any such exploration. Given the complexity involved and 
importance of information infrastructure planning, this delay in itself is not 
problematic. However, the cause of the delay should be the time necessary for in-depth 
analysis of the issues at hand rather than excessive caution.
The articulation of a national information infrastructure vision is an important aspect of 
successful information infrastructure planning. It is not sufficient for developing 
countries to jump on the "information revolution" bandwagon and announce ethereal 
plans. Rather, a vision is the fruit of a process of labour that strategically plans the most 
effective method of creating national information infrastructure to further 
developmental objectives. Many developing country policy-makers have fallen into the 
trap of articulating where they would like to be in 20 years time, whilst forgetting the 
reality of where they are now. Any attempt at maximising the potential of information 
and communication technologies must first involve an assessment of existing 
indigenous capacity in terms of strengths and weaknesses, priorities and threats as 
outlined above. In order to facilitate this process there is need to undertake a 
consultative exercise on information infrastructure development, at which the views of 
key stakeholders can be expressed. Key stakeholders will vary from country to country 
but provisionally should include representatives from:
127 Adeya, N. and Yahaya, F. (1999) Africa and the Information Economy, paper prepared at UNU/Intech on, 8 
July 1999, Maastricht, Holland, unpublished.
128 See Table A1 in Appendix A.
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• the government;
• the national telecom regulator;
• internet service providers (ISPs);
• other ICT service providers;
• telecom service providers;
• computer vendors;
• user groups;
• parastatals;
• educational authorities;
• the civil service;
• development agencies; and
• non-government agencies.
This consultative exercise should seek to fulfil at least three objectives:
• sensitisation of stakeholders as to the importance of information infrastructure;
• eliciting support for information infrastructure activities; and
• identification of needs and key objectives of a proposed national policy.
9.2.4 Strategy formulation
Policy-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa are justifiably apprehensive about adopting a 
form of technology that requires training and knowledge that may lead them into 
greater technological dependencies. However, the reality is that countries need a mix of 
advanced, intermediate and generic technologies to meet different needs effectively. 
Therefore, alternative efforts are needed to transfer and acquire technological 
capabilities and the technology itself in order to produce indigenously according to a 
country’s resources (Odedra, 1990b). Thus, it is envisaged that each country will have a 
hierarchy of needs based on cost-benefit analysis and internally generated criteria.
A key element in strategy formulation must be the need for realism. African countries 
are being urged to develop world class infrastructures by numerous actors, not least of
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all the development agencies and the manufacturers of these technologies themselves. 
The incitement of developing countries to "leapfrog" older, less efficient legacy 
information and communication technologies to modem, faster and less expensive 
infrastructures is far too enticing. The concept of "leapfrogging" was first mooted in the 
telecommunications industry when it was argued that developing countries had:
...a remarkable opportunity to completely leapfrog the electromechanical 
technology, avoiding the expense of replacing obsolete capital stock and 
problems of technological cumulativity, and start their telecommunications 
infrastructure from scratch (Antonelli, 1990, p. 71).
The concept rests on a number of assumptions:
•  the ability of countries to buy off-the-shelf technology that can be easily unpackaged 
and understood;
• the static nature of technology: that at any one time it is possible to have the latest 
technology that would remain static enough to allow rapid learning; and
• That all countries begin the "leapfrogging" race at the same starting line.
In reality not all developing countries are equally placed to benefit from the putative 
benefits of leapfrogging. Empirical evidence reveals that the most rapid rates of 
assimilation tended to take place in the first and second-tier newly industrialised 
countries within the Asia region (Hanna, Boyson and Gunaratne, 1996, p. 190). 
Moreover, the ability of these countries to leapfrog was contingent upon their high rates 
of economic growth and investment, a relative abundance of skilled labour and their 
exposure to international trade. There are inherent difficulties involved in technology 
transfer and transplantation, which seem to point to serious fallacies in the concept of 
"leapfrogging" (Singh, 1999; Adeya and Yahaya, 1999). As Davison et al. (1999) point 
out:
While leapfrogging may appear as an attractive option for the late adopters, it 
may not provide the intended results in all circumstances. The greatest danger is 
that a new "cargo cult" may arise, where the developing economies observe the
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benefits which later and succeeding generations of IT bring to the industrialised 
nations. Hurrying to acquire the same technology, developing countries rely on 
the blind belief that similar benefits will quickly accrue to themselves (Davison 
et al., 1999, p. 3)
At the same time, African countries are being urged to imitate the success of new 
information economy industries in areas such as Bangalore and Jamaica. Such a 
strategy is myopic in that the speed at which these industries innovate often precludes 
participation by "late-comers" (Heeks, 1998). If the putative goal of countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa is to attempt industrial catch-up and ape the success of their faster- 
growing developing counterparts, rather than chasing shadows, African countries must 
innovate rather than imitate. Developing countries can no longer rely on low-cost 
labour; greater emphasis will have to be given to improving the speed, effectiveness 
and quality of technological acquisition. Highly skilled personnel are required to 
absorb, adopt and apply these imported technologies. In addition, a well-trained 
workforce is required to assimilate and diffuse the new technologies and operate the 
systems.
Any talk about serious reduction in existing ICT disparities between advanced 
industrialised and developing countries is misguided, at least for the foreseeable future. 
It is an illusion to think that ICT-poor countries can "catch up" or keep pace with 
advances in the most technologically advanced societies. In the advanced industrialised 
countries the rate of technological development is very high and is supported by 
enormous research and development resources (Mansell and Wehn, 1998). This is 
certainly not to say that poor countries should not try to upgrade their ICT systems. But 
they should not do so in the unrealistic expectation that those who are ahead will wait 
for them. The situation may improve for poorer countries, but the present disparities are 
unlikely to go away. Having outlined the importance of applications and strategy 
formulation, the next stage in the process is focuses on policy formulation.
9.2.5 Policy formulation: the three dimensions of information infrastructure policy
National information infrastructure policies may take a number of forms; more 
generally they may be seen as explicit or implicit. According to Forsythe (1997)
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explicit policy instruments are intended to have a direct impact on technology variables 
and related activities. Implicit policies, on the other hand, are intended to affect targets 
other than technology-related ones, but can also impact unintentionally on technology. 
Policy instruments may be utilised to affect demand for technology by industry and 
other national actors. Here the intention is to ensure the appropriateness of the 
technology to be utilised, the source of the technology (local or imported), and the 
preferred form in which it is to be sourced, for example, licences and local research and 
development. Information infrastructure policies evidently must involve supply side 
policies as well. Likely policy instruments would include an analysis of the flow of 
innovation, the provision of information and communication technology services, and 
the creation and availability of indigenous capabilities in these technologies.
The three critical dimensions of information infrastructure policy are: demand, supply 
and government. The demand side of information infrastructure policy is represented 
by the user. Policy in this field focuses on facilitating access to information 
infrastructure services, and maximising user benefit. The supply side of information 
infrastructure policy is concerned with those who supply the component to the 
information infrastructure and the applications that run on it. Focus here is on 
improving the telecommunications and information technology environments and 
encouraging suppliers to these sectors to create appropriate applications and 
infrastructure. The third key element focuses on government itself. Government looms 
large in Sub-Saharan Africa as typically the number one employer and as the 
institutional mechanism that facilitates a fair and effective interaction between demand 
and supply, and dictates the environment within which this takes place. In addition the 
public sector in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be the largest user of, and supplier to, 
the information infrastructure. At the same time, the information infrastructure policy 
process is multilayered with multiple objectives determined by differential timescales. 
It is envisaged that governments in Sub-Saharan Africa will have short-term, medium- 
term and long-term goals. The strategy formulation process outlined below proposes a 
three-stage model comprised of:
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1. The foundational level: immediate priorities for public policy with a time horizon 
of between one and three years. Examples include telecommunications reform and 
the reduction of import tariffs on ICT-related goods.
2. The intermediate level: these priorities are envisaged to encompass medium-term 
goals and build on the foundational level. Here the time scale of implementation is 
between four and six years. Examples may include the creation of research 
institutes to foster the production of appropriate indigenous applications and 
information and communication technologies.
3. The advanced level: longer-term goals which may represent the achievement of 
objectives set at the vision-setting stage. These longer-term goals are envisaged to 
build on earlier developments and may be implemented over seven years or more. 
Examples could include the achievement of universal service objectives or the 
transformation of government business process and service delivery.
These levels are evidently not exclusive and represent progressive steps towards the 
achievement of the national vision. At each of these levels, policy is envisioned in 
terms of its impact within the dimensions of demand, supply and government. Given 
the state of information infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa as revealed by Chapter 
Four and the case studies of Nigeria and Ethiopia, the most pressing need is for the 
establishment of an effective information infrastructure foundation on which to build 
future capabilities. Appropriately, therefore, the emphasis is placed on the pivotal 
foundational level, which will determine a country’s ability to achieve medium and 
longer-term objectives. For example, without the immediate commencement of 
educational policies designed to increase national basic computer literacy it is unlikely 
that the majority will be able to benefit from information technology products in the 
future. Without devoting greater government resources to creating indigenous 
applications and content in the short-term it is doubtful whether information and 
communication technologies will have much of an impact on the local populace. The 
criticality of implementing a planned and targeted information infrastructure strategy in 
the short-term must not be lost on African policy-makers. At the same time, attempts to 
tackle the serious bottlenecks in information infrastructure development in the short­
term must not blind policy-makers to the need for long-term planning.
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9.3 The foundational level
Public policy at the foundational level should be focused on removing the constraints to 
information infrastructure development, and beginning the enhancement of national 
competencies. Though each country will have its own set of priorities, the findings of 
the previous chapters have revealed that there are four areas, warranting immediate 
attention in the short-term, that encompass the main constraints and challenges for 
information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
1. Infrastructure.
2. Human resources.
3. Applications and Content.
4. Environment.
Cross-cutting these issues is the need for awareness raising. This cross-cutting issue 
determines the extent of technology uptake within all three of the key dimensions: 
demand, supply and government. At the level of the user there should be awareness 
raising programmes to improve public understanding of the application of information 
and communication technologies, with co-operation from the public and private media. 
The case study of Ethiopia in Chapter Seven, for example, revealed the need for an 
improved culture of information exchange and sharing. At the government level there 
should be, first and foremost, sufficient awareness of the necessity of, and requirements 
for, infrastructure development among policy and decision-makers. Even in some 
advanced industrialised nations concern has been expressed at the lack of awareness of 
information and communication technologies by policy-makers and the private sector 
(OECD, 1998). To overcome this lack of awareness, special efforts must be made to 
sensitise heads of state and chief executives of the private and public sector to the broad 
policy goals and the importance of the information infrastructure to other sectors.
Specific awareness-raising programmes and pilot projects on the potential of 
developing public shared access facilities (e.g. smart payphones, telecentres, 
community information centres) should also be arranged to help overcome the high cost 
of access in rural areas and help to address universal access goals. Without awareness
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of ICT-related issues and their importance at all levels, it is unlikely that information 
infrastructure development activities will be accorded the status they deserve. In this 
area development agencies have already begun to hold workshops to sensitise high- 
level decision-makers and some grassroots organisations; however, there is still a 
critical lack of knowledge about information and communication technologies in rural 
areas, government and even the private sector (Wangwe, 1996). The government has a 
responsibility to publicise its information infrastructure vision and to raise user 
awareness through the educational system and national media.
9.3.1 Infrastructure development
At the foundational level the central focus will undoubtedly be on upgrading the 
existing physical infrastructure. Building on earlier needs assessment exercises, policy­
makers must prioritise the development of both the telecommunications and 
information technology sectors. Chapter Four highlighted that supply side constraints 
continue to hinder the ability of carriers to meet the burgeoning demand for 
telecommunications services in the region. These constraints include the state 
monopoly of telecommunications and the existence of regulations that restrict private 
sector participation. In addition, the two case studies revealed that whilst these 
operational considerations go a long way to explaining the poor rate of growth of 
telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa, the volatile political economy of the region 
continues to be a factor in accounting for the lack of development in 
telecommunications infrastructure. These generic problems were borne out by the case 
studies in Chapter Seven and Eight which analysed two vastly different countries at 
different stages of their telecommunications development, yet which both suffered from 
operational difficulties that were representative of the whole region. Both case studies 
also revealed that similar solutions were necessary in the short-term, namely:
• the reform of the telecommunications sector to increase operational efficiency;
• the extension of services to rural areas;
• the "digitalisation" of current networks;
• consistent policy-making;
• greater deregulation in the telecommunications sector;
• investment in new value-added services;
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• the establishment of standards for interoperability; and
• the analysis and deployment of appropriate new technologies.
At the demand level policy-makers must ensure low cost and easy access to a reliable 
communications network. Deregulation of the sector will also allow and encourage the 
indigenous private sector to provide value-added services. The role of government must 
be to regulate the sector to ensure first efforts towards longer term universal service 
objectives are being met. In addition there should be an immediate assessment of new 
technological options which may offer low cost solutions to extend rural access. 
Chapter Five found that new connectivity options such as satellite and cable 
telecommunications delivery mechanisms offer low cost and complementary options to 
countries wishing to extend their communications network. In the short-term the stark 
reality is that investment and operational improvement is required if the 
telecommunications sector is to act as an enabler rather than a constraint on information 
infrastructure development in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. In a similar vein there is 
an urgent and perhaps more pressing need to improve the level of information 
technology development in the region. Similarly, the major problems facing the 
expansion of information technology in Sub-Saharan Africa remain:
• the policy vacuum in the sphere of national information technology policy;
• import restrictions and outdated government policies towards the sector;
• inadequate maintenance of hardware;
• the scarcity of experienced and skilled software and management personnel trained
in information technology;
• the macroeconomic environment which has resulted in a small and weak middle
class with very low purchasing power for such items as computers and information 
goods;
• infrastructural deficiencies, namely a weak and expensive telecommunication
infrastructure, which has hampered the growth of information networks, and an
erratic electricity supply;
• the lack of an information culture;
• no well-established centres dedicated to developing software; and
• poor or non-existent procedures for equipment procurement.
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(a) The supply level
In the short-term, a national information technology policy must be articulated that is 
applied consistently to the sector. It should be enabling rather than restrictive. There is 
an urgent need to reform the existing policy environment affecting the supply of 
information technology products. Obvious targets would be an immediate reduction in 
import tariffs or restrictions on the importation of information technology products. 
Positive fiscal measures must also be put in place including: tax allowances on capital 
goods, grants on capital expenditure, subsides on leasing of technologies, and 
incentives to foreign investors. Though this may lead to the increased use of foreign 
technology, it would allow a greater degree of technology transfer and also facilitate the 
local assembly of information technology products. This would in turn provide a 
foundation for the development of indigenous information technology industries. 
Reducing the pace at which technology advances accentuate the experiential losses 
arising from any restriction on the free movement of technology. Countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa will find it increasingly impossible to play technological catch-up in the 
absence of unrestricted access to foreign technologies.
Straddling both the information and communication technology sector are new value- 
added services such as the Internet. In general, Internet access costs will still need to 
come down significantly before a wider spread of the population can make use of it. 
Generally it can be seen that service levels have improved and costs have come down 
where there is competitive Internet service provision and ISPs are free to establish their 
own independent links to the Internet, rather than being forced to go through the local 
telecommunication operator’s network (ITU, 1998b). At the same time, telecom 
operators can reduce service costs by providing national local call tariff rates for 
Internet traffic irrespective of location. There is an immediate need for African 
governments to provide a policy response in the short-term to improve the environment 
in which the physical infrastructure, namely telecommunications and information 
technology, is to be developed. In the telecommunications arena immediate policies 
should focus on:
• regulatory reforms to guarantee fair competition in telecommunication services;
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• subsidy or exclusivity policies to foster private investment in rural 
telecommunications;
• licensing policies to facilitate the take-up of the services that will be provided over 
new infrastructures such as submarine cable, GMPCS, and VSAT technologies;
• ensuring interoperability with the existing networks of new infrastructures such as 
cellular and other wireless systems, including roaming, directory services and 
sufficient data speeds for internet;
• ensuring transparent policies and corruption free licensing and procurement 
procedures;
• the development of responses to the global changes in accounting rate agreements, 
GATS and WTO agreements. This would include developing strategies for telecom 
operators to cope with the impacts of the changing accounting rate regime, Internet 
telephony and by-pass and examining the effect of these developments on the 
profitability of new capital investment; and
• the formulation of policies on restrictions on foreign ownership and cross 
ownership.
The policy response in the information technology sector should focus on:
• incentives for the adoption of technology and for the supply of technical consulting 
services and the establishment of professional accreditation in the information 
technology sector;
• creating an effective and consistent public sector procurement policy that builds the 
foundation for greater interoperability between departments and effective 
technology use; and
• the need for new legislation covering areas such as: intellectual property legislation; 
public information and contracting policies.
(b) The demand level
At the demand level, users can be encouraged to use information and
telecommunications technology by lowering prices and improving ease of access.
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Access to information and communications technologies is critical for effective 
participation in the global information economy. Government policy should focus on 
reducing the cost of information technology to the end user as rapidly as possible. 
Import duties and sales taxes could, for example, be removed from computer hardware 
and software (this is already the case in some countries, such as Mauritius). Special 
corporate and personal income tax deductions should be introduced to allow individuals 
and companies to offset the purchase of computer equipment. Soft loans should also be 
made available to individuals to purchase computer equipment. Governments can also 
fuel demand for information and communication technologies by being a visible user of 
the technology (Petersen, 1994). This can lead to increased government efficiency and 
have a powerful demonstration effect for those reluctant to invest in the requisite 
infrastructure. Further, liberalisation and privatisation in the telecommunications 
industry in Africa should be accomplished as rapidly as possible. Liberalisation and 
privatisation are not the end goals, but are the means to achieve the lowest possible 
prices, most advanced services, and network expansion to meet universal access 
objectives (ITU, 1998a). At the same time governments must formulate universal 
access obligations in concrete terms to ensure that deregulation does not further 
disenfranchise rural areas.
Evidently, in the short-term the highest priority will be attached to addressing the 
severe deficiencies in the underlying telecommunications networks and high costs for 
its use in the Sub-Saharan African region. Given that the majority of Africans live in 
rural areas there is a compelling case for listing the extension of information and 
communication technology services to rural areas as a priority for information 
infrastructure policy. Since the mid-1990s there have been increasing calls for the 
development of delivery mechanisms which are sustainable and effective (Chambers, 
1997; UNDP 1993). One of the most popular of these methodologies continues to be 
the multipurpose telecentre concept. Though there is no agreed definition of a 
telecentre129, it is generally agreed that each centre has a physical space and provides 
some information technology for public use. The telecentre concept is designed to
129 Community technology centres, networked learning centres, cabinas publicas, espaces numerises, 
telestugen, learning access places and telecottages are just some of the names that are being employed for 
places that provide a range of activities and services in often isolated areas that attempt to increase access to 
ICTs.
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bypass the usual obstacles to extending access to rural and dispersed populations by 
providing community-based access to information and communication technologies. 
International development agencies and organisations such as UNESCO and the ITU 
have, in the past two years, stepped up their activities to establish telecentres in 
developing countries.
Telecentres provide a cheap and potentially sustainable means of increasing access to 
information and communication technologies and sensitising rural or displaced 
communities to the their benefits. There are many telecentre support service models, 
ranging from the publicly funded village kiosks to small private sector centres that are 
entirely market driven and highly profitable. The choice of "which model" is dependent 
upon a range of factors, financial affordability being one of many considerations. For 
example, policy-makers may wish to use these centres to achieve their visions of 
empowering people to access and use information to their advantage. In reality it may 
be better to think of points of access strategies to increase the communications 
capabilities of the population (Hodge and Miller, 1996). A points-of-access approach 
argues the need for a variety of sustainable points of access to telecommunications and 
information services for the populace. It deconstructs the "universal access" issue and 
separates it out into questions of the construction of points of access in the form of 
telecentres, phoneshops and Internet kiosks and cybercafes, and affordability of access. 
It also raised questions about how value-added services and content are developed and 
delivered through these access points.
Individual points of access, by definition, offer access to local markets with varied 
needs that both vary over time and dynamically. It is thus unlikely that a single access 
point will be able to provide the full range of competencies likely to be needed to 
develop and supply a varying mix of services to meet local market needs. Attention 
must also be paid to how rural populations will access the information infrastructure. 
For Ethiopia, for example, a key factor in promoting information sharing and 
democratising access to information infrastructure will be the ability to communicate in 
the Gi'iz alphabet. For most people, English is a second or third language and for ease 
of communication, the ability to send e-mail or download information in Amharic or 
Tigrigna is vital. Though Ethiopia's National Computer and Information Centre has 
managed to create indigenous keyboards based on Amharic script and some basic
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software, there is an urgent need for national research efforts to develop country- 
specific software and on-line interfaces both for e-mail and for information retrieval. 
The development of a user-friendly Amharic interface for on-line connectivity is 
therefore an important priority which will greatly assist the promotion of electronic 
communication in the country and ensure sustainability.
Governments may also pursue a mixed strategy of constructing basic points of access in 
less profitable locations, while subsidising or deregulating telecentres provided by the 
private sector, which are likely to more closely mirror local needs. In this way points of 
access will emerge, where needed, that are sustainable and do not exhibit the classic 
suboptimal return on public investment that is typical of the Sub-Saharan Africa region. 
Despite some criticism of the sustainability of the telecentre concept during the first 
few years of its introduction to Sub-Saharan Africa, the consensus is that they represent 
an effective mechanism for expanding information and communication technology 
access (Opoku-Mensah, 1998).
The key issues, sustainability and affordability, can be addressed by the government 
targeting the most marginalised communities whilst allowing the private sector to 
respond to local needs. This will release scarce public and donor funds from the burden 
of funding a potentially huge number of points of access. In order to effectively place 
points of access policy-makers should use information and communication 
technologies to target populations. For example, census data and geographical 
information systems (GIS) can play an important role in planning telecentre projects as 
part of an integrated rural development strategy (Brodnig and Mayer-Schonberger, 
1999). Major national mapping and household surveys can be employed to aid in the 
planning and selection of potential locations, to pinpoint areas where the level of 
demand and ability to pay make such services viable (Bekele, 1999).
(c) The government level
The main deficiency in the information technology sector in many Sub-Saharan African 
countries is that there is no single institution specifically charged with information 
infrastructure policy formulation, implementation and review. As a result there is no 
national programme to enable the country to develop information technology and
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utilise its potential. There is a desperate need for institutional responsibility to integrate 
information and communications technologies into the development process. In 
addition there is an urgent need for the development of what Woherem (1995) has 
called a culture of management and maintenance. In resource-scarce countries the 
effective leverage of existing national resources is imperative. Woherem cogently 
argues for a mechanism to be put in place to check the Impulsive or unwarranted 
buying of new systems due to ignorance, ulterior motives, the sales-pitch of the vendors 
or the technical and graphical attractiveness of new systems’ (Woherem, 1995, p. 14). A 
national procurement policy for the public sector can go some way to alleviating the ad 
hoc purchasing of incompatible or inappropriate technologies.
A second key goal for high-level decision-makers in the short-term is to increase their 
capacity to make informed decisions. Decision-makers in Africa often suffer from 
severe information deficiencies and have access to far fewer intelligence sources than 
their industrialised nation counterparts (Jequier and Dedijer, 1987). This lack of 
"intelligence for development" results in decision-making based on often outdated and 
perhaps irrelevant information. Given the new opportunities for rapid and timely 
intelligence gathering offered by the Internet amongst other services, African policy­
makers cannot justify claims of ignorance. In the short-term a strategic development 
intelligence bureau should be set up with state of the art links to the Internet and global 
commercial databases. This bureau should be charged with the task of providing 
constantly updated information, filtered for relevance, to each government ministry. 
Examples of such information include:
• critical assessments and information on the expanding range of technology options 
available;
• international legislation that affects information infrastructure and national 
development;
• development of online information resources for use by entrepreneurs to identify 
sources of investment and development funds; and
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• developing guidelines and identifying sources for the production of the information 
required by investors including financial reporting of existing operations, market 
analysis and general economic investment and risk analysis.
This strategic intelligence resource is vital if countries are to benefit from rather than be 
disadvantaged by the rapid pace of technological change. It would allow greater 
scrutiny of foreign assistance and more coordinated state procurement policies. In turn, 
strengthening the local bargaining position through an improvement in the capacity to 
identify and negotiate for technology.
9.3.2 Human resource development
Human capital is increasingly being recognised as the engine of the global information 
economy (UNDP, 1998b). Effective technology transfer can only take place if it also 
incorporates a transfer of knowledge. Without a thorough understanding of imported 
technologies, countries in the Sub-Saharan African region cannot hope to determine 
their information infrastructure futures. Rather, they will remain trapped in a cycle of 
dependence upon foreign manufacturers.
With the decline in the macroeconomic fortunes of all but a few Sub-Saharan African 
countries there has been a concomitant fall in the level of educational spending (ADB, 
1998). Restricted by structural adjustment programmes and blighted by falling 
commodity prices the majority of governments in the region have significantly reduced 
public expenditure on education at precisely the time it is being deemed critical 
(OECD, 1998). Within the framework of national information infrastructure, human 
capital plays a key role and it is imperative that policy-makers assign it the requisite 
status. In the short-term policy should focus on achieving a basic level of national 
information and communication technology literacy.
A national information infrastructure policy must also ensure the ability to benefit from 
these technologies for all stakeholders. Mitter (1998) argues that rather than being 
gender neutral, the benefits that can arise from technological change may bypass the
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female population. Looking specifically at telecommunications technologies, she 
asserts that for socio-cultural reasons -  including limited mobility, low incomes, lower 
educational levels and the urban-rural bias -  women will not be the first in accessing, 
using and experimenting with these new technologies nor in benefiting from their 
potential. Mat Zin et al. (2000) corroborate this assertion, in a study of gender 
differences in computer literacy levels in Malaysia. They found a significant difference 
in computer literacy levels between male and female students among undergraduate 
students in Malaysia. In order to address the critical issue of human resource 
development policies may include:
• making basic information technology courses compulsory throughout the 
educational chain;
• increasing the number of information technology teachers;
• ensuring every school has access to the Internet and is networked to a country-wide 
"SchoolNet";
• providing free information technology education classes for adults;
• upgrading national technological capabilities through the establishment of 
information-intensive institutions that can provide extensive extension services on a 
wide scale and deliver comprehensive packages of assistance comprising technical 
know-how, finance, management skills, training and sales information;
• creating professional programmes to train a large cadre of experts in advanced 
information technology; and
• redressing the gender bias in technology uptake.
Another important element is the promotion of science and technology, which is 
increasingly being seen as a cornerstone of economic progress (Cassiolato, 1997). 
Recent biotechnological advances and genetic engineering must alert African policy­
makers to the importance of indigenous research and development, and also the threats 
that may arise from commodity substitution. Africa's share in the world's scientific 
output fell from 0.5 per cent to 0.3 per cent between 1985 and 1995; Africa as a whole 
accounts for only 0.36 per cent of the world's total number of scientists (UNESCO, 
1998). The continent unwittingly continues to encourage a steady stream of intellectual 
exportation, by ensuring the lack of adequate research facilities and disincentivising
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advanced education. Intelligent public policies are critical to effecting the shift from 
simple agriculture and simple manufacturing to information-based economies that 
employ innovation and technologically advanced applications.
9.3.3 Applications and content development
African policy-makers will also need to assess how information and communications 
technologies are applied nationally, what applications are needed and the content that is 
available. How information and communications technology is applied, and whose 
interests it serves, is central to whether this is an enabling technology, or a 
sophisticated way of keeping people and communities disempowered (Bourgault, 
1995). At various stages in the development and use of applications, it is necessary to 
ensure that the needs of end users are paramount, and not those of intermediaries.
Given the scarcity of resources available to Sub-Saharan African countries, policy­
makers must formulate a national information infrastructure strategy that prioritises 
those applications which can give its citizens the most benefit in the medium and long­
term. In the Sub-Saharan African region, given the preponderance of the state, a top- 
down strategy is the most appropriate. This strategic model emphasises that the key 
responsibility for information infrastructure development lies with the government 
itself. At the same time, developing indigenous capacity is fundamental if countries 
want to avoid the asymmetrical dependencies inherent in playing technological catch­
up. This thesis views information and communications technologies in a utilitarian 
light: how they can best be applied as an enabling technology, rather than as an end in 
themselves. The potential number of applications that can be facilitated by the 
information infrastructure is so great that it has tended to obscure some practical 
considerations. While the Internet has already shown that there is a widespread demand 
for electronic content and services, the utility of many innovations is unclear to many 
potential users and policy-makers. Possible application areas should dovetail with 
development goals and criteria, and be prioritised. The most pressing area for public 
policy is to tackle some of Sub-Saharan Africa’s endemic problems. From a review of 
the development literature (UNDP, 1998b; UNECA, 1998; OAU, 1989) these are 
commonly adjudged to be:
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• alleviating poverty and fulfilling basic needs;
• improving agricultural efficiency and rural development;
• improved macroeconomic and environmental management; and
• diversifying the economy by strengthening the private sector and reforming public 
enterprises.
Countries will need to assess their own hierarchy of needs and prioritise the 
development of applications appropriately. The case study of Ethiopia in Chapter 
Seven, for example, pointed to three target areas for applications development: meeting 
basic needs, developing human resources and diversifying the economy. In terms of 
meeting basic needs, environmental and resource management is of paramount 
importance in a largely rural country. Given Ethiopia’s dependence on agricultural 
products, the sustainable exploitation of Ethiopia’s natural resources is critical to 
national development. In the area of disaster prevention and preparedness the ability to 
prevent or minimise the impact of natural disasters is a priority in Ethiopia. Information 
is critical to the success of disaster prevention and a national network can play a vital 
role in empowering policy-makers through the more effective information gathering 
and processing capabilities that can be achieved through modem geographic 
information systems technologies.130 A functioning telecommunications service can 
itself be seen as a basic need (ITU, 1998b). Thus, a priority must be the development of 
a modem and integrated telecommunications and information technology system that is 
capable of enhancing and facilitating education, health care, business information, 
public administration and mral development.
An allied strategy in fulfilling basic needs is the development of human resources. 
Applications such as distance learning technologies can improve the educational 
delivery mechanism to previously marginalised areas in the mral hinterlands. The 
Ethiopian government is also embarking on intense efforts to diversify its economy 
away from agricultural dependence. A national information infrastructure policy would 
support these efforts through the use of information and communication technologies to
130 Cisler, S. (1999) "GIS in Africa", posting to the Global Knowledge for Development listserv, 16 November 
1999. Available from gkd@phoenix.edc.org.
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facilitate the development of agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism and perhaps the 
creation of new export opportunities. India, for example, has managed to create a 
domestic IT industry that is forecast to be valued at US$58 billion by 2008131, within 
the space of twenty years. The Ethiopian government would also benefit from 
improved local government service delivery, and eradicating outdated and ineffective 
tax and fiscal mechanisms. An effective government information infrastructure can 
improve tax collection and aid in the accumulation of accurate and timely data for more 
effective macroeconomic decision-making.
Basic needs and poverty alleviation can be supported by a number of applications. For 
example, health care and education systems can be strengthened through tools that will 
provide data for self-diagnosis and self-care. The education of rural people in health 
issues can be implemented by using information and communication technologies and 
distance learning. Remote healthcare via health informatics systems can make public 
health policy more effective by storing and providing information on disease and 
patients. Modem electronic communications can facilitate access to libraries, 
laboratories, and public archives. Distance education employing information 
technology such as multimedia and video-conferencing can become a vehicle to 
provide continuing education to people who are out of school. This would facilitate the 
educational process and reduce the likelihood of African researchers in advanced fields 
being marginalised because of their lack of access to germane information.
Rural development and the improvement of agricultural efficiency can be achieved 
through the systematic and reliable collection of data. Economic policies that are 
geared towards an equitable distribution of resources between the urban and mral 
sectors require reliable demographic, production, market, weather and other critical 
data. A systematic approach based on accurate statistical data is required to map out a 
realistic strategy to alleviate poverty. National experts and scientists in the field also 
need accurate meteorological information, harvest data, market reports and population 
counts at the local and regional level to facilitate their task of realising sustainable mral 
economic growth. Many countries have skilfully employed information technology to 
their advantage. Indian researchers, for example, have become among the leaders in
131 Knipe, M. (2000) "Lonely cabbies spearhead the IT revolution", The Times, 9 March 2000, p. 19.
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meteorological sciences using information technologies of meteorological data 
gathering, analysis and forecasting (Kupkes, 1996).
Another common development objective within the Sub-Saharan Africa region is a 
reduction of the macroeconomic dependence on the agricultural and extractive sectors. 
To this end, the region must look to strengthening the private sector. In many 
industrialised countries the private sector has been the major driver of the diffusion of 
information and communication technologies (OECD, 1998). These technologies have 
made existing business more efficient and profitable while at the same time enabling 
the creation of new profitable value-added services. Though the so-called "productivity 
paradox" has yet to be fully resolved, new technologies are now all-pervasive in the 
private sector of practically all industrialised countries (Kelly, 1998). Previously seen 
as a key, mission-critical support tool information and communication technologies are 
increasingly becoming a commercial medium in their own right. Electronic data 
interchange and business-to-business electronic commerce are just two examples of 
applications that are forecast to become essential for firms who wish to compete 
globally (Kelly, 1998). Evidently those developing countries that wish to attract foreign 
investment may find themselves bypassed in favour of countries with more developed 
communications infrastructures.
Emphasis must be placed on the application of these technologies to achieve specific 
objectives. Further examples of possible application areas include:
• improving the effectiveness of public information and judicial administration;
• enabling the functioning of financial markets and the development of the private 
sector through applications for: property, land, and business registry systems; 
payment clearance and settlement systems;
• improving infrastructure service provision: air transport control, vehicle
registration, utility management systems;
• strengthening trade and global competitiveness: trade facilitation systems, 
electronic data interchange systems;
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• managing the macro-economy and government: national and monetary statistics, 
debt management, tax administration, expenditure management, municipal planning 
systems; and
• preserving the environment: natural resource inventories, environmental
monitoring, licensing and inspection, regional planning.
A central concern needs to be the building of capacity so that the people with the needs 
have the skills to understand and shape the applications, rather than continually 
depending on external experts. This is true both at the level of communities, and at the 
national level, where it is essential that Sub-Saharan African countries build the 
necessary skills to address their own needs. Currently, the majority of software 
applications originate from the developed world. Many of these are excellent, and it 
would be a waste of resources to duplicate them. However, there are other areas where 
the needs of the developing world are so different that completely new applications 
could be developed. An example of the former would be word-processing where the 
needs of document production are largely similar throughout the world; whereas health 
care would be an example of the latter, where the experience of developing countries 
differs greatly from that of the developed world. At the same time, the most useful 
applications are not necessarily the most sophisticated (Schumacher, 1993). Installing 
basic word-processing and electronic mail will greatly assist in many situations in the 
developing world. When considering pilot projects, attention should be paid to whether 
they are reproducible on a large scale. For example, broadband tele-medicine is an 
application with enormous potential, but the cost makes it unrealistic as a means of 
addressing widespread health problems. Whereas placing a basic personal computer 
with a dial-up connection in most rural health centres would make a significant 
contribution to health-care workers.
There are evidently strategic choices for each developing country. Prioritisation 
directed by the overall developmental and economic needs of the country is central to a 
coherent information infrastructure policy. First and foremost, appropriate applications 
should fulfil local needs and promote local industries. Application examples that fulfil 
these criteria include:
/
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• virtual agricultural trading markets;
• agricultural extension information services;
• local tourism promotion;
• government information access;
• banking and e-commerce facilities; and
• census registration.
A country’s assessment of its own hierarchy of needs is critical to leveraging 
information and communication technologies in support of development objectives. 
Countries cannot just concoct a "wish list" of desirable applications and hope to 
transplant them into the local environment. Rather, the needs assessment described 
above must be placed in the context of local needs and within a clearly articulated 
strategic framework.
9.3.4 Environment
One of the biggest constraints to information infrastructure development in countries in 
the Sub-Saharan African region is the environment in which physical and human 
capital must operate. The Sub-Saharan Africa region exhibits the highest concentration 
of low-income countries in the world and records correspondingly low scores in terms 
of annual human development indicators (UNDP, 1999). Though the focus of this 
research is not on economic development policies, there is an explicit 
acknowledgement that policy implementation and design does not take place in a 
vacuum, and is constrained by the national environment in which it is formulated. 
Political instability and a lack of good governance appear to be endemic in large areas 
of the continent and do not augur well for consistent policy-making.
One of the lessons that can be drawn from the success of the South-East Asian 
economies in upgrading their information infrastructures is that the presence of a stable 
policy regime helped ensure that long-term plans reached fruition (Amsden, 1989). It is 
important that membership of the national institution/body or committee charged with 
directing and implementing information infrastructure policy be based on merit rather 
than political expediency. Moreover, providing they are effective within their roles, 
committee members should be viewed as long-term appointees, immune to the political
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waves that invariably buffet the national polity. The information infrastructure 
development process is based on incremental progress towards long-term objectives. If 
the process becomes an extension of national politics then it will suffer from the same 
deficiencies that so typify African policy-making.
Allied to the need for policy consistency and macroeconomic and political stability is 
the need to address the linkages that affect national development. The state of public 
utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa represents another constraint on national development. 
The case study of Nigeria, for example, highlighted the additional costs to potential 
users of information technology as a result of the need to provide backup energy 
supplies (Lee, 1996). Information and communication technologies are energy 
intensive and incorporate in-built design assumptions of uninterrupted power and 
neutral climatic conditions. A generalisation can be made with regard to the limited 
extent of national grids in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in rural areas (de Olivera, 
1991). Therefore a national information infrastructure strategy will also have to look at 
integrating the use of information and communication technologies and the host of 
infrastructural services they rely on. A critical segment of public infrastructure is the 
transportation network, which continues to hamper trade in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
neglect of major transportation routes and the lack of national rail networks in Nigeria, 
for example, increases transaction costs and curbs economic growth (Lee, 1996).
Much has been made by development agencies of the opportunities offered to Africa by 
electronic commerce (Cogbum and Adeya, 1999). However, this patently disregards 
the obstacles to transacting electronically in the region. In Ethiopia, for example, as of 
August 1999, credit card facilities were only available in a handful of international 
hotels in the capital Addis Ababa and local banks had yet to be networked with their 
outlying branches. Even in countries with relatively well-developed banking systems, 
environmental factors such as the high rate of fraud and the lack of credit reference 
agencies and accurate national records represent serious constraints to the development 
of electronic transactions. Even if these were to be overcome, internal transport 
networks may nullify the time gains from transacting electronically. The government 
must ensure that it takes a holistic approach to information infrastructure development. 
It must ensure that secondary linkages to the information infrastructure do not impinge 
upon overall policy efficacy. Government policy in this are may include:
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• maintaining macroeconomic and political stability to encourage investment;
• investing or deregulating the public utilities sector to ensure a more reliable service; 
and
• encouraging innovation in the banking sector to facilitate electronic payments 
systems.
Governments must provide an enabling environment to foster the growth of technology 
and technology-related industries in the economies of Africa. It is clear that there is no 
universal solution to the problems facing African countries. National policy 
formulation must be specifically tailored to meet clearly defined national objectives, 
based upon local realities, constraints and needs. Nevertheless, there are some 
identifiable common principles, and African decision-makers should actively pursue 
the vigorous debate around these principles at all levels. Any efforts to prepare the 
continent for an era of accelerated structural change must encompass policies to address 
basic needs and ensure an environment that is conducive to creating the necessary 
conditions for the information economy to flourish. These conditions include good 
governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and ensuring transparency 
and accountability in public administration. The short-term measures outlined above 
point to the kinds of policies governments in the Sub-Saharan African region should be 
focusing on in order to build a foundation that expedites the achievement of medium 
and longer-term objectives. This foundational period of one to three years will lay the 
groundwork for much of what is to come and will determine the pace at which 
countries can progress toward their goals.
9.4 The intermediate level
Public policy at the intermediate level should focus on leveraging the information 
infrastructure to pursue national development objectives. In the medium term 
information infrastructure policy should concentrate on consolidating the foundation 
created by the previous two or three years’ policies; strengthening, deepening and 
entrenching the national information infrastructure. Again, policy should focus on the 
four areas of: physical information infrastructure and human resource development,
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applications and content development and the environment. Typically centring on:
• information and communications technology industry development;
• research and development;
• leveraging information and communication technology applications to facilitate 
public sector service delivery;
• the implementation of large-scale demonstration projects: networking the 
educational system, electronic customs systems, national identification systems, and 
the creation of an electronic census; and
• the codification of indigenous knowledge.
Information technology should be utilised to improve productivity, quality of products 
and/or services, labour productivity in the workplace and competitiveness in the 
international marketplace. The links between information technology and the different 
sectors of the economy must be analysed and understood in the planning process. Such 
factors as user requirements and infrastructural support, should be included in assessing 
the impact of information technology on the various sectors. Lastly, information 
technology should be considered as an economic sector in its own right. This sector can 
be categorised into sub-sectors such as research, human resources development, 
hardware, software, consultancy and database/networks. Each of these subsectors can 
be analysed to assess its impact on national development programmes.
For most Sub-Saharan African countries there is no realistic opportunity to break into 
the international information technology market. However, indigenous skills in 
information technology must be nurtured and the relationships between international 
suppliers of hardware must be better managed to ensure a more effective transfer of 
knowledge. Software should hold a special place in public policy (Heeks, 1999a). 
Policy aspects of information technology therefore need to be addressed in terms of 
formulation, dissemination, and implementation. In the absence of clear and 
enforceable policy, the African information industry is likely to evolve in a haphazard 
manner in reaction to uncoordinated external motives, thus allowing improper practices 
that would impair the growth of enthusiasm for information and communications 
technologies.
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In the long-term there is a critical need for research and development in order to 
develop appropriate new products for the domestic and international markets, and also 
for keeping abreast of international technological developments. At present, countries 
in the Sub-Saharan African region are almost entirely dependent on the foreign private 
sector for information technology products. As a result, they must adapt to products 
designed for use where there is a reliable energy source and stable climatic conditions, 
and where the English language is standard and literacy taken for granted. Few African 
countries if any, exhibit these characteristics, hence the urgent need for indigenous 
research and development to create products appropriate to the local environment and 
market. In the medium term there is a desperate need for the local production of 
information technology products. The simple assembly of computers is growing in 
countries such as Nigeria and Kenya, and should be encouraged to foster the 
development of local information technology industries. This can help prevent a 
widening technological gulf between developing countries and industrial nations and 
form the basis of product adaptations for the local market.
The direction of research and development is as important as the level of funding and 
the underlying capabilities. As much of the research into information technologies has 
been dominated by industrial countries, the focus is on sophisticated entertainment 
products such video-on-demand, interactive television and virtual reality, products 
which are clearly not a priority in Sub-Saharan Africa. Local research and development 
technologies should address customer requirements in developing countries, such as 
voice-text conversion for illiterate people or cheap cellular networks for rural areas or 
interface design.
In view of the fact that African countries are opening up their economies to both 
external investment and market competition, policy formulation should take into 
account the impact of the national and the external environment on the development of 
information infrastructure. Issues such as international data networks, technology 
compatibility, intellectual property rights, transborder data flows, technology transfer, 
and economic conditions, should all be explicitly considered by policy-makers. Once 
the main impediments to information and communication technology use, such as poor 
telecommunications networks, the lack of Internet service providers and restrictions on
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the supply of information and communications technology have been overcome, 
attention should be given to leveraging these technologies to expedite national 
development goals. It is hoped that the achievement of the objectives at the 
foundational and intermediate levels will allow a maturation of a national information 
infrastructure, and hence the reduction in government participation. Advanced 
applications which should be prioritised include:
• digitising public records to facilitate public service delivery, taxation and anti-fraud 
measures;
• developing an electronic clearing-house mechanism, for use by operators and 
entrepreneurs seeking investment, to make widely available the information needed 
by prospective investors;
• developing innovative methods for reducing the cost of equipment in new
investments in infrastructure, such as making use of the technology with the best 
price/performance ratios; and
• creating government information networks.
9.5 The advanced level
The advanced level of information infrastructure planning can represent the fulfilment 
of some of the long-term objectives set out in the national vision. Policies will be 
specific to the aspirations of and contingent on the effectiveness of public policy at the 
foundational and intermediate levels. The timeframe for the achievement of these 
advanced and long-term goals is envisioned as being over seven years, but countries 
may well have longer-term ambitions which require correspondingly lengthier 
horizons. Potential long-term policies might focus on:
• national ICT applications utilising the latest technological innovations;
• broadening the industrial base by the creation of new information and
communication technology based industries;
• advanced research into biotechnology and genetic modification; and
• regional electronic trade networks.
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It is important that these longer-term aspirations are realisable and that policy-makers 
assess what local skills competencies are required for their fulfilment in, for example, 
15 years. It is likely that the technology possibility frontiers will shift dramatically over 
such a long period of time, hence policy-makers need to be visionary in their estimation 
of what can be achieved locally by a certain deadline.
9.6 Roles and responsibilities
It is explicitly acknowledged throughout this research that Nil development is an 
inherently complex process. This is evidenced by the fact that industrialised country 
policymakers continue to struggle to create information infrastructures that are 
conducive to their local environments. Nor have many countries successfully managed 
to articulate and delineate the necessary stages in the infrastructure development 
process. The contention of this thesis is that the lack of indigenous social, political and 
economic capacity within the Sub-Saharan Africa region warrants an approach to 
strategy formulation that is broad-based and participatory. Chapter 3 highlighted the 
often overlooked issue of state failure, and it is this weakness of the African state and 
local actors that necessitates a broad coalition of internal and external actors. The 
following groups need to be represented in formulating the strategy, for the reasons 
given:
• the government usually needs to mobilise other stakeholders to participate,
organise and often lead the preparatory work, and of course plays the central 
role in actual formulation of the strategy, as a policy maker and regulator;
• the demand side of the Nil, including the productive and service sectors, as well
as sectoral ministries of government. After all, the Nil's impact on development 
will be determined primarily by the way it is used in society;
• the private sector, both supply and demand sides, will need to provide the bulk
of the investment and of the technical expertise needed to deploy the Nil;
• local non-govemmental organisations have increasingly important roles as 
providers of services in society, particularly to the poor; and
• the scientific and academic community for the provision of knowledge and
expertise in their fields. International experts from the private sector or from 
international financial organisations can contribute a world perspective and an
393
objective, non-political point of view. They can also facilitate financing of 
follow-up investments.
There is also a critical need for coordination and strategic alliances with external actors.
9.6.1 The Regional level
Given the low level of competencies exhibited by the vast majority of countries in the 
Sub-Saharan African region, and the dependence of these countries on the foreign 
private sector for the production of information and communication technologies, there 
is a critical need for regional cooperation. Regional and sub-regional collaboration are 
necessary to optimise the use of scarce resources. Chapter Five, for example, 
highlighted the economic benefits that can accrue to African countries from the 
economies of scale that arise from pooling satellite capacity. Moreover new 
connectivity options such as pan-African submarine cable systems rely to an extent on 
cooperation between countries to ensure interconnection. The fact that the majority of 
countries in the regions are facing common challenges in their efforts to develop their 
infrastructures means that there is much to be gained from learning from the experience 
of other countries in the region. Historically, the lack of regional and subregional 
collaboration has led to poor telecommunications interconnection between countries 
and wide variations in the deployment of information and communication technologies 
(Akwule, 1992). Countries in the Sub-Saharan African region can vastly improve their 
negotiating position by combining their buying power and actively pursuing collective 
bargaining for purchasing information and communication technologies.
Firstly, there is an urgent need for organisational rationalisation. There are a number of 
organisations on the continent with overlapping briefs, namely: the Pan African 
telecommunications organisations, PATU, PANAFTEL and RASCOM, the regional 
satellite coordinating body. Efforts should be made to harmonise and reduce 
duplication among existing and envisioned regional and sub-regional organisations. 
Existing regional organisations, such as PATU should either be strengthened or 
disbanded if they continue to be ineffective. In the area of infrastructure development
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concerted efforts should be made to share information and experiences on best practice. 
There are likely to be divergent approaches to information infrastructure development 
within the region; however, there may be valuable generalisable lessons that can be 
learnt by late starters. All countries within the region can benefit greatly from improved 
information exchanges between countries regarding best practice, restructuring models 
and regulation. There should also be benchmarking mechanisms for comparing 
operational and network performance, such as the achievement of universal service 
objectives. There should also be collaboration on procurement strategies where 
applicable, as this would facilitate interoperability and reduce costs. Regional 
cooperation on interconnection may also go a long way to reducing the domestic costs 
of calls within the region. Sub-regional telecommunications hubs can provide telecom 
services to other African countries at the lowest possible cost by sharing inter­
continental links.
In terms of telecommunications development countries should strive to improve 
interoperability between telecommunications networks. The inefficiencies of routing 
calls to neighbouring states through distant third parties must be tackled. This could be 
achieved by the appointment of a regional telecommunications advisory board to 
oversee the development of international connections in the region and, for example, 
the adoption of common standards for the use of new technologies and in procurement 
procedures. By the same token national Internet development can be greatly facilitated 
by regional cooperation. The creation of regional hubs can improve the speed at which 
countries can connect to the wider Internet. At the same time, Africa must lobby for an 
African regional Internet registry to allocate Internet Protocol address space, 
autonomous system numbers, and maintain databases of registry information. This 
organisation will assist in the development and growth of the Internet in the African 
region and assist the African community in the development of procedures, 
mechanisms, and standards to efficiently allocate Internet resources as a service to the 
community as a whole. It could also serve as an advisory body to aid in the 
development of public policies and public positions on Internet development.
There is also scope for regional cooperation to reduce the impact of the limited human 
resource base, by creating, for example, regional centres of research on information and
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communication technology. In this way, smaller countries that lacked the resources to 
fund domestic research development would still be capable of benefiting from 
advanced research. The development of a regional research network amongst African 
universities to carry out research and development would facilitate this endeavour and 
could provide policy-makers in the region with valuable input. This regional network 
could be bolstered by establishing centres of excellence or specialisation, to train 
policy-makers, network operators and users in government and the private sector. 
Regional applications development may be another area for consideration. Given that 
many countries in the regions suffer from similar resource management problems, there 
may be scope for regional applications and content development. Disaster preparedness 
and prevention applications could be created and coordinated at the regional level to 
increase national efforts. Regional cooperation can also foster economic integration. By 
adopting measures for the regional development of transport, communications and 
tourism networks, countries can encourage trade and growth.
In terms of financing infrastructure in the region the creation of an African 
telecommunications fund, long mooted, should be a priority. At present there are a 
significant number of countries that are unattractive to foreign investment and who fail 
to qualify for development assistance. The creation of an African fund could target such 
countries that fall through the financing net and aid them in their telecommunications 
development efforts. Though mechanisms such as WorldTel, the ITU’s developing 
country telecommunications fund, have been set up for this purpose, the stringency of 
the requirements for funding qualification precludes many countries that are not 
prepared to fully privatise their telecommunications operators.
9.6.2 The International level
National information infrastructure planning cannot be expected to take place within an 
international vacuum. Rather, the global nature of the deployment and production 
information and communication technologies necessitates a strategy that recognises the 
importance of the international arena. Sub-Saharan African countries are dependent on 
the foreign private sector for the supply, maintenance and knowledge of information 
and communication technologies. This dependency dictates the formulation of an
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international dimension within the information infrastructure development process. 
International actors impact on the domestic creation of information infrastructure in a 
number of fundamental ways, namely as:
• suppliers of technology;
• suppliers of information and expertise;
• global regulators and standard setters;
• an international marketplace;
• a source of finance; and
• the source of development assistance through the international development 
community.
The dependency of Africa on the foreign private sector for the supply of technology has 
been a recurrent theme throughout this thesis. In the long-term it is hoped that this 
dependency can be ameliorated by greater indigenous production. The reality is that in 
the short-term, the development of African information infrastructure will be predicated 
on the ability of countries to access, transfer and transplant foreign technologies into 
their local environment (Bhatnagar et al., 1992). Chapter Five investigated the role of 
the foreign private sector in providing new connectivity options, which included 
satellite delivery mechanisms and submarine intercontinental cable systems. It was 
argued that these represented alternative options to African policy-makers seeking to 
widen access to their public telecommunications operators, but that each scheme 
warranted in-depth analysis to assess appropriateness. It is likely that research will 
accelerate the development of new, lower cost telecommunications and information 
delivery mechanisms. Therefore it is imperative that information infrastructure policy 
planners have access to the latest information regarding their development.
Access to the latest information is critical for effective planning in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially in the field of technological development. Sub-Saharan Africa has for too 
long been the repository for outdated technology. At a recent communications 
conference in Nigeria one of the founders of one of the first American Internet service 
providers, Prodigy Inc., highlighted the fact that the majority of vendors were selling 
Internet technologies that had been discontinued in the United States three years before
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in 1996.132 The region cannot continue to accept the technological cast-offs of 
industrialised nations, whilst at the same time striving for technological parity. It is 
essential that policy-makers are suitably knowledgeable and sufficiently 
technologically literate to ensure informed procurement. Hence the need, as stated 
earlier, for strategic intelligence bureaux that scan and filter the relevant information 
for the perusal of decision-makers.
In addition there may be a need for strategic alliances with information and 
communication technology producers. Global competition in these industries ensures 
that it is very much a buyer’s market and African countries should leverage their 
collective buying power to dictate the terms upon which technology is transferred. 
Large populous countries with relatively substantial resources and significant domestic 
markets, such as Nigeria, could for example tender an international offer to suppliers 
for a large consignment of information technology products, specially modified to 
incorporate surge protectors for the local market. Even smaller countries, such as 
Ethiopia, could enter into agreement with Indian software houses in Bangalore to 
produce bespoke products in the local language.
One of the biggest constraints to rapid information infrastructure development in Sub- 
Saharan Africa is the lack of local expertise and experience with information and 
communication technology products. The global phenomenon of skill shortages in 
these industries is particularly acute in Africa and will remain so long as governments 
fail to prioritise education and provide an environment that encourages its most talented 
resources to contribute to the brain drain. In the industrialised nations the solution to 
shortage of skills has been to induce people to transfer their knowledge assets from 
other countries through the promise of higher financial remuneration. It is unlikely that 
Africa can offer the same level of remuneration; however, policy-makers should think 
laterally as to how they can exploit the global brain drain. The deterioration in African 
living standards has seen a concomitant rise in the size of the African diaspora. Though 
there has been few attempts to quantify its size, it is generally agreed that within this 
disparate group a significant proportion are employed within many of the leading
132 Eric Sung, formerly a technology executive, Prodigy Inc., in a personal communication to the author 
commenting on the NICOMM exhibition, held in Lagos, Nigeria, 8-9 November 1999.
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information and communication technology sectors in the industrialised nations. 
Policy-makers should investigate mechanisms for exploiting this hidden reservoir of 
expatriate talent. Mechanisms could include:
• a database of expatriate nationals who work in these key industries;
• the establishment of foreign working groups who would provide industry 
intelligence and expertise on the latest developments within their industries;
• networking to facilitate employment exchanges;
• expatriate input into local software and hardware design; and
• representation and informed participation at international conferences.
Alice Amsden (1989), in her seminal book on the newly industrialised economies of 
South-East Asia, highlights how South Korea boosted indigenous knowledge by 
sponsoring the graduate education of thousands of engineering and science students in 
Western universities. By leveraging the collective experience of their expatriate 
populations African governments may be able to achieve similar success in increasing 
their domestic human capital and ensure that they stay informed and are represented at 
the international level.
Another important factor that affects national information infrastructure development is 
the role of the international governance regime. National efforts to develop the 
information infrastructure are conditioned to a degree by international regulations on 
the trade of information and communication technologies. For example, the World 
Trade Organisation’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) commits 
signatories to deregulating their telecommunications markets. Specifically GATS 
stipulates that the telecommunications sector must be competitive and incorporate an 
independent regulator. Though the majority of African countries signed this agreement, 
by 1998 only seven countries, including Ghana, South Africa, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire 
and Mauritius, had made commitments in the area. However, GATS will affect almost 
all African countries through their membership of the WTO. Though a Coordinated 
African Programme of Assistance Services (CAPAS) was set up to strengthen African 
power at the international negotiating table, there is a lack of coordination between the 
various national ministries concerned. In particular, the Ministries of Trade and
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Commerce and the Telecommunication ministries appeared to have little or no dealing 
with each other on the issue (Cogbum and Adeya, 1999).
Whilst there have been efforts to ensure an effective African presence at international 
fora, the fact remains that despite its size and importance Sub-Saharan Africa remains 
marginalised. The continent’s inability to create a united front at the international level 
arises from a number of factors. Firstly, the struggle for resources and geopolitical 
influence is a familiar tale in Africa. The abiding legacy of the arbitrary division of the 
continent according to the whims of the colonial powers has left enduring pockets of 
instability. For example, some 11 countries have been involved in the ongoing civil war 
that swept through the Congo in 1998. Also it seems that old colonial ties continue to 
linger as countries such as France continue to maintain a key stake in practically all the 
telecommunications sectors of its former colonies. These divisions, along colonial or 
ethnic lines, limit the effectiveness of Africa’s positions in global fora and reduces the 
potential for regional and sub-regional activities. African countries must attempt to put 
these barriers to international cooperation behind them and create effective institutional 
mechanisms to ensure that the African voice is heard and respected rather than merely 
tolerated at the international negotiating table.
With the advent of services such as electronic commerce and the success of developing 
countries, such as India, in creating successful export industries, there has been talk of 
African countries exploiting the economic opportunities of a global marketplace 
underpinned by information and communication technologies. Though there are many 
barriers to this happening on a major scale there may well be opportunities in the 
medium to long-term for countries to export on a significant scale to the global 
marketplace. Should this be the case policy-makers must ensure that its entrepreneurs 
have access to information on foreign markets and are encouraged to export by a 
welcoming fiscal environment. Tax incentives should foster entrepreneurship and a 
"start-up" culture amongst the domestic private sector. Policy-makers can also facilitate 
the export process by sponsoring foreign trade fairs and expositions.
From a financial viewpoint, the prohibitive costs of information infrastructure 
development may mean that revenue-scarce Sub-Saharan African countries need to
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enter into alliances with the foreign private sector. As the pressures to place public 
infrastructure on more commercial principles have increased, financing sources have 
become more diversified. Initially this has involved privatisation of existing providers 
and a significant number of public telecommunications operators have already had a 
significant proportion of ownership transferred to foreign multinational 
telecommunications companies. The financing requirements for building new 
communication infrastructures are substantial. Raising these large sums will not be 
easy given the indebtedness of African countries and their poor credit ratings which 
restrict the types of commercial lending. For some countries this may imply that 
funding is limited to multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and regional 
development banks. However, receiving funding from these institutions may, for the 
foreseeable future, take some time due to the complexity of disbursement procedures 
and the stringency of conditions. This often means that by the time funding is agreed, 
the technological landscape may have changed and needs to be renegotiated. Allied to 
this issue is the fact that those countries which fail to qualify for such funding find, due 
to a high level of external debt, that private commercial lending and equity markets are 
not accessible.
In order to be successful, innovative financing techniques will need to be applied to 
meet the large capital investment requirements associated with building new national 
information infrastructures. This suggests the importance of strategic alliances between 
national and foreign financiers, equipment suppliers, governments and local companies 
in order to attract foreign investment. Investment capital is an essential element of the 
partnerships that have to be formed to successfully develop the national information 
infrastructures required for sustainable development. However, the process of 
procuring funds will in itself require prior mobilisation of partners to provide the 
specific construction, operational and financing expertise that a particular project needs. 
Increasingly, financing has to be viewed as an integral component of each development 
project rather than something that can be added at the end.
The international community of development agencies also has a responsibility to 
leverage information and communication technologies to improve the assistance they 
provide to developing countries. The Internet has proved to be an effective tool for 
facilitating collaborative partnerships. Virtual fora and online resources can allow
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greater dissemination of knowledge and can improve coordination of development 
assistance. There is a need for interagency knowledge partnerships that share 
information, experiences and resources to promote broad access to, and effective use 
of, knowledge and information as tools of sustainable and equitable development. 
Specifically, there should be efforts to:
• encourage the international development community to assist efforts to improve 
infrastructure;
• encourage support for capacity building, awareness raising and human resource 
development; and
• support the development of electronic information sharing and distance training 
resources to facilitate financing and investment in African information 
infrastructure and policy and regulation.
Countries in the Sub-Saharan African region must also exploit the knowledge of other 
developing regions. There should be exchanges of experience and practices on 
information infrastructure development in Latin America and Asia. It is likely that there 
will some common ground and room for south-to-south collaboration on infrastructure 
services and procurement strategies. The weakness of the African state in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and its inexperience with information infrastructure development policy calls 
for web of interactions between actors at the national, regional and international level. 
What is required is a new institutionalist approach that takes into account the new 
realities of globalisation and the need for intranational, regional and international 
cooperation. Institutions are seen in the broad sense as comprised of representative 
collectives ranging from grass roots organisations to multilateral agencies whose key 
roles could be coordinated by the state. Within this schema NGOs, for example, could 
help African policymakers assess the appropriateness of incoming technologies, local 
grass root organisations could sensitive local communities to the advantages of using 
ICTs and international development agencies could provide financial and technical 
assistance at the micro and macro level.
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9.7 Evaluation, reappraisal and research
A final aspect of the multilevel strategic framework involves a constant evaluation and 
reappraisal of the information infrastructure planning process. The rapid pace of 
technological change necessitates a close monitoring of public policy in this area. The 
advent of fresh innovations may well offer more efficient solutions to old problems and 
need to assessed in this light. Periodic working groups based around the key areas 
mentioned above must assess the efficacy of public policy and whether it is meeting 
objectives and benchmarks. In close alliance to this should be research in line with the 
principles of constructive technology assessment. This understanding will allow policy­
makers to anticipate social consequences better and to construct those institutional 
arrangements that orient technological change towards socially desirable ends. Here 
one must look at relationships among variables affecting technological development, be 
they socio-economic, political, cultural or gender variables, geographical locations or 
market forces. Too little is known about how these factors interact at the micro, meso 
and macro levels. It is hoped that in the long-term strategies can be formulated that 
allow a more appropriate and equitable development of socially beneficial 
technologies.
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CHAPTER 10 
Conclusion
10.1 Research findings and discussion
It is only since 1995 that the majority of industrialised nations began to articulate a 
policy response to the dynamics of information infrastructure development. It is 
therefore unsurprising that their developing country counterparts, which have more 
pressing concerns such as the fulfilment of basic needs occupying their agendas, have 
been somewhat slower in their response. In 1999, with more than half of the countries 
in the region engaged in military action at home or abroad, endemic macroeconomic 
and political instability and some countries on the edge of human disaster, it would be 
understandable if information infrastructure policy was viewed as a luxury. Such 
government myopia is dangerously negligent. Chapter One of the research highlighted 
the confusion surrounding the perceived impact of techno-economic change. It 
highlighted that the despite this constant, the leitmotif of the literature was of 
fundamental transformation.
Chapter Two presented evidence for the importance of information infrastructure and, 
pointing specifically to the economic gains arising from more efficient communications 
networks, the importance of accurate and timely information for decision-making. 
Chapter Two stressed that the Sub-Saharan Africa region faced a set of challenges that 
could be ameliorated by leveraging information and communication tools; such as 
improving resource management. At the same time, information and communication 
technologies are accelerating the pace of scientific and technological change and posing 
questions about the sustainability of African agriculture in the face of commodity 
substitution through genetic engineering. It was concluded that countries that fail to 
adapt or to shape this transformational process may find themselves marginalised to the 
global periphery. Finally, the chapter argued that the outcome of this process of 
transformation for Sub-Saharan African countries was predicated on the pivotal role of 
public policy.
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Chapter Three presented a conceptual framework outlining how African governments 
can constructively steer the information infrastructure development process to suit their 
national development objectives. It was firstly argued that African policy-makers must 
understand the complexity of the issues at hand. This understanding could allow policy­
makers to anticipate social consequences better and to construct those institutional 
arrangements that orient technological change towards socially desirable ends. The 
conceptual framework, drawing on a number of theories, including constructive 
technology assessment theory, provides an empowering analytical perspective from 
which to view the development of information infrastructure. This perspective looks at 
relationships among variables affecting technological development, be they socio­
economic, demographic, political, or cultural. The framework is seen as a policy matrix 
for integrated information infrastructure planning at the national, regional and 
international levels. The final objective being to give policy-makers the ability to 
prioritise the use of scarce resources according to their national hierarchy of needs.
Chapter Four revealed the lack of national information infrastructure policy-making in 
the region and pointed to the overall weaknesses in the provision of
telecommunications and information technology use and diffusion. While Africa’s 
communications and information infrastructure has improved dramatically since 1995, 
access to, or the means to exploit a reliable, widespread communications infrastructure 
is still a dream for the majority of Africans. Since the early 1990s there has been a 
belated recognition of these failings. In the wake of concerted efforts by external actors 
such as development agencies, African policy-makers have been sensitised to the 
importance of information and communication technologies to national
competitiveness, and as a means of supporting national development. However, the 
strategic policy responses to this issue have on the whole been disappointing. Though 
characterised by immense diversity countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region remain 
remarkably uniform in their lack of an effective public policy response in this area.
Chapter Four also revealed that the majority of countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region have begun to restructure the telecommunication sector. This has typically
involved the separation of the postal service from the national telecommunication
operator and the institution of a separate regulatory authority. International capital and 
strategic partners have been obtained by some of the national telecommunications
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operators but few second operators have been established as yet. Early liberalisation of 
the market for value added services in some countries has also resulted in a large 
number of alternate data, paging and mobile telecommunications service providers. 
There have also been some noteworthy efforts to expand telecommunications services 
to rural areas through the institution of universal access obligations and funds for rural 
communications development, and in setting targets for provision of services and the 
quality and extent of national connectivity (Cogbum and Adeya, 1999).
However, the institution of these reforms in the telecommunications sector represents 
only the first faltering steps in the information infrastructure development process. The 
analysis of the Sub-Saharan African region in Chapter Four revealed a public policy 
vacuum in this area and the continuing existence of explicit fiscal barriers to 
information infrastructure development. This suboptimal development of information 
infrastructure was borne out by the case studies conducted in Ethiopia and Nigeria in 
Chapters Seven and Eight respectively. Both the case studies revealed a similar lack of 
policy in the field and fundamental weaknesses in their information infrastructures. 
These weaknesses, which appear to be typical of countries within the Sub-Saharan 
Africa region, were found to be:
• underdeveloped information infrastructures, in terms of the telecommunications and 
information technology sectors;
• low utilisation of information and communication technologies;
• weak, non-existent, or ineffectual public policy in this area;
• underdeveloped human resource capabilities in the utilisation and production of 
information and communication technologies; and
• political and economic constraints which have deterred private investment.
Chapter Four also revealed that there was a widening gap between the developed and 
developing countries as well as an intranational gap within countries. This divide was 
between urban dwellers with relatively good access to communications networks and 
the majority of the population who are rurally located and often unconnected. Chapter 
Four also highlighted the existence of a number of external actors -  namely
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development agencies and the foreign private sector -  who appear to be heavily 
influencing the development of information infrastructure in the region.
Chapter Five began the first of two chapters analysing in greater depth the role of 
external actors in the area of information infrastructure development, looking 
specifically at the role of the foreign private sector in terms of their development of 
'offshore' information infrastructure. The proxy variables of satellite and submarine 
cable projects were taken as an indication of the importance of the foreign private 
sector in information infrastructure development and the need for public policy to 
regulate and coordinate their actions. In a similar vein Chapter Six examined the role of 
development agencies. It was found that while development agencies are bringing 
much needed capacity to the region in terms of network development and training, 
there is a lack of coordination and effective evaluation of their assistance. A survey of 
development agency projects revealed that there were over 100 organisations engaged 
in over 300 projects involving information and communication technology activities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in 1998. Of these, 273 were devoted to the Sub-Saharan African 
region.
Qualitative analysis of the project abstracts of these 273 projects within the Sub- 
Saharan Africa region, that were completed or ongoing between January 1 1996 and 
May 31 1999, revealed a high degree of homogeneity in the stated justifications and 
rationales behind these projects. A case study of one such initiative, the United Nations 
Development Program's Internet Initiative for Africa in Ethiopia, was conducted to test 
some of the assumptions underpinning the use of ICTs in development assistance 
projects and to illustrate some of the issues raised in the of sample projects. The project 
was found to be undermined by issues deriving from project design and 
conceptualisation and the unique problems associated with the technology itself and the 
African context. Despite these problems it was acknowledged that development 
agencies have played and will continue to play a key role in agenda setting, consensus 
and capacity building. Thus, though there is an explicit recognition of the importance of 
the development community, there is also an acknowledgement of the need for a more 
coherent framework for planning and implementing information infrastructure-related 
projects. Finally, the last two chapters, national case studies of Ethiopia and Nigeria,
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have shown the common and specific problems facing countries in the Sub-Saharan 
African region.
Chapter Seven’s case study of Ethiopia revealed a country emerging slowly from a 
prolonged period of political and economic instability, with a correspondingly low 
level of information infrastructure sophistication. With over 80 per cent of the country 
living in rural, often inaccessible areas, the vast majority of Ethiopians were found to 
be reliant on the traditional forms of communication, and national usage of information 
technology, even in government, is limited. In terms of physical infrastructure Ethiopia 
continues to suffer from the high costs involved in reconstruction and development in 
the wake of its ongoing war with Eritrea. This has destroyed significant segments of 
basic infrastructure in the hinterlands and restricts government efforts to extend 
services to outlying regions.
Ethiopia is also unique in that it is home to a large number of non-govemmental 
organisations and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 
This is an important distinction because the country has benefited from the activism 
and funding of these organisations. For example, the single most important 
development agency project for information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Africa Information Society Initiative, has been designed by UNECA. This 
has meant that policy-makers in Ethiopia were sensitised to the importance of 
information and communication technologies as early as 1993 and Ethiopia had one of 
the earliest African experiences with the Internet in 1995. Yet, the country has failed to 
capitalise on these advantages. As in the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, the 
national telecommunications operator is a government-owned monopoly that has failed 
to effectively develop an extensive public telecommunications network. However, the 
public telecommunications operator is widely acknowledged as a relatively well-run 
parastatal and the government has publicly stated that it has no intention of privatising 
it (Adam, 1995). Nor will the government allow competition in the provision of 
Internet services. Again, like the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries the 
government has yet to articulate a national information infrastructure policy and 
appears content to wait and see. Chapter Seven concluded that, given the structural 
problems facing the country it is vital that the indigenous information infrastructure is 
upgraded. The long-term solution to Ethiopia’s seemingly intractable problems may lie
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in the creation of an effective information infrastructure that furnishes policy-makers 
with timely and accurate information. This information in turn will improve the 
capacity of government to manage such information-intensive issues as environmental 
deterioration and demographic management.
The case study of Nigeria in Chapter Eight investigated the development of information 
infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa’s most populous country. The obvious 
demographic differences between Nigeria and Ethiopia -  Nigeria's lucrative supply of 
natural resources, its higher standard of living and the fact that English is the official 
language -  would seemingly favour it over Ethiopia in the race for information 
infrastructure. However, despite the abundance of resources and relative prosperity of 
the country, Nigeria was found to be suffering from the same deficiencies in 
information infrastructure that were affecting its smaller and less resourceful 
neighbours. The coverage of the telecommunications network was clearly inadequate 
and the population subsisted with an unreliable and expensive service that functioned 
sporadically.
The main cause of these problems could be divined from two sources: operational and 
political economic issues. Like Ethiopia the public telecommunications operator, 
NITEL, suffers from poor maintenance management, effective management, low 
revenue generation and a non-commercial modus operandi. However, unlike Ethiopia, 
NITEL is widely acknowledged as a poorly run parastatal, which has resulted in a sub- 
optimal public switched network. At the same time, it was found that political 
economic considerations continue to exert a negative impact on the development of the 
sector. Political instability had militated against consistent policy-making, and had 
resulted in a state-owned monopoly which straddled the divide between its national 
responsibility and commercial sensibilities rather uncomfortably. Nor have the 
country's macroeconomic frailties encouraged the information infrastructure 
development process. An examination of information technology development in 
Nigeria found an industry bereft of government support and restricted by a negative 
fiscal environment of high tariffs on ICT goods. Chapter Eight did find evidence of a 
vibrant private sector that managed to circumvent government restrictions, and engage 
in the local assembly of personal computers comprising smuggled components. 
However, value added services such as Internet provision were seriously constrained by
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the public monopoly of telecommunications, the poor provision of public utilities and 
the lack of domestic buying power. Coupled with this were the typical problems of 
inadequate skilled human resources and the lack of indigenous content, applications 
and maintenance capabilities.
An investigation of Nigerian public policy in the field of information infrastructure 
development revealed a familiar level of inaction at the government level. It was found 
that while successive regimes had vaguely acknowledged the importance of 
information and communication technologies there had been no consistent and 
comprehensive policy in this area. The government of General Sani Abacha had 
attempted to create a comprehensive policy blueprint, which was designed to articulate 
a vision of where Nigeria would be by 2010. However, despite the lengthy consultative 
period and the expertise of those who participated in the project, the "Vision 2010" 
document paid only lip-service to the importance of information infrastructure. The 
subsequent death of General Abacha and the election of a civilian government in May 
1999 saw the repudiation of this exercise in political posturing. As is customary in 
Nigeria, in October 1999 the newly-incumbent civilian government announced a poorly 
drafted and vague telecommunications policy, that essentially disowned the policies of 
the previous regime, and has only served to obfuscate the telecommunications reform 
process.
Overall this thesis has highlighted the fact that the global shift in the importance of 
information and communication technologies and information infrastructure has caught 
Sub-Saharan African policy-makers unawares. Whilst these global shifts represent 
challenges to policy-makers on a global scale, they represent unique challenges for 
African policy-makers.
10.2 Further research
The literature review in Chapter One revealed that information infrastructure policy 
development straddles a number of dimensions ranging from the economic to the 
technological. Yet there has been little academic research into how the shift towards a 
new techno-economic paradigm, wherein knowledge is deemed the key resource, will
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affect and is affecting developing countries. The U.S. economist Thorstein Veblen 
argued that the ’outcome of any serious research can only be to make two questions 
grow where only one grew before’133. In the same spirit, this thesis has raised more 
questions that it can answer and has pointed to an urgent need for further research. 
Suggestions for further research include:
• National case studies of the effectiveness of national information infrastructure 
policies.
The critical success factors in information infrastructure planning are as yet 
undetermined, but it is hoped that with time researchers will be able to point to 
effective and ineffective information infrastructure policy regimes. This will enable 
policy-makers to better understand the information infrastructure development process 
from other national experiences and avoid a sub-optimal return on public investment. 
The conduct of comparative case studies could give insights into the effectiveness of 
policy-making.
• The need for better metric methodologies
At this critical time, when both countries and companies are restructuring to take 
advantage of new technologies and services, both government and industry need better 
tools to measure impact and efficacy. They must reach beyond traditional 
measurements of infrastructure and look at who is constructing information 
infrastructure, and how and why. Traditional methods are failing to accurately capture 
the extent of information and communication technology usage in developing 
countries. Further research should look to the development of more accurate metric 
methodologies that take into account dispersed communities and communal societies.
• The impact of greater access to information
An important area for further research is an analysis of the content that will flow on and 
through an information infrastructure. In the Sub-Saharan African context research
133 Veblen, T. (1919) The Place o f Science in Modem Civilization, London: Thoemmes Press, p. 23.
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could focus on the impact of information garnered from improved information 
infrastructure access. Content analysis will provide much needed information on how 
the information infrastructure is being utilised and whether alternative access 
methodologies are warranted.
• The impact of information and communication technologies on developing 
countries
It is hoped that policy-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa will begin in earnest to create 
information infrastructures, yet it is likely that a significant proportion will fail to 
promote this critical resource. With information and communication technologies 
increasingly becoming ubiquitous in industrialised countries, there is an urgent need for 
an assessment of the implications of this for Sub-Saharan. Areas may include the 
economic impact on countries in an era of genetic modification and commodity 
substitution and employment, and the competitiveness of the African private sector in 
an era of electronic commerce. In addition, further research in this area might look at 
the effect of informational deficiencies on decision-making in public policy. Little if 
any research has been conducted on the effect of informational deficit on the 
development process. There has been no substantive research on the effect of planning 
without adequate statistics, which is so common in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nor have 
attempts been made to assess the use of information sources in public policy.
• Design of rural information infrastructure access methodologies.
Researchers in information infrastructure development in Sub-Saharan Africa must 
keep in mind the demography of the region; namely, the rural population bias. There is 
an urgent need for practical research into the design of effective information and 
communications technology delivery mechanisms to facilitate relevant and timely local 
information to rural communities. Research areas might include, for example, the use 
of interface and interactive design to overcome literacy and language issues.
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10.3 Conclusion
Technological innovation in such diverse domains as information and communication 
technologies, material science (alloys, ceramics, fibre optics, composites) and 
biotechnology are fundamentally restructuring the global economy. Underpinning all 
these advances are a host of ICTs that are helping to unleash the potential of other 
technologies and creating fundamental transformations in other areas. In this new 
global economic environment, information and the knowledge it provides has become a 
key factor in determining national economic competitiveness and underpinning national 
development objectives. This thesis has justified the importance of information 
infrastructure for Sub-Saharan African countries. It has been argued that information 
infrastructure represents a new foundational infrastructure that can offer a number of 
benefits and help African policy-makers in their endeavours against the challenges they 
face now and they will face as a result of technological change. Whether African 
countries benefit or lose out from the structural shift to an information economy is 
predicated on the effectiveness of public policy in creating a host of competencies. 
These range from designing and implementing information infrastructure to the 
creation of a conducive environment by government.
The research has looked at the role of external actors, in particular the foreign private 
sector and development agencies and argued that they represent an important 
dimension in national information infrastructure planning. Finally, this last chapter has 
enlivened the conceptual multilevel strategic national information infrastructure 
framework, articulated in Chapter Three, by presenting specific policy 
recommendations for the region. It has been argued that information infrastructure 
represents an increasingly critical resource that can support Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
development efforts. However, it is recognised that whilst the African state is likely to 
play a critical role in this process, its historic weakness in policymaking necessitates a 
broad coalition of internal and external actors ranging from grass roots organisations to 
international development agencies. This is best achieved through strategic policy 
planning and implementation that involves public, private and voluntary sector 
participation and partnerships, at the national, regional and international levels.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Table Al: National Information Infrastructure Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa, June 1999
Country National information infrastructure agency N il
Policy
Comments
Angola No No The majority funds earmarked for information infrastructure is being spent on 
reconstruction and development of war-effected areas. Rebels still hold key parts of 
the country, thus an N il are difficult to implement.
Benin The Ministere de la Culture et de la 
Communication
No
Botswana Government Computer Bureau (GCB) No
Burkina Faso Delegation generate a l'informatique (DELGI) Yes
Burundi No No
Cameroon The Centre National de Developpement de 
l'informatique (CENADI)
No
Cape Verde No No
C.A.R Office National d'Informatique (ONI) No
Chad No No No formal national policy for ICTs but there is a high level of awareness at top 
levels o f government, partly fostered by the Centre National d'Appui a la Recherche 
(CNAR) which is the UNDP's national SDNP partner.
Comoros Ministere de l'Education nationale, de la 
Formation professionnelle et technique
No
Congo Ministere de la Culture, des Arts et de la 
Recherche scientifique, the Ministere de 
l’lnformation and the Ministere du 
Developpement
No As of November 1999, the ongoing civil war had resulted in the destruction of key 
elements of the national telecommunications infrastructure. Until a negotiated 
settlement is reached it is unlikely that any information infrastructure strategy will be 
mapped out.
Cote d'Ivoire Commission Nationale pour l'informatique, 
(CNI), the Secretariat General l'informatique, 
(SGI) and the Commissions Ministerielles de 
l'informatique, (CMI).
Yes Cote d'Ivoire has a relatively long history of national information technology policy 
development. In the late 70's the Government established the Commission Nationale 
pour l'informatique, (CNI), the Secretariat General l'informatique, (SGI) and the 
Commissions Ministerielles de l'informatique, (CMI). It also set up the Commission 
Nationale pour le Traitement de l'lnformation (CNTI) in 1980.
Djibouti The Centre d'information de la Direction du 
Plan
No
Equatorial
Guinea
No
Eritrea Eritrean Information Systems Agency 
(EISA)
Yes Despite the ongoing border conflict with neighbouring Ethiopia the government is 
keen to improve the practically non-existent information infrastructure. In 1999 it 
signed a contract with a US firm to supply the countries first GSM mobile network
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Country National information infrastructure agency N il
Policy
Comments
and has recently licenced its first ISP.
Ethiopia The Ethiopian Science and Technology 
Commission (ESTC) National Computer and 
Information Centre (NCIC)
No A broadly constituted cross-sectoral national Internet working group, Bringing 
Internet to Ethiopia (BITE), drew up a detailed and well thought out proposal which 
was among the most comprehensive national information infrastructure in Africa 
plans to date.
Gabon No
Gambia No
Ghana Ghanaian National Information and 
Communications Committee (GNICC)
Yes A draft national communications policy has been developed by the Ghanaian 
National Information and Communications Committee (GNICC) which comprises 
representatives from the academic, research, government and private sectors and 
coordinated by the University of Ghana
Guinea
Bissau
The Instituto nacional de estudos e pesquisa 
(INEP)
No
Kenya No No In general there has been little in the way o f leadership emerging from the academic, 
research and public sectors in the area of national networking and use of ICTs. This 
is partly explained by the political climate, the lack of broad institutional support 
from government for the academic sector (which has had a history of opposing the 
Moi regime), and the tight controls the state puts on public sector communications.
Lesotho No No
Liberia No No Most of the information infrastructure has been destroyed during the war.
Madagascar Centre d Information et de documentation 
Scientifique et technique (CIDST)
No There is no formal national ICT policy process but the Ministere de la Recherche 
scientifique et technologique pour le developpement is planning a number of studies 
in this area, most likely to be carried out by CIDST.
Malawi No No There is no national process for the development of information infrastructure plans.
Mali No No
Mauritania No No
Mauritius National Computer Board (NCB) Yes The Government has put into place a National Information Technology Strategy 
Plan (NITSP) a strong commitment to ICTs and has already made a number of 
efforts in addressing the regulatory and legal framework for ICTs.
Mozambique No No Although an active rebuilding process is taking place in Mozambique with support 
from a broad spread of the international community, the 20 years of civil strife have 
reduced the economy to very low levels and left few remaining functional public 
institutions outside the capital city.
Namibia Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Yes The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting convened a conference on Building 
Namibia’s National Information Infrastructure in Windhoek, May llth-14th '98. This 
was expected to assist with the government's decision to establish a national 
information network linking all the regions in Namibia which will provide public
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Country National information infrastructure agency Nil
Policy
Comments
access to government information and support the development of Namibia’s 
Information Society
Niger Delegue General a l ’informatique (DELGI) No National information infrastructure planning started with a UNDP SDNP mission in 
May 1997. However, since then there have been no public declarations of intent.
Nigeria No No
Reunion No No
Rwanda Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur, de la 
Recherche scientifique et de la Culture
No
Sao Tome 
And Principe
No No
Senegal Delegue General de l'informatique No The country has advanced information infrastructure organisations , and has 
announced a variety of initiatives to improve the local information infrastructure.
Seychelles Technical Support Services Division (TSSD) of 
the Department of Industry is responsible for 
national science and technology information 
policy.
No The national information infrastructure is designed to underpin the country's key 
sectors: tourism and fishing. Though no formal plan has been announced the 
government has declared its intention to turn the island into an information 
technology hub for the region.
Sierra Leone No No This war tom country has had much of its public infrastructure destroyed.
Somalia No No There is no recognisable national government in the country and virtually no public 
institutions are operational.
Sudan No No
Swaziland No No
Tanzania No No
Togo No No
Uganda No No
Zambia No No
Zimbabwe No No
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Table A2: Main telephone lines, Africa, 1996
Country Population 1996 Total (000s) P er 100 inhabitants
G row th over previous 
year
Algeria 29,168 1,278.1 4.38 8.7%
Angola 11,185 52.4 0.47 -12.6%
Ascension 1 0.4 38.35 2.6%
Benin 5,514 32.7 0.59 15.9%
Botswana 1,490 72.2 4.84 21.0%
Burkina Faso 10,780 34.1 0.32 13.4%
Burundi 6,088 14.8 0.24 -13.7%
Cameroon 13,560 70.6 0.52 7.6%
Cape Verde 396 25.2 6.37 17.3%
Central African Rep. 3,344 9.0 0.27 15.2%
Chad 6,515 6.0 0.09 12.6%
Comoros 632 5.0 0.79 10.4%
Congo 2,668 21.4* 0.81 4.2%
C6te d'Ivoire 14,781 130.0 0.88 12.3%
D.R. Congo 46,812 36.0* 0.08 —
Djibouti 617 7.6* 1.31 0.5%
Egypt 60,603 3,024.9 4.99 11.4%
Equatorial Guinea 410 3.7 0.89 45.8%
Eritrea 3,280 18.8 0.57 9.5%
Ethiopia 58,506 148.7 0.25 4.4%
Gabon 1,106 35.0 3.16 9.4%
Gambia 1,141 19.2* 1.73 4.9%
Ghana 17,832 112.9 0.63 88.2%
Guinea 7,518 16.2 0.22 49.3%
Guinea-Bissau 1,091 7.9 0.73 7.6%
Kenya 31,806 261.4 0.82 9.1%
Lesotho 2,078 17.8* 0.90 13.2%
Liberia 2,820 4.5* 0.16 —
Libya 5,593 318.0* 5.88 20.5%
Madagascar 15,353 39.4 0.26 20.9%
Malawi 10,114 35.5 0.35 3.3%
Mali 11,134 21.3 0.19 24.1%
Mauritania 2,351 10.2 0.43 10.3%
Mauritius 1,134 185.9 16.39 25.4%
Morocco 27,623 1,251.0 4.53 8.0%
Mozambique 17,796 61.2 0.34 2.3%
Namibia 1,575 85.5 5.43 9.0%
Niger 9,465 15.4 0.16 11.7%
Nigeria 115,020 405.1* 0.36 9.9%
Reunion 664 225.9 34.01 3.3%
Rwanda 5,397 15.0* 0.19 —
Sao Tom6 & Principe 135 2.5* 1.91 1.7%
Senegal 8,572 95.1 1.11 16.0%
Seychelles 76 15.2 20.00 12.4%
Sierra Leone 4,297 16.6* 0.37 5.5%
Somalia 9,822 15.0* 0.17 —
South Africa 42,393 4,258.6 10.05 8.5%
St. Helena 6 1.7* 34.26 9.5%
Sudan 27,291 73.8 0.27 -1.6%
Swaziland 938 20.5 2.19 3.8%
Tanzania 30,799 90.3* 0.30 2.2%
Togo 4,201 24.1 0.57 10.8%
Tunisia 9,156 584.9 6.39 12.1%
Uganda 20,256 47.9 0.24 10.8%
Zambia 8,275 77.9 0.94 1.5%
Zimbabwe 11,908 175.0 1.47 14.8%
AFRICA 743,195 13,642 1.84 9.9%
Note: * 1995 data. Figures in italics are estimates.
Source: International Telecommunications Union, World Telecommunications Indicator database.
Table A3: Sub>Saharan Africa country summary of Internet connectivity, August 1999
Country No. of 
ISPs
Users International
Bandwidth
(Kbps)
Local Call 
Cost* 
(US$)
Internet 
Density 
(Population / 
User)
Speed (Users 
/Int+ 
Bandwidth 
Kbps)
Total (Excl.) South Africa 192 67985 16011 2.8 9,395 5.0
Angola 5 1,500 192 6.00 7,978 8
Benin 7 2,000 128 4.80 2,941 16
Botswana 6 1,000 640 0.60 1,551 2
Burkina Faso 3 700 256 1.10 16,289 3
Burundi 1 75 19.2 0.75 87,853 4
Cameroon 4 2,000 256 1.55 7,162 8
Cape Verde 1 50 19.2 n/a 8,340 3
CAR 1 200 64 6.90 17,445 3
Chad 3 200 64 10.50 34,460 3
Comoros 1 50 64 0.20 13,440 1
Congo 0 0 0 n/a n/a n/a
Guinea 5 300 128 2.00 48,557 2
Djibouti 1 400 128 1.00 1,628 3
Equatorial Guinea 1 200 64 n/a 2,150 3
Eritrea 4 300 28.8 0.60 11,827 10
Ethiopia 4 2,400 512 2.60 25,880 5
Gabon 2 1,000 512 13.90 1,171 2
Gambia 4 150 128 1.20 7,960 1
Ghana 9 4,500 640 1.34 4,190 7
Guinea Bissau 1 150 64 n/a 51,153 2
Ivory Coast 3 2,000 256 4.80 568 8
Kenya 16 15,000 2000 1.36 1,935 8
Lesotho 1 200 9.6 n/a 10,920 21
Liberia 1 50 64 n/a 54,960 1
Madagascar 5 700 256 0.43 23,354 3
Malawi 3 400 128 1.56 25,943 3
Mali 5 400 128 2.80 29,578 3
Mauritania 2 100 128 6.60 24,540 1
Mauritius 6 960 896 1.00 1,202 1
Mozambique 6 3,500 384 0.80 5,340 9
Namibia 6 2,000 1000 1.00 827 2
Niger 2 200 192 1.31 50,595 1
Nigeria 15 1,000 1152 0.40 121,773 1
Reunion 1 500 64 n/a n/a 8
Rwanda 1 100 128 n/a 65,270 1
Senegal 9 2,500 1000 1.90 3,600 3
Seychelles 1 1,000 128 n/a 76 8
Sierra Leone 1 100 128 1.50 45,760 1
Somalia 0 0 0 n/a n/a 0
Sudan 1 300 128 n/a 95,090 2
Swaziland 3 900 64 0.95 1,036 14
Togo 2 300 196 1.60 14,780 2
Uganda 4 3,000 256 8.40 7,106 12
Tanzania 4 2500 1098 1,94 12,876 2
Zambia 3 3,000 256 1.60 2,897 12
Zimbabwe 17 10,000 2000 4.00 1,195 5
♦Converted to US$/hour. ^The number of Internet users per 1 kbps o f available international bandwidth.
Source: Compiled from www.apc.org and e-mail postings on Global Knowledge for Development listserv postings.
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APPENDIX B
Table Bl: Foreign private sector involvement in the ICT sector in Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Company(s) Industry
Angola n/a n/a
Benin n/a n/a
Botswana Sprint/France-Telecom/Deutsche-Telecom alliance -  Global-One. France Cable & Radio (FCR). Telecommunications and 
Internet provision
Burkina Faso Teleglobe (Canada). OMNES, (a subsidiary of Cable & Wireless) Public telecommunications 
and Internet provision
Burundi n/a n/a
Cameroon n/a n/a
Cape Verde Portugal Telecom International (PTI) has a 40 per cent share of CVT the PTO Public telecommunications 
and Internet provision
Central African 
Republic
A subsidiary of France Telecom, SOFRECOM holds a 40 per cent stake in the PTO Public telecommunications 
provision
Chad Full Internet services using an X.25 link to Paris were established by the PTO, TIT, in October 97 in co-operation 
with France Cable & Radio (FCR).
Internet provision
Comoros n/a n/a
Congo n/a n/a
Cote d'Ivoire Second largest ISP is Globe Access, a joint venture with French company Omnes, with 35 per cent of its shares 
being retained by the state and 51 per cent being bought by France Cable and Radio (FCR).
Internet service provision
Democratic Rep 
Congo
n/a n/a
Equatorial
Guinea
GETESA, the PTO, is partially privatised with 40 per cent being owned by France Cable and Radio (FCR). Public telecommunications 
provision
Eritrea n/a n/a
Ethiopia Ericcson holds the sole license for mobile telephony provision Mobile telephony
Gabon n/a n/a
Gambia n/a n/a
Ghana The UK based Africa Online provides Internet services. GNPC (US) is working with the Israeli company Gilat to 
deploy a VSAT-based telephone network around the country. Both GT and GNPC each have 20-year exclusivity 
licenses. Celltel (a joint venture between local investors and AT&T) and -  Millicom Ghana, of the UK, operates a 
GSM cellular network.
Public telecommunications 
provision
Guinea Bissau Guinea Telecom (GT) is the sole telecom operator in the country is 51 per cent owned by Portugal Telecom 
International (PTI).
Public telecommunications 
provision. Mobile 
telephony
420
Country Company(s) Industry
Kenya AfricaOnline offers Internet access n/a
Lesotho n/a n/a
Liberia n/a n/a
Madagascar Data Telecom Services (DTS), a joint venture of the PTO, Telma, with 49 per cent ownership by France Cable 
and Radio (FCR) operates the public telecommunications network. The national telecom operator, Telecom 
Malagasy (Telma), has a 10 year exclusivity period which began in 1994. Telma is 66 per cent owned by the state 
and 34 per cent owned by France Cable & Radio (FCR).
Public telecommunications 
provision
Malawi Full Internet services have been supplied since mid-1997 by MalawiNet, a joint venture between the PTO, 
(MPTC) and American company USCOMNET Inc. A joint venture between Telekom Malaysia and MPTC 
(which owns 40 per cent) called Telekom Network provides cellular services in limited areas.
Public telecommunications 
provision. Mobile 
telephony
Mali n/a n/a
Mauritania Supplied as a turnkey solution by France Cable & Radio (FCR)., Mauritel, was the first in Africa to provide 
Internet services, via its joint venture with FCR, Telecom-Plus. It is still the sole provider of public 
telecommunications
Internet provision
Mauritius Similar to those in other francophone countries, the PTO is a joint venture with France Cable & Radio (FCR) 
which owns 30 per cent.
Mauritius will be connected by fibre optic cable to the global backbone in 1999 when South Africa’s Far-East 
(SAFE) project links to the country
Public telecommunications 
provision. Mobile 
telephony
Mozambique One of the major providers of connectivity in Mozambique has been Teledata, a joint venture company between 
TDM and Marconi Portugal (Telecom de Portugal). There is one GSM cellular mobile operator, M-Cell that is 
owned by Telecomunicacoes Moveis de Mocambique, a subsidiary o f TDM (76 per cent) with Detecon (24 per 
cent), the consultancy arm o f Deutsche Telekom.
Public telecommunications 
provision. Mobile 
telephony
Namibia n/a n/a
Niger Full Internet services have been available from SONITEL since November 96. The international Internet link is 
provided by France Cable and Radio (FCR)
Nigeria n/a n/a
Reunion n/a n/a
Rwanda In 1998 a GSM cellular service was established by Rwandacell with investment from South African cellular 
operator MTN. An X.25 data service is also available (Rwanda Pac).
Mobile telephony
Sao Tome And 
Principe
The Companhia Santomense de Telecomunicacoes (CST) is the sole telecommunications operator, 51 per cent 
owned by Portugal Telecoms International (PTI). Full Internet services are being developed by the PTO, CST, as 
a joint venture with Portugal Telecommunications International (PTI)
Public telecommunications 
provision. Mobile 
telephony
Senegal The sole telecommunications operator is the Societe nationale des telecommunications du Senegal (SONATEL) 
which was privatised in 1998 been privatised, with France Cable & Radio (FCR) purchasing 33.3 per cent. Togo 
Telecom and the West Africa Growth Fund has also invested in Sonatel.
Public telecommunications 
provision
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Country Company(s) Industry
Seychelles In 1998 Cable & Wireless Seychelles PLC, a subsidiary of the British C&W group was the sole 
telecommunications operator, although plans are being made to end its monopoly.
Public telecommunications 
provision. Mobile 
telephony
Sierra Leone n/a n/a
Somalia n/a n/a
Sudan n/a n/a
Swaziland UUNET Swaziland provides an Internet dial-up service Internet service provision
Tanzania n/a n/a
Togo n/a n/a
Uganda UK owned AfricaOnline has been the most recent entrant, setting up service in November 1998. Internet service provision
Zambia The public Telecommunications operator awarded a $17m contract to Motorola to provide a wireless local loop 
facility in 1998.
Public telecommunications 
provision
Zimbabwe Full Internet access is provided by three locally registered companies with international ownership -  SIT A, 
Wilken/afsat and Datel
Internet service provision
Source: GKD List serv, Bellanet, and UNDP/RB A
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APPENDIX C
Table C l: Main ICT-related projects by development agency, January 1999
Development Agency No. of projects
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) 97
World Bank 73
United Nations System
• International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
• UN Development Programme (UNDP)
• UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
• UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
23
19
7
4
Bellanet International Secretariat 16
US Agency for International Development (USAID) 15
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 14
Agence de la Francophonie (ACCT) 4
International Institute for Communication and Development 3
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of South Africa 3
Source: Global Knowledge database. Available at http://gkaims.globalknowledge.org. Accessed 2
January 1999.
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Table C2: Major ICT-related Development Projects in Africa, 1999
Initiative Executing
agency
Cost Countries
Leland Initiative USAID US$15
million
Benin, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Mali, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Acacia IDRC CAN$60m South Africa, Mozambique, Senegal, Uganda
TradePoint UNCTAD ECU 30 
million
Pan-African
SDNP UNDP Angola, Cameroon, Benin, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique and Chad.
Internet Initiative for 
Africa (IIA).
UNDP Africa 
Bureau
US$6m Angola, Burkina Faso, Cap-Verde, Gambia, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Sao Tome et Principe, Swaziland, Chad and Togo.
Africa Information 
Society Initiative 
(AISI)
UNECA
UNESCO
UNCTAD
UNIDO
n/a
Pan African
African Networking 
Initiative
IDRC
ITU
UNECA
UNESCO
n/a
Pan African
African Virtual 
University Project
InfoDev (World 
bank)
US$1.2m Pan African
Source: UN agencies, Infodev, Bellanet database.
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Figure C l: List o f  organisations with ongoing inform ation and com m unication technology projects
Regional Agencies: Standing Conference of 
African National &
United Nations 
University (UNU)
Germany Italy US
African Development University Libraries World Bank Fredrich Ebert Stufting Italian Government Co­ USAID
Bank (ADB) (SCANUL) World Health (FES) operation
Commonwealth of Organisation (WHO) Carl Duisberg Zambia
Learning (COL) International Agencies: World Trade Gesellchaft (CDG) Japan
COMNET-IT Organisation (WTO) Deutsche Gesellschaft Council for Scientific and
CTA CAB International fur Technische Japan International Co­ Industrial Research (CSIR)
European Community InfoDev (World Bank) National/Local Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) operation Agency (JICA)
European Space Agency International Council of Agencies: Private Sector &
Forum of African Museums (ICOM) Denmark Netherlands Foundations
Ministers of International Belgium
Communications Documentation Network Danish Agency for International Institute for BellaNet
La Francophonie (ACCT) on Great Lakes Belgian Administration International Communication and Eutelsat
Organisation for African International Federation for Development Development Development IICD Microsoft
Unity (OAU) of Library Associations Cooperation (BADC) Assistance Ministry for Co­ MWeb
Pan African IFLA Vrije Universiteit of operation (DGIS) Pan African News Agency
T elecommunications International Brussels (VU) Ireland (PANA)
Union (PATU) T elecommunications Norway 2B 1 Foundation
Regional African Satellite Union (ITU) Canada Irish Ministry of Carnegie Mellon Corporation
Organisation (RASCOM) United Nations Foreign Affairs Norwegian Agency for Ford Foundation
UN Economic Development Programme Canadian International Development Global Information
Commission for Africa (UNDP) Development Agency Finland Cooperation (NORAD) Infrastructure Commission
(UNECA) United Nations (CIDA) (GIIC)
Education, Science and Canadian Ministry of Finish Ministry of New Zealand Intelsat
Sub-Regional Agencies: Cultural Organisation Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs US-Internet Society
(UNESCO) C\CEN New Zealand Ministry of Kellogg Foundation
African Agricultural UN Environment International France Foreign Affairs PanamSat
Association (ASARECA) Programme (UNEP) Development Research Rockerfeller Foundation
Common Market for East UN-Food & Agriculture Centre (IDRC) Caisse Frangaise de Sweden Satellife
and Southern Africa Organisation of the UN Provincial government of developpement Service for IT in International
(COMESA) (FAO) Quebec Centre Int. Swedish International Agriculture (SITIA)
East African Co-operation UN Industrial Developpement de Development Agency Volunteers in Technical
Intergovernmental Development Switzerland l'lnforoute (CIDIF) (SIDA) Assistance (VITA)
Authority on Drought and Organisation (UNIDO) Ministere de la Co­ WorldSpace
Desertification (IGAD) UN Office for Outer Fondation de Devenir operation Frangais United Kingdom Global Education Network for
Southern African Space Affairs (FDD) Reseau electronique Africa (GENA).
Development Community UN Operations Support Swiss International Co­ francophone (REFER) British Council Telkom SA
(SADC) (UNOPS)
UNITAR
operation ORSTOM DflD
Source: Bellanet Donors database, Jensen@apc.org, UNDP IT for development department, InfoDev Database, January, 1999. 425
APPENDIX D
Research process and data analysis
Personal interviews were deemed an important part of the research. A total of 21 
interviews were undertaken in order to establish the opinions, issues and constraints to 
the effective implementation of the UNDP project. Interviewees were selected form the 
IT community; and personnel in agencies that were overseeing procurement and 
implementation strategies.
Interviews took approximately one hour each and began with an introduction to the 
project, its objectives and strategy for implementation. It was also explained to the 
participants that their answers would form part of the data of the research project. Next, 
interviewees were asked questions relating to their educational background and role 
within their respective organisations. The time allotted was sufficient in that it allowed 
a thorough examination of the project and also adequate time to receive data on 
interviewees’ recommendations for information infrastructure development in Ethiopia. 
The interviewing process was semi-structured in the sense that specific question areas 
were explained to the interview at the beginning of the interview in order to maximise 
the receipt of the requisite data. Interviewees were also encouraged to comment on 
general issues such as the state of the information technology industry in Ethiopia and 
the governments attitude towards information sharing. Due to the reluctance of 
interviewees, respondents were not tape recorded, however, to ensure accurate data 
collection, notes were taken during each interview. Other data collected included e- 
mails, notes from planning meetings, and project documents.
Structure of semi-structured interviewing
Participants were asked to comment on six areas based around the UNDP’s Internet 
Initiative for Africa in Ethiopia. These areas interview themes were collated from the 
existing literature of development project evaluation as well as the Internet Initiative for 
Africa project document it self. It was felt necessary to give some structure to the
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interview process to ensure the collection of data relevant to an evaluation of the 
initiative itself.
Semi-structured interviewing themes
Interviewees, as well as being asked their general impressions of information 
infrastructure development in Ethiopia, were also asked to respond to the following 
themes:
• Initial impression of the project
• Strengths of the project
• Weaknesses of the project
• Who they felt would benefit the most from the initiative
• What they felt the constraints might be
• Recommendations
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Table Dl: List of individuals and organisations interviewed as part of the case study of 
the Internet Initiative for Africa: Ethiopia
NAME TITLE ORGANIZATION / COMPANY DATE
MARK
BIDDER
INFORMATION MANAGER EMERGENCY UNIT FOR ETHIOPIA, 
UNDP, ETHIOPIA
10/07/98
NEWAY
BEYENE
CUSTOMER ENGINEERING AND 
SERVICE MANAGER
AFCOR (ETHIOPIA) PLC 10/07/98
MICHEAL
ASFAHA
SECRETARY GENERAL ADDIS ABABA CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE
12/07/98
HUSSEIN
HIBESHI
HEAD, TRADE INFORMATION 
DEPT.
ADDIS ABABA CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE
12/07/98
ESHETU
ALEMU
DEPUTY DIRECTOR NATIONAL COMPUTER & INFORMATION 
CENTRE, ETHIOPIAN SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION
10/07/98
SOPHIA
BEKELE
MANAGING DIRECTOR CITY BUSINESS SERVICES 10/07/98
HAILU
AYELE
VICE CHANCELLOR UNIVERSITY OF ADDIS ABABA 17/07/98
MUHGETA
BAYEH
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER CHRISTIAN RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATION
11/07/98
ABEBE
KEBEDE
HEAD OF PROGRAMME DEPT CHRISTIAN RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATION
11/07/98
ASRAT
GAMD
HEAD OF ADMINISTRATION CHRISTIAN RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATION
11/07/98
GIRMA
SHIFERAW
HEAD OF FINANCE DEPT CHRISTIAN RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATION
11/07/98
DEJERE
BALCHA
HEAD OF COMMUNICATIONS 
UNIT
CHRISTIAN RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATION
11/07/98
AKALEWOLD
BANTIRGU
STRATEGIC PLANNING 
COORDINATOR
CHRISTIAN RELIEF & DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATION
11/07/98
TEWODROS
DEMISSIE
HEAD, MANAGEMENT 
INFORMATION SYSTEM
CARE ETHIOPIA 15/07/98
RAHEL
KEBEDE
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER ACTION AID 15/07/98
JEMAL
YUSUF
LOGISTICS/ PROCUREMENT 
OFFICER
AFRICARE 16/07/98
SOLOMON
YEWONDWO
SSEN
MANAGER OF INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS.
COMMERCIAL BANK OF ETHIOPIA 16/07/98
GETACHEN
TESFAYE
HEAD OF INFORMATION DEPT NATIONAL BANK OF ETHIOPIA 16/07/98
ALEMAYEHU
TESFAYE
DIVISION MANAGER 
COMPUTER NETWORK & 
COMMUNICATIONS
ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES 16/07/98
MKANE
FAYE
DIRECTOR DISD, UNECA 10/07/98
ABEBE
CHEKOL
DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION 
OFFICER
THE BRITISH COUNCIL 15/07/98
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